Fansubbing in China. Technology-facilitated activism in translation

This paper seeks to explore the socio-political tensions between freedom and constraints in the Chinese fansubbing networks. It approaches the development of fansubbing in China as a process of technology democratisation with the potential to liberate ordinary citizens from authoritarian and commercial imperatives, enabling them to contest official state domination. The paper draws on the strategies adopted by fansubbing groups to organise their working practices and interactive social activities with a view to engaging target audiences. Both facets complement each other and bring to the fore the ‘gamified’ system of fansubbing networks. Gamification enables ordinary citizens to translate, distribute and consume foreign audiovisual products in a strategic move that pits collective activism against government dominance.


Introduction
Translation technology has broadened the spectrum of translation scholarship and blurred the boundaries between professional and non-professional fields (Pérez-González and Susam-Saraeva 2012). Research in translation studies has begun to analyse the interplay between human and non-human agents in the process of translation as well as the influence of such interplay on the outcome of translation (Bowker 2006, Moorkens et al. 2014, Olohan 2011. Given the increasing importance of translation technologies, the acquisition of technological skills is deemed key to the development of translation competence in institutional training and real-time practice (Quah 2006). Even so, despite the ever greater automation envisaged by machine translation technology (Kenny 2011), new technologies and tools such as translation memories are unlikely to replace human translators. Computer-aided translation practice has, rather, increasingly become "a decentered process conducted by teams of people linked electronically through technological systems" (Tymoczko 2005(Tymoczko , 1089, where the shift from the individual to the group is a consequence of the "increased networking and interdependence of the world" (Tymoczko 2009, 401). Fansubbing exemplifies this shift, and it pushes (traditional) ethical and (commercial) copyright boundaries (Dwyer 2012). only what is to be subtitled, but also how to subtitle. Fansubbing can thus be considered a form of user-led cultural production which entails a democratisation of technology (Burgess 2006). Its political potential has gradually become evident in a shift of power from cultural elites to grassroots users that increasingly allows the latter to judge and interpret cultural forms and commodities (Hartley 2004).
Fansubbing favours "the creation of networks of amateur translators involved in practices of cultural resistance against global capitalist structures through interventionist forms of subtitling" (Pérez-González 2012b, 6, 2012a. Research into such forms of non-professional translation can widen our understanding of the potential uses of translation and of its ideological and political effects. This paper seeks to explore the ideological impact of technology on fansubbing in the sociopolitical context of the People's Republic of China.

Fansubbing and gamification in China
Much existing research tends to emphasise the activist nature of fansubbing, but a number of questions are yet to be answered; in particular, what exactly are the fansubbers resisting and to what extent has fansubbing challenged the industry (Gambier 2015). Fansubbing groups in China have crossed the boundary from cultural practice towards political activism, which has engendered an alternative power dynamics different from official translation practices. First, the spread of fansubbing exposes further a paradoxical situation exemplified by the continuous enforcement of state censorship in China. The ruling Communist Party has a longstanding dual policy to discipline its citizens, but to also guarantee state-approved popular forms of entertainment (Zhao 1998, 43, Fung 2009). The Chinese authorities allow "market-driven popular culture and soft entertainment" to thrive, but let them serve only "a conservative role of social pacification and thus function to sustain the party's continuing political dominance" (Zhao 2008, 223). In this respect, fansubbing embodies a new and vibrant element in Chinese popular culture and in the country's entertainment industry, because Chinese audiences who access fansubbed media content tend to be aware of the extent to which official censorship deprives officially imported foreign films and television series of their authenticity (Gao 2012).
Secondly, those web-based projects by fansubbing groups are on the cusp of changing the field of Chinese audiovisual translation with respect to the game-changing effect on state-sponsored film translation which still fulfils gate-keeping tasks for the Chinese regime. Nonetheless, official translation practices have started to depart from rigid linguistic prescriptions by beginning to mimic the largely informal style of fansubs (Lv and Li 2013).
Most importantly, in a country where dubbing used to be the only means of audiovisual accessibility (Qian 2009, Du, Li, andCheng 2013), fansubbing activities have significant subversive potential to forge new ties with target audiences (Kung 2016). Massidda (2015) connects the web-based activities of fansubbing with "digital playbour" (Scholz 2013) where work and play coexists. The recent development of fansubbing in China also reflects the tendency of introducing fun into translation, which is can be explained by the concept of gamification, defined as "taking game mechanics and applying [them] to other web properties to increase engagement" (Terill 2008). The guiding idea behind gamification is "to use elements of game design in non-game contexts, products, and services to motivate desired behaviours" (Deterding 2012, 14). In essence, gamification is about "using game principles, like rewards, level up, and flow, to engage users and influence their behaviour, knowledge, attitudes, or skills" (Egenfeldt-Nielsen, Smith, and Tosca 2013, 243).

