

Conflict Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah Versus As-Sunnah in Aceh (Case Study of the Politics of Religious Identity in the Burning of the At-Taqwa Muhammadiyah Mosque in Samalanga, Bireuen-Aceh Province)

Nirzalin*, Fakhurrazi, Yogi Febriandi, Rizki Yunanda

Sociology Department, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Malikussaleh, Lhokseumawe, Indonesia

**Corresponding Author email: nirzalin@unimal.ac.id*

ABSTRACT. This article examines the root causes of conflict and understanding why conflicts between followers of Ahlussunnah Wal jamaah (The splinter of the Islamic group of dayah) and As-Sunnah (The Islamic Group of Muhammadiyah) in Samalanga, Aceh end in violence. Based on ethnographic studies through data collection using live in, observation, in-depth interviews, Focus Group Discussions and study of the document. This article argue that Conflicts based on Islamic religious understanding in Aceh were generally triggered by heresy allegations against groups that were targeted by the attack, but the attack of the Ahlussunnah Wal jamaah followers to the As- Sunnah group that took place in Sangso village, Samalanga showed a different basis for justification. In fact, roots of the conflict followers of Ahlussunnah Wal Jama'ah and As-Sunnah was triggered by the view of Islamic identity in Aceh. The splinter of the Islamic group of dayah (Ahlussunnah Wal jamaah) in Samalanga considers that the original Islam of Aceh as developed since the 14th century, is the Ahlussunnah Wal jamaah. Then, Muhammadiyah (As-Sunnah Group) is an Islamic understanding of imported from Java whose development in Samalanga is considered to pollute the authenticity Islam of Aceh and threaten the elite authority of Ahlussunnah Wal jamaah in Samalanga community.

Keywords: *Conflict, Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah, As-Sunnah, Politics of Religious Identity, Aceh.*

1. INTRODUCTION

Basically, religion is an instrument for the formation of knowledge and warm communication for its believer. For believer, this communication is chained through the symbols of religious teachings and the intended meaning of life together. The same religious symbols and life goals have a significant function in uniting social relations, collective representation and in particular forming a common model of religious classification among believer, [1]. However, social integration which is embedded in the substantive teachings of religion behaves differently at the empirical level in the political realm. Because religion is not only a particular cultural variation but is something systemic: it provides the basis for the sub-system instrument to differentiate itself (religion / understanding) from others. Like politics, religion is a social space in which various forms of interaction exist, [2].

In the context of Aceh, the legalization of Islamic syari'at which began in 1999 not only presented the social face of Aceh to be more Islamic than before, but also brought about a frenzy of contestation of the dominance of Islamic ideology in its social space. Every Islamic understanding desires to gain

recognition and main influence both in coloring government policies and in society, [3] Most prominent is the contestation between the two majority ideologies adhered to by the people of Aceh, namely the Islamic Ahlu Sunnah Waljamaah (Aswaja) which is fanatically followed by the traditional Islamic school (dayah salafi) group and the majority of the villagers and the As-Sunnah Islam which is followed by the Muhammadiyah community who generally live in urban areas and are educated with modern education.

The involvement of Ex GAM (Free Aceh Movement) activists who sided with one of the competing dominant Islamic groups has added to the complexity of the contestation of the two parties. Contestation of Islamic understanding between the two parties generally occurs in the struggle for the grand mosque or the construction of a mosque which is considered to threaten the existence of a certain majority of Islamic ideology. Not infrequently, this contestation is not only "hot" in terms of discourse but also even spreads to conflicts that give rise to verbal and physical violence.

