

Democracy and Human Security: Analysis on the Trajectory of Indonesia's Democratization

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Abstract—Democracy institution is believed would naturally lead to greater human security. The end of communism in the Soviet Union and other countries has been described as the triumph of democracy throughout the world, which quickly led to claims that there is now a right to democracy as guide principles in international law. In Indonesia, attention to the notion of democracy developed very rapidly in the late 1990s. In Indonesia, after 32 years of President Suharto's authoritarian regime from 1966 to 1998, Indonesia finally began the democratization phase in May 1998. It worth noting that Indonesia has experienced four different periods of different government and political systems since its independent, and all those stage of systems claim to be democratic. However, this article maintains that the Indonesian political system could be classified into two periods: the authoritarian period and the democracy period. President Sukarno's Guided Democracy (from 1959 to 1965) and President Suharto's Pancasila Democracy (from 1966 to 1998) were an authoritarian period, while Parliamentary government (from 1950 to 1957) and the post-Suharto era (from 1998 to present) are considered as a democratic period. This paper aims to analytically elaborate democracy and human security by elaborating the development of Indonesia's democracy and the historical context of democratization in the country. This paper also discusses the contemporary debate on structural approach and actor-centered approach on Indonesia's democracy.

Keywords—Democracy, human security, oligarchy, actor-centered approach.

I. INTRODUCTION

Democracy and Human Security have a vital relationship. Many scholars are optimistic that the adoption of democracy in a country can naturally lead to increased human security. This article ties human security to a series of welfare domains. Welfare refers to the conditions under which human security is realized. This condition must reflect freedom from three aspects: poverty, inequality, and vulnerability. Specifically, it includes income, health, education, environment or biodiversity, political freedom, and democracy.

The concept of national security has a long history, since the conclusion of the thirty-year cessation of war set forth in the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648. National security was defined as an effort

aimed at maintaining the integrity of a territory the state and freedom to determine the form of self-government. However, with global developments and increasingly complex relations between countries and the variety of threats faced by countries in the world, the formulation and practice of security implementation tend to be achieved together (collective security) becomes an important reference for countries in the world. In its development, the implementation of collective security is not only done only to maintain the sovereignty of the country but also to protect the security of citizens. The idea of human security was introduced by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) since the 1990s. Human security is defined as protection for human survival, livelihood and dignity [29]. The concept of human security consists of seven dimensions: economy, food, health, environment, personal security, society, and politics. This security dimension is related to human rights to be free from fear, desire, and freedom to live in dignity. Security also means being free from various risks. Freedom from fear focuses on protecting human rights, while freedom from desire, and emphasizes economic aspects that are at par with development.

Traditional international law has been neutral towards the concept democracy as part of human security. Based on the classic concept of sovereignty, States are given full authority to elect their governments. However, since the early 1990s, democracy has become an interesting topic in law and international relations. Many scholars claim the end of communism in the Soviet Union and elsewhere has been described as the victory of global democracy. Many scholars, especially Western scholars, have discussed many the right to democracy. There is a consensus among them regarding the right to the existence of democracy, also on the legitimacy of collective intervention for the restoration of

democracy. Some of them support unilateral interventions to protect democracy. If unilateralism is illegal under the provisions of article 2 of the UN Charter, and contradicts the normative principle of collective security under which the UN system is established, scholars recognize that there is an international right to democracy that can be protected by the collective intervention [28]. In addition, global and regional human rights instruments have also ratified the right to democracy.

In Indonesia, since acquiring independence in 1945, Indonesia has experienced four different periods of different government systems. All those phases of governments claim to be democratic. How is the development of Indonesia's democratic process? Are all phases of government truly democratic? This article aims to critically analyses and discusses the journey of democracy in Indonesia since its independent to date. After the fall of President Suharto's authoritarian regime, the democratization process received considerable attention. Many scholars have tried to characterize politics in Indonesia. The analysis of patterns of accumulation and use of power has centered on the question of whether the old elite figures of the authoritarian regime continue to control politics or whether groups marginalized during the dictatorship have gained influence. Besides, these scholars tend to emphasize more on material wealth and strength, as well as actors and agencies.

II. RESULT AND DISCUSSION: THE JOURNEY OF INDONESIA'S DEMOCRACY

A. *Parliamentary Democracy*

On August 17, 1945, Indonesia proclaimed its independence from Dutch colonialism. The statement of independence was conveyed by two nationalist politicians, Sukarno and Hatta. Both had an official position as chairman and deputy chairman of the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence- a body which was formed by Japanese government in an effort to gain support from the Indonesian people by promising that Japan would help the Indonesian independence process [1]. The committee later elected Sukarno and Hatta as president and vice president for Indonesia as a new independent country.

