

Criminal, King, and Rebels: A Re-examination of Bandits Alliances in Polombangkeng, South Sulawesi (1905-42)

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ABSTRACT

Bandits as a social category generally tend to have a negative connotation, because they are identical to criminals, robbers, or people who often carry out physically violent acts. In fact, the social history of bandits cannot be regarded as simple criminals by public opinion. This article aims to examine the banditry alliances in Polombangkeng concerning political changes during the Dutch East Indies period. This study used the historical methodology that emphasizes time and process. The primary resources used in this study are colonial archives, such as a political report, newspaper, as well as using the oral tradition to figure out the subjective view of society about themselves. The result of this study proves that on the one hand, the bandit's movement is characterized by violent acts, such as robbery, murder, or other outlaw acts. On the other hand, the bandit's movement cannot be separated from the social movement against economic and political injustice. When the Dutch colonial government came into power at the beginning of the 20th century, bandit's movement affiliated with local elites whose position marginal or excluding from changing local political structure. The bandit's alliance drove the transformation of bandit acts into the rebellion movements.

Keywords: Bandits, Violent Acts, Political-Economy, Polombangkeng, South Sulawesi

1. INTRODUCTION

De onrust eiland (the unrest island) was the Dutch government's nickname for South Sulawesi at the end of the 19th century, based on its high level of crime [1]. Entering the 20th century, was a new spirit for the Dutch East Indies government. If in the previous century, the government had almost always let law violations occur in society, in the 20th century, the government was determined to run modern governance throughout Indonesia [2]. The manifestation of this determination was in a political project known as *pacificatie politiek* (pacification politics). This political agenda originated from the idea of improving the quality of life of Bumiputera through education that prepared to take over the Dutch civil service. In practice, however, the pacification politics as a political terminology that initially looks peaceful, and humanist creates more complex problems.

Polombangkeng, which is the focus of this study, is an area in Takalar, South Sulawesi which has historically produced bandit movements from generation to generation. During the VOC (*Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie*) era, this area became the base for rebellious movements, such as; Bataru Gowa rebellion 1777-1778 [3] and the Abu Bakar Karaeng Data movement 1797-

1819 [4]. Then, during the Dutch colonial period, this area was known as a place of thriving robbery and theft [5]. The Dutch government showed absolutely no effort to address these robberies. It was not until 1905 that the Dutch East Indies Government took attention by placing security posts in the Polombangkeng [6]. In the 20th century, acts of robbery developed into a rebellious movement involving high-ranking nobility in Polombangkeng. Why did these robbery actions transform into a political movement against the Dutch government, was it linked to the contestation of local authorities or was it an extension of the bandit alliance network that had been since the 19th century? These are essential questions that underlie this study.

The phenomenon of banditry in various places has received much attention from historians and other social scientists with various perspectives. Eric J. Hobsbawm first introduced the concept of social bandits as a phenomenon of peasant protest and rebellion within the sphere of small social organizations [7]. About a decade later, Hobsbawm revised the concept of social bandits by placing them as banditry practices that represented primitive forms of peasant protest to the landlords and the rulers of capitalist regimes. They are peasant outlaws whom the state regard as criminals, but who remain within peasant society, and are considered by their people

as heroes, as champions, fighter for justice [8]. When the village becomes part of the jurisdiction of the state and the economy of the peasant society becomes capitalist, social bandits as an endemic pre-political phenomenon in peasant society transforms into more progressive social protests, such as; peasants' leagues, trade unions, or political parties thus demanding a more massive following. In the end, social bandits may become extinct due to the loss of peasants' support and strengthening of the superior power of the state [9].

As "the new social history", social banditry came under increasing critic within the academy. Anton Blok [10] criticizes with arguing that social bandits only emphasize the bandit's ties to the peasantry while minimizing important order structural dimensions of his socio-political role. In fact, according to him, the acts of bandit violence reflected more of defending personal interests than defending peasants' interests. Bandits are often accomplices of the ruling class. This view is in line with the studies of Billy Jaynes Chandler [11], Linda Lewin [12], and Paul Vanderwood [13], who generally say that most of the bandits come from the middle class and only a small proportion of farmers. These bandits seek alliance and protection for the elite. Bandits use revolutionary organizations to legitimize their criminal acts, such as the bandit phenomenon during the Cuban revolution in the study of Rosalie Schwartz [14]. Then, Richard Slatta [15] took the case in Pampa, inland Argentina, illustrating that criminality often reflects the socio-economic conflict between gauchos and landowners. The gauchos were mostly recruited into the army and cavalry militia units during the civil war, while the landowners and officials had strong political influence and social control. Both have the resources to uphold their class interests. The studies of bandits show that the characteristics of social bandits, as described by Hobsbawm, did not find in studies of bandits in rural areas of Latin America.

