

Islamic Organization Movement Strategies in the Victory of a Muslim Governor Candidate Pair in the 2017 Governor Election (A Case Study of Islamic Defenders Front)

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Abstract — *This paper has discussed the political strategies carried out by the Islamic Defenders Front organization in the victory of a pair of Muslim governor candidates in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election. The political strategies carried out in each phase involved mass mobilization for the political candidate, the usage of religious identities by the Islamic Defenders Front to influence the political choices of Jakarta Muslim communities, and the usage of networks of religious communities and mosques for lectures and other religious activities to campaign for the Muslim governor candidate pair. This study has used the theory of convergence between the theory of identity orientation and mobilization of resources to analyze how the religious instruments owned by the Islamic Defenders Front organization assisted them in the process of governor leadership succession in the capital city of Indonesia.*

Keywords—*Islamic Defenders Front, 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, Islamic Social Movement*

I. INTRODUCTION

The success of the Anies-Sandi pair in winning the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election is inseparable from the role of several Islamic organizations in Jakarta that jointly organized themselves as a machine for winning Anies-Sandi, one of which is the Islamic Defenders Front organization. The Islamic organization led by Habib Rizieq performed several political agendas in the candidacy process and campaigning to the public opinion of Muslim voters in Jakarta to choose a pair of Muslim governors and to reject non-Muslim couples. At the time of the election of the Governor of Jakarta in 2017, the Muslim governor candidate pair was represented by Anies-Sandi and the non-Muslim pair is Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok)-Djarot.

The involvement of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) organization in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election was not without reason; their participation was motivated by not wishing to be led again by a non-Muslim leader, who at the time was the incumbent Ahok-Djarot pair, and wanting the presence of Muslim leaders in Jakarta. Prior to the execution of the Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2017, the relationship between FPI and the then-Governor of Jakarta Ahok was not harmonious; they often conflicted due to policies issued by the provincial government of Jakarta, which are not in accordance with the interests of FPI, especially policies related to the worship agenda of Muslim

communities in Jakarta. This includes the ban on using the National Monument (Monas) as a place for recitations, the prohibition of doing *takbir* parades when welcoming Eid al-Fitr, and the permission for the Jama'ah Ahmadiyya to perform religious activities.

In addition to policies not in accordance with the interests of Muslims in Jakarta, the distaste that is felt by FPI is also based on the style of communication of Ahok that is considered rude and does not reflect leadership that protects the public. The peak distaste of FPI toward Ahok was when Ahok committed defamation with Surah Al-Maidah Verse 51. The words of Ahok was considered to have degraded the holy verse of the Quran; along with other Islamic groups, FPI conducted a mass action called "action to defend Islam" to encourage the police to immediately imprison Ahok for the criminal act of blasphemy. The Islamic action not only asked for Ahok to be imprisoned but also to refuse to vote for the Ahok-Djarot pair in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election.

Select narrative campaigns against non-Muslim leaders and Muslim leaders conducted by FPI has been proven to influence Muslim voters in determining the next Jakarta governor. The exploitation of the issue of religious identity as conducted by FPI was also examined by Narendra Ghaniy and Eriyanto (2017). They found that the election of the Jakarta governor in 2017 had the massive role of the FPI in reaching Muslim voters; Islamic communities were invited to demand a thorough investigation of the case of defamation of Islam by Ahok through a demonstration called the "Defend Islam Action". At the same time, in preparation for the Jakarta gubernatorial election, the Anies-Sandi pair managed to take advantage of these Muslim groups to support them by building synergistic relationships with them. This support cannot be separated from the condition that Anies was to be the only candidate for a Muslim governor, advancing to the second round of the election.

In addition to utilizing identity issues, FPI also used houses of worship and Islamic communities as places to conduct the campaign. This was also supported by the political capital owned by FPI as one of the Islamic organizations that is popular among people, third after the NU and Muhammadiyah. (Alvara, 2017) FPI leader Habib Rizieq Shihab also noted that scholars heard appeals by Muslim voters. (LSI, 2018).

