

The Rise of Sharia Issues in the Contexts of Power Relation in Contemporary Indonesia

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ABSTRACT

Sharia issues emerged and developed in Indonesia before and after the 2019 presidential election, as a response to the authoritarianism of the ruling government, its ignorance to the poor, and its resistance to Islam. This phenomenon has become an attention of the international society by virtue of the fact the the issue provides “a new data for working in research and a topic in seminar”. In the Indonesian context, this phenomenon is of a current issue, which needs to be studied and found its exact solution. This is because, issues related to sharia in Indonesia are very complex and emergency. Because of it, this study tries to question about the patterns of sharia issues that emerge in Indonesia, their main factors, and their relation with the existing relations of power in Indonesia. This article will answer these questions by using a qualitative method with a historical approach and a power relation theory. Data of this research are processed with an application of NVivo 12 Plus, in order to discover models of sharia issues, its basic roots, and its patterns of power relation.

Keywords: *Sharia issues, relation of authority, Indonesia*

1. INTRODUCTION

The current rise of sharia issues[1] in Indonesia has many to do with the exercise of power relation. It manifests in the form of contestation between the religious-pancasilais group[2] who support the establishment of sharia Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic state), and the pancasilais-religious group[3] who want to keep Pancasila as the country’s ideology. This phenomenon can be a disaster for the ruling government, if it is not handled with care, tenacity, and precision. The pancasilais-religious group, represented by *Nahdhatul Ulama (NU)* and nationalism groups, who are anti sharia issues and radicalism, has won the 2019 presidential election of Indonesia. This means, for now, Indonesia will still be based on Pancasila, thus, a country that is pluralist. Yet, things may change toward and after the 2024 presidential election.

A statement from many observers, such as Isnatin Ulfah (2014), that “fundamentalism had stabbed the heart of NU”, is not an invented story or a baseless fear, because now that fear is happening. A textual, puritan, and radical understanding of Islam has penetrated into the internal parts of NU, and there is a shift of understanding of Islam among elites of NU and people in NU pesantren (Islamic boarding schools that becomes the basis of NU), from the one that is moderate to that that is radical. There is an assumption that fundamentalism movements have increased their activities so massively that established Islamic organizations such as NU become less popularⁱ. Their activities include, among others, baseless accusation toward NU religious leaders as being infidel, apostate, and liberal. Purposes of their activities, in particular, are to

promote the establishment of Islamic state, jargon of *sharia* Indonesia, and formalization of sharia law.

Yuyun Sunesti, etc. (2018) has observed the life of a group of young *Salafi* girls in Surakarta who wear *niqab* (face-covering veil) and call themselves ‘the group who migrates to ‘a *hijrah* (conversion) for a *kaffah* (comprehensive) Islam’). This group begins their movement by changing their dressing style with the one they considered “*lebih syar’i*” (more Islamic), that is a *gamis*, a long dress with a hat. They understood that Islam is identical with Arab, so that they alter their life style into that look like an Arab style (a kind of Arab-style veil with flowing robes, or when men avoid wearing trousers below their ankles (isbal) and adopt long beards (lihyah).[4] Her finding is a unique negotiation of self-identity among young Salafi-niqabi girls for living in a modern and globalization era in the form of ‘*hijrah* experience’.

Muzayyin Ahyar and Alfitri (2019) mentioned that there was an online network on the Internet, especially social media such as Facebook, twitter, and instagram, that tag-lines itself with this jargon, “the spirit of religious-pancasilais, integrated with the 212 movement”. This group has carried out a series of “defending Islam” demonstration, most notably on the second of December 2016, asking the government to bring Ahok to jail on accusation of blasphemy. Ahok is a Christian Chinese Indonesian who run for the 2017 Jakarta’s gubernatorial election, in competition with Anies Baswedan, a Muslim of an Arab descendant. According to their article, the Islamic social movement in the millennial era, especially after the 212 movement, consistently takes in the form of

identity politics, which uses Islam as the “clicktivism” of their movement.[5]

Azyumardi Azra (2018)[6] has studied about the relationship between religious piety and political behaviors. He argues that more than 99% of Muslims in Indonesia believed that religion is a significant element in their lives. However, in reality, with regard to their political choices, the number does not implicated to the electoral voices gained by Islam-based political parties, specifically at the general elections after the Soeharto era. This indicates that, essentially, religious piety in Indonesia is not related to the main matter in political and economic life. Indonesian Muslim’s political behavior is more heavily influenced by the social and economic transformation than by that of politics.[7]

Earlier researchers have analyzed that Islamic resurgence in Indonesia had started to rise since the 1980, and had its peak season in 1998. Their rise has popularized a new model of Islamic populism, one that (re)promote the use of sharia issues for political purposes. This group claim that Islam is the only true religion and only Muslim who has right to be a president in Indonesia. With this rationale, they authorized themselves to organize a series of demonstration, resisting the ruling government, and trying to stop the run of the candidates of the opposing party, both in Jakarta’s gubernatorial election in 2017, and Indonesia’s presidential election in April 2019.

