

Making Sense the Conception of ‘Unrecognized Statehood’: Taiwan’s Protracted Struggle for Seizing International Recognition

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to examine the lens of the 'Unrecognized Statehood' concept in the case of Taiwan's legitimacy as a sovereign state. The study found: (1) the dualism of government determined by the competition of the number of people in favor, (2) China's victory in the civil war between the PRC and the ROC that resulted in effective geographical control of the territory in Beijing government, and (3) the recognition of international countries to the Beijing government as a de jure and de facto representation of "China" by 15 countries alone that recognize the Taipei government. It argues that Taiwan categorised as an “unrecognised state” has successfully created their “own” characteristic of sovereignty even with a small number of foreign state recognition. This research uses qualitative-explanatory methods to answer how the concept of unrecognised statehood is interpreted based on the case of China-Taiwan dispute. It analyses existing secondary data with case studies. The research concluded that the national character by Taiwan’s government in the international arena is politically identified as a tangible defiance of China's established sovereignty.

Keywords: *Unrecognised Statehood, National Identity, Sovereignty, One China Policy, Taiwan, PRC*

1. INTRODUCTION

Taiwan's status constituting as a sovereign state stands apart from China experienced ambiguity of definition due to the history of the political dynamics of the two countries. "China" which was originally a union between mainland China and the Formosa, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu islands stood under one Republic of China proclaimed by the famous nationalist Dr. Sun Yat Sen in 1912 under one Kuomintang flag after overthrowing the last Qing dynasty empire.¹ Then on October 1, 1949, China split into two different government factions namely Communism under Mao Zedong and Taiwan which were remnants of republican under Chiang Kai Shek inhabiting Formosa Island.² The two governments claiming to be Chinese had a different political path, where China chose a single-party system and Taiwan adopted western-style democracy.³

With the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Beijing government was determined to regain control of Taiwan into one flag, in the concept of sovereignty offered by One China Policy.⁴ One China Policy has been widely recognized as a policy outlining efforts to integrate Taiwan within China, emphasizing that there is only one China standing in the international world.⁵ The idea of one

China policy drew criticism from Taiwan's President in the 1990s, Lee Teng-Hui who acknowledged there were two Chinese in which the two entities exercised state relations with China, which further triggered pros and cons especially in Taiwan.⁶ Taiwan's Kuomintang (KMT) political party tried to raise the debate in the parliamentary realm because it felt teng-hui's idea was contrary to the spirit of reunification as Germany, Korea, and Vietnam tried to do.

With the One China Policy, the concept of sovereignty offered by Wolff became obscured as he claimed that sovereignty is the right to rule and be ruled, while what Taiwan demonstrated in the form of resistance seems an anomaly.⁷ The contradictory conditions conceived in terms of legitimacy where recognition of other countries in the United Nations (UN) toward the official representation of the name "China" has been directed to the People's Republic of China, as opposed to Taiwan which diplomatically did not get formal recognition through the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in 1971 which resulted in resolution 2578. In contrast, after 1971 Taiwan informally established trade relations with major countries both the United States (US), including China as a competitor in cross-strait relations.⁸ The form of one-state government with two systems as indicated by Hong Kong can be a comparative compliance in terms of sovereignty at large.

This study uses a case study-explanatory approach with qualitative research methods. Qualitative research method in this study refers to Creswell definition which mentions that qualitative research is built through a constructive-perspective that manifests in the meaning of individual experience, social value, history and so on.⁹ Furthermore, the case study-explanatory approach is used by the author to answer questions about how a case occurs and build, elaborate, and widen, as well as test the existing theories.¹⁰

The data collection technique in this study is to use a secondary data collection approach or literature study. Neuman explained that the technique of data collection through literature studies is to look from the point of view of social life in the past using various available documents.¹¹ This data collection is done by seeking information from a number of books, research results, journals, magazines, websites as well as other documentation sources relevant to the concept of "modern sovereignty" in the Taiwan-PRC issue.

Moleong explained that analyzing data begins with the process of studying all the necessary data from various reliable sources.¹² Next is to reduce the data by summarizing, sorting the points and focusing on what is important. The purpose of this reduction is to obtain simpler underlying data to make analysis easier. The data analysis is then presented in the form of an overview as well as the conclusion of the case study that became the object of the study. By looking at the concept of "modern sovereignty" as a theoretical foundation, it can be used to see how far a democratic state Taiwan can realize state sovereignty as well as gain international recognition of the Taiwan-China dispute within the "One China Policy" in detail and comprehensively.

Based on previous literature studies, there is a research gap related to the position of Taiwan's sovereignty as a nation-state that must be seen distinctly rather than the classical model of sovereignty. Furthermore, the research question taken by the author emphasizes the urgency to re-conceptualize the previous concept of nation-state sovereignty which was not found in the Taiwan case in relation to the dispute against China. Therefore, the author formulated a particular research question; how is the concept of modern state sovereignty interpreted in the Taiwan-China dispute in the One China Policy?

2. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO "UNRECOGNIZED STATEHOOD"

The concept 'Unrecognized Statehood' was first introduced by Nina Caspersen in 2012 where she found several anomalies phenomenon related to state sovereignty. One of those is the case of which several states like Abkhazia, Eritrea, Montenegro, Nagorno Karabakh, Somaliland, Kosovo, and Taiwan remain sovereign though they do not possess international recognition. These are categorized as the

so-called Unrecognized states which they have achieved de facto independence, but failed to gain international recognition.¹³ To further understand the Unrecognized states, Caspersen rendered some facets in its definition, as follows.

First, an unrecognized state has achieved de facto independence, covering at least two-thirds of the territory to which it lays claim and including its main city and key regions. Second, its leadership is seeking to build further state institutions and demonstrate its own legitimacy. Third, the entity has declared formal independence or demonstrated clear aspirations for independence, for example through an independence referendum, adoption of a separate currency or similar act that clearly signals separate statehood. Fourth, the entity has not gained international recognition or has, at the most, been recognized by its patron state and a few other states of no great importance. Last, it has existed for at least two years.¹⁴

From this definition, it can be seen that unrecognized states predominantly lack international recognition as well as de jure independence yet those are still independent entities and searching aspirations for external sovereignty.¹⁵ The main idea of independence emphasized by the unrecognized states is the right to self-determination. However, in the case of Taiwan not only self-determination, but also territorial integrity becomes the central point of which Taiwan attempted to deal with the mainland of China. Krasner contends that elective courses of action within the case of Taiwan give the 'functional comparable of recognition'.¹⁶ Indeed, in spite of the fact that Taiwan has been prepared to mutilate its de facto autonomous status and has not formally pronounced freedom, the need of acknowledgment still comes with limitations.

Statehood without outside sway takes a particular frame, but the address is in case this ought to be seen as a modern shape of statehood, and in fact a modern form of sovereignty. Unrecognized states within the present-day worldwide framework are born out of the exceptionally prohibitive right to self-determination that rose after World War II. This essentially compels their prospects for long-term survival. The kind of statehood that emerges reflects the ought to guarantee outside bolster whereas ensuring their de facto freedom and guaranteeing residential backing. Unrecognized states need to possess and preserve military power, internal cohesion, external support as well as adaptability with the globalized system. As such, unrecognized statehood could be perceived as a new form of statehood by which it challenged traditional views of statehood and/or sovereignty; the nonattendance of outside sway can coexist with a shape of statehood that copies conventional statehood, however contrasts from it in critical regards.¹⁷

Caspersen argued that the entities stay caught in an equivocal and to a great extent temporal position. Unrecognized states are not essentially 'states in waiting', indistinguishable to recognized states aside from their need of acknowledgment. These entities subsequently challenge

prevailing conceptions of sovereignty by indicating to the diverse shapes that internal sovereignty can take and illustrate the proceeded control of the sovereignty paradigm. Unrecognized statehood is characterized by particular pressures and ambiguities that are improbable to be found in recognized entities, but other shapes of clashing weights will be found: pressures between outside pressures and internal demands, clashing requests from distinctive communal bunches.¹⁸

Besides, in further discussing sovereignty there are other concepts that render significance and are mutually relevant to each other, among others; shared sovereignty and sovereignty games. Firstly, Krasner's shared sovereignty is a contract between national authorities and external agencies. The concept of shared sovereignty combines the legitimacy of international law within the framework of agreements agreed upon by many countries. Followed by a symmetrical bargain involving external actors. Local leaders with the involvement of external actors will be encouraged to realize better governance on specific issues, which then generate domestic political support.¹⁹

Secondly, sovereignty games are defined as strategic maneuvers of a country to claim and interpret sovereignty to simultaneously protect autonomy and increase influence on the international stage.²⁰ The concept of sovereignty games is divided into two dimensions, namely horizontal and vertical. The horizontal dimension of sovereignty games speaks of the use of extensions of international institutions and multinational corporations to exercise national sovereignty, while verticals talk about legal and symbolic instruments used by national executives to increase autonomy at the domestic and international level by making sovereign claims.²¹ Fourth, selective sovereignty of Amitav Acharya that emerged after the events of 9/11 made the country provide a double standard definition of recognition of the sovereignty of other countries, given the emergence of terrorism as one of the new actors in international relations.²²

Furthermore, the concepts of sovereignty can be synthesized as follows: State sovereignty shifts from the originally used definition of the Westphalia treaty which greatly emphasizes the internal aspects of the prerequisites, among others, government-people-territory, into recognition of sovereignty derived from external parties. In this case the national authority needs to spur domestic legitimacy which then turns to the relationship between two dimensions namely horizontal and vertical. Horizontal and vertical dimensions require a combination of international efforts through international institutions and multinational corporations as well as sovereign recognition from within the country. Responses from other countries are possible in recognition made in terms of sovereignty games, in the form of selective sovereignty.

