

# The Victory of the Taliban and Its Influence on the Jamaah Islamiyah Group in Indonesia

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## ABSTRACT

The Taliban group has succeeded in occupying the Afghan government since August 2021. Some observers say that the Taliban's victory could trigger the spirit of radical groups to establish an Islamic state. When Afghanistan was invaded by the Soviet Union, many Indonesian members of Jamaah Islamiyah went there to help the Taliban, with the excuse of defending their fellow Muslims. There they experienced brain washing, so that when they returned to Indonesia in the late 1990s, they began to carry out acts of terrorism from 2000 to 2009 with the excuse of upholding the Islamic State. Other observers say that the Taliban's victory will not directly make radical movements in Indonesia stronger and trigger acts of terrorism. This paper tries to answer questions about the current condition of Jamaah Islamiyah, and how its members react to the Taliban's victory. The facts show that the current condition of Jamaah Islamiyah is weak. First, this happened because many of its leaders and members were arrested by the police. Second, many members of Jamaah Islamiyah left and joined Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid. Third, weak leadership since Hambali was detained at Guantanamo, and especially since his successor, Para Wijayantowas arrested in 2019. Fourth, Para Wijayanto instructed members of Jamaah Islamiyah not to commit acts of terrorism. Jamaah Islamiyah does not have the human resources and weapons to fulfill its objectives. However, vigilance must not end, because the victory of the Taliban was greeted with euphoria by members of Jamaah Islamiyah. Nothing is static in the human mind, therefore the new, more militant amir of Jamaah Islamiyah can emerge with a more aggressive approach than his predecessor. Therefore, despite its current weak condition, Jamaah Islamiyah remains a dangerous group.

**Keywords:** *Taliban, Jamaah Islamiyah, terorisme, Islamic state*

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The United States decided to leave Afghanistan in July 2021. As a result, the Afghan government was shaky and unable to stand on its own two feet. The Afghan president surrendered, and his men chose to flee abroad instead of fighting the Taliban. Because of that, the Taliban easily took control of the territory of Afghanistan and controlled it since August 2021. Subsequently, the Taliban, slowly but surely, formed an Islamic state and set up a new government based on religious law. This is the return of the Taliban for the second time. The victory that many countries feared, including Indonesia, but was greeted with joy by admirers around the world.

The Taliban succeeded in occupying the Afghan government in August 2021. Some observers said that the Taliban victory could trigger the spirit of radical groups to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. The victory of the Taliban is also a sign of the defeat of ISIS. The Taliban has always rejected ISIS, which wants to create its own government (*daulah Islamiyah*). Other observers say that the Taliban's victory will not directly make the terrorism movement in Indonesia stronger. But the Taliban victory could inspire radical groups to create an Islamic state. We take the example of the statement of the *Jama'ah Ansharu Syari'ah* (JAS) group which was founded by Abu Bakar Baasyir's son, Abdurahim Baasyir. JAS is grateful for the Taliban's victory and supports the Taliban in implementing an Islamic state system in a Kaffah manner.

The victory of the Taliban in Afghanistan will not trigger acts of terrorism in Indonesia, because there is no evidence to support this allegation. "We don't need to worry about the Taliban's victory and its connection with acts of terrorism in Indonesia, because there is no empirical evidence that the victories of foreign movements triggering acts of terrorism in Indonesia, in this case related to Islam," said Imron Byhaqi alias Abu Tholut, an Indonesian citizen who had been a militia in Afghanistan in the period around 1985-1992. Abu Tholut gave an example of several victories of the Islamic movement abroad, for example the victory of the Iranian Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini was not immediately welcomed by the terror movement in Indonesia. According to Abu Tholut, acts of terrorism actually emerged when the United States and NATO (North Atlantic Defense Organization) entered Afghanistan in 2001. "It means, this is psychology, it's a victory movement that doesn't trigger anything that is terrorism in nature. What triggers it is news of defeat, injustice, sad news." According to Abu Tholut, new acts of terror will occur if there is conflict, injustice, colonialism, and bad news [1].

Meanwhile, many are worried about the impact of this Taliban victory on the escalation of terrorism in Indonesia. There is an analysis that the victory of the Taliban in Afghanistan will trigger the interest of radical groups in Indonesia. Considering that since the 1980s, Afghanistan has been a training ground and battle ground for terrorists, including those from Indonesia. Afghanistan has long been a training ground, training camp, and battle ground for Indonesians who were influenced by radical groups to join the war in Afghanistan.