Although Indonesia had declared its independence in 1945, during 1945 to 1949 there were two active states in the Indonesian archipelago: the infant Republic of Indonesia and the Netherland Indies [1]. After the Dutch finally withdrawal in 1949, Indonesia turned into a unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia in 1950. Parliamentary democracy or

constitutional democracy was adopted as an Indonesia political system [2]. Parliamentary democracy was adopted as a political system as a result of a lack of choice [2]. parliamentary democracy persisted in Indonesia until around 1957 only because there was no other form of regime possible, there was no coherent civilian bureaucracy, no dominant national political party emerges, and no professional and centralized armed forces to control the archipelago. The parliamentary political system was also the result of an agreement between the government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands [2] [3].

Another reason in the parliamentary democracy implementation is the notion that the Western model was the ideal political system for Indonesia. The notion came from a small elite group influenced by European liberalism and socialism that believed Western-style democracy could protect Indonesia from turning to authoritarian rule and fascism [2]. Parliamentary democracy with its people's representative system, including the electoral system based on proportional representation [2] [4] was viewed as a clear expression of societal supremacy toward the state and consideration of Indonesian social and cultural plurality [1]. Another reason for implementing parliamentary democracy is the fact that Indonesia needs international support [2]. International support has encouraged the Indonesian elite to build a democratic government.

Nevertheless, the implementation of parliamentary democracy only lasted seven years. the system that provided a channel for political aspirations through political parties caused social instability during the implementation of the 1950 Constitution [5]. None of the political parties became the majority in the cabinet even after the first Indonesia election in 1955 [2]. Between 1950 and 1959, there were seven cabinet exchanges in Indonesia. Political unrest increased significantly after the 1955 elections. The continued political divisions among the Indonesian elite during the period of parliamentary democracy were the main factors contributing to the emergence of political unrest.

Besides, in this post-independence period, Indonesia experienced a regional rebellion that threatened national unity and the role of the army which weakened parliamentary democracy. Political dissatisfaction occurred in the mid to late 1950s as a result of differences between Java and outside Java. Some rebellions outside Java such as in central Sumatra, Eastern Indonesia and Kalimantan reflected local problems with the central government. The prime minister Ali Sastroamidjojo, who came to power as a result of the first election in 1955, was unable to overcome the rebellions. He further declared martial law in 1957 before resigning as prime minister. The

martial law proclamation came at the request of the military elite in Jakarta and was supported by Sukarno who tried to overcome the rebellion and to prevent advance divisions in the military [3]. Then in this instability state condition, the idea of Sukarno's Guided Democracy emerged in February 1957. Sukarno and his new political allies, the military and the communist party, took power from the cabinet and parliament. The conception of Guided Democracy would later bring the Indonesian communist party (PKI) into the cabinet According to [6]

B. *Guided Democracy*

Guided Democracy is a political system in which power was only shared by President Sukarno, the army and the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*: PKI) as the third partner in the coalition [2] [3]. President Sukarno considered that the parliamentary system was ineffective, and called Western parliamentary democracy as "50 percent plus one-democracy" [7] [8]. Sukarno believed that Western democracy did not fit into the culture of Indonesia and other Eastern countries. So, he sought a system based on traditional village discussion and consensus systems under the guidance of village elders and the concept mutual-self-help 'Gotong Royong' [9]. For the sake of national unity, Sukarno urged *musyawarah-mufakat* (a society grounded in consensus decision making) as the very idea of all political mechanisms. He measured the *musyawarah mufakat* was better fitted the nature of Indonesia than Western-style voting mechanism. Sukarno also proposed a mixture of nationalism (*nasionalisme*), religion (*agama*) and communism (*komunisme*) into the concept of the 'NASAKOM' government. The concept of Nasakom was intended to assuage the three main factions in Indonesian politics: the army, Islamic groups, and communists. Sukarno also established National Council (*Dewan Nasional*) to unite all socio-political power [2] [8].

Moreover, the implementation of guided democracy in Indonesia was also inspired by the People's Republic of China's experience. In 1956 during an official visit to China, President Sukarno was impressed by the progress made by the Chinese government [7]. Sukarno concluded that China's development was due to the leadership of Mao Zedong with his strong centralization power. Sukarno later believed that he had been chosen by destiny to lead the people and build a new society of Indonesia [9].