The first library is about the concept of sovereignty. The initial argument for sovereignty was not a fact, but rather an assumption of authority derived from legitimacy or

recognition, and was mentioned by Jean Bodin and Niccolò Machiavelli in the 16th century.²³ Since sovereignty is an assumption, the definition of sovereignty becomes an uncertain, normative, and interpretive concept.^{24 25} At first the concept of sovereignty was absolutism or *l'état c'est moi* expressed by the philosopher Rousseau also attached to inalienable, indivisible, and inalienable traits. The emperor or king holds the highest power in a state institution that has been arranged in such a way as to form patronization between the people and the family or someone who has "legitimacy" power. There was hierarchical control between power and the presence of the Pope and the ruling kings on a limited territory and divided Europe into political divisions under one Holy Roman empire.²⁶

The concept of sovereignty came to public attention during the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 which determined that the form of sovereign state was a formal recognition of the existence of government, territory, and people. In the treaty ending the 30-Year War that legitimized the church as a political force and strengthened secularism between political institutions and religious institutions, the state gained affirmation in the form of *de facto* requirements with the ruling dynasty.^{27 28} However, criticism came from Moita who considered that Westphalia only strengthened territorial jurisdiction.²⁹ The argument was reinforced by Hassan's statement that the purpose of the Westphalia treaty was the establishment of a territorial state system that was merely recognized for its territorial boundaries rather than other factors such as government and people, thus making Osiander referred to Westphalia as a "myth" in International Relations studies.³⁰

The development of sovereignty after Westphalia is merely an addition to how state authorities can consolidate sovereignty. For instance, in 1688 the British invented parliament as an instrument for foreign policy even though it was still surrounded by royal dynasties.³¹ In 1688 with the emergence of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, "modern" sovereignty was strengthened by the existence of a constitution and law of a public nature rather than the private law of the royal family or even the private law of a feudal and patrimonial king. The definition of sovereignty based on absolutism is increasingly shifting with the existence of legislative sovereignty that places people as the holders of state power. The use of sovereignty again shifted as the world faced a period of decolonization in the era of World War I and II, in which sovereignty was obtained by showing a feeling of independence to the so-called nation in a territory of a colonizing state. Further sovereignty is demonstrated by a nation's ability to establish a state without the intervention of other powers.^{32 33}

Ronzoni then distinguishes sovereignty in two large fragments, negative sovereignty and positive sovereignty. These two types of sovereignty differ from the point of view aspect, which distinguishes between recognition done internally of the country or from outside parties. Negative

sovereignty emphasizes on the value of self-determination that depends on how the state sees its own strength and is much influenced by its people's confidence in the independence of the country. On the contrary, positive sovereignty depends on how substantive and empirical world recognition of the independence of state entities has been established. In this division, the sovereignty of Westphalia which recognizes the triumvirate of government-people-territories and their derivatives simultaneously belongs to negative sovereignty. Furthermore, transforming negative sovereignty into a positive one will reduce global inequality or injustice as it falls into the realm of multilateral cooperation as expected by liberal-internationalists while still potentially creating illiberal and undemocratic countries such as Nazi Germany in World War II era.³⁴ Krasner explains that the sovereignty of Westphalia in the contemporary era shifted to the sovereignty of international law.^{35 36}

In the end, the development of the concept of sovereignty has not found a standard and clear meeting point until the time this article was written. But what can be drawn is that each phase of sovereignty takes on the theme of relations between countries and societies. Concepts on sovereignty are at least used in fundamental basic discussions in International Relations as subjects in science and will continue to evolve along with the complexity of current global issues.³⁷ In addition, the study of sovereignty will always involve the law as it concerns the foundation of the legal principle of the establishment of a country and political aspect which is concerned on state autonomy.³⁸

The second library is about the study of Taiwan's sovereignty. As a country that stands independently but still cannot be separated from China historically, Taiwan has an anomaly in the concept of sovereignty because it is far from the concept of independence from the colony state. Taiwan's independence is considered the same as China's independence when the two entities currently stand as the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China under the proclamation of Dr. Sun Yat Sen. So, to assert Taiwan's position on the international community it is necessary to build a positive image through national identity and strength as well as the aspects of diplomacy and trade relations with China.³⁹ Thus, the structure and subject become important in gaining international recognition through the active participation of Taiwan in various international organizations.⁴⁰

Lawrence sees Taiwan's political and security issues as central to China's recognition of unilateral sovereignty over Taiwan in the One China Policy. China strengthened its position by issuing the Anti-Secession Law in 2005.⁴¹ One China Policy based on Lawrence's suggestion needs to be addressed by the US under President Trump's leadership to restore the mandate of six assurances that give Taiwan flexibility without interference from the Beijing administration. Ukai later found that the concept of sovereignty by Taiwan was self-defined by incorporating a unilateral element of recognition from society to oppose

established powers such as China.⁴² Sovereignty is populist and relies on performance in accordance with its consistent and constitutional nature. Chow affirmed to the "One China" Dilemma that the interpretation of sovereignty on the part of Taiwan and China depends on the definition given by every President-elect in Taiwan and makes the country vulnerable to maneuvers carried out by mainland China.⁴³

The literature review found that there are still few who research on this topic. Classically Sovereignty since the Era of Westphalia has been interpreted internally by recognition of the existence of territories, people, and governments; externally by the recognition of other countries; and other requirements such as ownership of the armed forces. Even with the discussion regarding Taiwan, which so far has not been drawn in the outline between One China Policy from the point of view of Taiwan and China establishes a problematic framework on the status of recognition of state sovereignty de facto and also de jure.

3. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

3.1. Understanding Taiwan's long-way struggle to obtain international recognition on sovereignty

Taiwan in historical viewpoint was established on January 1st, 1912, proclaimed by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen as the culmination point of the Xinhai nationalist revolution that claimed the last qing dynasty empire that had been established for more than two thousand years in China.⁴⁴ Political turmoil emerged in China, between a nationalist republican, the Kuomintang Party (KMT) and the Communist Party of China (CCP).⁴⁵ The tipping point of Taiwan's founding was Chinese revolutionary military leader Chiang Kai-Sek establishing a makeshift government in Taipei after losing control of four important cities on the mainland including Beijing, Luoyang, Nanjing, and Xi'an over the CCP in 1949. At the same time as the declaration of the People's Republic of China, President Chiang has brought with him the ranks of government, gold and foreign exchange reserves, as well as a number of troops of the Republic of China which later became Taiwan's.^{46 47}

The establishment of Taiwan as an independent country first gained recognition from countries from all over the world, as it was a continuation of China founded by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen. However, in line with the UN's recognition of the People's Republic of China on October 25, 1971 through UNGA Resolution 2758, recognition of the representation of "China" fell to the People's Republic of China followed by the revocation of Taiwan's membership as a representative of "China" within the UN and all intergovernmental organizations under it. Since the revocation of Taiwan's delegation to the UN, simultaneously the One China Policy that has been rolled out since the era of President Chiang has been refined and Taiwan can only expand through NGOs and multinational companies (Wei, 2012).

Taiwan's government's efforts to gain national recognition have gotten significant hurdles from China. Taiwan can only

be allowed to open a de facto representative office and is not allowed to use the name "Republic of China", otherwise using the Chinese Taipei name as in the Olympics.⁴⁸ To date there are only 14 unification members from Latin America, Oceania, and the Holy See who recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state.⁴⁹ The biggest challenge of Taiwan to uphold the sovereignty of the country is to gain legitimacy from the external by making claims for the application of international treaties even though legally the international organization entities and the countries that initiated the international treaty do not de jure recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state.⁵⁰

The policy that is central to the claim of sovereignty of both Taiwan and China is the One China Policy. Taiwan's point of view consists of two positions each represented by two major parties standing: the KMT and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The KMT recognizes the One China Principle based on the 1992 Consensus stating that China and Taiwan are one region of the country standing under the umbrella of the Republic of China.⁵¹ The DPP instead does not recognize the One China Principle as a consequence of the 1991 Constitution which provides an additional article that Taiwan's highest law does not apply in the mainland of China. The principle of opposition to the One China Principle was later named by the One China DPP Convention in Kaohsiung in 1999 as One Taiwan or One Country on Each Side.⁵²

Dualism of the position of One China Principle with One China One Taiwan on the one hand becomes an internal factor of Taiwan to take a strong position before China and the international world determining in which direction Taiwan as a sovereign state. Dualism also makes Taiwan's political divisions in two factions: between conservatism represented by a pan-blue coalition currently filled by the KMT, People First Party (PFP), New Party (CNP), and Non-Partisan Solidarity Union (NPSU) parties; with the progressivism represented by the pan-green coalition filled by the DPP, Taiwan Statebuilding Party (TSP), Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP), Taiwan Constitution Association (TCA), and New Power Party (NPP). Broadly speaking, the KMT and all pan-blue factions continued President Chiang's legacy in politics to keep supporting for Resinicization, while the DPP and pan-greens continued to voice anti-Sinicization (Au, 2017).

The exception for the NPP, which was born from sunflower movement embryos in March-April 2014 provides a much more radical perspective on the establishment of Taiwan's identity separate from China or de-sinicization.^{53 54} The NPP movement initially only protested the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) that took place between Taiwan and China to formally legalize trade relations. The Sunflower Movement was preceded by previous protests such as the 228 Hand-in-Hand Rally in 2004, the 1025 Demonstration in 2008, the Wild Strawberries Movement in 2008, and the 517 Protest in 2009 (Au, 2017). A survey conducted by the NPP in 2020 stated that 74.3 percent of

respondents stated that Taiwanese people only need the name "Taiwan" instead of including "Republic of China" in their passports.⁵⁵ The existence of the NPP voiced localization as a follow-up to the nation building of Taiwan as an independent country in contrast to mainland China while criticizing the majority of pan-green coalitions, especially the DPP under the leadership of President Tsai Ing-Wen who is still comfortable with the status quo.^{56 57}

But on the other hand, dualism's position provides a bright spot in Taiwan's political direction to assert Taiwan's identity rather than compete over who is more "Chinese" than the People's Republic of China which gives fresh wind to the growth of civic nationalism in an anti-Sinoist context.^{58 59} Identity as a Chinese nation was gradually replaced with a new spirit to form a new multicultural Taiwan identity between the Hakka and mainland China. But what needs to be underlined is that with the democratization that has run in Taiwan so far, there is no consensus with clear limits on Taiwan's position.⁶⁰ There has been no clear demarcation between the RULING KMT from 1945-2016 with the DPP which since 2016 until the time this article was written, in the fight for Taiwan's identity as a separate country from China.