State domination and Civil Disobediance
In spite of an "unbroken line" of censorship throughout the history of China (Tan 2015), there has been little research on state censorship by Chinese translation scholars. A considerable body of research has focused on literary, cultural and political censorship (Cornelius and Smith 2002, Gao 2009, Kuhn 2010, Lam 2000, Xie, S. 2012a, Zhu 2008, but the role of translation and translators has largely passed unnoticed. The very few studies on censorship and translation have mainly targeted the following two aspects: the state-sponsored translation of Chinese literature into English, which aims to propagate China's soft power and cultural prestige among Chinese citizens and internationally (Chang 2015, Di 2014, Volland 2008; and the import of foreign literature through translation into Chinese, which often results in the expurgation of foreign images and memes for political and cultural reasons (Chang 2008, Tan 2015, Chan 2007. A recent study by Lv and Li sponsored by the Chinese Ministry of Education set foot on the challenge to official censorship posed by the increasing availability of electronic content disseminated through the Internet. Despite seeing the "de-professionalising" effect of fansubbing on officially supervised subtitling (2015), the authors fail to address the complex relationship between technology, state domination and civil disobedience by arguing for the intervention of policy-makers in web-based translation practice so as to "guide it to develop more healthily" (126). The tendency to deprofessionalise can be demonstrated by exploring the power struggles between the state audiovidual censorship and fansubbing groups.
Audiovisual censorship in China involves the interplay of several official institutions.
The Chinese government is directly involved in the film industry and the complex regulatory structures governing the media: the China Film Corporation exerts substantial control over the distribution, import and export of films; the Exhibition Bureau and its regional subsidiaries regulate contracts and admission prices; the Ministry of Culture monitors the import and distribution of home videos; and the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT) regulates the editing and exhibition of films (Wang 2010, Pang 2011, Qian 2009, Yeh and Davis 2008, Xie, T. 2012. It is the SAPPRFT, above all, that supervises all matters related to cultural and media production and that guards access to foreign (popular) cultural and media content on behalf of the central government (Bai 2013 • contains information which is prohibited by law There are, however, no comprehensive definitions and guidelines regarding the individual elements targeted by censorship (Makinen 2015), since in actual practice Chinese censorship is "contextual, individualized, and continuously negotiable rather than absolute or binding" (Calkins 1998, 243). There exist, for instance, no precise descriptive guidelines on how notions such as social morality and traditional culture are to be understood, nor are there any indications on what kind of content may compromise such values. The focus of censorship is on the content itself, and therefore actual criteria vary from case to case (Bai 2013). The censors seem to approve or reject a particular film or programme based on what they consider an appropriate 'contextual' interpretation of the above regulations. Moreover, this new policy renders the authorisation and copyrighting of foreign audiovisual products as separate and mutually exclusive procedures. It reserves for the state adaministrations the power to authorise distribution and exhibition. In this repsect, copyright is not considered by the government a lawful endorsement for local private online media in China to distribute foreign digital media products. This government stance continues to face persistent pressures from civil disobedience, with various groupswho feel empowered by the progress and spread of information and communication technologies -"defying law for a good course" (Klang 2004).
Technological evolution does not serve any predefined goals, and it can be regarded as an "'ambivalent' process of development suspended between different possibilities" (Feenberg 2010, 15). This apparent state of affairs brings to light the paradox that the spread of technology supports yet simultaneously weakens state domination. From the birth of television and video technology up to modern digital interconnectivity, the very same technologies harnessed for political and ideological control may be utilised by audiences to gain freedom from state domination. Homevideo technology was introduced to Chinese audiences soon after television in the late 1980s, and audiovisual piracy arose as a persistent by-product (Creemer 2012, Yang 2009, Wang 2003. Chinese authorities have never accepted the idea of an infinite (and thus uncontrollable) cyberspace, and they remain at pains to keep digital space under tight ideological and political supervision (Tsui 2003), yet the state's monopoly over online access has paradoxically facilitated the expansion of the Internet in China (Zhang 2006, 286). Today's viewers, in any case, find that the Internet is more compatible with their lives than other consumption patterns associated with television, DVDs and cinema (Zhang 2013).
The Internet functions as a technology of freedom as well as control in Chinese society (Tsui 2003). Given that there is not necessarily a causal relation between webbased dissident activities and civil disobedience in the real world (Herold 2008), it is fair to argue that the majority of studies focusing on the Internet in China somewhat overemphasise the apparent threat posed by the free digital flow of information (Weber and Jia 2007, MacKinnon 2008, Wang and Hong 2010, Yang, Tang, and Wang 2015. The emergence of digital consumerist cultures in contemporary China has led Internet users to regard social, recreational and commercial web-based activities as more important than activities within the political domain (Damm 2007, Zhang 2006). Nevertheless, the Internet has been utilised to channel civil disobedience, particularly among young and well-educated urbanites in China (Tang and Yang 2011), and fansubbing and the consumption of fansubbed media constitute one facet in this tale of resistance to state domination.

