

Battle of the Aru Sea in 1962

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Abstract—Aru Sea in this study is a historic sea that contains the events of the liberation of West Irian from Dutch rule. In 1962 was one of the crucial events in Indonesian history concerning the liberation of West Irian which at that time was part of the Dutch rule. West Irian is one of the regions geographically located in the eastern part of Indonesia which at that time was contested by the Netherlands and Indonesia. The liberation of West Irian is essentially an absolute national demand, in which all components of the nation fully approve and support it. The Round Table Conference (KMB), which took place in Den Haag on August 23 to November 2, 1949, and on December 27, 1949, there was a 'surrender of sovereignty' except West Irian for the time being at the latest one year to be taken over by the Indonesian government. The KMB succeeded in reaching agreement from both parties, namely between the Indonesian side and the Dutch side, regarding the "transfer of sovereignty" over Indonesia. Article 1 Thus attracting the sympathy of the Indonesian government in forming a small inter-army planning committee formed in April 1961, to develop a military operation plan for the liberation of West Irian. Thus, Sukarno's speech on 19 December 1961, a force called Mandala was formed as the name of the force led by Major General Soeharto in Operation Trikora; an operation carried out in the form of an armed confrontation with the Dutch in Papua. The Indonesian government calls this operation the name of the Liberation of West Irian.

Keywords— *Battle, Aru Sea, 1962, Seizing, Defending, West Irian, Indonesia, the Netherlands.*

I. INTRODUCTION

After Indonesia's independence from the Dutch colonialism in 1945, the founders of the Indonesian state declared West Papua (eastern Papua is Papua New Guinea) a part of Indonesia. However, the large island was still controlled by the Dutch and was prepared as an independent state no later than 1974 as an independent state. Soekarno (First President) stated that it was the strategy of the Netherlands (or the West) to continue to implant imperialism after the strategy of colonialism failed miserably. The State of West Papua is considered a puppet state which will overshadow an independent Indonesia.

Thus, Soekarno declared Trikora (Tri Komando Rakyat), including covering three things, namely: One failed to establish the State of Papua's Papua-made Buneka, Second Hoist the Red and White in West Irian Indonesia, Third, Prepare for general mobilization to maintain independence and unity of the Motherland and the Nation. So on 9 January it was difficult for

Soekarno to appoint Soeharto as Commander of the Mandala Command to free West Irian from Dutch rule [1].

Thus the Aru Sea battle that took place in Maluku on January 15, 1962, between Indonesia and the Netherlands. This incident occurred when two destroyer types, the Dutch type of Neptune and Frely aircraft attacked RI Matjan Tutul (650), RI Matjan Kumbang (653) and RI Tiger (654) owned by Indonesia who were patrolling at position 04.49 ° LS and 135 ° 02 ° east. Commodore Yos Sudarso died in this battle after calling on his famous last message, "Stir up the fighting spirit". From the message of Commodore Yos Sudarso which gave the spirit of struggle for the Indonesian government to be more eager in freeing West Irian.

Dutch ship fired warning shots that fell next to KRI Harimao. Cabbage. Soedomo ordered to return fire. Then the KRI leopard shot backfire but did not hit the target. Armed with the hotspot from the muzzle, the Dutch succeeded in targeting the right target to the ship's hull and the KRI Tigers' control room, resulting in several injured members including the Captain of the Wiratno Ship. In a state of emergency, the KRI Commandant of the Leopards was later taken over by Commodore Yos Sudarso in the fight against Dutch ships in the battle in the Aru Sea.

The situation is more urgent. Then Colonel Soedomo ordered the three ships to turn around 239 degrees. Colonel Soedomo realized the battle was out of balance. Because the three KRIs were only armed with anti-aircraft machine guns in the form of 40 mm cannons which could not reach the target of Dutch ships and did not carry Torpedo at all so it was impossible to face Dutch ships that were much stronger, so holding on with any formation would not work because the third equipment Indonesian battleships were inadequate in the fight against the defense of battles with Dutch ships, because Dutch ships were armed with adequate war equipment so that the battles did not produce results.