The status quo position is used by the KMT in fighting for the closeness of relations between Taiwan and China to keep Beijing's diplomatic position from direct confrontation with hard power. On the DPP's part, maintaining the status quo makes a significant difference between maintaining the independence of the Republic of China espoused by President Chiang (獨/Hua Du) and liberating Taiwan from China (獨/Tai Du) formally establishing an independent Taiwanese state entity (Taiwanesequo 灣國). When the DPP came to power, there was no formal attempt by the Taiwanese government to make changes and change the ambiguity of the position of a de facto independent state with minimal state de jure status.⁶¹

The lack of consensus did color the political nuance in Taiwan, with the emergence of social movement organizations as a means of criticizing the status quo conditions run by governments controlled by both pan-green and pan-blue coalitions. Hsu notes that since the abandonment of authoritarian regimes, Taiwan has not had a solid social movement organization on the issue, and prompted massive protests that have had a significant impact on Taiwan's domestic political dynamics.⁶² Poor mass organizing accompanied by a weak collective identity makes the issue of Taiwan identity cannot be rolled out properly. The Sunflower Movement then gave birth to pragmatic or practical political interests in order to win the DPP in the 2016 Elections with 65 percent of the vote compared to the KMT which only got 35 percent of the votes of the Taiwanese people.^{63 64}

3.2. Interpreting Taiwan's international engagement strategy: from foreign aid strategy to NSP

Taiwan cooperates with external agencies in order to strengthen international recognition of the country's existence de jure. There are at least three steps that Taiwan takes in inter-state relations. First, open non-official diplomatic representation to countries that have the prospect of trade relations that can open up the economy. Second, efforts to provide financial assistance to developing countries through foreign aid strategies and the New Southbound Policy.

In the first strategy, Taiwan has 15 embassies, 2 consulates general, 1 permanent mission as the only one in the WTO, as well as 89 other representations represented by de facto embassies and consulates with various names.⁶⁵ With this achievement, Taiwan ranked eighth among Asian countries and 32th from around the world. All officials serving in de facto representatives are officially appointed by the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁶⁶ Taiwan's efforts are supported by 57 UN member states to maintain unofficial relations.⁶⁷ Furthermore, 15 countries that have official embassies in Taiwan are the last number after Kiribati and Solomon Islands cut their official diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 2019.⁶⁸

In the second strategy, Taiwan disbursed aid funds to be distributed to countries that consider to be partners. A foreign aid strategy called checkbook diplomacy was used by the ruling presidents of the KMT from at least 1959 to 2008.⁶⁹ From the periodization used by Tubilewicz & Guilloux, foreign aid was channeled in two forms. The first form from 1959 to 1971 aims to demonstrate Taiwan's existence in order to remain recognized as a sovereign state by the UN and all member states. In addition, Taiwan's foreign aid is aimed at maintaining relations with partner countries and restraining the pace of Beijing's government in isolating Taiwan internationally.⁷⁰ The second period ranged from 1971 to 2008, purposed to maintain the taipei government's position so as not to further sink from the efforts made by mainland China. Strategies included demarcation of identity between a democratic Taiwan and an "undemocratic" China.⁷¹ In the 2000s, foreign aid was said to be able to "borrow" and "buy" the support of developing and underdeveloped countries specifically in Latin America.^{72 73 74 75} For the record, in the 1970s, Taiwan had greater economic power than China.⁷⁶

Continuing foreign aid diplomacy, President Tsai Ing-Wen in his first and second leadership periods used the New Southbound Policy (NSP) to respond to changing global conditions and place Taiwan in regional integration. Taiwan holds 10 principles in the implementation of the NSP: (1) Settle in for the long haul, forge a sense of economic community; (2) Properly define Taiwan's future role in regional development; (3) Pursue a strategy of four key links: Soft power, Supply chain, regional markets, People-to-people; (4) Cultivate more people with the skills needed to

support the New Southbound Policy; (5) Pursue institutionalized bilateral and multilateral cooperation; (6) Plan out a comprehensive set of coordinated measures and effective risk controls; (7) Participate actively in international cooperation; (8) Comprehensively enhance mechanisms for talks and dialogue; (9) Good-faith cross-strait interactions and cooperation; (10) Make good use of private-sector organizations and vitality.⁷⁷

Before the NSP, there were two presidents before President Tsai Ing-Wen who had similar foreign policies such as Lee Teng-Hui and Chen Shui-Bian who used the Go South strategy.⁷⁸ The NSP was launched in conjunction with the development of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy which emphasizes the significance of the role of the diamond shaft relationship between Australia-Japan-India-USA, where Taiwan can take advantage of this situation to strengthen relations specifically with the US and Japan in helping to secure the border between Taiwan and China.⁷⁹ In addition, through the NSP, Taiwan can widen the opportunity to agree free trade cooperation with more target countries after successfully intertwining with New Zealand and Singapore in 2013.⁸⁰

The placement of the NSP office with presidential funds as well as the appointment of Taiwan representative in Singapore James Huang strengthened the implementation of the NSP.⁸¹ NSP target countries include Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Australia, and New Zealand. In 2017, NSP has disbursed USD10 billion of capital to target countries in 2017 with a trade balance of USD117 billion providing an increase of almost 20% from 2015.⁸² The NSP itself is still a small part of President Tsai's foreign policy in a diplomacy strategy that has been drawn up alongside the ranks of the Taiwanese government. Martin explained that the President's foreign policy principles of the DPP party are named "Steadfast Diplomacy" as follows. First, "to be 'unwavering' in our pursuit of greater international space for Taiwan, by working with diligence and pragmatism, taking one steady step at a time and solving every diplomatic challenge we meet. And second, to be 'firm in purpose' in upholding freedom and democracy, and to work closely with countries that share these values, not only to benefit each other, but to contribute tangibly to the international community".⁸³