In the past, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, from Indonesia there were at least 10 waves of sending people to Afghanistan from several militant groups. In Afghanistan, they train, collect ammunition, and also build terrorism networks. In the end, they returned to Indonesia and made a number of terrors. Like Imam Samudera, Ali Imron, who departed in the last wave, returned to Indonesia in the 1990s. Then not long after returning home, began to carry out acts of terror.

Those who went to Afghanistan experienced a process of ideological brainwash, which made them change their destination. Initially they had aspirations to save their Muslim brothers and sisters, but because of the brainwashing process, they wanted to build the *Daulah Islamiyah* with acts of terror. As did the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) group. If we look at some of the incidents that became the target of attacks by Jamaah Islamiyah, they were the Christmas Eve bombings in 2000, the involvement of conflicts in Ambon and Poso, the Bali 1 and 2 Bombings, the bombing at the JW Marriott Hotel, the bombing at the Australian Embassy, and then the Rich Carlton bombing in 2009.

The series of bombings in Indonesia were carried out by the same network, namely alumni of the Afghan jihad and members of Jamaah Islamiyah. Fathur Rahman Al Ghozi, Zulkarnaen, Hambali, Mukhlas, Ali Imron, Imam Samudra, and Dr. Azahari is an Afghan war alumnus who has received military education and war strategy [2]. In addition to the alumni of 62 Afghanistan, there is also the name of Noordin M. Top, a Malaysian citizen accountant who is a member of Jamaah Islamiyah and a top recruiter. It was from them that terrorist networks were formed through regeneration and doctrination to give rise to "brides" ready to die, as they are called for suicide bombers such as Asmar Latin Sani, Dani Dwi Permana, and Nana Ikhwan Maulana [3].

Based on this historic event, some believe that the Taliban's victory in Afghanistan has the potential to have an impact on Indonesia. Among other things, it can attract radical groups in Indonesia to return to Afghanistan. Moreover, there is still the potential for another conflict to break out in Afghanistan. This can attract groups from around the world to fight in Afghanistan.

The collapse of the US-backed Afghan government, the return of the Taliban to power in August 2021, and the ISIS suicide bombing at Kabul airport have raised fears of a new act of terrorism and a widespread threat in

Southeast Asia. Many in the Southeast Asian region are concerned that the Taliban could again provide shelter to al-Qaeda and allow Afghanistan to become a training center for international terrorists as it did in the 1990s. The Kabul airport bombing showed that ISIS, hostile to the Taliban, could inspire its supporters around the world to carry out new attacks in a deadly new chapter.

The risk from al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Southeast Asia, at least in the short term, is quite low. The theoretical risk of ISIS remnants could be higher, especially as they have been the main perpetrators of terrorist attacks in Indonesia and the Philippines since 2014. The extremist organization with the closest ties to Afghanistan and al-Qaeda in the past is Jamaah Islamiyah, a group that responsible for the 2002 Bali bombings and other terrorist attacks in Indonesia and the Philippines. Jamaah Islamiyah was never structurally part of al-Qaeda, but Jamaah Islamiyah needed funding and training from al-Qaeda, including for the Bali Bombings, worked with some of its key operators and accepted its basic ideological teachings. The operational relationship effectively ended with the 2003 arrest of Hambali in Thailand who later became the only Indonesian detained at Guantanamo. Prior to his arrest, however, Hambali had secured additional funds from al-Qaeda that were funneled to Jamaah Islamiyah. The splinter militants, led by Noordin Top, were responsible for major attacks in Indonesia in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2009, when most leaders of Jamaah Islamiyah avoided violence.

Jamaah Islamiyah then seemed to disappear from the arena of terrorism, especially when ISIS dominated the terrorist landscape. In fact, it is systematically rebuilding, with programs that focus on da'wah and education. When the Syrian conflict broke out, Jamaah Islamiyah leaders saw an opportunity to rebuild military capacity and started a program to recruit and send people to train with different militias, not linked to ISIS and al-Qaeda [4].

The lesson learned from the Taliban government when it was in power in Afghanistan is that the Taliban government fell because it did not have the means to defend itself against US attacks. Therefore, military capacity is needed for defense as well as expansion. The arrest and deportation from Turkey of a group of members of Jamaah Islamiyah in December 2017, Jamaah Islamiyah which carried out a training program in Syria, and the scope of the revitalized Jamaah Islamiyah, came to the attention of the Indonesian police. After a long period of surveillance, a crackdown began, and the police since mid-2019 have arrested and tried around 200 suspected members of Jamaah Islamiyah, including its leader, Para Widjayanto. The organization is devastated and lacks the capacity to capitalize on the Taliban's victories in Afghanistan. Jamaah Islamiyah, however, has always shown a talent for forward thinking and long-term strategy and even in its weak position, it should not be underestimated or sidelined.