Two KRI managed to turn around, but the KRI of the Leopards instead straight (somewhat right) approached the Dutch ship. There are several versions of why the KRI is instead approaching the Dutch ship. Some say the ship's control is stuck so that it cannot turn around, instead heading towards the enemy. Some say Yos Sudarso intentionally ordered the ship to go ahead to sacrifice himself so that the other two ships survived (Soedomo criticized Yos Sudarso's decision which was considered wrong by him), others said the command had heard wrong, the ship should have headed 239°, instead 229°, so the direction is straight. Maybe at that time the situation was very precarious with the control room that was damaged. Commodore Yos Sudarso on the radio shouted " Burn the spirit

of battle " in shouting the fire of battle by Commodore Yos Sudarso is a message that ignited the enthusiasm of Indonesian fighters to keep fighting for the fate of West Irian from Dutch rule as the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. So in the battle Commodore Yos Sudarso breathed his last in the Aru Sea which sank with the KRI Tiger Leopard on 15 January 1962 as a brave and brave warrior [2].

From the negotiations conducted by the United Nations between Indonesia and the Netherlands in the liberation of West Irian, then the Netherlands will hand over West Irian from the Netherlands to UNTEA (United Nations Temporary Executive Authority). As a result of the New York agreement on August 15, 1962, the most important thing about the New York Agreement was the surrender of government in West Irian from the Netherlands to the United Nations. Not later than May 1, 1963. The Government of West Irian was handed over to the United Nations represented by UNTEA [3].

This agreement was signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands Dr. J. Luns who was represented by the Dutch Ambassador at the UN Dr. Van Rojen. December 31, 1962 Dutch royal flag was lowered and replaced with the United Nations flag and the Red and White Flag. Since then the Dutch rule in mainland West Irian ended. But at that time West Irian was still in the hands of the United Nations (UNTEA) for one year. So on May 1, 1963, the transfer of power of the government of West Irian from UNTEA to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia was carried out by Dr. Djalal Abduh to the Indonesian side represented by Mr. Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro and UN envoy in Hollandia. The transfer of power was marked by the decline of the UNTEA flag and the raising of the Red and White. The surrender was provided that the Indonesian government held a popular opinion determination (Pepera). Thus, the end of Dutch rule in Indonesia. . After that the name of West Irian was changed to Irian Jaya and joined the Republic of Indonesia [4].

II. RESEARCH METHODS

This study follows the rules and procedures applicable in the historical research methodology which consists of four steps of historical research from Marc Bloch that will be applied continuously, namely: First, historical observation, which is conducting a preliminary study in order to collect data on the Aru naval battle. the Indonesian nation's strategy to seize and defend West Irian from Dutch rule in 1962. The second stage, carrying out historical criticism or testing data, by comparing information obtained about the Aru naval battle. The third stage, generalizing, or categorizing data according to the approach and theory used in this study. The fourth stage is the last stage which is to search for cause and effect of the problem under study to find a change that occurred in the Aru naval battle strategy in 1962. The historical research procedure will be used to approach textually and contextually. In the sense that research is carried out based on various relics of documents from the relevant time period and analytically compared with the context of the era in which the document appears. Thus, the expected historical picture is not only a descriptive record, but a description that is able to bring up the

dynamics of historical elements in accordance with the context of the era [3].

III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

3.1. West Irian Liberation Struggle

1. Struggle through the Diplomacy Path

a. Cross of Dutch and Indonesian Views

For the Dutch government, in order to eliminate colonial politics and not fool the Irianese, opportunities need to be given for the Irianese to develop their potential as human beings, both in learning and working. As for the Indonesian people, because the direction of the struggle of the Irianese is to integrate with Indonesia, this letter presents a kind of prerequisite for a sense of unity and unity with brothers and sisters from other regions in Indonesia, namely there is no monopoly on work, education and business in government and private. If the issues raised here are still visible in life as an independent nation and state, then unity and unity and brotherhood are absent or impossible. The message in this letter seems to be still relevant today, and is like a will that Irianese and other Indonesian brothers and sisters need to obey in developing Irian land [5].