One of the contestations that started from the struggle for the domination of Islamic discourse in the

followers community then became an open conflict in Sangso Village, Samalanga District, Bireuen Regency. Sangso is one of the villages in Samalanga which is inhabited by the majority of people who choose to follow the Islamic understanding of As-Sunnah. This As-sunnah understanding is the Islamic understanding of the Muhammadiyah organization. Even though this village is a Muhammadiyah "village", the surrounding villages are "villages" of the followers of the Islamic understanding of Ahlusunnah Wal Jamaah who are organizationally close to Nahdhatul Ulama (The Awakening of Ulama / NU). They are said to be close to NU because the community's Islamic practice is similar to NU, but they generally prefer to call their Islamic identity a follower of Dayah Islam or Acehese Islam.

In the decades since Muhammadiyah developed in Samalanga in 1928 there has never been a horizontal conflict between these two groups of fanatical followers. They live in a community that is typical of an agrarian society that is bound by a culture of mutual respect, mutual cooperation and is very strong in maintaining friendly ties in their daily lives. One of the monumental cooperative ties is represented in the construction process of the Great Mosque of Samalanga.

In fact, because they were seen as having good skills in terms of Islamic knowledge and knowledge of mosque construction management, the people of Samalanga chose the central figure of Muhammadiyah Teungku Burhanuddin Amien to lead the process of building the Great Mosque of Samalanga. Since the construction process of the grand mosque until 2002, the high priest (Raja Imeum) of the Grand Mosque of Samalanga has been led by local Muhammadiyah figures. There is no conflict between congregations who understand Aswaja and As-Sunnah, they respect each other even though they have differences of opinion on matters relating to sunnah such as Qunut and Tarawih prayers. Tolerance is put forward and friendship is still prioritized. The problems of the two parties began in 2002, [4].

Through the intervention of former GAM activists (Free Aceh Movement), in 2002 the Aswaja elite managed to occupy the position of the Grand Imam (Raja Imeum) of the Great Mosque of Samalanga. Since then, the relationship between the Islamic groups Aswaja and As-Sunnah in the villages of Keude Samalanga and Sangso has been strained. Both parties began to blame each other in Islamic understanding. The climax, on October 17, 2017, a mob identified as supporters of the Aswaja group attacked and burned the piles of the At-Taqwa Muhammadiyah mosque in Sangso Samalanga village., [5]. Based on this reality, this article aims to explore the roots of the conflict and the strands of the process of dominating the majority Islamic ideology

group against minorities through the introduction of identity politics in Sangso Village, Samalanga Sub District, Bireuen District, Aceh Province, Indonesia.

This reality is interesting to study because of the mingling of religious and political interests in the religious dialectic of the people of Sangso village, Samalanga. [6], religion and politics have a paradoxical face. On the one hand, religion and politics didn't seem to interfere much with each other. Many are of the view that politics and religion are fundamentally different, oppositional, have different and separate perspectives in people's life so there is no need to mess around. According to followers of this view, religion is believed to only be concerned with sacred matters and metaphysics, only on matters of the afterlife, religious rituals and so on. While the political sphere is the realm of power, the use of force is legal or illegal, the economy, administration and other mundane matters are no exception to matters of pleasure. But on the other hand, history shows the close relationship between religion and politics, both among the Christian community and people who adhere to other religions. In fact, at present in various parts of the world, various political ideologies are emerging which are based on religious justification. We also note, the emergence of religious fundamentalism movements that have certain political goals that wrap the movement through ideal religious practices, this is generally done through behavior and preaching. In a note [7], politics requires religion, especially as an instrument in legitimizing various interests. At the historical level, religion has proven to be the most effective instrument of political legitimacy. Religious legitimacy makes social reality as ordered by actors of certain political interests. The justification of religious legitimacy in politics becomes very effective because the construction of the empirical reality of society is combined with the ultimate goal of life, namely heaven. The social world is framed with things that are believed to be sacred, so people do not hesitate to act according to what the religious "teachings" say. So according to Berger, legitimacy is the raw material for the formation of social cohesion. In the political realm, this legitimacy is a strategy to achieve hegemony. In this context, religion for Berger is one of the examples of ideology or a tool to serve power. In perspective [8], there are five root triggers for conflict, namely: first, this conflict competition occurs when there is an attempt by one party to achieve something at the expense of the other party. Second, domination. Domination occurs when one group tries to organize and control another group, this will encourage a clash of the group to be arranged with the group that wants to organize. Third, a group fails to achieve the desired goal. Fourth, there is provocation. This is usually done when one group taunts another. This action generates feelings of

displeasure with the other group of the teaser. Fifth, differences in value systems. The difference in the value system adopted is not in harmony between what is considered right and wrong by one group to another, this triggers conflicts with other groups.

