

Research on the Causes, Predicaments and Countermeasures of Mobilized Governance Taking the Special Governance of Crime Crackdown as an Example

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ABSTRACT

This paper takes the special governance of crime crackdown that is being vigorously promoted as an example, and analyzes the connotation, evolution process, characteristics, causes and predicaments faced by mobilized governance. It proposes to promote the transformation and development of mobilized governance and realize a new type of normal governance with institutional building as the focus, law-based governance as the core, and the cultivation of civil society as the impetus.

Keywords: mobilized governance, crime crackdown, normal governance

I. INTRODUCTION

For the first time, the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China put forward the goal of "fully deepening reforms and promoting the modernization of the national governance system and governance capabilities". Subsequently, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China put forward reified action strategies, which provided a guide for advancing the modernization of the national governance system and governance capabilities in the new era. It can be seen that studying the characteristics, causes and difficulties of mobilized governance, vigorously promoting the transformation and development of mobilized governance, and realizing a new type of normal governance have important practical significance.

II. THE CONNOTATION OF MOBILIZED GOVERNANCE

Mobilized governance is not a simple addition of movement and governance, but an organic superposition of the two, and is closely related to China's political mobilization and mass movement.

Mobilized governance refers to the governance process in which the governance subject with a certain political power, when facing some major unexpected events or difficult problems that are difficult to be solved by conventional governance, turns to adopt a top-down and political mobilization approach in order to quickly solve these problems [1].

III. THE EVOLUTION OF MOBILIZED GOVERNANCE

The origin of China's mobilized governance can be traced back to the Qin Dynasty more than 2,000 years ago, when the centralized system of prefectures and counties was formed initially. However, the mobilized governance studied in this paper refers to the governance pattern of a modern country, and its evolution process can be roughly divided into three stages since the establishment of the nation.

A. *The period of social and political movements after the founding of the People's Republic of China*

In the nearly 30 years from the founding of new China to the reform and opening up, China's social and political movements have been characterized by a large number, a wide range, and a deep influence. From the "socialist industrialization and socialist transformation of agriculture, handicraft industry and capitalist industry and commerce" for the establishment of the socialist system, to the "People Community Movement" and the "Great Leap Forward" movement aimed at the great development of production, and even the far-reaching "Great Cultural Revolution" movement, these political movements are typical events of mobilized governance and have had a profound impact on social development.

B. *The period of severe crackdown after reform and opening up*

"Severe crackdown" is a unique judicial term that emerged in China after the reform and opening up,

which refers to the activities of severely cracking down on serious criminal crimes in order to solve very prominent social security problems in a certain period of time. Its main method is to strengthen the functions of the relevant law enforcement departments to judge and execute penalties more heavily and more quickly. The goal of the "severe crackdown" operation is to efficiently and quickly resolve outstanding problems in social security in order to maintain social stability. The period of the severe crackdown was basically the period from 1978 to 2010. China has implemented a total of four severe crackdown movements in 1983, 1996, 2000, and 2010 respectively.

C. The period of special governance

Special governance refers to a mobilized governance activity carried out in a specific field. In 1987, the 13th National Congress of the Communist Party of China clarified the development of special governance activities. Since then, mobilized

governance has entered a period of special governance from the severe crackdown movements. The relevant documents of the 13th to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China have different expressions on special governance.

Since then, at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, it was proposed to build a "five-in-one" national overall layout. This layout is significantly different from the requirements of the period of social and political movements and the period of the severe crackdown. The overall layout of the "five-in-one" requires effective governance of the difficult governance issues that have remained so far, and the goal orientation of the special governance is highly consistent with the overall layout of the country's "five-in-one". Therefore, after 2013, China issued a series of announcements (see "Table I") to guide the development of a series of special governance actions.