Social bandits have developed a perspective seen from the study of John McQuilton and Cheah Bonn Kheng, which pay attention to class conflicts and political institutions that encourage the emergence of various interests, including the bandits themselves. McQuilton [16] analyses the geographic setting in figuring out the case of the 1887-1880 Ned Kelly robbery. Kelly is considered a criminal to the country but a hero to its supporters. Then, Cheah [17] [18] examines bandits who came from farmers in the northern district of Kedah-Malaysia bordering Siam, a low, sparsely populated area far from state control. The bandits were considered criminals to the country, but heroes became legends in society. These two studies showcase of social bandits that arise from groups of peasants or marginalized groups who generally fight for the interests of the oppressed against the rulers. The exploitation of the authorities creates shared experiences for rural communities. It is where the role of social bandits has the potential to encourage awareness of rural communities in understanding their position amid a heterogeneous class.

The role of social bandits in encouraging the emergence of rebellious movements also found in the Polombangkeng in the early 20th century. The Dutch government's pacification policy in this region created a sense of injustice for some aristocrats, especially those who marginalized from the stage of power. At the same time, the government policy also encouraged the emergence of a new aristocratic social class resulting in increasingly intense social competition. This situation exacerbated when the village economy got worse. The alliance between bandits and aristocrats strengthened and transformed into a political movement against Dutch rule.

There are two contradictory arguments regarding the relationship between the robbers and the local elite in the Polombangkeng in the 20th century. Poelinggomang [1] sees that robber leaders have succeeded in utilizing local political institutions to gain legitimacy and support for their movements. Such as the support of native officials by giving royal heirlooms to the robber leaders to appear as recognized and obeyed leaders. Otherwise, Ijzeeraf [19] argues that indigenous officials were using the robbers to achieve their political goals, namely, to seize the Dutch power. This study intends to re-examine the emergence of the bandits linked with change and power relations in the Polombangkeng. By using a historical methodology that emphasizes the perspective of time and local political changes, this study describes the transformation from the banditry to a political movement. This study assumes that there is an expansion of relations, strategies, alliances, and escalation of banditry that negotiate power struggles.

2. THE GENEALOGY OF BANDITRY

Polombangkeng has known as an area with a high crime rate [5]. The crime problem originated when the Dutch government built a colonial government hierarchy that ignored local authorities prevailed in the society. In the traditional government structure of Polombangkeng, there are three hierarchies, namely the *karaeng* or king, *gallarang* and *pongawa*. *Karaeng* is the leader of a kingdom, *gallarang* is a position under the king as well as an autonomous region. Then, under the *gallarang* are *pongawa* or village heads. Polombangkeng consists of five *gallarang*, namely Moncongkomba, Bontokadatto, Malewang, Lassang and Lantang. Moncongkomba and Bontokadatto were *gallarang* with the most substantial influence and the most extensive area. The Dutch government abolished the *gallarang* power and appointed the *karaeng* as regent [20]. This system followed the existing system in Java; there were only regents and village or village heads in the colonial government system [21]. So, the *gallarang* was outside of the colonial government hierarchy. In fact, the position of the *gallarang* in the traditional hierarchy has a powerful influence.

In the hierarchies of the Dutch colonial state, regent was as a liaison officer between the Dutch government

and the indigenous population. It seems that the Dutch government did not want to rule the colonies directly unless they had contact with traditional rulers. It shows that there is a combination of colonial and traditional government which creates a dichotomy of the regent position. One side of the regent is the king, the supreme leader in the local community, but within the regent itself, there is colonial authority attached to it. In other words, there was the laying on of colonial power over traditional power. In this case, Regent's position was as a broker or middlemen of the Dutch colonial government [22] [23].

With this kind of government system, it created problems in Polombangkeng. *Gallarang* of Moncongkomba and Bontokadatto had an aristocratic status equivalent to regent, large numbers of followers, influence and vast territory, but they did not include in the colonial government hierarchy. The colonial system which reduced the *gallarang's* authority resulted in the loss of most of their income, such as privileges; Kalompoang land rights (occupational land), the right to a percentage of regional income, the right to collect taxes, and the right to lease land [24]. Not only that, but this problem also permeates the value of *siri*' (dignity)—the loss of *gallarang's* authority regarded as an insult to their dignity.

This situation exacerbated when the farmers of Polombangkeng felt tax injustice. The ten percent rice tax levy was very burdensome for farmers in Polombangkeng. Meanwhile, other economic sectors; coffee plantation owners, traders, among them the very rich, sailors, craftsmen and fishermen are all exempt from this ten percent tax. As a comparison, in 1877 Takalar spare parts whose inhabitants were mainly farmers with a tax yield of f. 57,000 from rice products, sugar cane, salt ponds, and relatively small trading activity. Meanwhile, in the same year, Bantaeng spare parts export more than 40,000 *pikul* of coffee, trading activities were advanced, there were coffee planters and wealthy traders, especially the Wajoneese, only contributing taxes of approximately f. 10,000, including citizen tax [5]. Polombangkeng farmers felt the tax injustice, and this situation continued into the 20th century [25]. As a result, there was resistance from farmers, either by openly refusing to pay rice taxes or by hiding part of their harvest to avoid taxes.