2. RESEARCH METHOD

This study is a qualitative research. The research process was carried out using the ethnographic method by emphasizing the portrayal of conflict events between the Ahlusunnah Waljamaah (Aswaja / Traditional Islam) understanding and the As-Sunnah (Muhammadiyah) group in Sangso village, Samalanga sub-district, Bireuen District, Aceh Province, Indonesia. Data collection was carried

out through observation, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and document studies. Research informants consisted of the Chairperson of Aswaja Keude Samalanga, Chairperson of the Muhammadiyah Samalanga Subdistrict, Chairman of the Muhammadiyah Branch of Bireuen District, Government Staff of the Bireuen District Government Secretariat Office, Administrators of the Great Mosque of Keude Samalanga and Mass Action Figures. Data analysis was carried out interactively, meaning that any data obtained in the study was directly linked to other data and this has been done since the beginning of the data collection process.




FIGURE 1. The circle of data analysis process, [9]

The data analysis ultimately resulted in the meaning of each conflict incident between the Ahlusunnahwaljamaah and As-Sunnah groups in Sangso Samalanga, Bireuen district which was then presented in a narrative form. Through this data analysis, it is possible to identify, understand and explain the root of the conflict, the actors involved, the actors' motivations and the ongoing series of conflicts.

3. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

3.1 Social Geography of Followers Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah and As Sunnah in Samalanga

The religious map in Aceh shows that Samalanga is the center of the Islamic development of Ahlusunnah waljamaah. The incessant voices of the Samalanga traditional dayah ((Islamict Traditional Boarding School) leaders influenced the Islamic discourse in the political sphere of post-peaceful Aceh government, has clearly not only attracted rural

youth in Aceh to study at the Islamic Traditional Boarding School in Samalanga, but also became the direction for the Acehese government elite in determining government policies related to the implementation of Islamic law. In addition, the stickiness of the political influence of teungku dayah (Kyai / Ulama) on the electability of the Acehese government elites in the Pilkada (Regional Head election) and the General Election (Pemilu) also determines the alignment of the Acehese government elite to the aspirations of the Teungku Dayah Samalanga.

The charm of the dominance of Islamic discourse, the large number of students and the respect of Acehese government officials for the

Teungku Dayah Samalanga, especially in policies related to Islamic law, became the main basis for the shift of the Aswaja Islamic center (AhluSunnah Waljamaah) from South Aceh District to Samalanga, Bireuen District. In terms of quantity, the number of dayah (pesantren/Islamict Boarding School) and santri (Islamict Boarding School Student) in Samalanga is very significant in Aceh. Even when combined with the number of branches affiliated with the Samalanga dayahs (Islamict Boarding School) today, nearly half the number of dayahs (Islamict Boarding School) in Aceh are connected to Samalanga. The following is a table of the number of dayah and santri (Islamict Boarding School Student) in Samalanga and Bireuen District.