TABLE I. NOTICE ON SPECIAL GOVERNANCE ACTIONS FROM 2013 TO 2018

Release time	Announcement name
2013	"Regulations for Party and Government Offices on Practicing Economy and Opposing Waste"
2016	"Notice on the 13th Five-Year Plan for Poverty Alleviation"
2018	"Special Campaign Supervision Work Program of National Crime Crackdown"
2018	"Three-year Action Program for the Improvement of Rural Human Settlement Environment"
2018	"Three-year Action Plan to Win the Blue Sky Defense War"

It can be seen from "Table I" that the central government attaches great importance to the special governance movement. Especially in 2018, it issued three announcements of special governance actions one after another, and the special governance for the crime crackdown is one of the focuses. Therefore, this paper uses it as an example to analyze the characteristics, causes and predicaments of mobilized governance.

IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF MOBILIZED GOVERNANCE

The special governance of crime crackdown is a typical mobilized governance. Taking the crime crackdown as an example, through analyzing the subject, object, goal, means, process, and effect of governance, the characteristics of mobilized governance can be concluded.

A. The governing subject is authoritative

In China, the mobilized governance is a common governance pattern to solve major emergencies and difficult social problems. Mobilized governance is usually carried out by the party and government offices, judicial administrative organizations and other subjects that have certain powers. When carrying out a special governance for crime crackdown, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the

State Council first issued the "Notice on Launching a Special Campaign for Crime Crackdown" in January 2018, making overall arrangements for the crime crackdown. Party committees at all levels are required to play a leading role, and governments at all levels regard the crime crackdown as a major political task to promote all departments to perform their duties and jointly manage. Public security organs, courts, procuratorates and other departments are required to cooperate closely. Therefore, the special governance for the crime crackdown has demonstrated strong deterrent force and high execution power, and has demonstrated its authority in policy formulation, implementation, supervision, feedback, and summary. At the same time, the above-mentioned organs have corresponding constraints and restrictions on all areas of society, and can relatively quickly solve social problems involved by vicious power. It can be seen that the subject of mobilized governance has strong authority [2].

B. The governance object is specific

The objects of mobilized governance can also be referred to as governance objects. These governance objects are usually concentrated in specific areas or specific fields. This is a concentrated expression of the specificity of governance objects. The targets of the special governance of crime crackdown are very clear. In short, they are the vicious power, including the

"black protective umbrella", grassroots micro-corruption, rural bullies and vicious power of clans, and professional medical disturbance personnel. Before launching the special governance of crime crackdown, relevant departments have already conducted statistics, analysis and classification of a large number of targets involving vicious power to ensure rapid and efficient special governance. It can be seen that the objects of mobilized governance show specificity [3].

C. Governance goals are predetermined

Predetermination is to set goals in advance, to solve existing social problems, not to prevent them in advance. The overall goal of the special governance of crime crackdown is to further crack down on vicious power that has not been completely cleaned up in the previous movements of striking the gangdom and exterminating the evil to further solve the hidden problems in social security, and to maintain social stability. In addition, in the special governance of crime crackdown, the goals that should be achieved at each stage are also subdivided. The stage goal of 2018 is to take temporary solution, that is, to curb the outstanding problems of illegal criminal activities committed by vicious power; the stage goal for 2019 is to assault fortified positions, that is, to dig deep along the line and reach the bottom one by one; the stage goal in 2020 is to effect a permanent cure, that is, to achieve an overwhelming victory in the crime crackdown. All provinces and regions also have their own corresponding plans and goals for the special governance of crime crackdown. It can be seen that the governance goals of mobilized governance are predetermined.

D. Unconventional governance methods

The means of mobilized governance is unconventional. The special governance of crime crackdown is not a conventional system of governance, and the methods it adopts are obviously unconventional. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council, when formulating a special governance plan for the crime crackdown, required that the problems of vicious power should be basically solved within three years, reflecting the high requirements and strict standards for solving problems in a short time. At this time, it is difficult to achieve a short-term solution to the problem of vicious power by using conventional governance methods. As a result, all provinces and departments have adopted a top-down political mobilization method, and by means of incentives, people are motivated to expose and report the vicious power[4]. In addition, methods such as leadership inspections, the establishment of special teams, and the establishment of special online report platforms have been adopted. These governance methods are all unconventional in nature.