The reluctance of the Dutch colonial government to release West Irian was evident in negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands such as the Malino Conference (1946), Pangkalpinang (1946), Denpasar (December 1946), Linggajati (November 1948), and Renville (January 1948). This is not because of the love of the Dutch in the ethnic Irian. However, this was an attempt by the Dutch to maintain this part of the East Indies colony, which was originally based on the desire to reserve the country (New Guinea-new region) as a place of resettlement of the Indo-Dutch, who wanted to find a new homeland. West Irian is not even aspired to be a place for resettlement of the Indo people, but also for totok Dutch immigrants from their hometown who have been threatened with population explosion. The politics of the Dutch colonial government were then attempted through meetings with political leaders in areas not controlled by the RI government, especially in an effort to separate West Irian from the Republic of Indonesia, as happened at the Malino, Pangkalpinang and Denpasar conferences [6].

b. Reflections on Dutch View in Conference

1. Malino Conference 1946

The Malino Conference of 1946 was part of the politics of lieutenant governor-general H.J. van Mook to master political developments in Indonesia. Previously he proposed to the Dutch government in The Hague, that he be given permission to hold a conference of political leaders from areas not controlled by the government of the Republic of Indonesia. Van Mook intends to form a federal state within the framework of the Dutch empire. Based on permission from the Dutch government in Deng Haag, 26 figures were invited as representatives from 15 regions outside Java and Sumatra as the Republic of Indonesia's Government. Among the invited figures were Frans Kaisiepo, who was chosen by Conica, J.P.K. van Eechoud as representative of the West Irian region.

The Malino Conference was very important for West Irian, because this conference determined the development of the position of West Irian in the political arena. Because at this

conference officially laid the foundations of splitting the territory of Indonesia in regions that stand alone as the state of a federal state. This division of regions gave the Dutch the possibility to separate the West Irian region from other parts of Indonesia, an opportunity which was proven later. An attempt was actually launched by the Dutch on July 15, 1946 without the Indonesian political leader realizing it. On this date, the entire West Irian region was declared a separate residence. As the first resident of West Irian, the Dutch government appointed Jan van Eechoud who was seen as having experience in the region. The West Irian residency that was formed, apart from the Maluku residency, was done without being seen because it was manifested in a change in government. So, since that change the position of West Irian can be disputed by the Dutch rather than the ties that unite it with the residency of Maluku. West Irian is considered to be an independent political entity [7].

However, Jan van Eechoud admitted that at the Malino conference, it was first proposed by Frans Kaisiepo that the name "Papua" be replaced by the name "Irian". Because the name "Papua" is considered by some to be a name that contains a demeaning element of the population of West Irian. From this proposal was later taken over in the news by the Dutch information service so that it was known to people outside. The name "Irian" was then used by the RI government, whereas by the Dutch colonial government, the name was banned. The Malino Conference ended on 22 July 1946 provided that another conference would be held as soon as possible to question the formation of the constitutional changes of Kalimantan and the Great East.

2. Pangkal Pinang Conference 1946

The Pangkalpinang Conference, which was held on October 1, 1946, was related to the plan to change the Indonesian state that van Mook was working on. The conference was attended by a number of figures who were considered to represent minority groups. Some of the participants expressed their concerns about their respective groups, especially about their position in the planned structure of Indonesian state administration. From the Dutch peranakan group, it was proposed to make the West Irian area a new residence for groups of people who wanted to separate themselves from other Indonesian residents. Based on this proposal, in a motion received at the last session, the participants suggested that West Irian be given a separate political status, independent of Indonesia, in the Dutch kingdom [8].

In fact the voice about the interests of the Dutch peranakan group, received great attention from various groups in the Netherlands who wanted to maintain the West Irian region as a Dutch colony. The position of the Dutch peranakan group in Indonesia was used as an excuse, and was considered in accordance with humanity and religious teachings, and to avoid West Irian being separated from Dutch rule and falling into the hands of "republicans" who were considered to be detrimental to the position of the Dutch peranakan group. The Pangkalpinang Conference, chaired by van Mook and lasted for 12 days, although the position of West Irian was questioned

in various discussions, no one paid heed to the position of the indigenous population, as if the area had no inhabitants who needed attention [8].

c. Denpasar-Bali Conference 1946

In the Denpasar-Bali Conference, which was organized by van Mook as a continuation of the Malino conference on December 18, 1946, the participants were invited as representatives of the regions of Kalimantan and the Greater East. In contrast to the Malino conference, no representatives from the indigenous population of West Irian were invited. The participants proposed the formation of the State of East Indonesia (NIT), which was based on previous conference decisions at Malino. From the formulation of the draft presented to the participants, it was clear that the desire of the Dutch colonial government for the formation of the NIT, did not include West Irian. West Irian's close relations with other regions previously in the economic, religious and government administration sectors were ignored. West Irian is considered an area separated from other regions which will become the NIT area.