Based on this, it becomes interesting to see the strategy of the Islamic Defenders Front in organizing the political resources at their disposal to become involved in the movement to bring up the representation of a Muslim governor in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election. This study is also expected to contribute to the study of Indonesian politics, particularly concerning religious issues based on social movements such as Islamic social movements. This study, which analyzes the strategy of Islamic mass movement in the political arena of elections, however, still lacks the political participation of the people to conduct discourse and political work in encouraging leaders to represent their issues and concerns. This study is also expected to contribute to the organization in seeing the role of Islam and politics in Indonesia.

II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The type of this research is Phenomenology. Briefly, the phenomenological approach aims to achieving an interpretation of human understanding on an apparent phenomenon and the meaning behind it that comes into the human consciousness (the subject). This study used a qualitative approach, as a contextual research that attempts to emphasize the meaning of a phenomenon of the interaction of human behavior in certain situations.

The studied location is the city of Jakarta, with data taken from various sources, including literature, mass media, and quotes from a number of sources. By using qualitative research, the aim is to create a complex picture, study words, make a detailed report of the views of respondents, and conduct a study on the natural situation.

The utilized analytical method is qualitative analysis, the analysis method that uses logical thinking, induction, analogy or interpretation, comparison, and other similar ways. The utilized thinking method used is the inductive method, from data/facts leading to higher levels of abstraction, including synthesis and theory development (if necessary and supported by data). This analysis then leads to a conclusion in response to existing problems.

III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this study, the concept of convergence theory is utilized, which combines the Resource Mobilization Theory and the Identity Theory. Prior to this research, the convergence of the two theories had been presented by Rajendra Singh, who was investigating new social movements in the country of India. The application of this theory is considered appropriate because the Theory of Resource Mobilization is expected to describe the instruments needed in a social movement to achieve goals, and the Theory of Identity is used to see how far identity can help the success of social movement agendas in society, in addition to the concept of the convergence theory.

A. Resource Mobilization Theory

The Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) was first introduced by Anthony Oberschall (David Locher, 2002); this theory focuses on the social processes that enable movements to emerge and be successful. The Resource Mobilization Theory gives more attention to economic factors, and the political theory is also built not based on the assumption that there is motivation from individuals when they joined the movement; individual alienation is considered irrelevant or less precise. The Resource Mobilization Theory assumes that in a society with emerging discontent, it is quite possible to bring about a social movement (Badruazam, 2019). The factors of organization and leadership may encourage or inhibit a social movement. As well, the existence of social groups would be allowed to give rise to a social movement if social groups are segmented. The segmented social groups will withdraw their membership from a special class in society. Increasingly segmented groups of associations in a society are more likely to be mobilized into the Social Movement Organization (SMO). The similarity of

membership in a group tends to show things in common as well as in terms of a common desire. The important factors of why a group is easier to mobilize are because the group had already established a communication network, there are members present with leadership skills, and the members traditionally participate. In addition, there is also a group leader, members, meeting places, routines, social chain, beliefs, symbols, and the same language. A leader in a Social Movement Organization should focus attention to the problem of mobilization, things that create dissatisfaction, tactical options, community infrastructure, and movements necessary for a successful social movement.

Thus, it can simply be concluded that these are the determinant factors in a social movement by the resource mobilization theory:

1. Social movement organization, a common value system, the sense of community, norms of action, and organizational structures. In this case, the common value system built by FPI is a refusal to be led by a leader who is not Muslim because of inconsistency with the teachings that they understand.
2. Leaders and leadership; a leader is defined as a strategic decision maker who inspires and organizes others to participate, while leadership is the ability to influence the group through achievement. In this research the Islamic Defenders Front act as leaders of the movement headed by their chairperson Rizieq Shihab.
3. Resources and resource mobilization; there are five types of resources in social movements, which are moral resources, cultural resources, social organization resources, human resources, and material resources.
4. Networking and participation, as social networking is an adhesive factor for most members of various organizations.
5. Opportunities and society capacity, which refers to the ability of local society to organize collective action.