Fansubbing as a force against state domination
The cross-cultural phenomenon of fansubbing turns the formerly prosperous business of product piracy into a voluntary social activity. Groups such as YDY and Fr1000 refused to join the commercial sector because, in their opinion, this move was in contradiction to the ethos and spirit of fansubbing, i.e.
to uphold the values of free content-sharing, community and voluntarism (Zhang and Mao 2013). They eventually had to cease their fansubbing activities by the end of 2014 due to pressure from the government and copyright holders as well as insufficient financial resources. In contrast to its fallen counterparts, YYeTs strove to maintain its relationship with major enterprises and transform its former website into a social network for American TV enthusiasts. This is ultimately in service to its continued fansubbing and free content-sharing activities on its renewed website and elsewhere. Its persistent operation makes activism become increasingly prominent in the context of fansubbing, Unlike partnerships with the private commercial sector, the sharing of fansubbed resources on alternative platforms moves this form of translation into illegal territory.
In China, however, the legal framework and public awareness surrounding copyright protection rest on shaky foundations (He 2014, Hsiao 2014. Fansubbing groups operate in a legal grey zone because their materials are unavailable in official distribution channels. Their translation output does not count as authorised intellectual property, so it does not cause a loss of revenues for foreign media companies (Meng and Wu 2013, 130). Moreover, audiovisual piracy in general and fansubbing in particular have largely been taken for granted rather than considered a major concern by ordinary citizens (Wilson 2011, 225). In fact, the official enforcement of copyright protection is hardly plausible, as the government's primary concern is to secure broadcasting rights for its own benefit rather than to protect the interests of copyright holders (Hu 2013, 443).
At present, video-streaming services must be provided by licensed enterprises that are either state-owned or stated-controlled (The State Administration of Press 2014).
However, even these media enterprises may risk violating rules, when, for instance, the state-owned online video-streaming platform CNTV was sued by two private In March 2016, YYeTs started to use their logo on their subtitled American TV drama together with the link www.zimuzu.tv. YYeTs has been proactive in diversifying the functions of fansubbing media, and other groups have adopted similar strategies to continue their operations. In cycles of acquiescence to power and resistance, fansubbing groups strive to remain active and upgrade their websites to create multifunctional virtual communities, an idea which will be elaborated in the next section.

Gamification in Fansubbing Media
Technological expertise has enabled fansubbing groups to encroach (at least to a certain extent) on the social dynamics of power by applying rules of gaming systems to subtitling and other activities on their websites. The usage of technology fosters a sense of community which tends to be forged through interpersonal ties that enable sociability, peer support and the sharing of information, as well as a sense of belonging and social identity. It can also conceivably be claimed that relationships in cyberspace complement relationships in the real world and render the reality of community from geographical locations to person-based networks in cyberspace (Wellman 2001). Within the virtual community, each subtitling project is produced by its members through a tight-knit and vertical distribution of labour that differs from what is commonly known as crowdsourcing, in which collaborations tend to be based on a horizontal distribution of labour involving a vast Internet population (Howe 2008), often by means of less organised, less structured, and in many cases temporary problem-solving mechanisms. The vertical structure of a fansubbing group establishes a hierarchy among its members which depends on their length of membership, the extent of their dedication and their contribution to the community among other factors. In an online community, hierarchy functions as a generative force which is manifested in a process of learning and socialisation between newcomers and veterans, peripheral participants and core members, and ordinary contributors and decision-makers, rather than functioning as a repressive force that sustains peer production at both organisational and discursive levels (Berdou 2010). This 'generative' hierarchy also serves to enhance communication between fansubbing groups and their audiences, and to involve them in their networked cultural practices. When a news message becomes translated, the translator provides a link to the source text or, more commonly, the original article is displayed together with its translation.
Despite its popularity among Chinese users, WeChat is not an ideal channel of interaction between fansubbing groups and their audiences because it is obliged to detect and erase information unpalatable to official standards (Jiang 2016 and YYeTs provides details on the number of credits generated by various activities.
Users are willing to participate because the higher the levels they reach, the better video-streaming services they can enjoy on Ren Ren Mei Ju 2.0 and the more downloadable resources they can access on the YYeTs' website.
The technological expertise of Chinese fansubbing groups allows them to enhance the technical and qualitative aspects of subtitling. Most fansubbing groups create parallel, bilingual subtitles, presenting target audiences with source-language information and its translation. This parallel presentation is also used in the translation of entertainment news. These groups deliberately highlight the 'uncensored nature' of their translations and thus inevitably put themselves in opposition to the regime.
Fansubbing audiences, moreover, are invited to help enhancing the quality of subtitles, while the purposes and processes underlying authorised subtitling practice are largely banned from public view. Shortly after publishing their translation output, fansubbing groups receive feedback from audiences through various channels, upon which they tend to be willing to revise and improve their translations. In stark contrast, subtitlers working for authorised media do not have the authority to review and revise their work once it has entered the public realm. Chinese fansubbing groups have, indeed, developed a transparent platform of networked cross-cultural mediation.
By involving audiences more deeply in their interactive technologies, fansubbing media have evolved into interactive social spaces that may well have become a 'gamified' system that supports the translation, evaluation, distribution and consumption of foreign audiovisual products.

