

Typology of the Empire: General and Special Types

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Abstract—This article compares governance models of the past centuries empires in the context of modern political realities. The focus is done on the debatable issues of modern historiography. The specificity of the policy of the Russian Empire is revealed.

Keywords—*empire; expansion; multinational state; metropolis; dependent territories*

I. INTRODUCTION

Moreover, one hundred years passed since the moment when the last empire ended their existence, though there is the influence in echoes of imperial mentality, in the definitions used and in territorial disputes [1]. Problematics related to the fate of empires takes an important place in modern local and foreign historiography.

Due to certain objective and subjective reasons, a negative approach to assessing the role of an empire in the history of mankind has prevailed in researches. Only a few scientists, D. Lieven, D. Lal, N. Ferguson, have a different point of view, evaluating "their" empire positively (although they admit the fact that they were not the ideal form of government) [2].

II. EMPIRE AS A SYSTEM: CONCEPTUALLY CATEGORIAL APPARATUS

Despite the vast reservoir of scientific literature on the history of the metropolis and the colonies, researchers still interpret the concept of "empire" in different ways.

According to the American scientist R.G. Suny, in this notion the political domination of the metropolis over the periphery is decisive, when the people are "in varying levels of subordination" [3].

A number of researchers believe that the main problem is the classification of governance models of vast territories and multi-ethnic conglomerates. As a rule, the combination of the liberal policy of the metropolis and authoritarian-repressive regimes in the colonies is characteristic of "thalassic empires". As for "continental empires" — autocratic politics pass throughout the space and the pursuit of liberal policies in certain parts of the empire. For example, serfdom law in the Baltic States was abolished much earlier than in Russian provinces, and the constitution in Poland was approved when this issue was not even discussed in Russia itself [4].

The typology of empires is different: ancient and modern, thalassic and continental, nomadic and sedentary. The form of government in these empires was also different. The Egyptian, Assyrian, and Persian empires were Eastern despots. The Arab Caliphate - theocratic monarchy, the Spanish, Austro-Hungarian, Russian empires were absolute monarchies, the British Empire - a constitutional monarchy. Most often, the empire is associated with the monarchical form of government [5].

A number of scientists propose a new way of understanding the meaning of such concepts as "colonies", "dependent" territories. Colonies were marked by the domination of the alien population, the decline of the indigenous inhabitants and the similarity of the socio-economic system with the metropolis. In dependent territories, the share of alien population was only a few percent. Up to the XIX century in the imperial practice, which was based on the level of dependence on the metropolis, different forms of political and territorial administration were applied. For the British Empire, these were immigrant colonies, which later acquired the status of dominions (Canada, Australia), a protectorate that ensured the stability of the local regime under the rule of British power (Kuwait, Uganda).

And although in some cases it is difficult to distinguish between the concept of "empire" and "non-empire", the characteristic features of this concept are mostly known in the scientific literature: a large state with a multinational composition, active aggressive policies, imperial ideology, and background, as a rule, with a messianic idea of a religious or sociopolitical nature [6]. Practice has shown that external expansion does not always give rise to an empire.

The mission of the British Empire was to introduce the "younger nations" of civilization and progress into the colonial life. Historical experience shows that in the final third of the XIX century, elements of representative democracy gradually appeared, the system of officials' recruitment changed, and that opened the way for indigenous people to higher positions [7].

American imperial Messianism throughout the history of the country has been the dominant factor in foreign policy. Territorial expansion was justified by the desire to promote democracy. The United States began to call the "empire by invitation".

According to the mathematical model of P.V. Turchin, the flourishing of any empire is based on maximizing the external surplus product in the metropolis [8]. Empires exist as long as the gains from the overseas colonies exceed the costs. In 1918, Austria-Hungary became an example of the collapse of the continental empire that was formed over the centuries, in whose territory today there are several states (Austria, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia).