B. Identity Theory

According to Rajendra Singh, the Identity Theory about contemporary social movements explains the basic assumptions as a criticism of the Theory of Resource Mobilization. The base rationality of resource mobilization is considered inadequate in explaining new social movements. Resource mobilization theory fails in explaining some of the expressions of GSB, such as the feminist movement, the environmental movement, the peace movement, the disarmament movement, and the local freedom movement (Rajendra Singh, 2001). According to Hunt and Benford, some research that specifically examined New Social Movements showed that the action of the collective movement arises directly from the collective identity. Even so, the results of other studies indicated that collective identity arises from the action of a collective movement. Both of these findings indicated that the findings are equally accurate. Data from case studies clearly stated that there is an association between the movement of collective action and collective identity. There is agreement and some supporting evidence that a search of personal and collective identity is very important for an individual's participation in a movement, which explains how and why this happens (Snow and David, 2004).

Based on the explanation-oriented identity theory perspective, the determinant factors of social movements can be formulated, consisting of (1) collective identity, (2) solidarity, and (3) commitment. As stated by Hunt and Benford in Snow, Soule, & Kriesi (2004), collective identity and other related concepts such as solidarity and commitment constitute an improvement that is extremely interesting for understanding social movements, where collective identity, solidarity, and commitment help to answer questions of psychology, social psychology, and macro-sociology on social movements. The three concepts of collective identity, solidarity, and commitment work together.

In general, collective identity explains that a group of individuals has shared interests, values, feelings, and objectives. Collective identity includes the emphasis of the commitment of the individual, stressing the solidarity of the collectivity, as well as highlighting the broader macrosocial structure and dynamics beyond the movement of collectivity, including those that help shape and provide interest, political context, a symbol of culture, purpose, and so on. Meanwhile, commitment focuses attention on individual investments in the line of individual actions that are consistent with the line of action raised by the collective. Commitment helps explain the relationship between the individual and the collective through the primary attention to the activities of individuals. Meanwhile, solidarity gives attention to the level of social cohesion that exists in and with the group.

C. Convergence Model Theoretical Framework

Convergence of the two theories, as conceived by Singh (2010), leads to the theory of resource mobilization and identity theory giving rise to at least eight determinant factors in analyzing the dynamics and occurrence of a social movement. The description of the resource mobilization theory leads to the formulation of the determinant factors of (1) organization of social movements, (2) leaders and leadership, (3) resource and resource mobilization, (4) networking and participation, and (5) opportunities and community capacity, to undertake social movements. Meanwhile, identity theory leads to the determinant factors of (1) collective identity, (2) solidarity, and (3) commitment.

IV. RESULTS & ANALYSIS

A. Background and Membership FPI

FPI (Islamic Defenders Front) was officially established on 17 August 1998, coinciding with 24 Rabi' al-Thani 1419 AH, at the Al-Um Kampong Utan boarding school in Ciputat, South Jakarta. FPI was founded by a number of *habaib*, scholars, preachers, Muslim activists, and other Muslims, who also established FPI leader Habib Muhammad Rizieq Shihab. Not just in Jakarta, over time sympathizers of the FPI also grew in number and banded in areas such as Surakarta, Bandung, and Yogyakarta to almost every city in Indonesia. Organizationally, FPI has developed a national branch system, for which the central leadership is located in Petamburan, Central Jakarta.

There are several socio-political background situations that frame the founding of the FPI, among others. First is the extended suffering of natural Muslims in Indonesia because of human rights violations committed by powerful individuals. Second is the failure of the national authorities to enforce the law and ensure public order. Third, there is an obligation for every Muslim to preserve and maintain the dignity of Islam. Fourth, there is an obligation for every Muslim to be able to enforce goodness and forbid wrongdoing. Apparently, the background of the creation of FPI cannot be separated from the events of the social reform momentum and political change in Indonesia.

The objective of FPI, as stated in the documents and the creed of FPI, is to enforce goodness and forbid wrongdoing, and to assist the government in crushing social problems, such as prostitution, gambling, alcohol, and drugs. According to FPI activists, one of the efforts that could be taken to address the moral crisis that affects the nation is to create a harmonious cooperation of all elements of society, including the clergy, *umaro* (officials), and all Muslims. To realize the objectives of the organization, and in an effort to maximize the work of the organization, FPI created two organizational structures: Jemaah FPI and Laskar FPI. The Jemaah FPI carries out religious social activities, such as teaching, social

work, and education. Laskar FPI creates physical pressure to raid entertainment venues and to carry out sweeping and demonstrations. Laskar is more like military or a militia under the command of the chairman of FPI. Followers of the doctrine of the FPI movement claim that they are the *habaib* leaders and scholars, as a reflection of the saints who received religious legitimacy (Al-Zastrouw, 2006).