Rethinking state domination through the lens of gamification
As it progresses, technology continues to bring "centralized, hierarchical social structure" to everywhere it goes (Feenberg 2002, 24). While various types of technological mediation help to consolidate modern forms of hegemony, the evolution of digital networking leads to a certain decrease of social and political domination (Feenberg 2010, xxiii). The fansubbing network provides a digital social space where media consumers are empowered by technology to translate the contents of foreign audiovisual products. Although expressions of activism are rare, fansubbing groups resist official domination by pursuing an egalitarian ethos in web-based interactive social spaces. The methods used by fansubbing groups on their websites, such as offering rewards for writing film reviews, upgrading for better resources, and the credit system, can be seen as a 'gamification' of translation. Translating in a fansubbing group is similar to the experience of playing a game, with enthusiastic audiences being encouraged to collaborate in the production of subtitles. Translators can gain virtual rewards and real recognition from fellow translators and audiences, and they can enhance their translation skills and move up in the hierarchical system, which resembles the world of social online games. Moreover, the audience interacts with the fansubbing group like in a video game, with audiences entertained not only by watching subtitled media content but also by gaining rewards and moving to higher levels on multifunctional websites. By adopting gamification tools, fansubbing groups can create a stable community while marketing their output to larger audiences. In the realm of audiovisual media, the production and distribution of translation virtually becomes 'gamified'. In contrast, the Chinese authorities themselves do not view media products as pure entertainment, but as serious matters requiring ideological guidance and market control.
The gamification of subtitling media products may also provide some insight into the way fansubbers are challenging professional subtitling practice. Gamification entails an attempt to improve existing structures, services and products, it is regarded as a concept which "very much ends up sounding more like marketing than anything else" (Egenfeldt-Nielsen, Smith, and Tosca 2013, 248). By gamifying their translation activities, fansubbing groups have marketed themselves heavily on the Internet and gained substantial support. In contrast, professional AVT translators do not interact with their audiences or advertise themselves, which renders them as invisible agents in the online community. They are still supported by the authorities, and their jobs may not yet be in danger. In the eyes of Chinese audiences, however, their position has been weakened, and an increasing number of people prefer to watch fansubbed media products online rather than via official broadcasting channels (Lv and Li 2015).
This article has endeavoured to provide a broad outline of the power relations surrounding fansubbing activties in China. Future research may further the concept of gamification of translation in viewing the motivations of fansubbing groups as well as the conflicts between themselves and the professional translators commissioned by the authorities. The initial motivation of fansubbing groups is to make inaccessible media products available so that Chinese audiences can enjoy the same entertainment as the rest of the world. Their aim is to subtitle 'fun for fun', and their 'gamified' view of the translation process pushes monetary motivations into the background to the benefit of social and psychological gains such as group identification and personal approval. They are not paid, but nor do they work for nothing. They are empowered by a "good feeling" (Deterding 2012, 16) that is driven by the rewards earned from playing the fansubbing game. Professional translators, however, have a disparate view, as for them the work of subtitling represents work and responsibility. While beraking through boundaries enforced by political and economic powers, gamificiation in fansubbing media also leads to undiserable outcomes such as the imperialistic expsansion of Anglophone hegemony into China. Although fansubbing groups translate from a great variety of languages, English-language originals are most popular, and their audiences are considered most sophisticated in China (Ji 2015). The crowd is overtly obsessed by the 'game' to be aware of the asymmetry of translation between Chinese and English. Future research might empirically investigate user activities and interactions on fansubbing websites and other social networking platforms in order to further explore the new ideological conflicts and power relationships brought about by the evolving digital age.