

Some Thoughts on Improving the Level of Actual Combat Training

Peng Zhao^{1,*}, Jianghua Huang¹, Guo Li¹

¹Unit No. 31608, Xiamen, Fujian 361000, China

*Corresponding author. Email: 3313355677@qq.com

ABSTRACT

With the implementation of our army's reform, in order to promote the generation of combat effectiveness, combat training has become a powerful measure and guarantee. To achieve the goal of strengthening the country and building the army, we must closely focus on the requirements of actual combat training, learn from the good experience and practice of foreign army actual combat training, find out the main problems existing in the current actual combat training, and explore the Countermeasures of actual combat training, so as to lay the foundation for winning the future joint operations.

Keywords: *Troops, actual combat, training*

1. INTRODUCTION

With the adjustment of the establishment system, our army is gradually on the right track in the new period of military construction [1-3]. At present, the reform is stepping into the deep water area, the role of the army is becoming more and more prominent, and the function positioning is becoming clearer and clearer [4-6]. Therefore, it is necessary to deepen the reform in the training methods and effectively improve the actual combat training [7-10] level of the army.

We should carry out the party's thought of building a strong army in the new era, keep an eye on the enemy, make great efforts to carry out combat oriented military training, deeply promote the innovation of digital army construction management and operational application, and concentrate on building elite combat forces [11-12].

Focusing on the goal of being able to fight and win a war, taking the military struggle preparation task as the traction, we should vigorously strengthen the actual combat military training, practice and innovate the training mode under the condition of informatization, make good preparation for war, train the troops strictly from the difficulties and improve the combat ability from the actual combat needs.

2. FOREIGN ARMY'S PRACTIAL TRAINING EXPERIENCE WORTHY OF REFERENCE

Because of the importance of Combat Oriented Military Training in war, today's foreign armed forces all take actual combat training as an important aspect of military capacity building, and strengthen actual combat training as the most important factor to maintain a high degree of war preparation.

The guiding ideology of the U.S. military is to train like fighting in peacetime and to fight like training in wartime. The U.S. military training Code stipulates that training is not allowed if the environmental conditions do not meet the actual combat standards, and even proposes that the training should be higher than the actual combat, and it is difficult to carry out actual combat. According to U.S. Defense Department officials, a series of training and exercises conducted by soldiers participating in the Iraq war before the war were more difficult than actual combat. The U.S. Army arranges high-intensity training twice a year for each month, with only 1 rest per month-- The US military attaches great importance to the reflection on the lessons of the war. When reflecting on the Iraq war, the Americans pointed out that during the Gulf War in 1991, the Navy communication system did not match the air force's communication system, and the joint air combat command center had to send copies of air combat instructions to aircraft carriers by plane, which made many favorable fighters in vain. After the war, the U.S. military strengthened the joint training of service integration, accelerated the development of information technology, and increased the data processing capacity from one T-1 line during the Gulf War in 1991 to more than 100 T-1 lines, greatly improving the capacity and speed of information transmission, thus solving the problem of integrated and cooperative communication between services. During the Kosovo war, it took about two hours for the US military to find the target and destroy it; the war in Afghanistan was only 19 minutes; and the war in Iraq was almost real-time.

In the aspect of actual combat training, especially after the first Chechen War, the Russian army also made painstaking determination to strengthen the reform of military training, so as to make the training as close to the actual combat as possible. The Russian army stipulates that the company's tactical exercise shall not be less than three days and nights, with a depth of 20-40 kilometers; a battalion's tactical exercise shall not be less than four days and nights, with a depth of 40-60 kilometers; a regiment

tactical exercise may last seven days and nights with a depth of 100-150 kilometers; a division tactical exercise shall not be less than seven days and nights with a depth of 150-200 kilometers. In order to deal with the difficulties and be strict and proceed from the actual combat needs, the Russian army stipulates that the two exercises can not be carried out in the same field and subject, and must be exchanged training sites or drill on unfamiliar terrain. The organization and implementation of the Russian military exercises are also quite standardized and rigorous. There are clear requirements and specific index provisions from the determination and determination of the general gist of the exercise, to the preparation of the exercise plan, the establishment of the guidance and dispatching organization, and the organization of on-site investigation and various support. In the exercises of Russian airborne troops, live fire assault is carried out on the ground before landing, and the course of "movement under enemy fire" is also carried out with real guns and live ammunition.

Britain has also invested a huge cost in practical training. The British army has the largest simulation training ground for urban warfare in the whole NATO. For soldiers who are about to participate in overseas operations or peacekeeping missions, special training must be conducted in such training grounds to meet the requirements of overseas missions. In addition, the British army is also at the forefront in the construction of modern combat training environment simulation. Through the use of digital technology and computer simulation means to simulate the realistic battlefield, we can improve the training efficiency and save resources, at the same time, we can train and evaluate the actual combat level of the officers and soldiers participating in the training. The British army has also set up "adventure training centers" in overseas bases to cultivate the perseverance of soldiers, improve their survival ability in the wild, and forge combat effectiveness in extremely harsh environments.