Based on the above background, this research wants to explore the patterns of sharia issues, their triggering factors, and their relationship with the existing power of relation in Indonesia, which have never been studied in any research before.

2. RESEARCH METHOD

This research uses a qualitative method with a historical approach and Michel Foucault’s power relation theory. This is a library research kind. This is because this research needs a comprehensive analysis to answer the research questions that are formulated in Introduction: a deep and comprehensive analysis, thus, is needed. This research starts with data collection, data processing, and data analysis, using historical approach, power relation theoryⁱⁱ, and the researcher’s creative imagination. Result of the data analysis is processed and presented by the help of online application, called NVivo 12 plus, in order to help attain answer concerning the patterns of sharia issues, their basic factors, and the form of power relation that exists in them.

3. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

3.1. Patterns of Sharia Issues

Sharia issues lent a lot of Islamic vocabularies, such as *jihad* (holy war), *hijrah* (religious migration), and *Allahu*

Akbar (Allah is the greatest). These terms are created, constructed, and spread across all spaces in Indonesia, with its peak taking place before and after the presidential election in 2019. The phenomenon coincides with the rise profiting religion for political purposes by elite authorities in politics. Below are some to the sharia issues that emerged in Indonesia lately:

3.1.1. Religious Politicization

The sharia issues are identical to religious politicization made and spread across the country by the religious-pancasilais group. Members of these groups are the proponents of Islamic ideology, and ex-demonstrators of the 212 movement. The sharia issues, including a baseless accusation to president Joko Widodo as both a PKI and an ignorant Islam, since 2015, was sold to lay but devout Muslims for political manipulation, in order to overthrow the existing regime, and to either get or refuse a political victory. Their reason is because the sharia issues have so far been effective to be used as a political instrument, evidently influencing the political attitudes of lay Muslims who are not knowledgeable about religion but putting their full faith in it. The evidence is that almost 50% of Indonesian Muslims were successfully made to hate president Joko Widodo, because of these sharia issues.

The politicization of the Qur’anic verse of al-Maidah is an effort to mobilize the Muslim masses with an Islamic sentiment, *Tamasya Al-Maidah*, drawing them to choose a particular Jakarta’s governor candidate who came from their band. The committee of *Tamasya Al-Maidah*, Ansufridi ID Sambo, explains as follows. “The movement had nothing to do with the then political election in Jakarta. Yet, the name Al-Maidah will remind Muslims in Jakarta to give their vote to a Muslim candidate, as it is arguably suggested by the Qur’an in the chapter of Al-Maidah. In general, Islamic political parties are in opposition to democracy because it is deemed as a Western product, and it has no relevance with sharia concepts on “God’s sovereignty”. He further said that the movement was an effort to control and to ensure the gubernatorial election of Jakarta was a peaceful, fair, and democratic one.[8]

In addition that, a mosque named as “baitullah” was used for political mobilization, as it was use as a place for campaigning activities, in the form of Islamic learning (tausiah), during which audiences were approached to give their votes to the Muslim candidates. Moreover, there was a banner containing a message that threatened Muslims who did not give their voice to a Muslim candidate, if they dead, their corpse will not be buried. As such is clearly indicating a politicization of religion, again, at its worst.[9] Another mosque that was used for religious politicization is the Istiqlal mosque in central Jakarta. There is a fact that suggests that Istiqlal is now far from the spirit of “peaceful religion”. Muslim politicians joining the 212 movement, such as Amien Rais (Muhammadiyah), Hidayat Nur Wahid (Prosperous Justice Party, PKS), along with other ultraconservative Muslim scholars, and thousands of

Muslims, performed a noon prayer (dzuhur) together in the mosque, which was followed by them making a declaration, called some muftis and muslim personages, and by the thousands Islamic members organize pray dzuhur together ended by a declaration named by term “Risalah Istiqlal” (The Istiqlal Letter). Essentially, the declaration demands Muslim members not to choose a non-Muslim for Jakarta’s governor, clearly referring to Ahok.