One of the countries that can be an example of unofficial relations is Indonesia. Within the two largest cities of Jakarta and Surabaya was established Taipei Economic and Trade Office (TETO) as Taiwan's representative in various fields that not only overshadowed the main functions in the field of economy and trade as the name suggests, but also cultural exchange, education, and other affairs.⁸⁴ In social functions, TETO facilitates human-to-human interaction between business people, migrant workers, and students in terms of the exchange of ideas and knowledge. Within the TETO

organization there are five divisions that have their own job descriptions, including the general division, economic division, information press division, Overseas Community Affairs Council (OCAC) division, and consular division.⁸⁵

The establishment of TETO in Jakarta and Surabaya delivered significant results in the economy between Taiwan and Indonesia. The export-import activities of both countries generated a surplus of 2.92 billion US dollars in 2015. Indonesia's exports to Taiwan consisting of coal, natural gas, copper and gold condensation, wood, rubber, and other raw materials amounted to 5.96 billion US dollars. Meanwhile, Indonesia's imports from Taiwan such as oil, iron, and steel products, textile raw materials, machine parts, and chemicals amounted to USD3.04 billion, resulting in a balance sheet of USD9 billion in 2015.⁸⁶ Nevertheless, this amount is volatile with exports from Indonesia to Taiwan amounting to 4.02 billion US dollars and Indonesian imports from Taiwan amounting to 3.68 US dollars in 2019 (Trading Economics, 2020). In the social field, there are at least 4,500 Indonesian students studying in Taiwan and this number continues to increase along with the rollout of the NSP to embrace South and Southeast Asian countries including Australia as Taiwan's partner. In 2011, there were 185,000 Indonesian migrant workers working in Taiwan who accounted for about 42 percent of foreign workers. The Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) noted that there were 1,475 Taiwanese investors who invested a total of 14.68 billion US dollars.⁸⁷

There are certainly a number of challenges surrounding the foreign policy and diplomacy efforts undertaken by Taiwan's government under President Tsai Ing-Wen. First, international support waned with only 15 countries prompting Taiwan to take alternative measures in addition to President Tsai's principles of diplomacy and the NSP's strategy to approach Asian countries in providing legitimacy and recognition of Taiwan's sovereignty. Second, the pressure exerted by China forced Taiwan to "play elegantly" by avoiding direct confrontation in soft power and hard power. Taiwan's opportunity is to maximize the situation of the Covid-19 pandemic to offer international assistance through the Taiwan Can Help program in order to provide moral and material support in the form of good examples in virus prevention as well as medicines developed by pharmaceutical companies in Taiwan.⁸⁸ Taiwan's prestige in this regard can be restored, especially against countries across China that became the epicenter of the first spread of the coronavirus.⁸⁹

3.3. Taiwan participation on international organizations

Taiwan's membership in various international organizations, as discussed above, is hindered by China's existence. In this section will be explained about Taiwan's membership in the UN after the "exchange" of China and Taiwan in 1971, Taiwan's membership in international organizations under the auspices of the UN, Taiwan's

membership in sports organizations including the Olympics, and the response from the US from the beginning to take a position in defending Taiwan.

Since the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949, there has been no significant effort to question Taiwan/ROC membership. Citing representation, the UN Secretary-General in 1950 issued a memorandum asserting that representation depends on the recognition of other UN member states in the event of the case of two legitimate governments claiming representatives of the same country's name. The Soviet Union, which from January 1950 voiced mainland China's representation of the PRC rather than ROC/Taiwan because the ROC had lost control of mainland China since losing the civil war. In September 1950, after the People's Republic of China was proclaimed, Cuba proposed a discussion on the official representation of "China" at the UNGA.⁹⁰

President Chiang Kai-Shek in 1961 expressed reservations that "there is no room for patriots and traitors to live together".⁹¹ The issue of representation raised in the Security Council, approved by the majority of members rolling until 1971.⁹² Taiwan's membership was lost in 1971, at which time the decision of UN resolution 2758 decided to change the representation of "China" from the ROC to the PRC. And further, "to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place where they unlawfully occupy at the UN and in all the organizations related to it" approved by the 76 member states with 35 countries disapproved and 17 abstained.⁹³ To avoid humiliation, the ROC delegation was ordered by President Chiang Kai-shek to conduct a walkout of the UN.⁹⁴

Since resolution 2758 came out, the US has tried to mediate the dissenting parties especially China and Taiwan including choosing not to approve resolution 2758 published at the General Assembly. But the US was in a minority position and subsequent US efforts did not come to fruition and severed formal ties with the ROC in 1979.⁹⁵ ⁹⁶ The withdrawal of formal US relations from Taiwan also marks a change in the global constellation, where Taiwan is also expelled from major international organizations, especially those affiliated with the UN.