TABLE 1. NUMBER OF ISLAMIC BOARDING SCHOOL AND STUDENT BY SEX OF BIREUEN DISTRICT

No.	Sub district	Number of Islamict Boarding School	Number Of Male Student	Number Of Female Student	TOTAL
1	Samalanga	13	5 274	5 423	10 697
2	Simpang Mamplam	18	1 363	713	2 076
3	Pandrah	3	166	172	338
4	Jeunieb	12	760	201	961
5	Peulimbang	10	360	120	480
6	Peudada	12	576	160	736
7	Juli	5	515	334	849
8	Jeumpa	7	1 615	1 268	2 883
9	Kota Juang	6	235	30	265
10	Kuala	5	143	10	153
11	Jangka	7	97	50	147
12	Peusangan	16	1 120	606	1 726
13	Peusangan Selatan	4	60	50	110
14	Peusangan Sb Krueng	4	75	30	105
15	Makmur	5	75	50	125
16	Gandapura	6	358	124	482
17	Kuta Blang	6	147	33	180
		139	12.939	9.374	22.313

Source : Religious Affairs Office of Bireuen District, 2015

In the midst of the islamict boarding school student (santri) population and the understanding of ahluSunnah Waljamaah whose followers are in almost all villages in Samalanga, the Muhammadiyah community grows and develops. The modern ideology of Muhammadiyah is generally adopted by community groups of the Samalanga people who are educated with general education although some of the elites are educated

with Islamic scholarship who come from modern Islamic boarding schools or graduates from Middle Eastern educational institutions. The basis for the existence of this educational difference is that as in Java and elsewhere in Indonesia, the Muhammadiyah Samalanga community has developed in the urban area of Samalanga and several suburban villages such as Keude Aceh, Sangso and Rheum. Of the 46 villages in

Samalanga sub-district, the majority of Muhammadiyah communities are only in three villages, namely Keude Aceh, Sangso and Rheum, [10]. The Muhammadiyah community in Samalanga did not grow from the Muhammadiyah Samalanga educational institution because they did not have an educational institution here except for one Aisyiah Kindergarten (TK) whose existence could not develop due to different and fanatical Islamic ideas, parents who were willing to send their children to school of this kindergarten is only a small Muhammadiyah community.

Therefore, as an organization that grows from Islamic religious education activities, Muhammadiyah Samalanga really needs space to actualize its understanding and increase the number of its members. To consolidate mass and religious spaces, Muhammadiyah needs educational institutions ranging from elementary schools to tertiary institutions, as well as Islamic boarding schools [11]. However, the first step and at the same time most needed is the mosque. Having own mosque, apart from being the pride of the group, also creates spiritual calm because every member can worship quietly according to their own Islamic beliefs.

3.2 Mosque And The Contestation Center Of Islamic Understanding Domination

The Grand Mosque of the town of Samalanga, which is located in the village of Keude Samalanga, is a mosque that is the center of Islamic discourse activities in the town of Samalanga. As the center of Islamic discourse, mastery of the Great Mosque of Samalanga for local Islamic ideology, especially Ahlusunnah Waljamaah (Aswaja) and Muhammadiyah is very important and strategic. The norm is clear, who leads the mosque is confirmed to be the one who leads Islamic discourse [12]. Historically, the Samalanga Grand Mosque was founded on the initiative of a local Muhammadiyah figure, Teungku Burhanuddin Amien. Through his persistence in raising funds with the Sangso community, in 1965 the Great Mosque of Samalanga was firmly established. Then, since 1965 Teungku Burhanuddin Amien became the Teungku Imeum Syiek (Grand Imam) of the Samalanga mosque until his death in 1994. After the death of Teungku Burhanuddin Amien, the leadership relay of the great Samalanga mosque

was continued by the figure and chairman of the Muhammadiyah Samalanga, namely Teungku H. Ahmad Maun.

The existence of the leadership of the Great Mosque of Samalanga under the control of the Muhammadiyah elite, which for nearly 4 (four) decades (37 years) has become a stifling problem for the Islamic elite Ahlusunnah Waljamaah, how not traditional Islamic discourse is difficult to push to the public because formal Islamic discourse decisions are controlled by Imeum Syiek (Grand Imam) of the Great mosque who is none other than the central figure of Muhammadiyah Samalanga. For nearly 4 (four) decades, the Islamic group Ahlusunnah Waljamaah harbored a feeling of winning over leadership at the Grand mosque. The relationship between the two views of the religious congregation looks as if it is intimate, but actually what happens is a hidden conflict (incubation). It is only because of opportunity and strategic reasons to justify resistance that the conflict does not break out between the two. However, the desire to dominate Islamic discourse through leadership at the grand mosque of Samalanga finally gained momentum when some ex activists of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) who felt they had the same Islamic ideals gave their support. Although it is not purely a religious interest because of deep political motivation, the support of the some ex GAM activist is very strategic and decisive.

