

Opportunism and Internal Conflict of the Executive and Legislative in Planning and Budgeting

Nurhayati Nurhayati*
Institute of Economic Science of Bima
 Bima, Indonesia
 nurhayati.stiebima@gmail.com

Aliah Pratiwi
Institute of Economic Science of Bima
 Bima, Indonesia
 aliahpratiwi@gmail.com

Puji Muniarty
Institute of Economic Science of Bima
 Bima, Indonesia
 puji.stiebima@gmail.com

Kamaluddin Kamaluddin
Institute of Economic Science of Bima
 Bima, Indonesia
 kamal.stiebima@gmail.com

Abstract — This study aims to determine the description and causes of opportunism and internal conflicts from the executive and legislative sides in planning and budgeting. The phenomenon of this research is based on previous interviews related to issues including planning and budgeting formed in a regional budgeting team (RBT) in which it is still dominated by policies made by the RBT and the Regional House of Representative (RHR) *Banggar* team (Regional Budgeting Bureau). This research is qualitative research with embedded case study as its approach (single case design intertwined). The results indicate that opportunism and internal conflicts from the executive and legislative branches arose from the planning process. The policy implementation of the budgeting process that is carried out is not in accordance with the needs of the previous Regional Work Unit. Moreover, this occurred in the allocation of social assistance expenditure and grant expenditure that were vulnerable to inequality. Government policy needs to be based on the idea that the government and legislative council must be more sensitive to the opinions, desires and demands of the community by utilizing the *musrenbang* (Deliberation on Development and Planning) and recess as a monitoring tool in the planning process, the government must be honest and transparent in making policies by considering the interests of the people.

Keywords — budget actors, opportunism, internal conflict

I. INTRODUCTION

The City Government of Bima in the context of regional autonomy will not develop itself if it is not backed up with planning and budgeting because regional budget planning is one of the important aspects in determining the sustainability and success of regional development. Questioning the executive with the legislature is indeed a "sensitive" thing when it is associated with regional planning and budgeting. Both have different movements and each has a clearly different function [1]. The legislative function in question is the function of the Regional Representative Council to form regional regulations with the Regional Government. The budget function is the function of the Regional Representative Council with the local government in preparing and determining the Local Government Budget. In this case, a budget is a work guideline and target to be achieved by the organization for the future, and it is a central component of management accounting in the public sector for planning, coordinating, organizing and controlling [2]. In the

perspective of agency theory, the executive, as the proposer of the budget and also the executor or user of the budget, seeks to maximize the amount of the budget. Whereas the legislature has the opportunity to include its interests in the budget proposals submitted by the executive. The budget ratification process becomes a ground for contact between legislative and executive to defend their interests [3].

Based on previous interviews, there were several phenomena related to local government in planning the budget that could create opportunism behavior and internal conflicts from the executive and legislative sides including: Planning and budgeting formed in a Regional Budgeting Bureau (RBB) is still dominated by their own team members and *Banggar* team from Regional Representative Council, the results of the recess and proposed program from Regional Work Unit. However, the results of the Deliberation on Development Plans were not accommodated by the RBB team and the *Banggar* team in the city of Bima, this caused the results not in accordance with regional needs that had been determined in the previous Design of Regional Work Unit. Then the delay of funds availability inhibited the implementation of a work program that has been planned.

This study examines the Opportunism behavior and internal conflicts of the executive and legislative sides in the planning and budgeting in the city of Bima, so that an overview of Opportunism and internal conflicts of budget actors can be identified, and further can be used to find out the causes and solutions to these problems. This research is also expected to be able to contribute to policy makers in the Regional Government, so that the role of budget actors in developing and implementing them interacts well and has real benefits for the people of the city of Bima.

II. RESEARCH METHOD

The research was done in the Regional Government Agency of the city of Bima, West Nusa Tenggara Province. The research was focused on the Regional Development Planning Agency of the city of Bima, a government organization whose most of its members are Regional Budgeting team and Regional Representative Council as the Budget Bureau of the regional government budget planning. This research was conducted for three months, from May to July 2019.

This research is qualitative research with a Case Study as its approach. The strategy of this research is to carefully investigate a program, event, activity, process and group of individuals. The researchers collected a complete information with various data collection procedures based on a predetermined time [4].

The data were collected through interviews, i.e. a semi-structured interview in which it is a form of interview that combines structured forms. Although there are structured questions that have been prepared, it also provides flexible opportunities for researchers or interviewers to explore issues that recently appeared [5]. In addition, there are documentation techniques involving notes or documents, literature review and observation techniques in which the researcher observed phenomena or events at the location of the research [6].