This article attempts to answer important questions about the current status of Jamaah Islamiyah and how its members react to the Taliban's victory. This could be by looking at Jamaah Islamiyah's past and present contacts with al-Qaeda, as well as the aspirations and tactics chosen between 2019-2020 when most of the top leadership was arrested. This paper examines how Jamaah Islamiyah is positioned in relation to the enmity between al-Qaeda and ISIS, how high the level of danger of Jamaah Islamiyah is related to the victory of the Taliban.

## 2. METHODS

This study uses a qualitative approach. This approach emerged as a result of the reaction of the positivism and post-positivism traditions, so that qualitative research is a multiple method (bricoleur and bricoleur) with an interpretative approach in interpreting empirical phenomena [5]. This study does not use statistical figures but with descriptive exposure, which is trying to describe a symptom or event, an event that is currently happening, where the researcher tries to photograph an event and event that is the focus of attention to be described as it is.

The method used is descriptive-analytical, in order to describe a phenomenon to study the who, what, when, and how aspects of a topic. For Ronny Kountur, descriptive research will provide a description, description or situation as clearly as possible without any special treatment of the object under study [6].

The type of research used is a case study. In accordance with the opinion of Robert K. Yin, that case studies do not require a complete or accurate translation of actual events, because they are directed at developing a framework for understanding complex social phenomena to maintain the characteristics of organizational cycles, social change and international relations [7]. The study wanted to see the socio-political phenomenon that occurred in Afghanistan, namely the victory of the Taliban group, and the impact of this phenomenon on the Jamaah Islamiyah organization in Indonesia.

## 3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### 3.1 *The condition of Jamaah Islamiyah so far and Terrorism in Indonesia.*

Jamaah Islamiyah under the leadership of Para Widjayanto, prohibits its members from committing acts of terrorism in Indonesia. That would not allow them to seize power, and the Wijayanto knew this would take a long time. To that end, Jamaah Islamiyah has to go through two stages (*marhala*): preparation of forces, including logistics and personnel (*nuqthah inthilaq*) and "concept victory" (*tamkin risalat*). The latter aims to weaken the enemy's authority through da'wah and information warfare. Jamaah Islamiyah will only use force when these two stages are completed, and are ready to enter the next two stages: *nikyah wal inhak* (depleting

enemy energy) and *idaratut tawahusy* (managing chaos)[8].

The Jamaah Islamiyah reference manual for these last two stages is Abu Bakr Naji's book "Management of Barbarity" which was the inspiration for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq and has inspired many al-Qaeda commanders. It is unclear whether there has been a change in strategy since the arrest of Para Widjayanto in July 2019 and subsequent arrests. Any changes will depend on who is chosen to replace Para Wijayanto as leader, and until August 2021, it is unclear whether any selections have been made. The new Amir may choose to continue with the current strategy, in this case Jamaah Islamiyah will not support any terrorist actions. But a new emir may also decide that defensive jihad is the only way to confront the government and defend oneself against the enemy.

Who does the Jamaah Islamiyah see as enemies? Jamaah Islamiyah sees two enemies, namely a distant enemy such as America and its allies, and a close enemy, namely the Government of Indonesia, for its refusal to apply Islamic law. Jamaah Islamiyah always emphasizes the need to understand the local context before deciding which one to prioritize. It has repeatedly stressed that attacks in Indonesia are counterproductive as long as the country is not attacked and there is no public support for violence (as opposed to countries under occupation). Jamaah Islamiyah never accepted the ISIS caliphate as legitimate but nevertheless believed that a true caliphate would eventually be established in Syria. Whenever that happens, wherever it will be, it will definitely be attacked by the United States and its allies. At that time, Jamaah Islamiyah will give priority to "distant enemies". His method of attack may be to carry out jihad operations against American economic assets. Its leaders have on several occasions discussed the giant Freeport mine in Papua as a potential target. Having an ISIS attack on Kabul airport and the Western coalition against it, is not enough for Jamaah Islamiyah to decide to target American or Western interests in Indonesia. It may also stifle calls to attack Western interests from extremist groups in Afghanistan after the Taliban victory.