E. The governance process is mandatory

The authority of the mobilized governance subject largely determines the compulsion of the governance process [5]. In the special governance of crime crackdown, the subjects that formulate policies are the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council. The two subjects can be said to have extremely high authority in China; secondly, in the implementation, the "top leaders" of the local governments are basically responsible for the overall responsibility, and adopt high-pressure methods to demand rapid results in the crime crackdown, which further strengthens the compulsion during the governance process; finally, during the period of special governance of crime crackdown, incentives, penalties, and various policies and regulations in various provinces, regions and cities have been promulgated to strengthen the compulsion during the governance process.

F. The governance effect is repetitive

The mobilized governance is often of the howling winds and driving rains style, and can achieve significant results in a short period of time, and has the effect of restraint over certain major social problems. But when mobilized governance enters the intermittent period or ends, these social problems will resurface, and some will strike with even greater force[6]. The movement of striking the gangdom and exterminating the evil for more than ten years has dealt a heavy blow to the vicious force and played an important role in social stability. However, due to its incompleteness, part of the vicious power have not been completely cleaned up. Under this campaign, they have been hibernated. With the advancement of science and technology and the development of society, they have put a coat on their own existence, and even more covertly endangers social security. This is the upgraded version of striking the gangdom and exterminating the evil — crime crackdown. However, if only unconventional governance methods are adopted in the special governance of crime crackdown, a perfect long-term mechanism can't be established, and the vicious power will reappear, making the effect of mobilized governance repetitive.

V. CAUSES OF MOBILIZED GOVERNANCE

China's mobilized governance can be traced back to the beginning of the formation of the prefecture and county of centralized county system. In the practice of state governance after the founding of the People's Republic of China, it is relatively effective in dealing with some major social issues, which is in line with China's actual national conditions [7].

A. The mobilized governance has path dependence

It can be seen from the event of "calling the soul back" and the reform of "being made a public possession of loss in fire consumption" in Chinese history that the "mobilized" governance forms will appear repeatedly in different historical periods. This shows that the cause of mobilized governance can't simply be attributed to some specific scene factors, but has profound historical reasons.

Since the Zhou Dynasty replaced Shang Dynasty and divided the world, it gradually formed the idea of great unity of the world. Until the King of Qin swept and unified the six warring states, a centralized system with prefectures and counties was established, and the great unity system was formally formed, and the contradiction between the centralized unified system and the effective local governance also emerged. This contradiction was reflected in the contradiction between the jurisdiction of the central government and the governance power of local governments. The relationship between the two presented a tense and opposite situation. The central government tended to concentrate power and resources upward, which greatly weakens the ability of local governments to solve governance problems; however, local governments often appear to be independent and out of control, posing a threat to the central government in a unified system. This contradiction can't be fundamentally resolved, and only a balance can be found in the contradiction movement between the two [8]. Mobilized governance is one of the mechanisms developed in response to this contradiction and in response to organizational failures and crises.

From the First Emperor of Qin built the Wuchi road and the Lingqu Canal, to the political mobilization of the "calling the soul back" in the Qianlong period, the Boxer Movement supported by the Qing court at the end of the Qing Dynasty, the mass revolutionary movement that "a single spark can start a prairie fire" before the founding of New China, the social and political movement at the beginning of the founding of New China, and to the campaign of "severe crackdown" after the reform and opening up and the special governance actions now, the "mobilized" governance model continues from ancient times to the present. This governance method that began in Qin Dynasty is still used today, reflecting the historical dependence of its governance path.

B. Being in line with China's actual national conditions

One of China's basic national conditions is that it has a large population base and insufficient per capita resources. This will bring about two problems: the structural contradictions of a super-large society and insufficient governance resources. Super-large societies

are faced with such a problem. Every public decision and government plan has an extremely large number of target groups with extremely diverse composition. The larger the size of the target group and the more diverse its composition, it will be more difficult to use public policies to influence the behavior of the target group, and the degree of achievement of policy goals will become more difficult to measure. When social governance resources are relatively sufficient, this problem can be better solved. However, China's governance resources are obviously insufficient, which poses a severe challenge to governance. Behind the special governance of crime crackdown is the severe challenge of increasingly complicated social security issues to the governance of China's public security field.