On August 17, 1957, Sukarno officially laid down the ideology of guided democracy. Guided democracy was later expanded into an ideology known as Manipol/USDEK [2]. Manipol/ USDEK is a Political Manifesto that comprised the 1945 Constitution, Indonesian-style socialism, guided

democracy, guided economy, and Indonesian identity. Sukarno, furthermore, formed a new cabinet replacing the transitional cabinet from the period of Parliamentary Democracy to the period of Guided Democracy. The new cabinet was named as '*Kabinet Kerja*' or 'Working Cabinet'. It was *Kabinet Kerja* which later worked and was tasked with carrying out Sukarno's ideas in the form of Guided Democracy [10]. This new style of Guided democracy brought Sukarno to the top of power. Some scholars asserted that Guided Democracy in practice is a political system with 'democratic clothes but minus democracy', where there was a termination of legislative bodies and the reduction of political parties (from 27 political parties to 10 parties) [9]. The reduction in the number of political parties was taken because in the period of parliamentary democracy the parties were vastly powerful, each party pay more attention to their own interests, and the interests of the state were often ignored [3].

Moreover, the way President Sukarno regulated the political system at the national level was also reflected in the managing of local affairs. Central-regional relations and local government were designed to adopt the guided democracy system through Law No. 1 of 1957 concerning Regional Government. In the guided democracy, there was no longer the spirit of liberalism and local autonomy as acknowledged in the previous parliamentary era. Following the president's decision in 1959, where Sukarno declared the return to the 1945 Constitution, Law No. 1 of 1957 on regional governments was not functioning anymore. The presidential decree on regional government and the presidential decree 1960 made local government accountable to the central government, not to the local parliament.

Guided democracy was implemented in Indonesia from July 1959 and fall on October 1965. the primary reason for the fall of Sukarno's guided democracy system because Indonesia was too poor to afford simultaneously a huge military buildup to make a militant and credible foreign policy [1]. Besides, Sukarno was more focused on politics than economic problems, and his guided democracy system failed to achieve a healthy economic system [3]. Another cause was the hyperinflation that affected every aspect of Indonesian and caused to the fall of Guided Democracy system. Between early 1962 and the end of 1965, there was a rapid decline in the value of the Indonesian currency, the exchange rate to the United States dollar changed from Rp. 470 to Rp. 50,000 per 1 dollar [10]. Exports and imports stalled, and there was a currency devaluation of Rp. 1,000 to Rp. 1 [5]. The economic collapse later was followed by a power struggle between the army and the Indonesian Communist Party [11]. Political and economic turmoil

was ended with the killing of six military generals and one lieutenant by left-wing elements in the Army (on the night of September 30, 1965). This chaos led to an Army coup on March 11, 1966 that overthrew President Sukarno and guided democracy. The military coup on March 11, 1966 gave executive power from Sukarno to Suharto through the Eleven March Order (*Supersemar*).

C. Suharto's Pancasila Democracy: The New Order

The primary reason for the fall of Sukarno's guided democracy was that Indonesia was too poor to afford simultaneously a substantial military buildup to make a militant foreign policy [1]. Sukarno, as the country's 'father of independence,' was more focused on politics than economic problems, and his guided democracy failed to achieve a healthy economic system (Bhakti, 2004). Between early 1962 and the end of 1965, there was a rapid decline in the value of the Indonesian currency, the exchange rate to the United States dollar changed from Rp. 470 to Rp. 50,000 per 1 dollar (Mackie, 1967). Exports and imports stalled, and there was a currency devaluation of Rp. 1,000 to Rp. 1 [6].

The economic collapse was followed by a power struggle between the army and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Political and economic turmoil was ended with the killing of six military generals and one lieutenant by left-wing elements in the Army (on the night of 30 September 1965). The army, led by Suharto, quickly reacted to blame PKI as the mastermind and decided to crackdown PKI and its sympathizers throughout the country. The army initiative finally led to a 'coup' on 11 March 1966, which eventually overthrew President Sukarno. *Supersemar* became the legal basis for the birth of the Suharto regime in 1966. *Supersemar* was a covert coup carried out by Suharto to expel Sukarno from power [12]. Sukarno's power was slowly reduced until Suharto was officially appointed as interim president in 1967 and installed as Indonesia's second president in 1968 [12].