What is the ultimate goal of Jamaah Islamiyah? Is the focus on the Islamic State of Indonesia or the Islamic caliphate? How did that goal change? Jamaah Islamiyah from the beginning wanted to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. But his ambition didn't stop there. Once an Islamic state or daulah Islamiyah is established in Indonesia, Jamaah Islamiyah will then continue to seek the establishment of a caliphate through military expansion. The Khilafah can be started in Indonesia and branched out abroad. However, this view changed after Para Widjayanto took over the leadership in 2008-2019. He took over after the arrests of Zarkasih and Abu Dujana in 2007, but was only officially elected in 2009.

Jamaah Islamiyah became convinced that a caliphate would not be established in Indonesia for reasons. From around 2011-2012 its leaders believed that the world would end soon. Many Muslim sources state that the end

of time will witness the establishment of the Caliphate of the Prophet in Syria, not in Indonesia or other regions. The Syrian conflict raises the possibility that this caliphate, backed by the power of the Imam Mahdi or the savior of Islam, will emerge there as predicted. It is difficult to overemphasize how important or deeply held this belief is, even among pragmatists like Para Widjayanto[9].

What is Jamaah Islamiyah's short-term and long-term strategy and how has it changed with the wave of arrests? Jamaah Islamiyah under the current leadership of Para Wijayanto aims for political and military victory. He believes that the governance structure for an Islamic state is insufficient unless it is backed by a strong and coercive military. The grand strategy of Jamaah Islamiyah is still using a combination of da'wah and jihad to achieve victory. But in the new strategy developed under Para Widjayanto after 2008, jihad as physical combat must be subservient to da'wah. Thus, the concept of elitist jihad was changed to popular jihad. The only way to invite believing Muslims more generally to bear the burden of jihad is through religious teaching. Jamaah Islamiyah relies on three types of da'wah. The first is in the form of social da'wah and religious da'wah. The purpose other than recruitment is to make Muslims aware of the importance of jihad. Therefore, Jamaah Islamiyah established various da'wah institutions such as MADINA (Majelis Dakwah Islam Indonesia), on November 25, 2013. MADINA aims to train Jamaah Islamiyah scholars on how to attract support and gain support. It consciously adopted the institute model, after a da'wah body namely the Indonesian Dai Association, which is run by the Islamist political party PKS which is considered to have played an important role in recruiting nearly two million PKS members at the grassroots level. Jamaah Islamiyah hoped to reach such a large number, so scholars gathered to teach including some of the most famous names in extremist preaching, such as Farid Okbah, known for his anti-Shia focus, and Lukman Hakim Martyr, better known as El-Hakimi, a Muslim scholar, intellectual youth and author of "Reflections on Jihad Aceh", a critique of the extremist movement's lack of long-term goals. MADINA continues to be the biggest da'wah within the Jamaah Islamiyah.

The second form of da'wah is through social and humanitarian assistance, such as donations to the poor, free health services, disaster relief and the like. For this purpose, Jamaah Islamiyah established several aid organizations such as Abdurrahman bin Auf, One Care, and Syam Organizer. This social service program was largely inspired by the group Ansharul Syariah in Libya (ASL), which used the aid to expand its support base. The priority is da'wah first, jihad later.

The third form of da'wah is information warfare designed to undermine the legitimacy of the government. It aims to dehumanize the enemy and thereby destroy his hegemony, so that the people will dare to rebel. This form of da'wah is carried out through several websites such as [www.kiblat.net](http://www.kiblat.net), [www.lasdipo.net](http://www.lasdipo.net), [www.sketsanews.com](http://www.sketsanews.com)

and others. In 2019, sketchnews.com became very active in spreading anti-Chinese propaganda, including the fake news that China was planning to send troops to Indonesia if ethnic Chinese in Indonesia were targeted. For Widjayanto, this information war, which he calls the tamkin treatise, is an important stage in the strategy to achieve political victory and must be preceded by the use of jihad. Despite emphasizing da'wah, Jamaah Islamiyah does not ignore jihad. Jamaah Islamiyah has a program in place to militarily train its cadres at home and in Syria and provide logistical support for the war by producing crude oil and homemade weapons, but that will not be in use any time soon.

Indeed, Jamaah Islamiyah prohibits any jihad operations in Indonesia until a critical precondition can be met, namely that the polarization between the Muslim community and the enemies of Islam, especially the Indonesian government, must first reach its boiling point. The jihad strategy followed by Jamaah Islamiyah is outlined in the book "The Management of Savagery" (Idaratu Tawahusi) by Abu Bakar Najdi. This manual became famous as the main reference for Abu Musab Al Zarkawi in Iraq, who was later considered to be the ancestor or mother of ISIS [10].