Gallarang Moncongkomba and Bontokadatto allow cases of lawlessness committed by farmers. There was an interest in the *gallarang* as a patron in some instances to protect farmers. Amid the colonial government's tax pressure, farmers also still gave tribute and profit-sharing, especially those who managed the lands owned by the *gallarang*. In the view of Scott [26], when dealing with outsiders, patrons can do something for their clients, to maintain client loyalty. The legal loophole contained in the constitution of the colonial government became a space for *gallarang* to show protection for farmers and maintain, strengthen the patron-client relationship between the two.

The growing economic pressure of farmers and the neglect of minor law violations created space for larger illegal acts, such as theft and robbery. Often theft and robbery were masterminded by members of the nobility. Displaced members of noble families used their status to rake in wealth by organizing robberies and thefts. These royals and raiding raiders had massive followers who were either paid or shared. Sometimes the poor, apart from members of the robbers, also get profit sharing [19]. As a result, theft and robbery then become part of the economic activities institutionalized in the traditional hierarchy.

Some of the local officials preferred to cooperate with the robbers rather than be hostile to them, and after all the robbers were still close relatives of their own. The local officials needed the support of the leader of the robbers. Furthermore, at the same time, they had to protect the robbers when facing prosecution for breaking the law. The robber members guarantee the security and honor of the noble family and vice versa the members of the robber get legal protection from the aristocrats and right treatment or reception, party services, gifts of horses from followers of aristocratic officials when the robbers enter their territory. Being a follower of a robber group was prestige in society. This power relation between aristocrats and robbers drove to symbiotic mutualistic negotiations. There was the cycle of crime and the transfer of ownership of goods based on loyalty and distribution of power.

3. POST-PACIFICATION WAR: A NEW DIRECTION OF COLONIAL POLICY

Towards the 20th century, the Dutch government paid serious attention to the islands outside Java and Madura. This concern was not only related to economic interests, but also political and the development of the international geopolitics. The Dutch East Indies government felt it was essential to further exert power outside Java Island given the growing concern that these areas would contact other European nations. The influence of the industrial revolution in England which prompted European countries to begin to expand their influence created the possibility of the emergence of new relations in the Southeast Asian, including the Dutch East Indies. If this happened, it would be difficult for the Dutch government to build a political unity in the former VOC rule. Therefore, the Dutch government immediately launched a political policy called *Pax Neerlandica*. A political notion that aims to create peace and shared prosperity by establishing the entire archipelago under Dutch rule [27]. Achieve this goal, the Dutch government took military action, especially in dangerous areas which considered threatening the power of the colonial government. In 1905, this political project was going with a series of military expeditions forcing the rulers of the local kingdoms in South Sulawesi to hand over power to the Dutch government.

After the political project, *Pax Neerlandica* was successfully implemented in South Sulawesi, and the Dutch East Indies government focused more on defense and surveillance rather than emphasizing the improvement of government administration [28]. The colonial government's approach based on the assumption that the behavior of the aristocrats exploited the people. Kooreman describes a colonial perspective in seeing Polombangkeng with the behavior of high nobility at the end of the 19th century. According to him, the cruelty and criminality of members of the nobility were because they could not be punished by family members with the same status so that abuse of power often occurred. Most of the crimes were played directly or indirectly by aristocrats. Regent of Polombangkeng would not arrest his close relatives who had the same status as himself. Meanwhile, the villagers would never dare to arrest them [5]. Therefore, the new colonial rule in the 20th century aimed intensively at limiting the power of the aristocracy and accentuating the middle-class (*tomaradeka* or *tosamara*). This policy direction sought to erode the socio-political role of the aristocracy and to provide space for the emergence of a new aristocratic class.

The efforts of the Dutch government to create a new aristocratic class in the Polombangkeng were evident in the policy of dividing the territory of the subdistrict. The Dutch government divided the Polombangkeng into 22 subdistricts. Thus, there were newly subdistrict areas which aligned with *Gallarang* Bontokadatto, Moncongkomba, and Malewang. In other words, several villages that were previously under the control of the three *gallarang* turned into subdistrict with their own leaders. Therefore, the title of each head of the subdistrict in Polombangkeng was different. Some areas with the *gallarang* title, others with *pongawa* title, and there are also *daeng* titles [29]. However, in the colonial government structure, they had the same status, namely the head of the subdistrict. This policy demonstrated an effort to erode the status of the high aristocrats in society by providing space for the emergence of new controllable aristocratic groups. However, this policy also created an overlap between colonial law and customary law, especially in lower-level government practices [30].

The Dutch government policy sharpened competition between aristocrats. This situation exacerbated when the economic village has got worse due to the pacification war increasing the number of cases of theft and robbery. This situation led to the emergence of an increasingly strong alliance between the aristocrats and the robbers. The colonial government policies in this century created chaos in Polombangkeng society.