For France, Japan and other countries, they have also invested a great deal of cost in actual combat training. France has 13 large-scale training bases, Japan has 6 large-scale exercise venues, and all of them are equipped with large-scale simulation training system. Through the training mode of combining simulation with actual equipment, the combat effectiveness of the troops in complex environment is continuously enhanced.

3. THE MAIN PROBLEMS EXISTING IN THE CURRENT ACTUAL COMBAT TRAINING

Through the analysis of the actual combat training of the foreign army, we know that there is still a certain gap with the foreign army. The actual combat training of our army has also been put forward and practiced for many years. However, due to the long-term peaceful environment, the idea of being a peace soldier and a stable officer occupies a large "battlefield", and the overall level of actual combat

training is still relatively backward. There are three problems

First, it is not grounded. Is training for the sake of seeing or training for war? The answer is self-evident, action is tacit. There are policies at the top and Countermeasures at the bottom. It can be said that there are all sorts of ways and patterns emerge in an endless stream; the tunes and voices are louder and louder, the banners and banners are displayed one by one, and the news propaganda is boastful one by one. It was formalism, but it was talked about as experience. Second, it is not practical. Peacetime training is divorced from actual combat, and the training level of the army can not represent the actual combat level. In a non war military operation drill, a certain unit was handy and easy to use at the door of its own house. However, when it came to the actual exercise site, it was rigid and inflexible to face the "enemy" in the shape of a puppet. It was passive and "beaten". After the event, it was told that it was just a show off and would not come true. Thirdly, it was not strict. There are more "rehearsals" in military exercises, but fewer real confrontations. For example, reciting lines at war meetings, even if confrontations are conducted, they are mostly tactical confrontations with little information technology content. Although improvements have been made in the past two years, people still have a lot of imagination about whether they are exercises or acting.

There are many reasons for these problems. On the one hand, some leaders at all levels still have the idea of ensuring safety, and they are relatively conservative in carrying out training, and dare not challenge difficulties and take risks; on the other hand, our facilities and equipment are relatively backward, which can not meet the requirements of "training close to actual combat". However, I personally think that at the end, the root is at the top, and the main reason is that there are deviations and deviations in the ideological understanding of commanders. The training of formalism, the training of striving for the future, the training of blindly seeking new things, the training of eager for quick success and instant benefit, and the training of performance engineering. Such training is obviously out of touch with the actual combat requirements, and it is difficult to improve the combat capability under the condition of informatization. When we organize training, we should always think, "can the troops trained in this way be able to fight", "will future wars really be like this", "can you fight and win battles?" Only by solving the problem of cognition can we better solve the problem of material level. When our understanding of "actual combat" develops, military training will follow up to the "actual combat" direction.

4. SOME COUNTERMEASURES FOR STRENGTHENING ACTUAL COMBAT TRAINING

The actual combat training is easy to understand in theory, but it is easy to get out of shape in practice. I think we

should achieve practical results in the following three aspects.

4.1. We Should Be Resolute in Pragmatic and Practical Thinking

It is necessary not only to be pragmatic in style but also to be practical in thinking, so as to deepen the grasp of the law of practical training. With the development of war, actual combat training is also a dynamic development process. With the change of the times, its characteristics, laws and principles are also changing. However, no matter how powerful the technical means and how advanced the weapons and equipment are, any opponent must face it; whether it is a complex electromagnetic environment or harsh weather or unfamiliar terrain, any environment must be adapted; whether it is a war operation or a non war military operation, any task must be completed; whether it is informatization or mechanization, it must aim at actual combat. It can be said that if we grasp the "actual combat", we will grasp the support point and breakthrough point of military training, and we can better regard today's training as tomorrow's operation.

4.2. It Is Necessary to Give Prominence to the Practical Basic Training

In the future, the actual combat is bound to be information operation and system operation, followed by the continuous expansion of actual combat basic training content. Basic training is to learn and master the basic knowledge, basic tactics and basic techniques, and it is the basis of actual combat training. At present, the actual combat level of the army is not high. One of the most important reasons is that the relationship between major tasks, combat readiness duty and peacetime basic training is not well handled, resulting in weak basic training normalization and insufficient basic training details, resulting in the lack of new backbone talents in some key posts, main combat platforms, important elements and units, and even a fault crisis, and basic training is weak. It is a tendentious problem that all units have to face in the actual combat training. No matter how sophisticated the weapons and equipment of an army are, if the officers and soldiers are not proficient in using weapons and equipment, do not understand their basic principles, are not familiar with their performance, do not know how to maintain and repair, that is, a pile of scrap iron, and can not form a realistic combat effectiveness. Liu Huaqing once pointed out "the modernization of weapons and equipment is the material basis of military construction, but an army lacks training, and no matter how well equipped it is, it can not win a battle. The decisive factor is the well-trained officers and men. "