The movement and working procedures of FPI are more determined by elite organization policies. In-between organization relationships are only based on mutual consensus. In other words, the organization is actually not an organization, but a community movement to achieve a common goal. This can also be seen from the obscurity of the process of recruiting members for the organization; according to Al-Zastrouw (2006), the member recruitment process in FPI runs incidentally according to needs: sometimes once a year, twice a year, and sometimes cannot even be done in more than one year. At certain moments, FPI distributes registration forms to recruit members. Forms are usually distributed to college campuses, Islamic study groups (*majelis taklim*), and to the community. In this recruitment process, selection tests are not strict because the tests actually do not specify passing or failing, but are only to measure and determine the level of understanding of religious knowledge for the candidates members. Material tests include tests of reading the Quran and on the knowledge of the pillars of faith, the pillars of Islam, and the creed.

Besides being dominated by the urban poor communities in several cities, FPI membership also comes from diverse backgrounds who clearly articulate Islamic views. According to Ian Wilson (2019), the appeal of FPI membership for the urban poor, who form the majority of the active membership, they are, does not come from clear and thorough ideological or political programming, for example by the imposition of a system based on Sharia. Instead, it is through certain combinations of Islamic motifs, practices, traditions and social conservatism, and aggressive rhetoric, as well as the offered opportunity to pursue a pragmatic livelihood strategy (such as making money by implementing 'unlawful tax' voting), a strategic advantage in the battle for territorial resources and space, and by expressing complaints and anger. Religious militancy and the desire for a more 'mundane' material and political progress coexist in dynamic tension.

On one hand, the leader of FPI does not represent the organization as an alternative to state power, but as a 'helper volunteer' to countries that are considered incapable or unwilling to enforce the law and norms in accordance with Islamic morality because of institutional weaknesses, foreign intervention, or corruption (Wilson, 2019). Although their actions are sometimes contrary to the law and the interests of the state, the FPI has become an important part of the strategy of the power of the political elite, becoming a power broker for their own rights, sometimes conflicting openly with official authorities, or 'cooperating' in maintaining a certain type of social order. As stated by FPI leader Habib Rizieq, "We are not affiliated with this group or that, political party, or any figure. The point is, yes, we are open to collaborate with anyone who has the same goals, both short- and long-term."

B. The Dynamics of Rejection of Non-Muslim Candidates

During the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, the FPI made a number of political agendas to influence the votes of Jakarta people, especially people who embraced Islam, to vote for a Muslim governor candidate represented by the pairs of Agus Yudhoyono - Sylviana Murni and Anies Baswedan - Sandiaga Uno, and to reject non-Muslim governor candidate Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) with Djarot Saiful.

The rejection by the FPI of the Basuki - Djarot pair was implemented with the initiation of the FPI to hold a mass action to reject the non-Muslim governor candidate and support Muslim governor candidates. The act of rejection grew when a video of governor candidate Basuki Purnama (Ahok) that was considered to defame Quranic verses circulated among the people. Ahok was thought to have committed blasphemy, causing a massive reaction among Muslims in Jakarta and in other cities.

During the process for the Jakarta gubernatorial election, there were at least four rallies held by FPI and other joint Islamic organizations such as members of the MUI Fatwa Guard National Movement (GNPF MUI), with the agenda of encouraging the police to investigate the case of blasphemy committed by Ahok and to reject the leadership of a non-Muslim governor. The first was the "1410 Protest" which was held on October 14, 2016 after Friday prayers in front of the Jakarta City Hall; thousands of people led by the FPI participated. In this protest, FPI demanded the immediate investigation of the case of blasphemy committed by Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama.

The second was the "411 Protest", which was held on 4 November 2016. This protest had the participation of one hundred thousand people in front of the National Palace; this was a follow-up response to the demands of the FPI and other Islamic organizations to encourage the police to investigate the case of blasphemy committed by Ahok. In the protest, the representatives of demonstrators were given the opportunity to meet with Wiranto as the Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law, and Human Rights, and Jusuf Kalla as the Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia, to discuss possible solutions related to the blasphemy case involving Ahok. The third was the "212 Protest", which was held on December 2, 2016. This was the most widely followed protest, consisting of Friday prayers being performed in congregation on the National Monument, and was attended by about 3 million people, even spilling into the Hotel Indonesia roundabout.