After gaining power, General Suharto operated the terms 'New Order' or *Orde Baru* and called Sukarno's Guided Democracy period as the Old Order or *Orde Lama* [13]. The country's new leadership tried to assert that the distinctive form of Indonesian democracy based on five principles of national ideology actually existed: Pancasila Democracy [1] [11]. In the early period of the New Order, Suharto seemed to be introducing a new era with freeing political prisoners and lifting the restrictions on newspapers closed by President Sukarno [11]. In the following years, the New Order moved slowly but surely towards dictatorship.

Freedom of the press as a fundamental element of democratic governance was almost non-existent [14].

Suharto also banned the PKI and began to expand the political role of the army in politics. There was a 'dual function' doctrine which enshrined as a fundamental aspect of Pancasila Democracy. Dual function or *Dwifungsi* is a concept that legitimizes military involvement in social and political affairs that extends far beyond the usual scope of maintaining national security and providing national defense [15]. *Dwifungsi* was the central military doctrine during Suharto's New Order regime, where apart from its normal defense function; the military had a sociopolitical mission in promoting national development and ensuring political stability. With the dual function doctrine, the Indonesian Armed Forces had permanent responsibility in the field of national security and socio-political-economic development [1], as well as the formation of political programs, organizational ideology, security policies and patterns of civilian-military interactions during the Suharto era [15]. Besides, the military was given 100 seats in parliaments (around 20%) both national and local levels and strategic positions in the cabinet, bureaucracy and economic activities.

In 1964, Suharto and the Armed Forces created the *Golongan Karya*: Golkar (an acronym for the Working Group, or functional group) as a political tool to gain legitimacy to dominate [11]. Golkar originated from a large number of organizations (consisted of several hundred small functional groups, such as labors, farmers, students and religious teachers or *ulama*) created by the Armed Forces during the Sukarno era to replace political parties that caused political disorder under parliamentary democracy [12]. Suharto merged the organizations to manage a single organization, i.e., Golkar as the government party, to compete with existing political parties in parliaments [12].

This arrangement resulted in a significant victory for Golkar in the New Order first general election in 1971 [16]. Golkar, later, formed a majority in the parliaments and worked to maintain the regime that lacked support except the Armed Forces [12]. The Suharto regime's consolidation continued by castrating political parties through political party merging [16]. Suharto proposed to fuse political parties into three categories: religious, nationalist and functional. Ten political parties run in 1971's general elections but after that, there were only three parties (Golkar, PPP, and PDI) from 1977 to 1997.

The New Order regime also controlled political parties with restrictions of the branch establishments at the sub-district level. Under laws No. 3 of 1975 concerning political party and *Golongan Karya*, political parties were formally banned from

establishing branches below the district level. The government almost limited the political party's activities only in big cities [10]. This policy was implemented to legitimize the 'de-politicization' of society with a narrative that political parties should not 'destabilize' the country by provoking grassroots communities. This policy resulted in the weakening of political parties and prevented them from mobilizing voters at the grassroots level.

This policy on branch establishment restriction was applied to all parties except Golkar, a government party that took advantage of its alliance with the military and bureaucratic institutions [17]. Golkar won 62.8 percent of the votes in the 1971 general elections [18] and later become 'the always winner' in all six elections held during the New Order. Golkar and military factions always have a majority of seats in both national and local legislatures. The legislature could even perform the most basic functions in the law, namely budgeting and supervision [19]. As a result, the legislative performance was almost nothing more than 'stampers'. The central government effectively controlled regional political and economic spheres. Law No. 5 of 1974 became the legal basis for a very centralized regime in which the central government controlled local authorities [17]. To elect the local head executive position, three candidates were proposed by the local legislature, but it was the central government to choose one of them [21]. Regional heads (governor, mayor, and regent) were representative of the central government.

Moreover, the New Order took repressive policies against opposition groups [17] in maintaining the authoritarian regime. The brutal effectiveness of the repressive apparatus was an important reason why the Suharto regime survived more than three decades and the combination of repression with toleration for constrained forms of political action that made Suharto New Order one of the most durable and successful authoritarian regime [22].

In contrast to the repressive treatment given to political opponents, the New Order regime gave the reward to its supporters and followers. Suharto's loyalist generals, national politicians, bureaucrats, and local elites obtained incentives ranging from formal political positions such as ministers, governors, parliamentarians and ambassadors to positions on board of commissioners in state companies, and enjoyed privileged access to business licenses and state protection [12] [20]. The provision of rewards, including the material ones, for those who participated in formal regime structures, combined with the fear of sanctions applied to those who stepped outside them ([12].