4. FROM BANDITS TO REBELS

J. Tideman, the controller of Takalar (1905-1910) factually describes the situation in the Polombangkeng. According to him, "it is open secret that some of the close relatives of the regent of Polombangkeng profit from their followers, such as supporting robberies and making

the surrounding environment unsafe". Tideman often receives reports of major robberies, threaten human lives, they were followers of the regent of Polombangkeng or one of the *anakaraeng* (sons of the nobility) in their territory [31]. At the end of 1905, The Dutch East Indies military government arrested Hajina Daeng Masaung, the regent of Polombangkeng, on charges of preparing for a rebellion, supporting robberies, and embezzling timber [32]

Since the arrest of Hajina Daeng Masaung, the position of Regent of Polombangkeng has been left vacant for two years so that the *gallarang* and village heads under controlled by the controller [33]. The Dutch government only appointed two *gallarang* in September 1906, namely Mappakamu Daeng Pabundu as *gallarang* of Bontokadatto and Bau Daeng Manaku as *gallarang* of Moncongkomba [34]. The government seems to have paid enough attention to controlling the two *gallarangs*. So far, a criminal case; theft and robbery originate from these two areas. The government seems to be facing a dilemma because it always has to replace regent and *gallarang*. On the one hand, the government needs officials who have a strong and respected who were none other than the *karaeng*, but on the other hand, the *karaeng* was sometimes behind criminal acts. If the officials appointed were not from high aristocrats, this would open up space for resistance from among aristocrats who feel they were in the higher status.

In November 1908, the Dutch government in Takalar appointed Tikolla Daeng Malleio, son of Hajina Daeng Masaung, as a regent of Polombangkeng [35]. This year, a group of robbers known as *paggora patampuloo* (forty robbers) emerged, led by I Toloq Daeng Magassing, a legendary and phenomenal robber in Makassar society. Various versions describe the origin of I Toloq. According to Poelinggomang [1] I Toloq was born in Limbung, Gowa. Before the Dutch East Indies government controlled the Gowa kingdom, he was the leader of the Gowa Kingdom troops. During the reign of Governor Quarles de Quarles, he was known as the leader of robbers when the action involved six to eight people. Stories from several journalists of that period were published several times in the Dutch newspapers that I Toloq was born in Parapa, his parents were low-status descent, but had brave genes. I Toloq's discernment earned him the respect of the aristocrats so that he got the honorable title, namely Daeng Gassing Karaeng Tompo [36]. From the perspective of oral tradition, Mapasedeng Daeng Magau, a *passinrilik* (traditional music of Makassar) told the stories of I Toloq, that he was a son of Bajeng, the son of a Polombangkeng aristocrat [37]. The word I Toloq itself is an inherent title which means champion while Gassing means strong or sturdy.

An article entitled *De Bandiet Tolo* published in *Provinciale Geldersche en Nijmeegsche* courant, January 8, 1916, describes a brief history and activities of I Toloq which became the byword of the Makassar. This article described I Toloq as a heroic figure, well built, good looking, the dream of girls. At any given moment, he

would never give mercy to anyone who got in his way but was also very generous, sharing his wealth like a prince, but he was also a robber and wanted by the Dutch government. This figure shows the imagination of I Toloq in the society which depicted in the newspaper as reflecting the character of social bandits. Social bandits are lawbreakers and criminals from the perspective of the state, but still, they are considered as defenders and admired by society [8].

I Toloq's robbery was very troublesome for the government police because it was not only focused on one action, but spread in various places, and only involved about five to eight people in one robbery. After determining their target, they set up a "bivouac" not far from the location of the robbery. This bivouac serves as a place of scouting and temporary escape or shelter [36]. The strategy was successful in the May 1914 robbery which was only two palms from the center of the Dutch government in Takalar. The robbers managed to bring goods worth f. 3000, and two people killed in this incident. The Dutch government found it difficult to identify the actors behind these robbers because their actions organized neatly, their hiding was challenging to trace, and they also mingled with the community. The next day, after acting, they calmly worked on their fields [38].

I Toloq's robbery quickly attracted attention and gained followers of the famous robbers as well as nobles, among others; Macan Daeng Barani, Abasa Daeng Manromo Karaeng Bilaji, Pacciro Daeng Mattappa, Daeng Patompo and Daeng Manyengka. They were of high noble descent. Macan Daeng Barani was a nobleman of Gowa-Wajo, grandson of the former King of Wajo, Ishak Manggabari Karaeng Mangeppe. Abasa Daeng Manromo was a high noble of Gowa, half-brother of the last king of Gowa, I Makulau Karaeng Lembang, Paciro Daeng Mapata is also a nobleman from Gowa. At the same time, Daeng Manompo and Daeng Manyengka were brothers and nieces of the regent of Polombangkeng [1]. With their support, I Toloq's activities were more flexible in the area around Mount of Lompobattang to the border between Maros, Makassar and Bantaeng. Likewise, the I Toloq movement also received a good reception from the rural community. When this group of robbers entered a village, the local people greeted them a feast and gifts of horses [39]. After that, I Toloq communicated more intensively with the aristocrats in Gowa, Polombangkeng and Maros who tried to weaken Dutch power by indirectly trying to create chaos and riots [19]. I Toloq's robbery action began to open networks with local elites to become a part of the robbery movement into a political movement. The characteristics of the Toloq movement initially reflected as a social bandit, then developed into a part of a political movement against the Dutch government.