The collapse process is more complex in continental empires than in thalassic ones. Former metropolis is much more difficult to avoid the consequences of chaos in the former colonies, if they are united by one space. If you simulate a situation where the British metropolis would not be located at a great distance from the colonies, but compactly, on one continent, then the decolonization scenario could be accompanied by revolutions and wars [9].

But the situation was far from rosy in the thalassic empires also. In the 1950s France, its military and police forces, acted fiercely in the struggle to preserve colonial control over Algeria: they killed and tortured both rebels and civilians. In 1962, thirty thousand Algerian natives, who staged demonstrations in support of the independence of their indigenous homeland, were also brutally suppressed.

The collapse of each empire was characterized by postcolonial conflicts: the struggle for power in the former colonies, the conflicts of states formed on the spot because of the disputed territories and for the former influence. This happened during the collapse of the Spanish empire in the 20s of the XIX century, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian, in 1918 [10], the British, French, in the 40-60s and etc.

The relations forms between the metropolis and the colonies, acceptable for the XIX century, turned out to be impossible in the XX century. To keep the integrity of the empire became increasingly difficult. This fact required numerous armed forces, which maintenance cost the Western governments too much. The burden of a huge colonial empire in the 20th century turned out to be overwhelming even for the once powerful Britain. By the beginning of the 1920s, Great Britain, with a total of one hundred and twenty thousand soldiers beyond its borders, controlled almost a quarter of the world's population. By the 60s of the XXth century, an army of a number of million people could not save the once powerful Britain, so the empire collapsed.

III. RUSSIAN EMPIRE: INTEGRATION MEASUREMENT

A special place in world's history belongs to the Russian empire; its history is amongst the socially significant problems. The concept of empire is really connected with space; in the process of forming the Russian empire the dynamics of territorial expansion was unprecedented. Researchers, examining Russian history in this context, stresses the voluntary and the violent, the contradictory nature of the accessions, show various forms of joining into Russian State, governance systems of peripheral regions.

As a multinational state and as a country with a strong political center, Russia was formed in the XVIIIth century.

Then the form of government in Russia was defined as "autocratic".

The term "empire" in the titles of Russian monarchs appeared in the XVIII century. In the XVIIIth century this title was recognized by Prussia, the Netherlands and Sweden, Turkey, Great Britain, Germany, France, Spain. After some time, the imperial title began to usurp other European sovereign. At the beginning of the XIXth century the emperor appeared in Brazil, in Haiti, in Mexico, China, Japan, Abyssinia, Morocco. In 1876, the title of the English Empire was assigned to the Indian domain and the English Queen was declared the Empress of India [11].

In the struggle for the colonies, the European powers pursued economic goals. For the Russian Empire, however, other reasons were in the first place. In the XVI - XVII centuries, the main reason for the accession of the neighboring lands to Russia was the desire to secure the borders. In the XVIIIth century, Russia gained geopolitical interests: the shores of the Baltic and Black Seas were reached, the territory of United Commonwealth of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania entered the Russian Empire. In the XIXth century - Transcaucasus, Finland, Kokand, Bukhara and Khiva were included into the Russian Empire.

Expanding the territory, the Russian government sought the integrity of the empire using various forms of integration. The practice of "personal union", which provided independence in the constitutional structure, was applied in the cultural sphere in the Kazan Khanate until the beginning of the XVIIIth century, in Poland in the first half of the XIXth century, in Finland. For the Baltic provinces of Eastland and Livonia, after joining Russia, as a result of the Northern War, the status of "provinces with a special status" were provided, with independence in a number of spheres of life, including legislation. What Under the "protectorate" were the Emirate of Bukhara, the Khiva Khanate. In this version under the Russian governance remained foreign policy and military issues. In the administration of the Caucasus and the Turkestan region, the regime of "governorship" was used, when the governor, having full power, submitted directly to the emperor [12].

In the Russian continental empire there was no clear watershed between the metropolis and other dependent territories. This space was a multicultural education in the European and Asian parts, mastered by the metropolis [13].