Then through the support of ex GAM, in 2002 the Aswaja Islamic group succeeded in taking over the leadership of the grand mosque of Samalanga. Leadership that is felt to be achieved unnaturally and in addition to being different in several aspects of Islamic understanding makes Muhammadiyah members uncomfortable to be involved in the worship process, especially mahzah worship such as congregational prayer and Friday prayer at the Grand Mosque which they previously managed. As a result, Muhammadiyah members stayed away from this mosque. For Jamaah 5 prayers (time) they choose to pray at the *meunasah* (*mushalla*/place of worship) of Sangso village, while for Friday prayers they do it at the Teungku Chiek Di Rheum Mosque which is located in the village which is neighboring Sangso, namely the Rheum.

The separation of Muhammadiyah congregations from the Grand Mosque was considered by the elite who led the Samalanga Grand Mosque as an act of refusing to obey their Islamic authority. This was considered as

"treason", causing anger and heartache among the Aswaja Islamic elite who led the Great Mosque of Samalanga. They argued that when Muhammadiyah was leading they were still participating in congregational prayers at the Great Mosque of Samalanga, but when it was their turn to lead the Muhammadiyah congregation they separated and went to worship at another mosque. This treachery attitude cannot be tolerated. Because it disturbs the sense of prestige and authority of the leadership authority in the mosque [12]. This fact is considered an attitude of insult so that it offends the leader of the Aswaja group.

3.3 Politics of Religious Identity And The Burning of The Mosque Development Place In Sangso

In this situation of outrage, the Islamic religious milieu of Aceh was shocked by the emergence of movements to oppose the infiltration of a new Islamic understanding, namely Wahabi [13]. Wahhabi understanding that has developed rapidly in the roll of conflict of religious radicalism in the Middle East is alleged to have infiltrated Aceh. Unfortunately, the infiltration was allegedly through the Muhammadiyah organization. The labeling of Muhammadiyah with Wahhabism has a logical relationship in mass rationality because Muhammadiyah Islamic ideas are strongly influenced by Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab. Although, Muhammadiyah denies them as a Wahhabism movement but agrees that it is referred to as the *tajdid* (reformation) movement and moderate Islam, not radical Islam or liberal Islam [14].

However, the genealogy of its existence which was influenced by the thoughts of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab, which was stigmatized as an unfriendly understanding of local cultural accommodation, made this labeling accepted and absorbed by the village community. Moreover, in Islamic practice Muhammadiyah has teachings that are contrary to Islam Aswaja which is adhered to by the majority of the Samalanga community, namely not reading *qunut* during the implementation of dawn prayers, *tharawih* prayer 8 (eight) rakats, *tahlilan* (praying together), *yasinan* (reading Surah Yasin together), *tawassul* (making a sanctified figure as a medium to connect the relationship between worship and Allah SWT) and grave pilgrimage, are the basis for the labeling of Muhammadiyah as a wahabi in

the eyes of the public and the development of this understanding is allegedly threatening the conventional Islamic understanding of the local traditional Islamic religious elite (Aswaja). [15].