Dutch government officials in South Sulawesi saw robbery cases differently. Governor H. N. A. Swart [40] simplified the complexity of the robbery cases as only an attempt to make ends meet. This view based on the

decline of the village economy due to the military actions of the Dutch East Indies government which took place from June 1905 to early 1906. This military action negated people's efforts in agriculture and other economies [1]. However, this view seemed to ignore the more complex political problems that have occurred since the colonial state was first constructed, such as the contestation of local authorities, access to resources and the dissatisfaction of several *karaeng* to the colonial government system. Then, Governor A. J. Baron Quarles de Quarles (1908-1910) and W. J. Coenan took different approaches in overcoming the robbery movement. According to him, robberies in the Polombangkeng area were not only due to the economy but also related to political movements. Therefore, these robberies could only be countered by strengthening military forces [39].

On 19 October 1914, a police patrol surrounded the hiding place of I Toloq's follower, Macan Daeng Barani in Bategalung. Macan Daeng Barani could not escape and was shot dead during this siege. Meanwhile, I Toloq was not seen in this incident. The death of Tiger Daeng Barani prompted his relatives and family to seek revenge. I Kitti Petta Lolo and Janjang Kareng Manjaling, Macan Daeng Barani's father and uncle conveyed their intention to repay them to their father Ishak Manggabari Karaeng Mangepe. From the results of their meeting, they finally agreed to carry out an act of revenge [1]. The Dutch government thought that the death of Macan Daeng Barani weakened the rebel power and thus approved the withdrawal of troops to Batavia in October 1914. Compared to his predecessor who adopted a very repressive policy, Governor Th. A.L. Heyting (1913-1916) was weaker than the previous governor and barely protested the troop withdrawal. Governor Th. A.L. Heyting is a government official who started his career in South Sumatra and did not know Sulawesi well, trying to implement the Sumatra system of government in South Sulawesi by placing an indigenous government apparatus between the heads and the European government. He did not understand that he could not get the influence of the nobles and citizens. The withdrawal of these troops was to strengthen the military strength of the Dutch East Indies during World War II [19]. Heyting did not see that the death of Macan Daeng Barani could be a turning point in the rise of his relatives and followers to appear to take revenge when the military strength of the Dutch government weakened.

In May 1915, several Gowa aristocrats, among others; Karaeng Batupute, Karaeng Barombong, and Karaeng Manjapai held a meeting with Toloq when a follower, Paciro Daeng Matappa accompanied him. The nobility of Gowa expressed their support and would provide ammunition and encourage Toloq to destroy the Dutch government immediately. After the meeting, Gowa aristocrats escorted Toloq into Limbung, Palleko and Sungguminasa villages to show that the people in the area supported him [1]. This support boosted the morale of Toloq I group. Toloq's increased self-confidence reflected in a significant robbery plot.

On 15 June 1915, Toloq's group held a meeting to plan an attack directly on the Dutch government. However, this meeting failed because government spies reported on the meeting. The Takalar controller immediately told the deputy prosecutor in Limbung to send a patrol force to South Gowa. This patrol force managed to ambush the robber's meeting and captured several robbers. However, on their way home, the patrol was intercepted by a group of about 150 robbers, among them, carrying rifles. The smaller number of patrols could not attack this group, but only prevent it from leaving the Palleko region [39]. The attack on the collector's house in Palleko was proof that the Dutch government was too desperate to ignore the military approach.

The Dutch government was so preoccupied with the chaos that occurred in the Gowa and Takalar. The Dutch government had to bring in joint troops, consisting of; the patrol from Sungguminasa under the direct command of the West Gowa government official, H. van der Wall, from Makassar was led by A.L. van Waardenburg, from Palleko led by the provost tax officer, and from the Infantry by First Lieutenant Reeman. This military force succeeded in thwarting the attack of group I Toloq on June 5 with a total of about 100 people aiming to attack the collectors in Palleko. In this attack, I Toloq was accompanied by his well-known followers, such as; Karaeng Matika, Basareng, Pacciro Daeng Matappa and Japa. This incident tarnished the authority of the government and was considered a failure of Governor Celebes Th. A.L. Heyting [19].