In addition, the Qur’anic verses and Hadits are also often utilized as an instrument of religious politicization by these groups. There are five verses of the Qur’an that are often abused for attacking political rivals. They are al-Maidah number 51, Al Baqarah number 191, At Taubah number 5, Al Anfaal number 60, dan verses on hypocrisy. Moreover, there is a n activity that is called, Tamasya Al-Maidah, or Al-Maidah Vacation. This is a politicization of religion as its worst, because the Qur’an has been used as a political instrument, under the pretext of “defending Islam”, while in fact is for supporting support to one of the governor candidates running in the Jakarta’s gubernatorial election in 2017.[10]

3.1.2. Politicization of Hijrah

In this era, the one of trends followed by the millennial generations in Indonesia is the hijrah trend. This is an Islamic discourse offered by the religious-pancasilais group (ideology Islam), which becomes an important part in Indonesian discourses of political Islam, especially among young, urban, middle-class Muslims, who hold superficial understanding of sharia. This discourse has inspired many young Muslims, not only in daily practices of religion, but also in daily expressions of their political aspiration. This practice is allowed to happen because there is a relation of power at work. The groups of political Islam refused the existence of the ruling government, accusing them as anti Islam. They expressed their political aspirations by fashioning themselves with life styles that indicate, at least at the superficial level, the ‘correctness’ of their Islam, such as by donning themselves with ‘sharia’ dresses, a symbol of their hijrah, meaning practicing the comprehensive form of Islam (Islam kafah).

The term hijrah for them has various meanings. Firstly, for a girl it is started by covering the forbidden parts (aurat) of woman when in public. This is manifested in the following forms. (1) Muslim woman must wear a gamis (Arab-style shirt) or loose clothes (no tight cloth); (2) wearing a trousers as an underwear, so that if the skirt is lifted by wind, or when striding, the woman’s aurat is still covered; (3) wearing stocking because leg is considered aurat; (4) wearing long-sleeved clothes covering to the wrist because it is also an aurat; (5) wearing wide hijab, or veil, it is not entwined, covering the chest and back of waist; (6) wearing a first-layer hijab so that the hair is not exposed, because it is also aurat; (7) A hair bun is forbidden, and hair should be tied lower; (8) wearing flat slipper or shoes, and no high heel.[11]

Secondly, for a man, hijrah is identical with growing the beard. Usually a man artist will grow a thick and long beard. His pants is cut short, not reaching the ankle, and there is a black note in his forehead, indicating his frequent prayers. Thirdly, hijrah is translated as a changing attitude: more devoted to God, a better character, and more knowledgeable about Islam.[12]

In reality, hijrah that is propagated by the religious-pancasilais group is a brainwashing strategy to inculcate a blind religious obedience among the new hijrah Muslims to their group’s leaders. If some one has become an obedient follower of hijrah, he or she will do whatever their leaders ask them to do, including to give their vote for winning a particular politics of power. This is, according to writer, where the relation between the politics of hijrah and the politics of power lies

3.1.3. Radicalism

According to Nadirsyah Hosen,[13] radicalism in Islam can be classified into three folds. The first is the takfiri group: one that regards other factions that is different from it as infidel, even if the difference between them is of trivial mater in religion. This group is classified as a radical in faith. The second is the jihadi group: one that has the will to kill other people in the name of Islam. They are able to carry out an illegal action with no reason justified by Islamic law. It is classified as a radical in action. The third is a group wishing to change the state’s ideology by building an Islamic state or khilafah. Their action destroy the agreement of the country’s founding fathers. They are classified as a radical in politics. The fourth is a combination between the three groups, that is, those who would like to shoot an accusation of being kafir and to kill other Muslims who are considered as kafir, and to establish a state that is Islamic (khilafah) in Indonesia. It is the most dangerous radical group, let alone if they have an international network.

Their difference must be accurately studied before any program of de-radicalization is conducted, so that no wrong decision is made, which is only to make them more dangerous. The government’s job is to organize its society in the name of the prosperity of the society itself. The correct de-radicalization action, as a lesson learned for the society, is the one that is done wisely, that is, a dialog between the government and the society on how to prevent together ideas and action of radicalism in Indonesia.

Seemingly, radicalism has become an emergency issue in Indonesia. The case in point is the stabbing of Wiranto, the then minister of politics, law, and security, by a man reported to have been involved in ISIS.[14] This incident had made Joko Widodo mad, and acted decisively to elect the ministers in his 2019-2024 cabinet, appointing for example an ex-vice commander of the national army generals, Fachrul Razi, as a minister of religion. His rationale is that Razi is expected, with his military background, to be able to destroy radicalism in Indonesia. Yet, there was an opinion that as such has many to do with

his Javanese strategy of the so called “Nabok Nyilih Tangan” (to slap someone using another person’s palm). This is the reason why Joko Widodo did not choose his minister of religion from the NU leaders who are more expert in religion, but went on to pick Fachrul Razi, with his military backgrounds, believed to be able to pacify the alarming emergence of radicalism in Indonesia.