The New Order built its legitimacy by promoting economic success and development [16]. The government strictly controlled the price of some basic products that were important to society, such as fuel and rice, using state subsidies [20]. Suharto also played an essential role in several social assistance programs such as grants through *Instruksi presiden/ Inpres* (Presidential Instruction grants) and *Bantuan presiden/ Banpres* (Presidential aid). By these presidential grants, people dubbed him as *Bapak Pembangunan* or 'Father of Development' [21]. To illustrate the good performance of the Indonesian economy in the early 1990s, influential international institutions, such as the World Bank, labeled Indonesia the as Miracle of East Asia and Asian Tiger Economies [9]. Blessed by an abundance of natural resources, particularly oil, the Indonesian economy had grown steadily until 1997.

One of the chief beneficiaries of the first decade of the New Order was military officers. Nevertheless, the Suharto regime faced challenges related to intra-elite conflict [15], whose relations were increasingly tense with the military. Former Army chief of staff, General Edi Sudrajat criticized the regime's unilateral decision in handling public matters and suggested the military should master the ability to accommodate discussion and to hold a rational political debate [15]. The conflict emerged openly in the election of the country's vice-president in 1988. The appointment of Lieutenant General Sudharmono to the position gave rise to stiff resistance from a strong military faction led by General Benny Moerdani. Moerdani group promoted the problem of the social gap (*kesenjangan sosial*) to criticize Suharto's policy management [15].

In reaction to the tension with the military, Suharto began to look for new political allies. Suharto chose a newly founded organization, the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Indonesia Muslim*, ICMI) under the leadership of Suharto's right-hand man, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie [16]. The establishment of ICMI that positioned B.J. Habibie's as head of the organization signaled the weakening of Suharto's ties to the military.

The system built by Suharto lasted more than three decades. During the New Order period, Indonesia was outwardly successful for Suharto and his cronies. The economy was booming, the military was under control, the aspiration of the Muslim community had been assuaged, and Golkar enjoyed overwhelming electoral victories. However, only a year after the 1997 general election, Suharto was forced to resign, and the New Order came to an end. The financial crisis gripped Indonesia and Southeast Asia in July 1997. The financial crisis severely

damaged the sole legitimacy of the regime: economic development. National security and stability were disrupted by mass murders and riots in Jakarta in 1998 [11]. The government was powerless to halt the economic decline, partly because of the president's unwillingness to take necessary reform policies that could hurt the interest of the crony capitalists who constituted the core of the patronage network, including Suharto's family members [11] [23].

D. *Democracy in the Post-New Order*

On Thursday 21 May 1998, following the massive riot in Jakarta, Suharto resigned as the president, and the presidency was transferred constitutionally to his vice-president, B.J. Habibie. Suharto delivered a short statement that he had decided to resign in recognition of the nation's aspiration for reform. Suharto also mentioned that in accordance with article 8 of the Indonesian constitution, Habibie as Vice President would continue the office for the rest of the remaining term [9]. To avoid the leadership vacuum in organizing the government, Habibie was asked to immediately carry out presidential oaths before the Supreme Court at the same time with Suharto's resignation. Habibie then officially became the third President of the Republic of Indonesia; thus, the Suharto era ended, and a new era began

Habibie began his presidency amid chaotic economic and political conditions. Many opponents of the New Order targeted their attacks on Habibie. Habibie received many criticisms because he had been Suharto's 'golden-haired boy' [21]. In the early months of his presidency, Habibie announced broad-range reforms that effectively dismantled most of the New Order foundations. The Habibie government introduced fundamental changes, namely: laying the groundwork for Indonesia's democratic transition and decentralization, and allowing self-determination for East Timor [24]. Habibie realized that over the years, various Western governments had criticized the lack of democracy in Indonesia, the record of poor human rights, and Jakarta's centralized control. Habibie, thus, introduced a series of reforms that Indonesia had long needed but could not be implemented under the New Order [24].

He also acknowledged that political stability and economic recovery could only be achieved if the legitimacy of the government was not in dispute. To end political uncertainty and the decline of public confidence in state institutions, Habibie decided to shorten his presidency and put forward elections from 2003 to 1999. As the prerequisite for democracy, the Habibie government also prepared democratic elections, where political parties and candidates compete without fear of government intimidation and

voters were free to carry out their choices. Under the New Order, as seen above, the government limited the number of political parties and their activities. As a result of democratic transition, more than 200 parties were registered to the Ministry of Justice, although in the end 'only' 48 parties were eligible to participate in the 1999 elections.