This situation has prompted the government to further strengthen surveillance by spreading spies in areas suspected of a hiding place by Toloq I group. Apart from that, the government also sent special patrols with ample authority to force village heads to take action to arrest robbers if they were in their territory. The government deployed police patrols and a population of about hundreds of people, chasing robbers, burrowing bivouacs and entering forests to track their hiding. Most of these village chiefs then mobilized residents to spy on the robbers' hideout. The government even gave an ultimatum to the village heads to hand over the robbers. Including the Karaeng Polombangkeng, in several cases were forced to arrest members of their own families for avoiding the Dutch suspicion of their support for I Toloq [19]. Then, an ultimatum was given to the Tetebatu regen and the head of Pallangga village on June 23, 1914, which contained the order to hand over Abasa Daeng Manromo Kareng Bilaji, a follower of I Toloq Daeng Magassing. Regen Tetebatu and the village head of Pallangga could not avoid this ultimatum. On June 27, 1914, they gathered a resident patrol to raid the hideout and killed Abasa Daeng Manroma and arrested 39 of its members. In the same way, the government also succeeded in crippling I Toloq's prominent followers, such as Karaeng Matika, the suspect in the attack on the collector's house in Palleko on June 5, respectively Basareng, Paciro Daeng Matappa and Japa [1]

On June 28, 1915, Toloq held a meeting with the karaeng who supported him. Two royal heirloom spears Polombangkeng declared as a symbol that the meeting was at the meeting of the royal council. In this meeting, the karaeng present agreed to give power to Toloq to hold and keep the Polombangkeng heirloom and the royal heirlooms of Gowa hidden in Masale village when the Dutch military expedition attacked Gowa in 1905. This meeting means that I Toloq has received legitimacy as a king, have special rights, such as being entitled to tax and cannot be killed, only in exile if they commit serious violations. It is a special privilege attached to the aristocrats in South Sulawesi [41].

The day after the meeting, the inauguration ceremony of I Toloq Daeng Magassing was held. Attend this inauguration; Baso Patiro represented Gowa nobility, Karaeng Polombangkeng represented by three of his relatives, namely Cincing Daeng Tompo accompanied by an uncle and nephew, while two sons of Arung Matoa represented Wajo. Apart from that, there were also the village heads, members of the I Toloq group and the people. After the inauguration, I Toloq delivered a speech to all attended the party that the Dutch government had lost almost all its troops and it was time to escape the grip of the Dutch government, in the oral tradition that the aristocrats surrendered several weapons and ammunition and ordered their followers to join the I Toloq group. One of the weapons given by I Toloq, a *badik* (traditional gun of Bugis-Makassar), was named I Tabuleleng (the black one) [37]

The inauguration of I Toloq above also indicates that the I Toloq robbery movement has formed a resistance network involving the aristocrats, especially from Gowa, Polombangkeng and Maros. This network of resistance still related to the pacification war, which was unfinished. High noble families who were dismissed from their posts, arrested, and exiled appeared to take an important position in creating a resistance network in 1915. This condition strengthened when the military withdrawal to Batavia in October 1914 became a rational reason for the aristocrats to think of taking the opportunity to seize power by supporting a group of robbers.

To overcome the security situation, the Dutch government sent W.J. Coenen to investigate the background of the robbery actions in the Gowa, Takalar and surrounding areas. This appointment relates to the position of W.J. Coenen as a member of the Advisory Council for the Netherlands Indies (*Raad van Nederland Indie*) and as a former Governor of Celebes and its Subordinates. His experience and knowledge of this area was an essential asset in dealing with this robbery problem. The first step that W.J. Coenen was proposing to the central government to send military aid. According to him, the withdrawal of military forces in October 1914 during the reign of Governor Th. A.L. Heyting weakens the power of the government and provides an opportunity for opponents of the government to carry out resistance or revolt [19]. This view based on the assumption of a drastic increase in robbery cases, as in the research results

of W.J. Coenen shows the statistics of robbery cases, especially in April, May, June, and July 1915. In the Takalar region, there were 76 cases, Gowa 8 cases, Jenepontan, 45 cases and Bonthain 7 cases. Meanwhile, in the Kolonial Verslag records until August 1915, the number of robberies was approximately 150 cases [39]. In the political report of Th. A. L. Heyting that in June; 11 cases, June 39 cases, July 46 cases, August 8 cases, September 2 cases; August and November 1 case each [42]. According to W.J. Coenen that the robbery has become part of a political movement. Therefore, a military approach was necessary to quell the robbery movement [39].

The evidence that the robbery movement became a political movement was the involvement of the dissatisfied aristocrats with the Dutch government. Through the government's spy, Daeng Matutu, W.J. Coenen succeeded in uncovering the political motives of the aristocrats involved in supporting the I Toloq movement, among others; namely Karaeng Batupute and Karaeng Barombong arrested on May 3, 1915, and then exiled in Magelang. Regent Binamu Lompo Daeng Raja was fired in July 1915 and then exiled, Regent Tanralili and Camba also had got fired and detained on September 25, 1915 [43]. Meanwhile, Tikolla Daeng Malleo had got intentionally retained as a Polombangkeng regen with the consideration that the government had not been able to control the Polombangkeng fully. Tikolla Daeng Malleo has had an enormous influence in the region. Stopping and arresting Tikolla Daeng Malleo was tantamount to instigating more excellent resistance. The Dutch government still has an interest in not disturbing the position of Tikolla Daeng Malleo and is more focused on trying to paralyze the I Toloq movement [19].