In Abu Bakr Najdi's concept, the mujahideen would first weaken the enemy and drain its energy through repeated attacks on the economy and military centres. Then it will cause chaos by carrying out acts of terror so that the security of the situation will get out of control. Jamaah Islamiyah's variation on this is to hold back the attack until the enemy's authority can be undermined through other methods. Jamaah Islamiyah will then come when the chaos is in progress, exploit it by all available means including violence, and then restore order and finally be ready to establish an Islamic state.

The massive arrests of members of Jamaah Islamiyah by Indonesian police, since mid-2019, disrupted the plan. By August 2021, most of the top leadership had been arrested. Weapon factories and explosives storage facilities have been confiscated and fundraising efforts such as the Syam Organizer have been shut down. The activities of Jamaah Islamiyah are almost completely frozen. After the previous crackdown in 2007, it took about three years for da'wah activity to slowly resume. With more members arrested in the 2019-2021 crackdown, it could take longer for Jamaah Islamiyah to rise to rebuild strength.

How did Jamaah Islamiyah rebuild after 200 of its members were arrested? The crackdown that Jamaah Islamiyah has endured since 2019 is similar to what it experienced after the arrest of its senior leader in 2007, especially after the arrest of Amir Zarkasih. The leaders of Jamaah Islamiyah themselves believe that it must now focus on surviving for the sake of survival. Jamaah Islamiyah is likely to return to Para Widjayanto's strategy, a strategy that has proven successful after 2007, namely, focusing on da'wah and education. The pesantren network will be very important, because this is where important recruitment is still taking place, and the

police will refrain from direct action against schools. Islamic mass organizations, including mainstream ones, are also likely to object to any blatant police attempts to disrupt da'wah, as long as the dai Jamaah Islamiyah does not advocate violence directly, they may still be able to lead or carry out their da'wah activities. Jamaah Islamiyah may change its name for security reasons. Many of the members arrested in the last four years have been charged with membership in banned organizations, because Jamaah Islamiyah was explicitly named a "prohibited organizational entity" in a 2008 court ruling. The new name will complicate the legal process, but prosecutors may also find ways to overcome it [11].

How have political developments in Indonesia affected the ability of Jamaah Islamiyah to rebuild its strength? In 2020, Para Widjayanto sees the future of Jamaah Islamiyah tied to like-minded political activities with Islamic mass organizations that are committed to implementing Islamic law. He saw cooperation with these organizations as essential to any future political victories. In his view, Jamaah Islamiyah will most likely benefit from any efforts to strengthen Islamic organizations or expand support for those who are pro-Sharia. He saw infiltration into political parties and local institutions such as the MUI in the local area as a desirable tactic. He might also assume that if cooperation with other organizations could be strengthened, these organizations might be more willing to protect members of Jamaah Islamiyah from arrest by special Detachment 88. It is not known whether the young leaders of Jamaah Islamiyah had this assumption. It is possible that they can produce an evaluation and critique of the Jamaah Islamiyah strategy that will resonate within the jihadi community as did "Reflection on the Jihad of Aceh" more than a decade ago. The difference is that the book "Reflection on the Aceh Jihad" is written from the point of view of a self-confident organization, criticizing others for mistakes that lead to their weakening. Any criticism from the intellectuals of Jamaah Islamiyah could now be directed inward, namely at Jamaah Islamiyah which has become too cooperative to achieve. How does Jamaah Islamiyah view coalition building with other organizations such as Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, Jamaah Ansharut Syariah, Jamaah Ansharut Daulah, Indonesian Mujahiddin Council, Salafis. As noted, Para Widjayanto shifted the concept of jihad from elite to mass action. A significant change in thinking that only with the support of the masses, Jamaah Islamiyah can secure a political victory. This means building coalitions (*tansiq*) with other like-minded organizations, but only if they are *Ahlul Sunnah wal Jamaah*.