Another critical reform introduced by the Habibie government was of broad regional autonomy. Habibie's support for the shift from highly centralized state system under Suharto to decentralization and regional autonomy was related to his experience of living in Germany where a federal government system granted broad rights and autonomy to state governments, which enabled them to develop without undermining German unity [24]. Given its huge fundamental changes, the autonomy was saw as one of the most radical reforms. The Habibie government created a team mandated to explore decentralization reforms led by Ryaas Rasyid (a political scientist with decentralization expertise). The decision to implement decentralization later was made in November 1998. Without a particular debate and with little feedback from politicians, the president signed the decentralization laws in May 1999 [2]. The legal bases for the decentralization finally came into force in January 2001 under Law No. 22 of 1999 concerning Regional Government and Law No. 25 of 1999 concerning Financial Balance between Central and Regional Governments. Both laws legitimated broad authority and resource transfer to the sub-national level mostly bypassing the provinces. Under Law No. 22 of 1999, the authority over all matters was transferred to the regional governments except five main areas: defense and security, foreign policy, fiscal and monetary, judicial, and religious affairs. The new decentralization policy fundamentally changed the relationship between the central and regional governments, changing the character of the Indonesian state [24].

The fundamental change in the introduction of the 'big-bang' decentralization policy could be seen in the strengthening of the position of local parliament. The local parliament had the authority to elect regional heads and their representatives without the intervention of the president. The local parliament could also dismiss the regional head if he or she was found being committed a violation or misuse the authority. These new arrangements made the position of the local parliament very powerful and no longer subordinated as during the New Order periods [21]. Besides, the decentralization law required regional heads to provide an 'accountability report' to the parliament at the end of every budget year. The local parliament (DPRD), finally, could recommend dismissal of the local head if the reports were rejected

for the second time. The decision of rejections of an accountability report was often driven by the chance that the regional head would be willing to pay the legislature members. The payments were also routinely made during the regional head election process. In many cases, 'money politics' occurred when the successful candidate was not from the party that held the most seats in the legislature [2].

The establishment of the 1999 laws did not last long. There was an urge to revise the decentralization laws that came from various parties, especially the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) and the Association of Indonesian Provincial Governments [24]. Both of them were parties that had lost much authority due to the enactment of the decentralization policy. The argument for the revision was to restore the hierarchy and overhaul of the distribution of power between different levels of government and the threat to national integrity.

The authority given to regency (*kabupaten*) and city (*kotamadya*) dramatically strengthened the local government's sovereignty with authority distinct from that of the central government. Therefore, the implementation of these laws was more often colored by problems such as the tug of interest between the center and the regions, disputes between regions related to the management of various financial sources, land disputes and natural resource management, exploitation of taxes and levies which lead to high-cost economies.

The debate for the decentralization policy revision took long periods, from 2001 to 2004. Finally, the new decentralization law was passed in 2004. The law came on a package consisted of Law No. 32 of 2004 concerning Regional and Law No. 33 of 2004 concerning Financial Balance between the Central Government and Regional Government. The new law shifted the authority balance from the region towards the central government. The hierarchy that was abolished by the 1999 decentralization laws was reestablished, and central authority was given to the central government in accordance with the concept of the unitary state. Yet the 2004 laws still allotted the most administrative matters to the regions that continued to manage hugely grown share of public expenditure.

The most significant change in the new decentralization law of 2004 was the introduction of direct election for executive leaders both at the national and sub-national levels. The direct election for local heads is called *Pemilihan Kepala Daerah or Pilkada*. *Pilkada* could not be separated from the model arranged for the direct presidential election newly practiced in 2004. Following the 2004 presidential election, many direct local elections were held to elect regional heads. The new law provided a

foundation for deepening local democracy, just as the constitutional amendments and revised electoral laws had created a political system that mostly met the standard international criteria of democracy.

E. The Recent Debates: Structural Approach and Actor-Centered Approach

The impact of Indonesian electoral democracy's 'one man, one vote' was highly contested among scholars. There are two prominent approaches in the analysis of Indonesian politics after the fall of Suharto. Since the New Order collapsed in 1998, scholars have strived to characterize the deep architecture of Indonesian politics [26], that centers around the question of whether the old regime figures continue to dominate Indonesian politics or whether groups marginalized during the dictatorship have obtained influence [25]. The structural approach that leads to oligarchy thesis has maintained that small groups of rich people rooted in the New Order regime continue to determine politics in contemporary Indonesia, while the agency approach—which looks at plural actors—counters the oligarchy thesis.