The attachment to the Muhammadiyah label as a wahabi accompanied by a campaign by the Aswaja elite that the funds for the construction of the Wahabi (Muhammadiyah) Mosque came from Jewish assistance became a momentum and a strategic issue that fueled the anger of the masses, gluing the masses to be mobilized by an elite interested in actions against the establishment of the Muhammadiyah mosque Sangso. Thus, the mass radicalism which led to the burning of the foundations for the construction of the At-Taqwa Muhammadiyah mosque which took place in Sangso Samalanga Village, Bireuen District, Aceh Province, was an action that was not driven by Muhammadiyah's deviant Islamic ideology, but was triggered by hoax information received by the masses, concerns about contamination of the "original" Islamic understanding of the Samalanga community, namely Aswaja, a feeling of threatening the authority and domination of the Islamic discourse of the local traditional Islamic religious elite. It is feared that the presence of the At-Taqwa Muhammadiyah mosque in Sangso by the local traditional Islamic religious elite will reduce the number of worshipers at the Great Samalanga mosque and will also become a milestone for the massification of followers of Muhammadiyah congregations in Sangso and also Samalanga in general. this fact could threaten to reduce the number of Aswaja followers in the future..

This is worthy of concern for the traditional Islamic elite who adhere to the Ahlusunnah Wal Jamaah (Aswaja) concept because Sangso Village is a village located in the heart of Samalanga. As urban community, the Sangso community is an educated society with modern education that prioritizes rationality in receiving information, including information about religious knowledge. The construction of Muhammadiyah Islamic ideology which is rational and progresses into a religious urban community, including the Sangso community, to join the second largest Islamic mass organization in Indonesia [16]. This fact cannot be tolerated, because for the Aswaja group Samalanga is the legal home for the life and development of Aswaja Islamic understanding. For them, Islam Aswaja is the Islamic identity of the Samalanga people that must be maintained from the past, present and future. The threat of the

authority of the domination of Islamic discourse and the concern about the massification of Muhammadiyah followers in Sangso and Samalanga in general are the keywords that have driven the birth of mass mobilization in the burning action of the building of the foundation of the At-Taqwa Muhammadiyah mosque in Sangso. The principle is "Cut before it grows wild". So, the radicalism against the Muhammadiyah congregation is far from being a question of claims to be heretical or heretical. There is no theological justification for saying Muhammadiyah is deviant just because Muhammadiyah does not read qunut in the dawn prayer, tarawih prayer 8 (eight) rakats, is not fanatical about following one of the four schools of the Maliki, Hanafi,

Shafi'i and Hambali schools and does not perform feasts when a family died.

The labeling of Muhammadiyah as salafi wahabi is only a package to stimulate the anger of the masses so that they can be consolidated to move together, then destroy those they are considered as opponents. On the other hand, the Bireuen government elite should be the mediator in this conflict case, instead taking the practical interest of securing the government and its power interests by siding with the dominant group, namely the Aswaja group, [17]. This siding with the Aswaja group is driven by the practical interest of the Bireuen government to maintain security and stability so that development can run smoothly, [18]. However, according to Ustadz dr. Athaillah, the side of the Bireuen government elite towards Aswaja, apart from being driven by pragmatic interests of power stability, is also in order to gain their sympathy in the election of legislative members in the coming period because the government elite is currently preparing to become members of the People's Representative Council (DPR) after the end of their term of office as Regent, [19].

This fact confirms that the conflict between the ahlusunnah Waljamaah and As-Sunnah in Sangso was triggered by at least three factors. First, the domination of identity politics. Second, the threat of the Aswaja Islamic Elite's authority and third, the alignment of the state elite to the majority understanding group as a pragmatic political interest calculation. This last trigger is the main reason for the unsolved conflict between the Islamic groups Aswaja and Sunnah in Sangso Samalanga.

This reality emphasizes that the conflict that occurred was not triggered purely by Islamic understanding, but was more related to issues of political interest. Religion becomes the vehicle for political interests of elites who try to maintain the status quo of their power. This is actually not unique to the people of Samalanga, especially in the conflict between the Aswaja and As-Sunnah groups. In Hashemi's [20] observation, in the case of Muslim societies, at the end of the 20th century and entering the beginning of the 21st century, religion has been attached to political power. In 1979 the Iranian revolution was the first case, followed by several other cases such as: the National Islamic Front in Sudan in 1989, the Taliban Movement in the mid-1990s in Afghanistan, the AK Party in Turkey in 2002 and more recently the Ennahda movement in Tunisia in 2011 and Ikhwanul Muslimin in Egypt in 2012. These diverse and different political experiences have inspired the Muslim community to perceive and understand the relationship between religion and politics in the years to come.