Russia was not so much an economic empire as a military-political one that acquired colonies to expand its security perimeter. The statement that in the mid-60s of the XIXth century Central Asia was integrated because Russian manufacturers lacked raw materials does not hold water. All the factories worked mainly on American and Egyptian cotton, in Central Asia cotton was almost not grown. Land from the local population was redeemed, and during the XIX century the authorities stopped colonization twice because of the heavy burden on the treasury. The same could be applicable to the Baltic States, Finland, and Transcaucasus. The process of russification was not significant. Here is what the traveller of the late XIXth century wrote about

Azerbaijan: "It's hard to imagine that you are traveling in the Russian empire. Nowhere is there a single Russian person, no one Russian word, nothing Russian. If only I had casually flashed a cross of an Orthodox church somewhere, and already very soon a whole century, how this land is considered as Russian one".

In the XIXth century, the internal policy of the autocracy in Poland was aimed at turning the Poles into loyal subjects of the empire and retaining all departed to Russia territories of former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. After the 1831 uprising, Russia's policy towards Poland changed. Discrimination of the Polish population began due to its geographical location, professional activities, education, etc. In the reign of Nicholai I, the relevant legislation rested on two key principles - the re-education of the Poles by the civil service and their relocation outside their homeland. A series of decrees of the mid XIXth century instructed the children of the "well-to-do" non-Orthodox nobles in the western provinces who could not yet find employment to enter the army service. The poor gentry were encouraged to move to the Caucasus, in the eastern provinces of European Russia. After the suppression of the uprising in 1863-1864, the massive judicial and administrative expulsion of Poles began to central Russia, Siberia, to the Northern Urals. The government prevented in every way the return of deportees to the western provinces.

During the reign of Alexander III there was a systematic expulsion of Poles from the most important departments (military, railway), as well as from the universities. The trend for the depolonization of the management apparatus in Poland is connected, first of all, with the reform activities of N.A. Milutin as the head of the State Secretariat of the Kingdom of Poland. During the entire 19th century, the autocracy never developed a consistent concept of the russification of Poland. The state policy in the Polish question was marked by a stark inconsistency of political practice with strategic policy objectives.

A different policy was pursued towards Finland. The country was governed by a senate whose members could only be natives of Finland. Local taxes were paid to the Finnish treasury, but not to the Russian. Finns, while being in Russia, got all the rights of Russian citizens. The Sejm started to convene again. The country began to mint its own monetary unit — a mark. Finland formed its own military units. During the reign of Alexander III, a course was taken on russification, but it was not done consistently. Nicholai II tried to continue this policy pursuit, but soon the revolution began. Finland was allowed to pass a new electoral law in 1906. That law gave Finns the right to universal suffrage/ballot, moreover women also got voting rights, that was not so in any country in Europe at that time. Later, laws were passed that provided equal rights to Russians and Finns. That gave the possibility to appoint Russian officials to positions in Finland. Almost on all the key positions of Grand Duchy Russian officials were appointed. The apartness of Finland increased with the beginning of the World War I: this country did not send recruits to the front and did not bear the military hardships.

Russia "gained territories" with military and political, economic and cultural-educational expansion, which resulted in the formation of the Eurasian state from regions, differed greatly from each other in the level of development. Nevertheless, the government had sufficient resources to create a unitary state power with possibility to control national territories.

IV. CONCLUSION

Empires arose in different parts of the world, at various periods. Further details of this topic will give the answer to the question — about the reasons for their upraise. Namely, the process was under the influence of certain circumstances or it is a stage of the development of statehood, being peculiar for a number of nations.

The heyday, decline and collapse of great empires is unique, but there is a common trait — contemporaries of the fall of empires believed that his empire disappeared not due to conforming to the laws of nature processes, but because of subjective circumstances: incompetence of rulers, internal and external complots, etc.[14].

Further conceptualization of this problem is important for the development of the conceptual and categorical framework of international politics in the new configuration of the world, to justify the criteria of multicultural communities' governance. Scientific researches in this direction are updated both for European countries with their migration problems, and for Russia, which is a multinational state [16] [17] [18].

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