Under its previous leadership, Jamaah Islamiyah had never worked with any other organization, fearing this would compromise its clandestine nature. Under Para Wijayanto, Jamaah Islamiyah became more interested in alliances. And this is only partly because it is increasingly focused on the need for victory and political development with a broad base of support. But after the 2010 Aceh training camp disaster, when a planned military training camp led to the massive arrests and deaths of dozens of

fugitives at the hands of the police, some Jamaah Islamiyah intellectuals became convinced that nonviolent advocacy had actually done more to advance the enforcement of Islamic law than to do so. violence. In a distributed treatise entitled "Reflection on the Jihad of Aceh", one member of Jamaah Islamiyah argued that it was foolish to carry out jihad when there was almost no public support. Unless the situation is like with Iraq or Afghanistan, where the infidel enemy is attacking the Muslims. Otherwise, it would be useless to take up arms against the invaders.

A better strategy is who can contribute what from time to time to jihad in the cause of Allah. No such plan has ever been drawn up, which takes into account all the different sects of Islam and different kinds of expertise. All types of da'wah institutions must be protected. For example, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), FAKTA about fighting apostasy [12]. All have a role to play. In 2013, Jamaah Islamiyah demonstrated its willingness to join a Solo-based coalition called the Surakarta City Sharia Council (DSKS). Jamaah Islamiyah even allowed one of its cadres, Tengku Azhar, to serve as secretary general. The group also took an active role in mass anti-Ahok demonstrations from November to December 2016. For Jamaah Islamiyah, these events were an important test of their ability to mobilize their supporters. They invited their members, recitation participants, and students at their school to be involved in the protest together with other organizations.

At a large demonstration on November 4, 2016 (known as Aksi 411), Jamaah Islamiyah also issued a fatwa entitled "Peace Demonstration and Jihad Movement, Can They Work Together?" This fatwa criticizes the views that have emerged among jihadists who seek to use peaceful movements to carry out acts of violence. Supporters of the Jihad view believe that it is impossible for a non-violent movement to realize the implementation of Islamic law. This can only be done through jihad.

A rumor emerged that a jihadist group would try and use the anti-Ahok demonstrations as a way to incite conflict to open the door to jihad. Jamaah Islamiyah denies this view and emphasizes, as has happened many times before, that jihad is a means, not an end. More importantly, the fatwa supports the idea of peaceful demonstrations, seeing them as a form of "jihad of words", sometimes known as "sentence jihad or verbal jihad". Jamaah Islamiyah also saw the benefits of building a coalition when its up-and-coming cadre Siyono died in police custody after being arrested in March 2016. Jamaah Islamiyah worked closely with the Surakarta City Sharia Council, Muhammadiyah, and other Islamic organizations to campaign for the disbandment of Densus 88, whose officers are believed to be had used excessive force against the suspect. As a result of this pressure, Muhammadiyah doctors were able to perform an independent autopsy on Siyono's body, and concluded that Siyono died of fractures in his chest, trauma that occurred while in the police vehicle [13].

The number of members of Jamaah Islamiyah is around 6,000 people by the time Widjayanto was arrested in July 2019. The organization is entirely based in Indonesia, having lost its bases in Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and Australia, shortly before or after the 2002 Bali Bombings. With a membership of 6,000 people, Jamaah Islamiyah is three times larger than the pro-ISIS organization, a coalition founded by Aman Abdurrahman in Malang, East Java, in November 2015 which became known as Jamaah Anshorud Daulah (JAD). The coalition is, however, only one of dozens of pro-ISIS groups that have sprung up after the declaration of a caliphate in June 2014.

The growth of Jamaah Islamiyah occurred under the leadership of Para Wijayanto. But his active membership declined after the Bali bombings, largely due to arrests. As of 2007, around 400 members of Jamaah Islamiyah have been arrested in Indonesia, not counting the many arrested in Malaysia and Singapore. Another factor in the decline is competition from other organizations. In 2008, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir who had been released from prison and was free to travel around the country, founded Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), as a pro-sharia advocacy organization. Initially one could become a member of both Jamaah Islamiyah and Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid, but after Para Widjayanto officially became emir in early 2009, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir forbade its members to join other organizations. This "monoloyalty" policy led several senior members of Jamaah Islamiyah to follow Ba'asyir and leave Jamaah Islamiyah. Jamaah Islamiyah in 2008 experienced a crisis. Its members drop out of school or are wanted by the police. The court ruled in April 2008 declaring Jamaah Islamiyah a "prohibited organizational entity". The court's decision gave the police many legal grounds to make arrests. The Widjayanto, however, managed to steer the organization through difficult times, and Jamaah Islamiyah slowly began to bounce back, through a focus on education. From 2016 onwards, he grew even more rapidly as he began to work more openly with like-minded organizations while maintaining a policy of "monoloyalty".