The union of politics and religion are two inseparable things on the social stage, even though the stage is seen on the surface as a religious stage. The contestation of the domination of religious understanding is essentially a contestation of political interests. Parties who feel their interests are disturbed will always try hard to marginalize other parties who are considered as opponents. The existence of religion as a medium for integration of its adherents has always been a forum for the operation of the practical political interests of the social elites.

4. CONCLUSION

The conflict between Ahlusunnah Waljamaah (Traditional Islam) and As-Sunnah (Muhammadiyah) ideology in Sangso Village, Samalanga Sub-District, Bireuen District, Aceh Province, which ended in physical violence in the form of burning the foundations for the construction of the At-Taqwa Muhammadiyah Mosque triggered three factors. The first, dominance of religious identity politics (Islam). The Aswaja elites assert themselves as the original Islamic understanding of the Samalanga people so that the arrival of groups that have different Islamic understandings such as the As-Sunnah (Muhammadiyah) understanding is an imported understanding that "tarnishes" the authenticity and threatens the existence of Aswaja Islam. So, the existence of AS-Sunnah ideology as

an import concept must be under the control of Aswaja ideology. As-Sunnah group strongly opposed the policies to regulate the procedures of worship and the construction of places of worship.

The convenience of worship and freedom in developing teachings are the main argumentative grounds that encourage the As-Sunnah group in Sangso Village not to open up bargaining space to reverse their intention of not building a mosque. Of course, the ideological rationality of religious understanding, which is believed to be holy understanding, has led the As-Sunnah group to close the door for intervention by "foreigners". Second, a feeling of threatening the authority and domination of the Islamic discourse of the local traditional Islamic religious elite. The significant growth in the number of followers of As-Sunnah in the Samalanga sub-district from only one village to three villages is the basis for the high concern of the Aswaja elites for their future existence. If allowed, the increase in the number of followers of the Sunnah ideology has a great potential for the loss of the dominance of Islamic discourse and the political bargaining power of the Aswaja elites in the local political constellation in Bireuen District. Thus, the existential threat of the group and the authority of power before the masses became the basis for the Aswaja elite to close the dialogue space with the Sunnah understanding.

And the third siding the elite of Bireuen Government to Majority Group. On the other hand, the existence of an elite government apparatus who sided with the Aswaja group as the majority Islamic group made the conflict issue between the two Islamic understandings not having a mediator to create peace. The easing of the conflict that occurs is only a temporary phenomenon due to the cooling down attitude carried out by the conflicting parties. Not because the resolution was found from the dialogue between the parties facilitated by the Bireuen District government. Thus, this strand of conflict between the Aswaja and As-Sunnah groups experiences continuity and has the potential to create a spiral of violence that will never end in the future.

In the case of conflict between the Ahlusunnah Waljamaah and As-Sunnah groups, the Bireuen District government has failed to become the real government. Because normatively, the real government is to protect the community and in accordance with the mandate of the Law as a country based on the Pancasila ideology, as an integral part of the Indonesian Government, the District Government of Bireuen must be the first party to protect each party with different understandings to live and growing in

every region of Indonesia without exception. When conflicts occur between the two groups of people who have different understandings including religious understanding, the Bireuen District government must be able to become a fair referee without taking sides and then based on the law facilitate the resolution of problems on both sides through the principle of a win-win solution. Only with conflict resolution recognized by the parties can peace be created again.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The research team would like to thank to the ministry of Research and Technology / the National Research and Innovation Agency in particular the Directorate of Research and Community Service for the funding provided for this research. Rector Universitas Malikussaleh and the Chairman of the Universitas Malikussaleh Research and Community Service who facilitated and supported the implementation of this research. Finally, the leaders of Aswaja and As-Sunnah Samalanga Bireuen as well as the communities of the two groups who have received the research team so that exploration of the roots of the conflict between the two groups can be explored and found.