W.J. Coenen used a military approach to end the robbery acts. On July 23, 1915, eight companies of military reinforcements from Java arrived in Makassar. However, this military assistance was not able to ultimately end the I Toloq robbery movement. Even W.J. Coenen promises a prize f. 500 to anyone who can capture or inform I Toloq's hiding place [44]. Indeed, after military assistance made robbery actions lessened, I Toloq and his followers were still a threat to the government. W.J.'s military approach Coenen was unable to crush the I Toloq movement so that several high-ranking nobles, among others; Karaeng Mappayukki, Karaeng Kalukuang and Karaeng Lengkesa aid end the I Toloq movement.

The above conditions also resulted in increased hostility between *karaeng* relatives and between communities themselves. Due to pressure from the Dutch government, several village heads had to confront, arrest and even kill their relatives who were supporters of the I Toloq movement. Likewise, in several cases, robberies and murders were aimed at people or noble families who suspected of being spies for the Netherlands. This situation increasingly creates an atmosphere of uncertainty, mutual suspicion, aristocrats, and society cause division. Both the aristocracy and society trapped

in two choices, if they did not participate in encouraging the arrest of the robbers, then they were part of the robber's group. On the other hand, if they did not support the robber movement, then they were considered a Dutch spy and would become a target of violence, theft, robbery and even murder. This pressure from the Dutch government caused several aristocrats to pretend to help the Dutch government, but also to support the I Toloq movement. On July 15, 1915, a group of nobles; Karaeng Mappayukki, Karaeng Barombong, Karaeng Batupute, Karaeng Barombong conveyed to West Gowa controller H. van der Wal a sense of bitterness and stated that they were willing to help the government end the robbery practices. Among this group of aristocrats, Karaeng Batupute and Karaeng Barombong only play a role. Both also aided I Toloq to fight against the Dutch government [1].

The military approach and the involvement of several high-ranking aristocrats have not been able to crush the I Toloq movement. The Dutch government then increasingly put pressure on the village heads to support the crushing of the I Toloq movement. The result of this government pressure led to divisions in society—those who did not participate in I Toloq's crackdown considered to be part of the robbers. To avoid being accused of being part of the I Toloq group, some of the pro-Dutch government aristocrats formed civilian groups to join the police patrol to crush the I Toloq groups.

On November 15, 1915, about 30 men armed with *badik* and spears gathered in Kalukuang village. They were a group of *jawara* (strongman) formed to paralyze group I Toloq. The group then joined the police patrol from Sungguminasa under the command of J. Rambet. For two days this group patrolled around Palleko and sought information about I Toloq's group. Wednesday, November 17, 1915, a spy from the village of Sabintang conveyed the message that I Toloq appeared at Tarasi's house, in the village of Kalanipa. Police forces and civil society groups then rushed to Sabintang, where they met the Kalukuang *karaeng* and his followers. At J. Rambet's suggestion, they formed two groups to surround I Toloq. The first group moved from the west and the second from the east. The two groups then met on the south side of Kalanipa in the rice fields. I Toloq, and some of his followers noticed the police patrol from the east, so they left the Tarasi's house and headed south. I Toloq, and five of his followers were trapped in an open area so that fighting was inevitable. Initially, the fighting between I Toloq's group and the siege was balanced. Five of I Toloq's followers carrying Beaumont's rifles fought back. Although the number of sieges was far more significant, I Toloq and his followers continued to advance. I Toloq and several of his followers, including Rajamang, died in the attack [45]. I Toloq's body was then paraded around the village to break the spirit against the Dutch government and show the community that supporting I Toloq would have the same fate [46]. After this incident most of I Toloq's followers were finally arrested. Most of

them imprisoned in Makassar and some were being exiled in Java.

The success of the Dutch government in destroying I Toloq was inseparable from the Dutch government's strategy of putting pressure on the local elite and forming troops which also consisted of civilians, bandits who were at odds with the I Toloq Daeng Magassing group. The government appears to be using a "thief catching thief" strategy, in which the police use bandits to catch bandits. The bandit organization becomes an instrument of the ruler and at the same time, acts as an intermediary or broker for violence. This governance strategy also occurred in other areas of the Dutch East Indies administration [47]. Apart from using other bandit groups, I Toloq's defeat was also caused by the betrayal by I Toloq's followers. According to the oral tradition of *sinrilik* that several followers of I Toloq collaborated with the Dutch government, such as; I Camangkok, Sanrek ri Bontonompo, I Batong Daeng Tarang, brothers Baco Deng Jawaq, I Makkarawa Daeng Ngalle, and Pasaung Daeng Ma'lotteng [37]. I Toloq's followers who sided with the Dutch government got a position in the government structure. As, I Makkarawa Daeng Ngalle was appointed as a Moncongkomba *gallarang*, but his position as a *gallarang* was only a short time. When Pajonga Daeng Ngalle became Karaeng of Polombangkeng, he appointed Sirajuddin Daeng Bundu as *Gallarang* of Moncongkomba replacing I Makkarawa Daeng Ngalle.