According to statistics, the number of police officers of administrative establishment in China is about 2.1 million. According to the sixth demographic census, the total population of the country is 1,339,724,852. Therefore, each police officer is responsible for approximately 637 people's security and other services. This is just the average data. In relatively remote rural areas, two or three police officers are even responsible for the household registration and public security of an area with thousands of people. There are 157 police officers per 100,000 in China, 223 in Switzerland, 275 in the UK, 345 in Japan, and 384 in France. Through horizontal comparison with developed countries, China's lack of governance resources has been highlighted. Therefore, mobilized governance, as an expedient measure to make up for the lack of government mobilization ability and correct the failure of the market and social order under the condition of insufficient governance resources, has often become a tool of government governance [9].

C. Relative effectiveness of governance

The reason why the mobilized governance can exist for a long time is because that when conventional governance tools are inefficient or fail to solve problems, the use of mobilized governance tools can often achieve significantly better performance than conventional governance, and thus can also be recognized and accepted by the national governance system. But this is a governance tool used in some special situations, and is relative to conventional governance tools, so it is called relative effectiveness. The relative effectiveness of mobilized governance can be explained from three perspectives: short-term performance, long-term performance, and exemplary role.

The short-term and direct performance of mobilized governance and the repetitiveness of governance effects make it easy for people to ignore the long-term and indirect performance that it contains. It is true that most of the mobilized governance can't escape the rule of

"problems occur — govern — problems recur — re-govern". But it is undeniable that this process of dialectical negation contains positive and upward changes. Mobilized governance has made long-term and substantive contributions to society through multiple repetitions and cumulative effects. It can be seen from the movement of striking the gangdom and exterminating the evil that even though the movement of striking the gangdom and exterminating the evil for more than a decade has not uprooted the vicious power, it has clearly curbed the scope of activities of the vicious power and hit the arrogance of the gangdom. The rate of crimes by the gangdom has been declining year by year, which has acted as a deterrent and warning to potential gangdom members, and the social security has improved significantly. The accumulation of effects of repeated movements of striking the gangdom and exterminating the evil has played a very important role in social stability and the smooth operation of the economy.

In addition, the mobilized governance can also serve as a model for solving similar problems [10]. Trying out first and then popularizing is a successful experience of China's public domain governance, and the mobilized governance is a good example of this. The national action against the SARS epidemic in 2003 has played a positive role as a model for handling the COVID-19 epidemic in 2020. For example, the Xiaotangshan Hospital, which was built seven days during the SARS epidemic, provided valuable experience for the Leishenshan and Huoshenshan hospitals built three days during the COVID-19 epidemic. In addition, measures such as lockdowns, and delays in resuming work and returning to school in various provinces have also obviously borrowed from the measures taken during the SARS epidemic.

VI. THE PREDICAMENTS OF MOBILIZED GOVERNANCE

A. The governance effect of mobilized governance is repetitive

China's reform and opening up is a process in which problems continue to emerge. The problems that arise in this transitional period are highly anomalous, complex and interdependent, which makes the implementation of policies difficult to a certain extent. For example, the main goal of the special campaign of crime crackdown is to fundamentally curb vicious power, comprehensively rectify gangdom-related crimes violating public security, and maintain social stability. However, it is impossible to fundamentally solve the problems of the deep-seated causes of the vicious power, how to put an end to gangdom-related public security chaos, and remove the black "protective umbrella" from the system. In the face of social security problems that have multiple roots, it is impossible to

completely cure them with just one special campaign of crime crackdown. Therefore, the effect of mobilized governance is short-term and repetitive, and it treats symptoms rather than root causes.