Thus, to clarify the position of West Irian in the NIT administration, Zainal Abidin Alting proposed that chapter 15 verse 13, which states that "the North Maluku region, consists of Ternate, Tidore and Bacan swaprja areas, which together are bound as a federation", plus insert "including West Irian" after the word "Tidore". The good reception of the motion of Nadjamoedin and his friends gave the impression that Indonesian participants at the Pasar Den conference wanted West Irian to be part of the NIT territory. On the contrary, it became a reality that West Irian was not mentioned as part of the NIT area in the planned NIT formation, giving the Dutch the opportunity to consider the West Irian region separate from the NIT area. This disagreement is a form of the first disagreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands regarding the position of West Irian in a fairly long period of time. And finally the Denpasar Bali conference closed on December 24, 1946, after Tjokorde Gde Rake Soekawati (Bali) was elected president of the NIT. Since the NIT government was formed, it has always been at odds with the Dutch colonial government regarding the position of West Irian. A condition that lasted until the KMB in 1949 in The Hague, and the implementation of its results was not carried out consistently by the Dutch colonial government, so that as a result the Indonesian side made the decision to resolve the West Irian problem through confrontation. This step was taken by Indonesia, because in one of the KMB decisions, it stated that the West Irian problem would be resolved a year later. In fact, the Dutch continued to strengthen their position in the West Irian region.

2. Struggle Through the Open War Path

a. Trichora and West Irian Integration Struggle

The struggle for integration of West Irian with the Unitary Republic of Indonesia disputed between the Indonesian government and the Dutch colonial government, both through the Tri Komando Rakyat (Trikorra) and the Determination of the People's Opinion (Pepera), is believed to be successful on the Indonesian side. That means the Trikorra became an important political momentum, in which the Netherlands was

forced to sign a UN agreement known as the New York Agreement (New York Agreement) on August 15, 1962, regarding New Guinea. Although to cover the shame of the Dutch government, the surrender of Nieuw Guineea to Indonesia was done through the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) on May 1, 1963.

Important points in the 1962 New York Agreement include the following. First, if the United Nations has justified the approval or agreement of New York through the General Meeting, then the Netherlands immediately surrendered its authority over Papua to UNTEA. Second, as of May 1, 1963 UNTEA was in charge of government administration in Papua, then handed over to Indonesia. In connection with these important matters, the main tasks of UNTEA, namely: first, accept the surrender of government or the territory of West Papua from the Dutch. Second, hold a stable government in West Papua for a certain period. Third, hand over the administration of West Papua to the Republic of Indonesia.

In carrying out governance in West Papua, UNTEA is required to carry out the following tasks. First, maintaining security and public order (maintaining law and order). Second, widely announcing and explaining the conditions in the agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands and informing the population of West Papua about the conditions of self-determination as stipulated in the New York agreement. The implementation of these tasks faced various difficulties as a consequence of the process of transfer of power, but due to good cooperation between UNTEA and Indonesian representatives led by Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro, and representatives of the Netherlands under the leadership of LJ Goedharta, the implementation of this task went smoothly, calmly and peace, although there are several incidents that can be overcome, such as in Merauke, Sorong and Manokwari.

The situation leading up to the implementation of the Act of Free Choice in order to end the conflict between Indonesia and the Netherlands regarding the status of Papua, has left things that have positive or negative impacts in the subsequent lives of the people of Irian. From the Dutch government side, it seems that politics is ambivalent. On the one hand, the Dutch government tried to attract the hearts of the Irianese through education and development efforts as well as the promise of independence in the form of a "West Papua State". On the other hand, the Dutch government through its apparatus was worried about the orientation of the greater Irian people inclined towards the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, and had the opportunity to oppose the Dutch as happened in other regions in Indonesia.

b. Battle of the Aru Sea 1962

In an effort to fight for West Irian, the term "status quo" is still known which is still applied to West Irian within a year after the recognition of sovereignty to the RIS, the West Irian problem will be resolved by negotiating between RIS and the Dutch colonial government. The status quo referred to in this provision is to continue the Dutch authority over West Irian. But according to the interpretation of the Indonesian people, the Dutch would surrender West Irian. However, the RIS turned out to be misinterpreted especially with words like; "The problem of the position of West Irian will be resolved by

way of negotiations", which contained a hint that the Dutch would surrender West Irian to RIS, but only negotiated [9].