The question then arises because Taiwan or ROC is one of the founders of the UN since the UN Charter was signed on June 26, 1945 in San Francisco, especially being a permanent member of the Security Council.⁹⁷ Taiwan's attempts to reapply for membership once taken over by China would be contrary to article 4 of the UN Charter. Taiwan's submission would invite antagonism and pressure from China, given China as the Security Council has double veto power.⁹⁸

Taiwan's re-submission to become a member of the UN is not only subject to substantive and principled issues, but also a normative problem that cannot be tested in real terms. Suppose the threat of Taiwan's return to UN membership

would trigger a serious conflict involving armed forces in the Taiwan Strait and result in strained China-Taiwan relations.⁹⁹ The compromise aspect based on the real political situation that occurs is inversely proportional to the terms of UN membership which is at ease in accordance with article 4(1) i.e. becoming a country; be peace loving; agree to the obligations of charter; and be able to perform these obligations, and willing to do so.¹⁰⁰

Following the replacement of the "China" representation in the UN between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, at least three efforts were made in restoring Taiwan's membership to the UN. The first attempt was Taiwan's self-application to restore ROC membership. Since 1993, Taiwan has annually applied for UN membership on behalf of "ROC" until 2009 under the name "Taiwan". These efforts are part of "pragmatic" diplomacy rolled out by President Lee Teng-Hui since the 1980s.¹⁰¹ President Lee's pattern of diplomacy aims to place Taiwan as a sovereign state alongside China.

In 1996, Taiwan updated its more low-profile rationale with the argument that in making decisions regarding the resolution of inter-Strait conflicts, China has always been unilateral and never involved 21.3 million Taiwanese citizens.¹⁰² In this submission Taiwan does not use the term "full membership." In 2007, Taiwan's submission was followed by a request to process full membership on the grounds of wanting sovereignty legitimacy by re-becoming a member of the UN. Taiwan's request was responded to by Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon's response that Taiwan is an integral part of the People's Republic of China.¹⁰³ Taiwan's last membership application in November 2009, rejected by the secretary-general by returning the application without prior discussion with the General Assembly. The Secretary-General's reason is resolution 2758 of 1971 that does not allow Taiwan to stand as a member of the UN in a separate state from China.¹⁰⁴

Second, on 3 August 2000 at the UNGA there were 12 member states applying for ROC/Taiwan membership, among others: Burkina Faso, Gambia, Honduras, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Solomon Islands, and Swaziland.¹⁰⁵ The two main points of Taiwan's submission to membership are considering Taiwan's important position in the regional economy and the world, in addition to respecting human rights that should guarantee the right of Taiwan and all 23 million Taiwanese citizens to participate and unionize in the UN.¹⁰⁶

Third, following up on efforts made by Taiwan's government representatives last time at the UN in 2007, the DPP party has proposed two referendums held on the same day, March 22, 2008. The two referendum proposals resulted in a "agree" vote on Taiwan's return to membership of the UN of 94.01 percent and 87.27.¹⁰⁷ The referendum is planned to be held again in 2020, although it did not receive a positive response by President Tsai Ing-Wen. Membership, as the

highest participation status in the UN returns to the question of sovereignty held by Taiwan.¹⁰⁸ The three ways of making Taiwan into membership have not been able to find success considering the submission was never included in the agenda of the UNGA, and was never able to pass the approval of the UN General Committee.¹⁰⁹

Although it did not succeed in gaining UN membership for various reasons, one of which was China's efforts to deter Taiwan, Taiwan managed to enter as a member of important organizations under the UN. Suppose the World Health Organization (WHO) has been working since 1997 until President Ma Ying-jeou's parallel campaign in 2008 for Taiwan's "meaningful participation" in UN special agencies such as who in some conditions Taiwan has been affected by infectious disease outbreaks such as SARS.^{110 111} Taiwan's participation in who is supported by China's rivals under President Hu Jintao confirms that Taiwan can discuss international activities including WHO membership after cross-Strait consultations resume.¹¹² In the positive aftermath of this cross-Strait meeting, Taiwan was able to join as an observer and was given space to speak at the World Health Assembly (WHA), a WHO summit in 2009 to date. Nevertheless, Taiwan's participation is carried out on behalf of Chinese Taipei and in important documents Taiwan is referred to as "Taiwan, China" or "Taiwan, Province of China" Chao et al., 2011).^{113 114}

The initial US response to stem China's influence in the East Asian region did not support Taiwan's membership. On January 1, 2008, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called the move taken by Taiwan in the referendum provocative and counterproductive to the country's efforts across China on the international stage.¹¹⁵ Although 61 percent of US citizens support it, the administration continues to affirm the status quo in discussions about Taiwan's international status. Similarly, Japan, which within certain limits needs a strong enough shield to stem China's influence in the region, also supports the same with 74% of the public supporting Taiwan's integration within the UN and 81% supporting a referendum by Taiwan.