B. The mobilized governance will weaken or even violate the authority of the law

The foundation of governing a country is the legal system. The law is a long-term and relatively stable existence. To maintain the normal governance of a country, it is necessary to rely on the legal system. At the same time, law is also the fundamental way to solve social problems. The mobilized governance usually plays a remedial and temporary role, but law enforcement agencies often dissimilate temporary policies into laws to implement them. In order to achieve governance effects, they may sometimes even violate the inherent spirit of the law. This will not only encourage law enforcement officials to wantonly enforce the law and ignore the law, but also easily cause the masses to have a negative impression of the image of law enforcement agencies, and even induce violent protests, which will seriously damage the credibility of the government and the authority of the law [11].

C. The mobilized governance will promote speculation in disguise

The true deterrence of punishment depends on the inevitability of punishment, rather than the severity of punishment. However, the mobilized governance is usually a periodic and insufficiently thorough law enforcement action, and once periodic omissions in the punishment of illegal acts occur, criminals will have the illusion that their illegal acts will not be punished, they will use various loopholes to carry out illegal activities in the gap of mobilized governance [12]. The upgrade from "striking the gangdom and exterminating the evil" to "crime crackdown" is based on this consideration. It is hoped that the "crime crackdown" will be used to further crack down on the vicious power and try their best to reduce the illusions of the vicious power. However, most mobilized governance will not take or take timely "upgrade" measures, which will promote the speculative psychology of illegal crimes in disguise, and make the occurrence of social chaos appear periodic.

D. The high cost of the mobilized governance

The mobilized governance is to solve a major social problem in a short period of time. It faces many difficulties such as short time, heavy tasks, wide scope, multiple departments, and complicated details. In order to achieve governance goals as soon as possible, the government is often willing to handle things at any cost. In the special governance of crime crackdown, various local governments have introduced various incentives

to encourage the masses to report criminals and use the governance resources of various departments on a large scale. This has indeed improved governance efficiency, but is bound to bring the increase of governance costs. In addition, the effect of mobilized governance is repetitive, and the government tends to treat symptoms rather than root causes, which will also increase the cost of governance.

E. The diminishing utility of mobilized governance

When the mobilized governance is used for the first time or the first few times, good results can be received in a short period of time, but the effect is not continuous. As the number of uses increases, the mobilized governance will experience diminishing marginal utility. The more mobilized governance of a certain social problem is adopted, the worse its effectiveness will be. The movement of striking the gangdom and exterminating the evil, which lasted for more than ten years, achieved good results in the early stage, but the later actions could not really hit the vicious power in "invisibility" and the rural bullies in remote areas, and their effectiveness gradually became lower. This is also one of the reasons why the movement of striking the gangdom and exterminating the evil must be upgraded to the crime crackdown.

VII. COUNTERMEASURES TO SOLVE THE PREDICAMENT OF MOBILIZED GOVERNANCE

The mobilized governance and normal governance are interdependent and complementary, and at the same time there are contradictions between the two. The mobilized governance will disrupt the arrangement of normal governance and compete with it for governance resources. Today's Chinese society is becoming more diverse and complex, and public interests are also showing a trend of continuous dispersion. Periodic, top-down, and mobilized governance can't completely solve public problems. Therefore, the mobilized governance must be transformed into a normal governance in order to realize the modernization of national governance capabilities and governance systems.

A. System construction: the origin of force for marching toward normal governance

The mobilized governance is a process of concentrating manpower, material resources, and financial resources in a short period of time to solve unexpected social problems or confirmed problems that are hard to get rid of. However, due to the existence of mobilized governance dilemmas, these social problems can't be eradicated. Huntington once pointed out: the lack of institutional supply is the source of socio-political instability. It can be seen that the key to effective governance lies in reasonable institutional arrangements. Only by regularizing and

institutionalizing mobilized governance and establishing a long-term mechanism can these social contradictions be fundamentally resolved [13].