### **3.2 The Structure of Jamaah Islamiyah and How they Maintain Central Control.**

Al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah or commonly abbreviated as Jamaah Islamiyah was founded in 1992 - 1993 by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir who at that time lived in Malaysia. Both of them are veterans of the Darul Islam movement and the founders of the Al Mukmin Islamic Boarding School in Ngruki, Solo, in 1972. The goal of JI is to make Indonesia as an Islamic state and ultimately to realize an Islamic caliphate in the Southeast Asian region which will include Malaysia, Southern Thailand, Brunei Darussalam, and the Southern Philippines [14].

The hierarchical structure of Jamaah Islamiyah, as modified by Para Widjayanto and operating from 2009 until its arrest in 2019, allows for relatively tight central control. The police revealed that the organizational

structure of the terrorist group Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) led by Para Wijayanto was developing more maturely. They have treasurers to couriers in their organizational structure. Jamaah Islamiyah uses the *tamkin* strategy or territorial control [15]. The Amir and his four representatives were under the markaziyah, or central command. These representatives served as a buffer to minimize contact between the emir and the leadership of the Jamaah Islamiyah branch, so that fewer were aware of the identity and whereabouts of the top leaders. The *tajhiz* or supporter division oversees the branch structure seen below the provincial level very much like the old territorial division of Jamaah Islamiyah, but with a new name. Instead of four areas called *mantiqi* covering five countries, as at the time of the Bali bombings, Jamaah Islamiyah in 2009 was reduced to two main regions in Indonesia, East and West. These are called *qodimah*, and they are further divided into increasingly smaller units, down to the cellular level of two to three people. West Qodimah covers the area of Yogyakarta and the Central Java cities of Kebumen, Cilacap, Semarang, Klaten, and Salatiga. It also includes West Java, Banten and Greater Jakarta, Greater Jakarta, as well as Sumatra Lampung, Riau, West Sumatra, South Sumatra, North Sumatra and Aceh). East Qodimah includes the heartlands of the old Jamaah Islamiyah Solo and Sukoharjo, where the Ngruki Islamic boarding school is located, as well as the neighbors of Wonogiri, Karanganyar and Sragen. Also includes East Java (Surabaya, Lamongan, Magetan); West Nusa Tenggara and Sulawesi, including Poso.

As in the original Jamaah Islamiyah structure, the markaziyah, led by the amir, is responsible for setting the broad strategy and security policy. Each subdivision is free to change the broad policy as a guideline to meet local needs. Amir assigned his representatives to oversee the different divisions to ensure that the policies were being carried out effectively. The Markaziyah also has its own religious police, known as the Hisbah Team, to ensure that the behavior of its members conforms to Islamic principles and impose penalties for violations. The Widjayanto run Jamaah Islamiyah like a corporate business. He instituted a system to incentivize all managers to work full time, from markaziyah to department heads. They receive a monthly salary (*mukafaah*) and an office car [11].

### **3.3 The Supporters of Jamaah Islamiyah view the victory of Taliban in Afghanistan.**

Has the Taliban victory in Afghanistan changed Jamaah Islamiyah's view of the importance and usefulness of the military? Or will you change your strategy? Very little is known about Jamaah Islamiyah's internal reaction to the Taliban's victory in Afghanistan. But according to terrorism researcher, Muhammad Ihsan, when the police questioned the prisoners of Jamaah Islamiyah, many members of Jamaah Islamiyah were euphoric over the success of the Taliban. In their view, this shows the success of the *tamkin* strategy in moving from the stage of weakness (*marhala idtidlaf*) to power through *jihād fisabilillah*. They claim that the

success of the Taliban is due to two factors: by fully implementing sharia, and the Taliban struggling to fulfill the call of Islamic law.

Terrorism observer Noor Huda Ismail said the Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) network tends to be unhappy with the Taliban's victory in Afghanistan. Because, according to them, the Taliban are still using western standards, such as conducting negotiations and diplomacy. Meanwhile, the Jamaah Islamiyah responded to the Taliban's victory with feelings of pleasure. Because, according to them, the Taliban have been fighting for 20 years and have finally succeeded in achieving their goals. According to Noor Huda Ismail, this group thinks they can do the same. However, this does not necessarily have an impact on the emergence of terror everywhere. But it will not appear immediately then there is direct terrorism everywhere. That will not be the process. However, said Noor Huda Ismail, the victory of the Taliban raised the passion or spirit of the Jamaah Islamiyah group. Emotions play a very important role in the dynamics of extremist groups. The desire to be part of the caliphate state, to live in the Islamic world, is a very strong emotion. Moreover, as part of the extremist belief regarding the concept of the end of time, there is a hadith that says there will be troops from the land of Khurasan. Khurasan is according to a hadith that people believe in countries including Afghanistan today [16].