The similar rationale applies to the appointment Prabowo Subianto, Joko Widodo’s only rival during the presidential election who received his main support from the radical Islamist groups, as the minister of defense in Joko Widodo’s 2019-2024 cabinet. His appointment is a slap in the face for the radical groups who were his loyal supporters. It is President Jokowi’s excellent political strategy to silent the radical group by including Prabowo Subianto into his cabinet.

Politics is only to attain a triumph. It is a big loss for the defeated party if they are caught up in their disappointment. Thus it is understandable if Prabowo decided to join the winning party, a.k.a. Joko Widodo: he got both a position in the government and a protection of his political career in the future from the winning political groups.

According to Azzumardi Azra, the emergency statues of the development of radicalism in Indonesia, relates to the fact that many college students and campuses have become the main target of membership recruitment activities by the religious-pancasilais group. Students of elementary and secondary schools are recruited through the popularity of Integrated Islamic School movements. Students of senior high school through ROHIS’s Islamic learning activities, and universities students through the university’s mosque movements. Recruiting the university students is done under the reason that they are in the stage of ‘searing for an orientation’, and as they come from remote villages, struggling to cope with new ways of learning in university and facing economic difficulties. They are a vulnerable group who is easy to be brainwashed, in this case, by the radical ideas and understanding of Islam. According to Azra, despite Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia is forbidden, practically, they keep doing their activities by using another name. It must be anticipated by security agency including by leader of campus because they are now coming with another name, that is, the 212 group.[15]

3.1.4. Holy War Propaganda

Holy war propaganda is a strategy utilized by political Islam to espouse victory, or also to reject defeat of a political authorization. This case happens, both in Jakarta’s 2017 gubernatorial election moment and in the 2019 presidential election of Indonesia. According to Noorhaidi Hasan,[16] this reality has correlation with his research performed in twenty provinces in Indonesia in 2013, concerning the narrative of political Islam, or Islamism, and identity politics, showing that majority people in Indonesia, including the ulama, society leaders, students, and college students, have been quite sensitive toward

radical communities, which according to their judgment, has damaged the image of Islam, by abusing symbols of holy war for a political propaganda instrument. What is ironic about the radical groups is that they believe in the legitimacy of Indonesian state and Pancasila ideology, but they hold an intolerant views and attitudes toward adherents of other religions, by accusing them as as an “infidel” who has no rights to be a leader in Indonesia, as it is what they did to Ahok in Jakarta’s 2017 gubernatorial election.

The holy war propaganda was again used by the radical groups to refuse and sabotage, in a street action held on Mei 22th 2019, to the announcement of the voting result of the 2019 Indonesia’s general election, by the election commission (KPU). Amin Rais, one of the leaders of this movement, called what they did in the streets, more or less as a people power that is inspired by the Islamic doctrine of jihad (holy war) in order to refute the “fraud” that they assumed to have been done by the KPU. What they called as a holy war, is in reality an action of disturbance, of violence, burning car, throwing firecracker to police ranks, and attacking Brimob (police) barracks at Petamburan.

3.1.5. Sharia Indonesia

The Islamic political groups that hold dear the religious-pancasilais views admitted the legality of Indonesia as a state that is based on UUD 45 and Pancasila, yet in their additional note, the Pancasila that is based on Islamic sharia or sharia Indonesia. Explicitly, this group has rejected the system of democracy, because according to them, it is incompatible with God’s sovereignty, whereas democracy is a system of political that is based on the people’s sovereignty.

What is wished by that political Islamic groups has been implemented through the organization of the fourth mufti meeting, organized in Lorin hotel, Sentul, Babakan Madang, Bogor-West Java, on August 5th 2019. This meeting concluded eight points of agreement. They are, firstly, refusing tyrannical authorization, and taking space with that authorization; secondly, refusing law verdict which is not accordance with justice principle. Thirdly, inviting Muslim to make an alliance for a mutual struggle in these areas: 1. law enforcement toward religious blasphemy accordance with the mandate of constitution; 2. preventing the rise of Marxism and communism ideology; 3. refusing all realization of capitalism and liberalism such as selling state asset to foreigner; 4. forming a tragedy investigation team for the general election 2019; 5. stopping dissolution to Islamic society organization, a criminalizing of ulama, and returning Habib Rizieq to Indonesian without any requirements; and implementing sharia Indonesia by making the Qur’anic verses as the principle of the constitution. And many others.[17]