First of all, the governance subject should gradually transform the mobilized governance thinking to the institutional governance thinking; second, it is necessary to establish a set of long-term mechanisms for unexpected social problems or confirmed problems that are hard to get rid of, including information collection and uploading mechanisms for social problems, decision-making, implementation and supervision mechanism of problem solving and the feedback mechanism of policy effect. At the same time, it should ensure the timeliness of information upload and policy issuance; finally, a scientific and complete governance performance evaluation system should be constructed. It is not only necessary to assess political performance, but also to assess performance costs. It should not only pay attention to the evaluation of superiors to subordinates and internal evaluations, but also to the evaluation of subordinates to superiors and third-party evaluations among the people.

B. Governance under the rule of law: the core towards the normal governance

In the mobilized governance process, in order to complete the target within a limited time, the local government will adopt a way of law enforcement of the howling winds and driving rains style, often breaking the routine, even alienating temporary policies into laws, and leading to selective enforcement and illegal enforcement by law enforcement departments. The opportunism of law-abiding and law enforcement existing in the conventional governance process has become more serious, affecting the construction of the formal legal system, which may also trigger larger-scale social conflicts and governance crises. Therefore, only by promoting the transformation of mobilized governance to the rule of law can normal governance and the modernization of national governance be realized.

First of all, perfecting the legal system of governance is the top priority for the legalization of governance. Although the current legal system of governance in China has taken shape and laid a certain foundation for rule-of-law governance, this legal system is still incomplete, and the phenomenon of no law to obey still exists. This requires that people must pay attention to the improvement of the relevant legal system. Second, it is urgent to speed up the construction of a law-based government. The law-based government is the focus of advancing the process of rule of law. The government is not only the enforcer and defender of the law, but also one of the main bodies of social governance and mobilized governance. And the government's knowing the laws and abiding by them

and fair enforcement of the law are also a key link in the process of law enforcement. Therefore, in the transition process of mobilized governance, the construction of a law-based government is indispensable, and the construction of a law-based government should be the focus of rule-of-law governance. Finally, social governance is an important area of national governance. In society, it's needed to vigorously promote the spirit of the rule of law, establish the concept of the rule of law for citizens, get rid of the thought of the rule of man for thousands of years, let the thought become the leader of action, and promote the rule of law in social governance.

C. Cultivating a civil society: an important boost towards normal governance

One of the causes of mobilized governance is the lack of governance resources, and cultivating a civil society can effectively make up for the lack of governance resources. A well-developed civil society, especially the third sector, can effectively intervene in the service and governance level of the public domain, integrate the interest requirements of relevant social classes, and play its unique coordinating role outside the government to achieve the purpose of collaborative governance.

At present, the development of Chinese civil society is incomplete and inadequate, and there is still a big gap with Western developed countries[14]. To cultivate a civil society, it's necessary to firstly rely on the subjectivity of citizens. Subjectivity refers to the active role that citizens can play in governance activities. This role is crucial in the governance process. It is necessary to strengthen the subjectivity of citizens through publicity and education. On the one hand, the government should use media such as the Internet and advocacy boards as carriers to allow citizens to have a certain understanding of the large and small governance actions taking place around them. On the other hand, it is necessary to encourage social organizations such as schools, communities, and enterprises to actively carry out offline education courses, so that citizens can clarify their roles and responsibilities and become the real masters in governance actions. To cultivate a civil society, the government also needs to construct a responsive government more actively and play its guiding role, promote exchanges and dialogues between civil organizations and the government, promote the achievement of governance consensus, make the governance process form a reasonable division of responsibilities, and promote the participation of multiple subjects in governance, with a view to transforming from a single limited governance model to a collaborative governance model with multiple participation.

VIII. CONCLUSION

As a helpless choice under the condition of scarce governance resources, although the mobilized governance can't fundamentally solve social problems, it can alleviate public pressure caused by social problems to a certain extent, and it can also serve as a reference and demonstration role for dealing with similar problems and establishing a long-term mechanism. With the progress of society, the richness of governance resources, and the gradual improvement of the system, the effects of mobilized governance will become less and less insignificant, and the frequency of use will become lower and lower, and will eventually be replaced by new normal governance. But this doesn't mean completely abandoning. In the foreseeable future, the mobilized governance will still play a certain role, and the transformation of mobilized governance should take a gradual approach.

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