Structural approach

The thesis of oligarchy and the pluralist approach have different views about the fall of the Suharto regime and the subsequent assessment of democracy. The mainstream Indonesian scholars argue that the fall of the Suharto regime was due to successful mobilization of pro-democratic civil society, yet the literature of the oligarchy assumes that the fall of Suharto was more due to tensions between Suharto and the oligarchs. The essence of the concept of oligarchy is the emphasis on the superiority of material or wealth resources as political or economic forces. In the contemporary study on Indonesia, oligarchy thesis more dominates the discourse, as it is proven by many citations of these writings of oligarchic scholars [25].

The oligarchic theory states that although institutional reforms are made, democratic change remains superficial because the core structure of power remains unchanged [23] [25] [25]. The oligarchic scholars have highlighted the durability and continuity of the old elite and the oligarchic structure in the post-New Order government. They have argued that in the post-Suharto era, Indonesia is still influenced by the continuity of oligarchic structures and disproportionate influential actors who have had superior material resources. The formal structure of electoral democracy can coexist with oligarchic power, so that democratization has reduced the form of Indonesian politics without getting rid of oligarchic power. Thus, democratization only shifts the form of the oligarchy from *sultanistic* features to the 'untamed

ruling oligarchy' [23]. These oligarchs have managed to hijack post-Suharto reforms and reorganized their interests. Robison, Hadiz, and Winters acknowledged that decentralization and new democratic institution have a real effect on oligarchic power, but for them, the influence of oligarchs could not be reduced by competitive election processes. Therefore, although free and fair elections increasingly grew after 1998, power continued to preserve a handful of wealthy people.

Post-1998 Indonesia represented a complex but stable mixture of oligarchy and democracy [23] [27]. Having rules and norms in the democratic realm does not ensure that legal institutions tame the oligarchs. Indonesia is an important example of what might be called lawless democracy. Indonesia's political system has been rapidly turning into an 'electoral oligarchy' where the executive's office is increasingly linked to personal wealth [23]. Some oligarchs are directly involved in the rules when they operate within party institutions and compete for positions.

Moreover, Hadiz and Robison define oligarchy as a system of power relations that allows the concentration of wealth, authority, and its collective defense [27]. They also contended that individuals always find themselves needed to accommodate the logic of existing power structures, and claimed that institutional changes (such as democratization, decentralization, changes to multi-party systems, free elections, and the emergence of vocal civil society movements) did not contribute significantly to the collapse of the oligarchic structure of the previous authoritarian [27]. Their analysis is characterized by skepticism about liberal democracy in Indonesia.

Democratization is not a significant disturbance or even a reduction in oligarchic forces [23]. Two basic expressions in the context: oligarchs and oligarchy. Oligarchs are defined as "actors who control a large concentration of material resources that could be used to maintain or increase their wealth and exclusive social position." From the definition, three things need to be considered. They are: extreme concentration of wealth must be embedded in the oligarchs, the use of political instruments to concentrate wealth, and increased personal wealth or wealth defense as the goal. Winters defines the oligarchy as a politics of wealth defense and the oligarchy has various forms along with the changing threat to the oligarchs and the response to it. For the present, oligarchs and oligarchy hold a central place in the Indonesian analysis politics [26]. The scholars on Indonesian also shared opinions that reformist leaders might emerge, but all would be absorbed quickly in predatory politics: surrender to a logical system of oligarchic formation that never changed.

Actor-centered approach

In the current Indonesian political studies, there are also proponents of an actor-centered approach. The actor-centered approach does not entirely ignore the condition of the structural scope for elite analysis in society. However, actor-centered approaches differ from structuralists because they do not consider them to be the decisive and dominant factors for elite social composition and behavior. Elites are described as different people from the masses because of their extraordinary capacity or psychological character, not because of their social class or status. In the current Indonesian studies, scholars who are leaning toward an actor-oriented approach are political scientists such as Edward Aspinall, Michael Buehler, Thomas Pepinsky, William Liddle, Marcus Mietzner, and others who may also be categorized as critical-pluralists.