4.3. We Should Pay Attention to the Training of Practical Adaptability

Practical training refuses to be fixed mode. In the future, personalized and non stylized features will be more prominent. "Accidents" will continue to emerge. In the Iraq war, the operational area controlled by the third infantry division of the US army reached 16100 square kilometers at the maximum, which was far beyond the scope of the doctrine. As a result, the command and control, communication and operational support of the US army encountered a series of unexpected situations. However, in peacetime training, the U.S. military has highlighted the contingency training for "unexpected circumstances", and quickly launched the "unexpected situation" disposal plan, and finally successfully controlled the battlefield situation. To strengthen the training of emergency response ability, we should first strengthen the training of communication and liaison. Focusing on the expansion of future combat space, we should strengthen the training of communication emergency response ability under the condition of long-distance; we should focus on the rapid mobility of troops, and strengthen the training of communication emergency response ability in the case of electromagnetic attack by the enemy in view of the complex electromagnetic environment in future operations. Secondly, we should strengthen the training of response ability in combat operations. Focusing on the frequent transformation of combat styles, we should strengthen the training of contingency ability in the process of operational transformation; we should focus on the characteristics of increasing battlefield mobility and rapid change of operational objectives; we should strengthen the training of contingency ability in grasping fighter planes and rapidly selecting operational targets; we should also focus on the needs of joint operations of various services and arms, and strengthen the training of contingency capability in joint operations of various services and arms.

5. CONCLUSION

In the joint operation environment under the new system, combat effectiveness generation is a major goal of our army at the present stage. The generation of combat effectiveness is mainly reflected in the daily combat training. This paper introduces the good practice and experience of foreign army's actual combat training, analyzes the main problems existing in our army's actual combat training, and puts forward corresponding countermeasures and suggestions, so as to provide reference and reference for the construction and development of our army's actual combat training, lay a solid foundation for improving the actual combat training level and commission support for future joint operations.

REFERENCES

- [1] Vitaly Tsymbal, Appropriate Adjustment to the Military Construction, in: SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013, p. 43–45. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2330923>
- [2] Jasper Kremers, Bas Rietjens, Hans Voordijk, Sirp J. De Boer, Construction contracting and civil–military interaction, in: Construction contracting and civil–military interaction, 2009, pp. 871–883. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01446191003762256>
- [3] Aaron Wenzel, Plutarch, Alios Aristeides, and the Military Construction of Hellenism, in: SSRN Electronic Journal, 2010, pp. 1–2. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1603707>
- [4] Aleksandra Rogowska, Cezary Kuśnierz, Determinants of the attitude towards combat sports and martial arts, in: Journal of Combat Sports and Martial Arts, 2013, pp. 185–190. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5604/20815735.1090740>
- [5] V.P. VIDUTO, Combat Employment (Combat Actions) of Aerospace Forces and Artillery Formations: Aspects of Content and Research, in: Military Thought, 2017, pp. 150–161. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.21557/mth.48907744>
- [6] Zbigniew Bujak, Dariusz Gierczuk, Stefan Litwiniuk, Professional activities of a coach of martial arts and combat sports, in: Journal of Combat Sports and Martial Arts, 2013, pp. 191–195. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5604/20815735.1090742>
- [7] Chun-hui YUAN, Research on Actual Combat Mode Innovation of Peacekeeping Police Training Under the New Situation, in: DEStech Transactions on Social Science, Education and Human Science, 2017, pp. 11–15. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.12783/dtssehs/icssm2017/10377>
- [8] Dariusz Gierczuk, Zbigniew Bujak, The analysis of coordination training means used in the training of wrestlers, in: Journal of Combat Sports and Martial Arts, 2013, pp. 19–23. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5604/20815735.1072230>
- [9] Volodymyr Kharabara, Iurii Repilo, Partial methodology for assessing the level of methodological training of trainers during combat training of tank brigade during combat readiness, in: VUZF REVIEW, 2020, pp. 54-57. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.38188/2534-9228.20.1.08>
- [10] P.S. Bhat, Combat psychiatry: Indian perspective, in: Medical Journal Armed Forces India, 2017, pp. 404-406. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mjafi.2017.01.011>
- [11] I.I. KOROLYOV, Methods of Using EW Forces and Assets in Combat as an Arm of the Ground Forces, in: Military Thought, 2016, pp. 60-66. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.21557/mth.47912144>
- [12] Yu.I. LASTOCHKIN, Combat Employment of EW Forces as an Element of Ground Forces Operations, in: Military Thought, 2017, pp. 19-28. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.21557/mth.50290435>