At first, the high nobility kept secret in collaboration with I Toloq. However, when the I Toloq movement increasingly received support from various aristocrats, indigenous officials actively showed their siding with the robbers. After I Toloq's death, the government continued to investigate the involvement of native nobles and officials. After the Dutch government forced them to chase and arrest the robbers, now they became targets of the arrest. Tikolla Daeng Malleio, regent of Polombangkeng, and his nephew Daeng Manjengka, are both suspected of being involved in looting and robbery along with I Toloq. The two were later arrested and exiled [29]. The post of the Polombangkeng regent was left vacant for eight years, and the authority in Polombangkeng was under the direct control of the Takalar controller.

After the Dutch governments paralyzed the I Toloq movements, cases of robbery decreased dramatically. The number of robberies in 1915 reached 140 cases, reduced to 7 cases in 1916. Cases of theft and robbery were relatively small and escalation. Except, Bambu led a robbery case in the Takalar with 20 of his followers. Bambu and all his followers were arrested and sentenced to severe punishment [48]. When the robberies began to subside, a new mystical pattern emerged, namely predictions of a savior and the sale of magical amulets. The figure always predicted to appear was the resurrection of I Sangkilang Batara Gowa. In the Takalar, a figure named Baso Uta Esa or also known as Baso Daeng Magassing predicts a solar eclipse where Karaeng

I Sangkilang Batara Gowa will reappear to marry his daughter to him. The blood of I Sangkilang Batara Gowa will flow to him. At that time, power and supernatural powers imparted to him, he would eliminate all Europeans and "strange Easterners". On July 10, 1916, Baso was arrested and imprisoned in Makassar. In addition to predictions, amulets were also sold that promised immunity and supernatural powers so that those who had amulets could be free from paying taxes [48]. Forecasting and selling of these amulets occurred in almost all regions of South Sulawesi during the 1920-30s decade [1]. These mystical movements carried out to entice the people with predictions, to establish themselves, or in other ways aimed at opposing Dutch rule. Movements of this type were nativistic which blend with the expectations of the presence of extraordinary figures or declare themselves as descendants of figures who have become legends in society.

After eight years of arresting Karaeng Polombangkeng, Tikolla Daeng Malleo, the Governor of Celebes appointed Majadi Daeng Sisila as regent of Polombangkeng on August 14, 1924 [29]. Majadi Daeng Sisila was the younger brother of Tikolla Daeng Malleo. However, just four years later, in 1928, Majadi Daeng Sisila was again arrested for opposing tax collection and embezzlement [19]. Later he was replaced by his younger brother, Pajonga Daeng Ngalle, who later became the leader of the resistance against the presence of NICA in Takalar. The Dutch government seemed unable to remove the relative of Hajina Daeng Masaung, a Polombangkeng regent who was arrested and exiled in Java in 1906.

Until the end of Dutch colonialism, Polombangkeng was still being neglected compared to the development of other regions. For security reasons, government offices stationed on the beach, in Topejawa and then the opening of the postal highway to Bantaeng. The government opened schools and other offices in Takalar. The Polombangkeng aristocrats felt left out because they considered themselves to be the highest nobles in the area and opposed this development. The social system was unchanged, and hardly any developing economic middle class or independent social strata could move outside the influence of the aristocracy. However, the changes that occurred were evident in the emergence of a new elite of educated noble sons. The sons of the nobility did not go to school in Dutch schools. However, most of them took up education in Makassar, involved with the nationalist movement in Java, which later influenced Polombangkeng's position during the Indonesian independence revolution [19].

5. CONCLUSION

Since the 19th century, robbery and theft have been rampant in Polombangkeng. The robbery and theft network involved marginalized aristocrats in the government structure. In the 20th century, the policies of the Dutch East Indies government that eroded the role of

the high nobility and encouraged the emergence of a new aristocratic social class resulted in increasingly intense social competition. As a result, the robbery network underwent an expansion of strategy and an escalation in which a more powerful alliance emerged between the bandits and the indigenous officials. This bandit alliance with native officials turned into a political movement against the Dutch government. The robbery act transformed social banditry, stealing, and robbers who did not pretend to change the order developed into a part of the political movement against Dutch rule. However, the alliance of bandits with local officials did not essentially represent an open or transparent alliance. Local officials tended to hide their support for robbers in front of Dutch colonial officials. Local officials had an ambiguous attitude, on the one hand, they had an interest in maintaining relations with robbers who had an increasing number of followers, and on the other hand, they tried to maintain their position as officials appointed by the Dutch colonial government.

AUTHORS' CONTRIBUTIONS

All authors contributed to the study conception and design. Material preparation, data collection and analysis were performed by Taufik and Djoko Marihando. The first draft of the manuscript was written by Taufik, and all authors commented on previous versions of the manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

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