3.2. The Roots of the Rise of Sharia Issues

No things come out of a vacuum. Reformation applying a democracy system has been rejected, as well as been utilized by the political Islam groups in such a way that justifies them to offer than Islam is the only solution to everything, including problems of the state. As there is an effort to confirm Islamic ideology through formal application of Islamic law in Indonesia. Likewise, the existence of Islam as religion adhered by 85 % populations of Indonesia,[18] has been used as a rational basis for their demand of shariatization of Indonesia. Sharia issues are created by the political Islam group in order to diminish their fear toward the majority voice of Islam in the grass root level of Islamic Society. This phenomenon, according to researcher, is the main root that has been being used by the political Islam group in Indonesia, including concerning the production of sharia issues for achieving the desired goals.

Sharia issues are made and shared massively by the 212 movements, which is an alliance of HTI, FPI, and PKS, and is of radical groups either in faith, action, or even in ideology. The main root of their emergence is because of the existing contestation in Indonesian public sphere, between the groups of pancasilais-religious Muslims who are moderate, nationalist, and consistently defending the legality of Indonesia as a nation-state, and the groups of religious- pancasilais Muslims who are wishing Indonesia to change Indonesia into an inclusive sharia-Islamic state.

The case in point of the sharia issues category is accusation from community of political Islam that Ahok is the blasphemy doer relating with "al-Maidah verse 51"; accusation of communism, where President Jokowi is accused as a child of a communist party and anti-Islam; infidel can not be a leader, specifically for Indonesia. The leader of Indonesian nation must come from devout Muslim backgrounds, and are obeying to Islam.

The examples described above are the embodiment of the contestation era of creating a sharia Indonesia among the political Islam groups out of the pluralistic Indonesia after the presidential election April 2019. Right now, Indonesia is dominated by the Pancasilais-religious group, who will to defend Pancasila and UUD 1945 and the state's ideology. This group refuses to use sharia issues in public space, by giving an understanding of *Nusantara* Islam, one that is peaceful, inclusive, and friendly to local traditions.

3.3. Sharia Issues and Power Relation

The sharia issues are created and published through social media by the political Islam groups across the grass roots societies of the country, in order to refuse the ruling government whom they considered an authoritarian and anti-Muslim. The regime's policies are accused to be leaning toward foreigners, especially the Chinese Indonesian communities, and ignorant to the poor. The rise of prices of basic needs, health insurance, education, gas, oil and electricity is assumed to have been caused by the

regime's indifference toward the lay people. It is a form of political Islamic thought movement, which give rise to the creation of sharia issues as a rejection to the establishing powers in the country.

The wish of the political Islamic groups is that they want to be led by a regime that is care enough for Muslims, ulama, and that prices are cheap. However, their wish has never been realized: a historical fact that only increased their anger.

Thus, it is more precise to argue that the sharia issues are produced because of the politics of power relation in political areas, not because of the religious matters.[19] Yet, in practice, the sharia issues are made to seize Muslims' attention in Indonesia to overthrow the existing regime, to defeat political figures who is the rival of their political figure, or to refuse a win of their rival as reason *jihad fi sabil Allah*.

This is how a triangle shape of competition between a relation of political powers (of religion) has happened in Indonesia. This political contestation occurs between the ruling regime, the pancasilais-religious group or moderate Muslim communities represented by Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and the religious-pancasilais groups represented by the 212 groups (members of HTI, FPI, and PKS). The regimes in power consistently fighting to defend Pancasila and UUD 45, the Pancasilais-religious group struggling to support the nationalist regime, and the religious-Pancasilais groups fighting to slow down the nationalist regime by making the sharia issues.

4. CONCLUSION

The rise of sharia issues in contemporary Indonesia has caused a big problem in the country. They include the politicization of religion (Islam and sharia law), the politicization of hijrah, radicalism; holy war propaganda; and the sharia Indonesia. This phenomenon is a result of a political contestation between three different groups who are either in power, in defending those in power, and in seeking to take over the power. The first group is the ruling government, the second group is the moderate Muslim groups who want to defend Pancasila as the state's ideology (or the pancasilais-religious groups), and the third is the radical Muslim groups who want to Pancasila with sharia, and established an Islamic sharia state of Indonesia (or the religious-pancasilais groups). The contestation that becomes the background for the rise of the sharia issues, is not out of religion, however strong is the symbol of religion (especially Islam) in it, but is out of politics.

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