Various peaceful paths had been taken by the Indonesian government until 1957, but no results were achieved. These failures were exploited by the Dutch to continue to include West Irian as their territory. The legal basis is that the Dutch amend article 1 of the Dutch Constitution regarding its territory by calling "West Irian (Nederlands-Nieuw Guinea" as part of the Netherlands).

After the formation of the government of West Irian Perjuangan was formalized, the city of Soa Siu in Tidore was designated as the capital of West Irian province and Zainal Abidin Syah as the first governor of West Irian. Another step taken by the Indonesian government to fight for West Irian is to carry out a political confrontation with the economy and then it will be escalated into a confrontation in all fields. On August 17, 1960, the Indonesian government severed diplomatic relations with the Netherlands and consequently all Dutch working in Indonesia were released. From this, the West Irian Liberation Front was formed. Facing Indonesia's actions, the Netherlands formed the Papuan Council to hold a "self-determination" for the people of West Irian which was then proposed to the UN General Assembly in September 1961 [9].

Furthermore, in order to carry out the TRIKORA struggle, the Mandala Command was established in Makassar with the following tasks: (1) Conducting a military operation to liberate West Irian; (2) To lead and use all armed forces, lines of popular resistance, and other national potentials within their sphere of authority to liberate West Irian territory; (3) Major General Suharto was appointed Commander in Chief of the Mandala.

Before the Mandala Command worked actively, there was an infiltration to West Irian, among others resulting in the "Arafuru battle" or fighting in the Aru Sea on January 15, 1962. During the battle, the KRI of the Leopards drowned and killed a number of fighters such as Captain Wiratno, Deputy I KASAL Commodore Yosaphat Sudarso or better known as Yos Sudarso, who had said the last message "ignited the fighting spirit". The message was responded with enthusiasm by the fighters for the liberation of West Irian at the time. The next infiltration was carried out by volunteers who generally consisted of selected troops from various units, both Land, Sea and Air and Police.

c. Irian's Educated Struggle

The Council of Conference on Pepera (DMP) as a way taken by the United Nations and the Indonesian government in implementing the Act of Free Choice, was certainly based on the physical condition of West Irian at that time. The physical condition of Irian up to now for some areas is difficult to reach by means of transportation, it means that the conditions at that time were far more difficult, and it seems difficult to be able to gather residents one by one to vote. In addition to these difficulties, there are also international political conditions such as the influence of communist ideology from the north of Irian, which of course led to the acceleration of the settlement of the Dutch-Indonesian conflict regarding West Irian. The reality of West Irian's physical condition and the influence of the political constellation of the world at that time, it is less rational

if we ask "why at that time did the voting not take place?" communication.

From the divisions that have occurred among the Irian intellectuals above, it seems to us that there are 3 (three) groups of politically oriented Irian educated people. Each group struggled and influenced the community in the West Irian area. Pro-integration groups struggled in urban areas and were driven by several Irian educated groups such as Silas Papare, E.J. Bonay, Marten Indey, Lukas Rumkorem, Albert Karubuy and his friends, who were the exponents of the Free Indonesia Committee (KIM), which later became the Irian Indonesian Independence Party (PKII). This group struggle has the full support of the Head of the Indonesian Government in Western Irian. Indonesian government support as the results of an interview on December 5, 1996 in Yogyakarta by Pigay with R.M. Kuncoro, a volunteer warrior of Irian, was given in the form of providing falsities and assistance in the context of political struggle. The counterintegration groups who voted for independence themselves were mostly Irian educated in urban areas, and had led Papuan independence parties, such as Johan Ariks, Herman Wayoi, Mori Musendi, Willem Inury, Karel Gobay, Nicolaas C. Tanggahma, Isaac Hindom, Permenas Hans Torey. Mozes Rumanum, Baldus Mofu, Aser Demokotay, Tontje Meset, Terianus Aronggear, Abdullah Arfan, Clemens Kiriwaib, F.K.T. Poana, Dolf A. Faidiban, Alex Robert Wamafma, Johannes Rumbobiar, A. Mambrisau, and his friends. Their struggle has the support of most rural communities.