REFERENCES

- [1] Flower, S. (2015). Conversion to Islam in Papua New Guinea: Preserving Traditional Culture against Modernity's Cargo-Cult Mentality. *Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions*, 18(4), 55-82.
- [2] Cesari, Jocelyne. 2005. *Religion and Politics: Interaction, Confrontation and Tensions*. Routledge: History and Anthropology, Vol. 16, No. 1, March
- [3] Nirzalin. 2012. Islamic Shari'a Politics and Teungku Dayah's Political Authority Crisis in Aceh. *Yogyakarta: Journal of Government and Politics* Vol.3 No.2
- [4] Ustadz Yahya, Chairman of the Muhammadiyah Subdistrict Leadership Council of Sangso Village, Samalanga District,
- [5] Bireuen District
- [6] Ustadz Yahya, Chairman of the Muhammadiyah Subdistrict Leadership Council of Sangso Village, Samalanga District,
- [7] Bireuen District
- [8] Davor Džalto. 2013. Religion, Politics, and Beyond. The Pussy Riot Case. *Journal Of Religion & Society*. Vol. 15 (2013)
- [9] Titus Hjelm. 2014. Religion, Discourse and Power: A Contribution towards a Critical Sociology of Religion. *Journal Critical Sociology* 2014, Vol. 40(6)

- [10] Achmad. Mukhsin, Khoiruddin, Moch. Nur Ichwan. 2019. From Personal to Communal: The Conflict among Sunni-
- [11] Shi'ite in Sampang, East Java. Sunan Kalijaga: International Journal of Islamic Civilization Volume 2, Number 1
- [12] Blaiki. Norman.2000. Designing Social Research. USA: Polity Press
- [13] Fuad, M. (2002). Civil Society in Indonesia: The Potential and Limits of Muhammadiyah. *Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia*, 17(2)
- [14] Rizvi, K. (2015). *The Transnational Mosque: Architecture and Historical Memory in the Contemporary Middle East*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- [15] Mostafa, H. (2016). The Early Mosque Revisited : Introduction Of The Minbar And Maqsura. *Muqarnas*, 33, 1-16. doi:10.2307/26551679
- [16] Dewi, E., & Januar, E. (2019). A Comprehension Transfer of Wahabiyah in Pengajian System in Dayah Traditional Aceh. *Millati: Journal of Islamic Studies and Humanities*, 4(1)
- [17] Erwan Diantell.2003. *Pierre Bourdieu and the sociology of religion: A central and peripheral concern*. Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publisher
- [18] Zulian, P. (2018). *Fatwa in Indonesia: An Analysis of Dominant Legal Ideas and Mode of Thought of Fatwa-Making Agencies and Their Implications in the Post-New Order Period*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. doi:10.2307/j.ctv157bk2
- [19] Hefner, C. (2013). *Discourse On The Search For A Renewed Identity Of Muhammadiyah For Its Post-Centennial Era*. Malang : International Research Conference on Muhammadiyah (IRCM) Universitas Muhammadiyah 29 November - 2 December 2012. *Anthropology Today*, 29 (1).
- [20] Heri, Government Staff of Bireuen District Government
- [21] Teungku Tuhanan, Head of Aswaja Samalanga, Bireuen District
- [22] Ustad dr. Atailah, Chairman of the Board of the Muhammadiyah Branch of Bireuen District
- [23] Hashemi. Nader. 2014. Rethinking religion and political legitimacy across the Islam–West divide. *SAGE: Philosophy and Social Criticism*. Vol. 40(4-5) 439–447
- [24]