At the beginning of 2017, FPI conducted the "112 protest" as the fourth protest. This protest was performed during the campaign silence period of the Jakarta gubernatorial election; the protest was initiated by Habib Rizieq who originally marched into the national sermon held at the Istiqlal Mosque with the theme of "Implementation of Surah Al-Maidah 51: Voting a Muslim Leader Is a Must and Voting for a Kafir Leader Is Haram". The purpose of holding the February 11 protest was to reject the desecration of the Quran, reject the criminalization of Ulama, resist insults to Ulama, maintain a free and fair election, and elect a Muslim governor.

The series of solidarity-based protest movements glued together by an issue of blasphemy in another context affected the Jakarta gubernatorial election, resulting in the defeat of the Ahok-Djarot pair and the victory of the Anies-Sandi pair. The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) successfully used religious issues to influence Muslims not to vote for Ahok-Djarot, decreasing the electability of the pair that previously secured the highest number of votes in the first round of the gubernatorial election. The Basuki-Djarot success team also recognized the matter and said that the defeat was not a matter of the electability of Ahok or the performance during his tenure, but a matter of religious issues. The results of research by the Indonesian Survey Institute in December 2016 also revealed that the Al-Maidah incident affected the preference for as well as the electability and consideration of the incumbent candidate, and performance as an important consideration in making political decisions (Tirto.id, accessed on

February 2, 2019). After the Al-Maidah incident, Muslim voters saw this incident as an important factor in making the decision to reject the leadership of Ahok-Djarot.

In addition, religious issues underlying the resistance movement to the Ahok-Djarot pair also indirectly united a number of Muslim figures who previously had a pattern of propaganda or was in a different movement. Leaders of Muslims, Muslim organizations, and Islamic study groups, such as Abdullah Gymnastiar ("Aa Gym") of Daarut Tauhid Boarding School in Bandung, Muhammad Arifin Ilham of Majelis Zikr Az Zikra, Rizieq Shihab of FPI, Bachtiar Nasir as GNPf Chairman and Secretary-General of the Council of Intellectuals and Youth Ulama of Indonesia (MIUMI), Kyai Ma'ruf Amin as Chairman of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), and leaders of other Islamic organizations with many followers were able to sit together in the Islamic Defense protests to carry the common issue of protests over the issue of blasphemy and explicitly rejecting the nomination of the Ahok-Djarot pair in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election.

On the other hand, the act of defending Islam carried out by FPI and other Islamic mass organizations had an impact on the democratic process in Indonesia, with the strengthening of identity politics among the people. Such a political process, whether realized or not, will undermine democratization in Indonesia, as it is known that identity politics arises from the consciousness of individuals to elaborate particular identities, in the form of relations in primordial ethnic and religious identities. However, what would follow is that identity politics is actually hijacked and embraced by the majority group to establish the domination of power. According to Agnes Hellner, the use of identity politics to gain power, which actually further hardens differences and encourages the disputes, does not mean not reaping sharp criticism. Identity politics seems to confirm the existence of essentialistic wholeness about the existence of certain social groups based on the identification of primordality. (Hellner, 1994). In addition, the danger of excessive identity politics is that it can result in fascism, which is even worse than separatism and the people who have been assimilated based on certain identities can be easily mobilized by groups who want to achieve their political agendas.

C. Candidacy and Mobilization of Muslim Voters

The victory achieved by the Anies-Sandi pair, and in this case a Muslim governor representative pair, was not in spite of a number of political agendas conducted by organizations, from the Islamic Defenders Front candidacy process to the movements to guard all polling stations during the election day. In this case, the Islamic Defenders Front did a few things during the candidacy agenda process to mobilize Muslim voters, who had a significant impact in the victory of Muslim governor candidate pair.