They suggest that material resources are necessarily at play in any aspect of Indonesia's political economy [25]. The effects of material resources on political conflict are always conditional on non-material factors. Critical-pluralist offers tools used to understand Indonesian politics, as well as research programs that can encourage the analysis of material wealth and political power further than existing research on oligarchs. The critical-pluralist approach pays more attention to the significant role of political actors and individuals that can voluntarily and strategically influence and determine the nature of political structures. The explanatory power of the oligarchy thesis is weak because it is unable to account for the kind of policy outcomes that have been evident in both national and local politics after 1998. Examples of policies that have changed include those associated with women's affairs, labor issues, and human rights [26]. Actor-centered scholars have contended that the policy change at a far higher level is the result of the elite actions, and not determined by the structure. The elite actions are the crucial explanatory variable in an actor-oriented analysis, while a structure may be the best variable that affects. The actor-centered approach pays more attention to the significant role of political actors and individuals that can voluntarily and strategically influence and determine the nature of political structures. Liddle (2014), for example, proposes a theory of action to understand post-New Order Indonesian politics better. The theory of action conceptualizes the role of the actor in the political system.

There are gaps in the thesis of oligarchy, namely the failure to theorize the role of mass and agency mobilization in Indonesia's democratization process [26]. The oligarchic argument has many shortcomings and loses a critical dimension in examining contemporary Indonesian politics, and

scholars who use the oligarchic framework have produced "monotonous characterizations of Indonesian politics" at the end of the New Order and the subsequent reform period (called *reformasi*) (Aspinall 2014). Such characterizations do not recognize the influence of non-elite forces in shaping regime change or post-authoritarian politics, including through alliances with elements of the ruling elite. Also, the New Order regime was not the result of mass mobilization but was primarily due to the 1997 economic crisis and the tensions around Suharto (Suharto's children and his inner circle) [26]. Indonesia's democratic transition was driven from below. The material gaps had political consequences, yet the analytical focus on oligarchic domination alone cannot understand or explain the history and trajectory of Indonesian politics [26].

In contrast to the oligarchic thesis, some critical-pluralist scholars maintain that new institutional design paves the way for elite behavior change. For the political elites, the institutional change such as decentralization and direct elections has created a strong incentive for all political players to design policies to attract constituents [26]. and has imposed a reorganization of local elites to build relationships with the population [25]. It is also claimed that Indonesians have voted for attractive leadership that is both responsive and responsible to citizens' demands at the national level. At the local democracy, the decentralization of power facilitated the emergence of reform-minded individuals. While acknowledging that such leaders are rare, these scholars observe that provinces and districts that have been blessed with such good leadership have seen change ranging from the inclusion of hitherto marginalized groups in political deliberations to the reform of tax codes in favor of private sector interests [26].

Pluralists doubt that the oligarchs are as dominant in Indonesian politics as Hadiz, Robison, and Winters's claim. They argue that after 1998, representatives from a variety of interest groups, including entrepreneurs, politically ambitious newcomers, and civil society representatives, entered politics. There, they effectively counterbalance oligarchic dominance [25] [26]. Besides, institutional changes such as decentralization and democratization positively contribute to increasing elite political competition and increasing the role of constituents or the public. For pluralist approach, institutional changes have empowered Indonesian voters to have a significant voice in the outcome of inter-elite competition for political and economic forces, and having channeled political competition in a new direction [26].

III. CONCLUSION

It is hoped that democracy will facilitate greater access to human security, to public officials and accountability, which in turn increases demand for goods and delivery of public services, such as access to adequate food, housing, health, education, and employment. Addressing the unequal distribution of power in society is another important factor in improving human development policies and outcomes. This discussion above has illustrated the accumulation of academic works dealing with democracy and democratization in Indonesia. Since acquiring independence in 1945, Indonesia has experienced four different periods of different government systems. All those phases of governments claim to be democratic. However, the Indonesian political system could be classified into two periods: the authoritarian period and the democracy period. President Sukarno's Guided Democracy (1959-1965) and President Suharto's Pancasila Democracy (1966-1998) as an authoritarian period. While parliamentary government (1950-1957) and the post-Suharto era (1998 - present) are considered as a democratic period.

In the current debate, scholars have different views regarding the change and introduction of the new democratic institution in Indonesia. The structural approach that relies on oligarchy thesis and the pluralist approach that focuses on agencies. The structural approach maintains that the structure of the state elites has not changed much during the democratic transition. This structural approach has received many attentions in the study of contemporary Indonesia. Actor-centered scholars claim that institutional changes such as decentralization and democratization have positively contributed to the acceleration of elite political competition. The arguments of the above two schools of thought are fundamental to assess the current process of democratization of Indonesia that could support human security in Indonesia.

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