According to Jamaah Islamiyah, the impact of the Taliban's victory on Jamaah Islamiyah Indonesia is a condition for help from Allah for the victory of a strong faith. According to them, the Taliban met with the practice of conditions of victory (conditions of *kauniyah*) such as adequate human resources, population support, appropriate war tactics, adequate weapons and so on. The success of the Taliban convinced members of Jamaah Islamiyah of the validity of a war strategy known as *nikayah wal inhak*, also known as *harbu Intizab*, which would gradually weaken the enemy until defeat was inevitable. If the Taliban decide to bar al-Qaeda from using Afghanistan as a base, members of Jamaah Islamiyah say they will not object. He believes that the Taliban need to establish policies that prevent them from being targeted by the United States before they fully form a government and fully control the territory of Afghanistan and their policies. against Muslim minorities in the areas they control (Chechnya, Xinjiang). The member of Jamaah Islamiyah who is currently in prison said that this was not a problem. The Prophet Muhammad never forbade cooperation with infidels. In Mecca, the Prophet Muhammad worked with the pagan tribe, the Banu Khuzaah, against the infidel Quraysh. Some members of Jamaah Islamiyah say it is impossible to manage the Afghan economy without foreign help. They (members of the Jamaah Islamiyah who are currently serving time in prison) say the Taliban need to learn from AQAP's experience in Yemen after taking over three provinces in 2012. AQAP is the Al Qaeda group in Yemen, known as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Al Qaeda in Arabian

Peninsula/AQAP). AQAP does not have enough funds to govern. To sustain nearly a year, AQAP spent about \$200 million on goods, electricity and fuel and to meet the costs of the war at a time when its own strength dwindled, hundreds of its own members had died in battle. In the end, say the people of Jamaah Islamiyah, AQAP decided to withdraw from the three provinces and return to a guerrilla strategy in the mountains.

Does this mean Jamaah Islamiyah will be inspired to carry out an armed struggle in Indonesia? It seems that it is still far from being an action attempt. They believe that Jamaah Islamiyah is far from meeting the two conditions the Taliban met, and that armed jihad is still impossible in Indonesia. Jamaah Islamiyah knows that it does not have sufficient support, human resources and weapons to fulfill its own goals. Jamaah Islamiyah doesn't appear to have any immediate plans to open communication with al-Qaeda, but if it wants to do so, it won't be difficult. Having many members abroad who can help, especially in Syria.

How have the events of the recent Taliban victory affected the rivalry between ISIS and Jamaah Islamiyah in Indonesia? The bombing outside Kabul airport on August 26, 2021 and ISIS' claim of responsibility is likely to inspire the ISIS group to try and carry out new attacks in Indonesia. This could result in no competition between Jamaah Islamiyah and ISIS, which have never been particularly influenced by each other in terms of determining their actions. But there is competition and competition within ISIS to show that one particular cell can outperform another. For this reason, ISIS cells remain far more dangerous than anything associated with Jamaah Islamiyah.

Finally, as always, it's important to emphasize that nothing is static. A new Jamaah Islamiyah emir to replace Para Wijayanto, who was more militant, could emerge with a more aggressive approach than his predecessor. A splinter group, angry at the Indonesian government over the arrests, could find inspiration in the Taliban's victory to renew its jihadist operations. New pro-Taliban cells could emerge in Jamaah Islamiyah schools. Therefore, vigilance is necessary, even if ISIS-linked groups remain a higher near-term threat.

#### 4. CONCLUSION

Based on the facts surrounding the Taliban's victories so far and looking at the current condition of the Jamaah Islamiyah, the conclusion that can be drawn is that Jamaah Islamiyah remains a dangerous organization, even though it has weakened dramatically since 2019. The return to power of the Taliban will not necessarily increase the threat level of terrorism in Southeast Asia, but the long-term scenario is never clearly. The most important dynamic to examine closely in Afghanistan may be the relationship between ISIS and the Taliban, especially after the attack on the airport in Kabul. Meanwhile, Jamaah Islamiyah will continue to grow. Jamaah Islamiyah is currently still strong, especially in West Java, Central Java and Lampung. Although in some

areas, members of Jamaah Islamiyah still appear and exist. They have a diaspora in various regions and live in a clandestine manner.

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