A Muslim governor convention was the initial agenda carried out by the Islamic Defenders Front in the process of finding and selecting candidate figures who would represent their interests in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election. FPI initiated the Muslim governor convention along with other Muslim organizations and individuals who are members of the Sharia High Council of Jakarta, which was expected to be a forum to determine Muslim governor candidates. The Muslim governor convention candidates had to meet a number of requirements and criteria as a candidate for governor that has been determined by scholars, Habib, preachers, and leaders in Jakarta. The provisos were male, Muslim, intelligent, physically and mentally healthy, scholar, visionary, and aligned to the weak. The next requirement was that candidates had to have a

track record of never denouncing or being hostile to Islam and its followers, is willing to accept the House of Lords or the Council of Electors, and be ready to support and campaign for other election candidates (Tribunnews.com, accessed on February 2, 2019).

The Jakarta Muslim governor convention resulted in four candidates for governor: Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Sjafric, Adhyaksa, and Sandiaga Uno. After recommending the four names, FPI incorporated at the Jakarta Services Council (MPJ) and the Sharia High Council of Jakarta for a Muslim governor of Jakarta, calling on political parties immediately to name candidates for governor and vice governor of Jakarta from the four recommended names. The Jakarta Muslim governor convention by FPI and other Islamic organization led to the nomination of a candidate for governor, Sandiaga Uno. Sandi as deputy governor candidate managed to accompany Anies Baswedan as a governor candidate, backed by the Gerindra and PKS parties.

The political agenda of the Jakarta Muslim governor convention initiated by the FPI is a novelty in political dynamics in Indonesia because the concept of seeking leadership in the form of a convention is what political parties generally do. Similar to what is done by a party in the United States, the political party convention system was adopted to complete the president-vice president election system and who conducted the indirect election. The political party convention system is implemented as the final stage of the process of democratic candidacy before the eventually selected candidates advance to the election to the Electoral College. Electoral College is the stage of selection of candidates for president and vice president from the two parties that compete in elections, conducted by the elector or voter-elected representatives from each state (Susan Scarrow, 2005). In Indonesia, a political party that conducted a leadership convention was the Golkar Party in the 2004 presidential election, which was then won by Wiranto. Later on, the Democratic Party ahead of the 2014 presidential election held a convention won by Dahlan Iskan, followed by Dino Patti Djalal, Gita Wiryawan, Anies Baswedan, Irman Gusman, Pramono Edhie Wibowo, Marzuki Alie, Ali Masykur Musa, Hayono Isman, Endriartono Sutarto, and Harry Sarundayang.

In addition to engaging in the process of Muslim governor pair candidacy, the Islamic Defenders Front also participated to mobilize the masses of Muslims. In the process of mass mobilization carried out by the Islamic Defenders Front, there were at least two important agendas: *Gerakan Subuh Keliling* and *Tamasya Al-Maidah*. The second movement was initiated by the Islamic Defenders Front during the second round of the Jakarta gubernatorial election, as it is known that in the first round the Ahok-Djarot pair won the votes, and therefore FPI mobilized masses as an attempt to allow Anies-Sandi to win the second round of the 2017 gubernatorial election.

Gerakan Subuh Keliling, After finding out the results, the percentage of votes, and the territories won by the Basuki-Djarot pair, FPI initiated the *Gerakan Subuh Keliling* (“dawn walking movement”). This was a program with the aim of undermining votes from the Basuki-Djarot pair for votes of other Muslim candidates. FPI performed this activity in 22 places in Jakarta with an agenda to call to not choose candidate number two (Ahok-Djarot) and the importance of choosing a Muslim leader. The political agenda also had the aim to mobilize support from the Agus-Sylvi pair to be turned into support for the Anies-Sandi pair in the second round of the Jakarta gubernatorial election. The role of FPI in initiating the agenda was effective in increasing the

percentage of vote acquisition by Anies-Sandi in some areas. In the Thousand Islands region, for example, in the first round Ahok received 5,532 votes while Anies received 4,851 votes. In the second round, it was the opposite with the votes of Anies being 8,796 (62%) and Ahok-Djarot being 5,391 (38%),

The strategy of using mosques as a space to voice political choices was one way for the Anies-Sandi pair to reach the votes of Muslims; this was also expressed by one of the victory consultants of the pair, Eep S. Fatah. He explained that the use of mosques was a strategy that he had copied from the winning party of FIS (Islamic Front du Salut) in Algeria to win a political battle over the network mosque. According to Eep, political networks need to be developed through the clergy and clerics who became Friday preachers. Friday prayers became a strategic media to mobilize public awareness, in order to have a political stance. For Eep, preachers, scholars, and religious teachers conducted activities at the mosque. Including and especially the Friday prayers, it was not only a call for devotion.