When some members of these two groups (pro-integration and counter-integration), had been entrusted by the government to hold important positions in government in Irian, but in different periods of time. Pro-integration groups such as E.J. Bonay, had been appointed as the Governor of West Irian with a term of service of less than one year (1963-1964). While the counterintegration group had the opportunity in the 1980s, such as Isaac Hindom as Governor of Irian Jaya, FKT Poana as Head of Irian Jaya Province P and K Office, and Herman Wayoi as assistant III of Irian Jaya Governor's Office and others in various positions in government. Meanwhile, the group that cooperated with the Netherlands chose to leave West Irian by immigrating to the Netherlands with their families, such as Markus Kaisiepo, Nicolaas Youwe, and his friends. This last group at any time from the Netherlands fought for the independence of West Papua.

3. Outcomes of the West Irian Liberation Struggle

The integration of West Irian with the Unitary Republic of Indonesia which has gained international recognition through the results of the 1969 Pepera, on the one hand, marked the end of the political scenario that the Dutch colonial government tried to maintain to establish the state of Papua, and on the other hand, in response to the long struggle for the search for people's identity Irian in an independent life, namely in the Republic of Indonesia. However, the problem that needs to be explained is why after Irian was integrated in 1963, and further confirmed by the results of the Act of Free Choice in 1969, and approved by the United Nations, apparently resistance actions still appearing against the government until 2000?

A quick look back to the period leading up to the Act of Free Choice in 1969, the internal conflict of the educated people about the Implementation of the Act of Free Choice, which was considered to lack respect for the rights of the people of Irian, and acts of mistreatment by the security forces against the people of Irian, as well as resolving these problems that were not done wisely and wisely, has left wounds in the hearts of some people of Irian, so that at any time these feelings are displayed in the form of actions that contradict the wishes of the government.

The repressive actions of the Indonesian military around the struggle for integration in West Irian, it seems, were due to the tendency of the time to be greater in the political aspect, namely the victory of the Indonesian Military Act on the Indonesian side. Such orientation is the basis of repressive actions by the military against counter-integration groups in West Irian. In an atmosphere at a crossroads, it is not surprising that Irianese who act counter to the Act and the results of the UNTEA period, then they turn to the promise of the Dutch government, although only as nostalgia because Irian itself has been recognized in the Homeland by the international world through the United Nations.

Separatist movements such as the OPM, which emerged from 1965 to 1970, were the actions of some Irianese who were pledged by promises of independence from the Dutch colonial government in the form of a "West Papua State". Therefore, a broader understanding is needed in addressing this problem, so that we are not trapped in a narrow perspective, and assume that every action from the people in the area is motivated by political ideas to liberate the people of Irian, free from NKRI [10].

The mental turmoil of some people in Irian after the Act of Pepera from time to time has a different meaning, so that the actions of the community in some places are inappropriate to be associated with the OPM separatist movement. This is because the OPM resistance movement between 1965-1970, was clearly carried out by a part of the people of Irian with the intention to draw the world's attention to the status of Irian, while awaiting the results of the Act of 1969. However, the fact that the results of the Act made through the DMP showed the desire of the people of Irian to integrate with NKRI, the OPM resistance actions naturally became weak, because Jandasan's struggle became shaky, both *de jure* and *de facto*.

Evidence of OPM actions becoming weak is the surrender of military leader Ferry Awom and his followers in 1970, which was then followed by several other OPM leaders. With the surrender of the OPM leaders, the movements that emerged above 1970, were in a weak position. Each movement in each region runs independently without coordination and is not supported by adequate weaponry and a small number of followers.