In qualitative research, the research sample does not need to represent the population because the consideration of sample is not based on aspects of population representation. It focuses more on the ability of the sample (informant) to supply as much information as possible to the researcher. The source of the data presented is still temporary. However, researchers need to mention the sample which is likely to be used as a source of data [6]. As a general description, the information is presented in the following table:

TABLE I. THE SOURCE OF THE DATA

No	Field of work	Informants Identity	Member
1	The Chief of Regional Development Planning Agency	Regional Budgeting Team	Executive
2	The Secretary of Regional Development Planning Agency	Regional Budgeting Team	Executive
3	The Chief Division of Regional Development Planning Agency	Regional Budgeting Team	Executive
4	The Chief Division of Specialist Education Program of Regional Development Planning Agency	Regional Budgeting Team	Executive
5	The Regional Budgeting Sub-Division Chief of Regional Financial and Asset Management Agency	Regional Budgeting Team	Executive
6	The Regional Revenue Sub-Division Chief of Regional Financial and Asset Management Agency	Regional Budgeting Team	Executive
7	Members of Regional Representative Council	Budgeting Team	Legislative
8	Members of Regional Representative Council	Budgeting Team	Legislative

Source: Processed Premier Data (2019)

The data were analyzed through interactive analysis involving data reduction, display of the data, interpretation, and conclusion. However, before the data were processed, the validity test of the data was done. The technique used to test the validity of the data is triangulation techniques. Triangulation technique is a validity test that utilizes other situations in which the data were used as a comparison [7].

III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

A. *Planning and Budgeting Concepts of the Government of Bima*

1) *The implementation of Development and Planning Deliberation*

In accordance with Law number 25 of 2004 concerning the national development planning system in article 1 paragraph 21, it is found that the Development and Planning Deliberations is a forum of aspirations between communities in summarizing and compiling program activities that will be planned by the regions. The implementation of Development and Planning Deliberations has some phases which start from the village, sub-district, regional, central and national.

The informants of this research revealed that the application related to the implementation of Development and Planning Deliberations in the city of Bima was routinely carried out and in accordance with the provisions in the Regulations of Ministry of Home Affairs number 54 of 2010 concerning the preparation, procedure for implementation, amendment and implementation of regional development plans.

2) *Asymmetry of Executive-Legislative Information in Government Planning and Budgeting Processes*

Asymmetry between executive and legislative as budget actors has become a habit that occurs every year. The planning and budgeting are vulnerable to misperceptions. It caused by the argument between the executive the legislative which is based on their own needs. Therefore, the community needs are ignored. The existence of the Developments and Planning Deliberations which is held by the government and recess by the council should have been a strategic forum for arguments in formulating policy program to defend their interests as a government or as a legislative.

The statement from informant number 3 indicates that there should not be any information asymmetry in the first place, if the executive and legislature has jointly formulated a planned program of activity policies, it can be assumed that there are indications of other things that are prioritized by each of the budget actors (the executive and legislative).

3) *Overview of Opportunism and Internal Conflict Between Budget Actord in Planning and Budgeting*

Comprehensively, the background of the emergence of opportunism and conflicts between budget actors (executive and legislative) in planning and budgeting does not have significant differences. Informant 3 stated that the forms of opportunism and conflicts between budgets actors start from the planning process, the implementation of the Developments and Planning Deliberations to the formulation of the Regional Budget Expenditure Draft in which it is often infiltrated by personal interests from both the executive and legislative members. The sectoral ego that was formed led to over-financing the formulation of the Regional Budget Expenditure Draft that had previously been verified in the General Budget Policy – Temporary Budget Priority document, but this change was

inseparable from the legislative habit of ratifying the program of activities base on their interests.

4) *Conflict Between Budget Actors*

Informant 4 said that the clinical implementation of the budget could not be said to be effective because it had a constraint in which there are no standard for regional expenditure which could be used as a benchmark in formulating the budgets. Determining the budget thus far has been based on the price standards set by the regional government, the justification of reporting the activity should ideally be optimized so that the budget planning could be more optimal and appropriate. These discrepancies in the regional budgeting team often occur, but if it is allowed to continue, it may have an impact on the timing of the determination, the formulation of the budget. Informant 4 added that coordination is needed regarding the expenditure analysis.

IV. CONCLUSION

Opportunism in the allocation of expenditure grants and social assistance indicates that the regulation that oversees this allocation is not strong enough. There is a lack of inherent rules regarding the planning and implementation of the expenditure allocation that may lead to the potential for misuse of the budget even though the accounting is recorded in its designation. Every activity

should be followed by a clear term of reference to regulations that strengthen these activities so that there is a legal basis for those activities. The time of implementation and the cost should also be clear in order minimize errors during the implementation.

REFERENCES

- [1] I. B. Riharjo and I. Isnadi, "PERILAKU OPORTUNISTIK PEJABAT EKSEKUTIF DALAM PENYUSUNAN APBD," *EKUITAS (Jurnal Ekon. dan Keuangan)*, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 388–410, 2018.
- [2] A. Tuasikal, "Fenomenologis Perencanaan Dan Penganggaran Pemerintah Daerah," *J. Akunt. Univ. Jember*, vol. 11, no. 2, 2013.
- [3] I. A. G. S. Megasari, "Pengaruh Pendapatan Asli Daerah, Selisih Lebih Perhitungan Anggaran dan Flypaper effect pada perilaku oportunistik penyusun anggaran," *Bul. Stud. Ekon.*, 2015.
- [4] J. W. Creswell, "Research design pendekatan kualitatif, kuantitatif, dan mixed," *Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar*, 2010.
- [5] T. Asmony, "Penelitian Kualitatif: Pendekatan Studi Kasus," *Mataram. Univ. Press. Mataram*, 2015.
- [6] P. Sugiyono, "Memahami penelitian kualitatif," *Bandung Alf.*, 2005.
- [7] L. J. Moleong, "Metode penelitian kualitatif." Bandung: Remaja Rosdakarya, 2007.