In addition to *Gerakan Subuh Keliling*, the FPI role in mass mobilization was also conducted on the election day of the second round of the Jakarta gubernatorial election. FPI along with other Islamic organizations initiated the *Tamasya Al-Maidah* (“Al-Maidah outing”) movement, which was aimed to guard the polling stations from intimidation received by the people to choose a candidate; this movement also had the aim to provide confidence for Muslims to choose a leader according to Surah Al Maidah. The activity guarded 13,023 polling stations, and each polling station was escorted by 100 people. The previous political agenda was met with resistance from the police because it was considered as a form of terror or intimidation to the people. The appeal was criticized by leaders of the Islamic Defenders Front, Habib Rizieq Shihab explained that the activity was part of the right of every citizen of Indonesia to control, monitor, and supervise the elections of Jakarta to proceed without cheating. Although in general the mass mobilization in guarding every polling station in the election went well as conducted by political parties, the 2017 gubernatorial election had different dynamics that led to mass organizations also making sure political parties made sure the elections were fair.

Some of the political agenda carried out by Islamic organizations in mobilizing masses of people in Jakarta, especially Muslim voters, showed that the political movement committed by Islamic organizations contributed to the victory of Anies-Sandi pair. This was also recognized by Gerindra Party Chief Prabowo in a victory speech with the quick count result of the Anies-Sandi pair. In his speech, Prabowo was thankful to the leader of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Great Imam Rizieq Shihab, who had been at the forefront for the victory of Anies-Sandi.

The strategy of mobilizing Muslim masses as carried out by the FPI by utilizing the issue of identity in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election was inseparable from the voting behavior of the Jakarta people, which is not rational. This is motivated by a number of political and social-economic factors; according to Vedi Hadiz, there is a narrative that the *ummah* is part of a social group that had been systematically marginalized for a long time, and thus the issue was modeled by the political elite to mobilize sentiments of diversity. Furthermore, the impact of the mobilization of religious identity also tends to homogenize society and ignore heterogeneity in society. Those who are harmed are minority groups, vulnerable groups, and women. Because they are marginalized and not dominant, they will be forced to join the dominant group or be eliminated.

V. CONCLUSION

The success of the Islamic Defenders Front in allowing the Muslim governor pair of Anies-Sandi to win is inseparable from the issue of identity that is presented in every political agenda that was carried out. The identity issues had an impact on the formation of the collective identity of Muslims to refuse to pick the Ahok-Djarot during the gubernatorial election; the collective identity reflected from the solidarity of Muslim community elements in Jakarta were involved in the "Islamic Defense Protest" agenda. FPI in this case was capable of being a mover, and Muslim community leaders who previously had utilized a different method from FPI in terms of political attitudes were able to commit and be solid on the agenda of FPI in allowing the Muslim governor pair to win.

The FPI strategy in utilizing the network of houses of worship and religious organizations in Jakarta also managed to influence the votes of the Muslim community for a Jakarta Muslim governor pair Muslims; this is seen from the results of the second round of the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election in several areas previously won by Ahok-Djarot. The ease of FPI in using houses of worship (mosques) for campaigning was due to the social and cultural capital they possessed. FPI elites dominated by Islamic religious leaders in almost all regions of the Jakarta capital were able to network with Muslim groups in synergy with houses of worship.

Despite the success of the FPI in using identity issues for electing a leader, this had a very bad impact on the democratic process in Indonesia. The success of the FPI strategy to vote in a Muslim governor candidate pair may reflect that the public also has a right to determine leaders and to participate actively in the election process. This can be a positive experience for the public in that the general election is also a political arena for citizens, not just the parties and the political elites. This is important, given that civil society is a prerequisite for democracy. It comes down to the need to strengthen the public (citizens) to compensate, and to be able to control state policies that distort and tend to position citizens as weak subjects.

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