Thus, the actions of resistance against the government carried out after 1970, and continued in various regions in West Irian, were no longer based on the separatist goal of establishing the "Papua State". In fact, community actions in various regions, such as in Jayapura, Sorong, and Timika, are demands for respect and respect for Irianese rights in the development process in the area. However, because the approach to solving problems since 1969 in Irian was to

prioritize (military) security, the social protest actions were always labeled by the OPM. In fact, sporadic movements that bear the name of the OPM are only names and are not based on clear political beliefs, ideals, goals as in the beginning. However, this condition is continuously linked by the government to the separatist actions of the OPM, and there is insufficient effort to resolve the root of the problem, namely social, economic, political, and cultural gaps that cause social unrest in the Irian community in the area.

The recent riots provide us with clues. That the hopes of the Irianese integrated with the Unitary Republic of Indonesia so that they would live as equals in an atmosphere of independence, security, prosperity, a sense of justice, getting respect and respect for their basic rights and customary rights were not realized [7].

According to George Aditjondro, OPM was raised by 3 (three) parties so that it seems to still exist until now. First, the OOP itself (the real OPM). Namely, those who have a cabinet, military command and units, which have the interest in translating all the actions in Irian to OPM. So that, they strengthen their legitimacy. So, if a Paniai person killed a Makassar carpenter who entered ulayat and cut down trees carelessly, or people in the Bird's Head area clashed with Conoco oil company employees, then were killed, the actions of the people's resistance were immediately labeled OPM.

Second, military. The group has an interest in calling all the Irianese pre-movement movements OPM. Because that way, the operating costs remain high. With the high operational costs, they can look for profits, besides being able to continue to treat Irian as a training ground as well as in East Timor. Soldiers must always be trained, otherwise they can "rust" or "tasono" (sound asleep).

Third, rivalry among the Irian people sometimes exaggerates the OPM. For example, the rivalry between keret (clan), as happened in Genyem, the Hembring train versus the other train, where the latter cut the progress of the first train. Because of coincidence in Hembring's train, there was Yance Hembring who was an OPM figure, so even non-OPMs were reported to the military. Irianese people who become "suanggi" (informants to the army) are also many, so it is not only non-Irian people who report. In this example, the Irianese themselves, who become "suanggi" and also enlarge the OPM.

Reporting behavior also occurs in non-political activities. When Aditjondro fostered a group of rattan chair craftsmen in Genyem, and because he was close to the Hembring train, another train tried to cut it by reporting to the military. Finally, all the activities were reversed. Irian Democracy is sometimes extreme. Wants really the same taste, equally. There should be no more advanced, little bypass, cut, reported to government or military officials.

The act of suppressing pensioners or employees of Irianese was also carried out against Komboi, Head of the Forestry Service of Irian Jaya. He was beaten by several members of the army in Arso Jayapura on November 24, 1983, for reprimanding PT Hanurata's foreman, because Hanurata employees were cutting down trees evenly outside the specified area boundary. Examples of cases of allegations and harsh treatment in the form of beatings, and mental stress that was carried out against officials and employees of the people of

Irian made the community wonder if officials or employees who were jealous were needed harshly by the security forces, how was the treatment of the villagers? As a result, some people then felt unsafe living and working in Irian, and then they chose to enter the forest and eventually cross into neighboring Papua New Guinea (PNG).

II. CONCLUSION

The conclusions of this study include:

1. There was a battle between Indonesia and the Netherlands in the Aru Sea because on the one hand, there was an effort from the government and all Indonesian people to fight to free West Irian so that it would become a complete Indonesian nation in accordance with the ideals of the proclamation of Indonesian independence on August 17, 1945.
2. The Aru Sea is used by the Indonesian people as a pathway in the efforts to liberate West Irian, because geographically, the Papua region faces the Arafura sea waters, making it easy to reach both East, West and North and South.
3. The obstacles faced by the Indonesian and Dutch nation in the Aru Sea battle in the context of the liberation of West Irian were, on the Indonesian side, the obstacles faced were more on the issue of combat equipment and the lack of support from the local community (West Papua), because there were pros and cons contra among the people of West Papua itself is related to the struggle for irrigation with the people of Indonesia, the Netherlands or become an independent country. Also, that continues today.
4. The results of the battle for the liberation of West Irian in the Aru Sea, both for the Indonesian people and for the Dutch as colonizers, can be seen in the fact that there is a third party intervention in this case the United States and the international community who have an interest in the land of Papua together to suppress and criticize The Netherlands to get out of West Irian made the Netherlands must leave the land of Papua.

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