3.4. China's selective sovereignty efforts against Taiwan

Since Taiwan's declaration of independence on October 1, 1949, China has sought legitimacy by winning the civil war in 1950 and exploring bilateral relations with countries from all parts of the world, especially communist countries. In various important documents of the country, including the defense white paper of the Chinese communist government in 2000 that "The Beijing Government seeks to claim to have taken over the leadership of the ROC".¹¹⁶ From 1950 to 1971, both China and Taiwan sought legitimacy from other countries de facto resulting in recognition of the existence of the two "Chinese" countries. China, which in 1958 was still under the leadership of Mao Zedong, asserted that "there is only one China, not two, in the world".¹¹⁷

After being proposed by Cuba in September 1950, the proposed discussion of "Chinese" representation at the General Assembly had not been taken seriously by member states. The reason behind the rejection of the discussions was the Korean war that was still rolling on the Korean Peninsula, which from 1951 to 1952 UN peacekeepers faced off with Chinese volunteer soldiers/PRC. Proposals for representation continued to be championed by eastern bloc countries from 1953 to 1960 but continued to be rejected by other General Assembly member states.¹¹⁸ The proposal for representation was proposed to rise to an important statement in the General Assembly from 1961 to 1964 but did not reach the agreement of two-thirds of all members present in the General Assembly.

The dynamic occurred in 1965 outside the UN, when France became the first non-communist country to recognize Chinese/PRC rule. France's recognition of the Chinese/PRC government was followed by other Western countries, which made the constellation within the UN accounting for half of the participating member states in 1970 with more than 60 compared to 125. In the same year, the Chinese delegation/PRC was allowed to enter the General Assembly sessions even though the Chinese delegation/ROC was still in the same forum on the idea of the US to present China's "double-representation" of the ROC and PRC delegates together. The request of the Chinese delegation/PRC to expel the Chinese delegation/ROC was not granted by the member states.¹¹⁹

China's diplomatic efforts reached a culmination point when in 1971 it formally gained recognition at the UN with full membership in place of Taiwan agreed upon by member states on the grounds of more holistic representation with effective control over the geography of mainland "China" over Albania's proposal.¹²⁰ China's political pressure on Taiwan on a global level has been underway since gaining full UN membership in 1971. At the same time as the "exchange" of Taiwan's membership with China, the Beijing government called for the One China Policy first introduced by Deng Xiaoping in writing through the concept of "one country, two systems" that prioritize non-violent solutions for Taiwan's integration into the State of the People's Republic of China.¹²¹ Peaceful reunification efforts continued during the era of President Ziang Jemin on May 1, 1995.

One China Policy was affirmed by the White Paper on China's defense policy in 2000 and the Anti-Secession Law adopted in the third session of the Tenth National People's Congress.¹²² The law stipulates that Taiwan is part of China's jurisdiction and that any form of "independent Taiwan" movement is considered a form of secession from China. Taiwan will gain the highest autonomy status if it formally declares part of China, as Beijing's governments have done with Hong Kong and Macau.

To date, there are three Chinese propositions in claiming Taiwan as sovereign territory within the One China Policy. First, historical ownership refers to earlier Chinese dynasties and empires. Claims on the basis of historical ownership are

not supported by international law, but are always used by the Beijing government as a fundamental reinforcement of political arguments. Second, the cancellation of the Shimonoseki treaty in 1941 agreed between China and Japan as the basis for China's control over the islands of Formosa and Penghu/Pescadores. China, which was then under ROC rule, was unsuccessful in stemming an attack from Japan in 1941 that cancelled the entire Treaty of Shimonoseki. Third, the Cairo declaration in 1943 was agreed between allied countries to return Formosa Island and Penghu/Pescadores to wartime China. For the record, however, the San Francisco Peace Treaty was created in 1951 to renew an agreement on the Cairo Declaration regarding claims against the island that was later renamed Taiwan but never mentioned by either Taiwan or China.¹²³

China's assertive action against Taiwan with a series of claims made against Taiwan as a jurisdictional territory with the designation "province" or "area" has been noticed by the US since China's full membership in the UN in 1971. The Washington administration indirectly decided to follow in the footsteps of other UN member states by severing official diplomatic relations with China/ROC.¹²⁴ The US, with long consideration, decided on a rapprochement policy with China/PRC from 1971 to 1972 under President Richard Nixon. President Nixon made a historic state visit on February 21-28, 1972 to Beijing, Hangzhou, and Shanghai.¹²⁵ It wasn't only in 1978-1979 that President Jimmy Carter completed the normalization process with China while formally establishing relations with the opening of relations between the two countries after 29 years apart due to tensions in the Cold War.¹²⁶ Presidents after Jimmy Carter have different interpretations of the One China Policy as well as the diplomatic stance shown by the US in each leadership period.

President Barack Obama, who led the US from 2009 to 2017, has considerable interest in China as Pivot to Asia's foreign policy aims to contain China under Xi Jinping's leadership. President Barack Obama chose to exercise relations with China through soft-power approaches.¹²⁷ President Donald Trump, who became US President in 2017-2021, showed a more assertive stance toward China through his Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy that emphasized the deployment of greater military power in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly stemming China's growing influence in the South China Sea and East China Sea. China's show of strength cornered Taiwan so the US needs to re-intervene in cross-Strait affairs.¹²⁸

At the UN, China has so far made diplomatic efforts to prevent Taiwan's membership in both the General Assembly and the Security Council. The People's Republic of China, which claimed the successor of "China" as one of the founders of the UN in September 1945 and a permanent member of the Security Council effectively used veto authority, thus complicating Taiwan's strategy in efforts to restore UN member states' recognition of ROC sovereignty. In the contemporary era, with the permission of China/PRC as a full

member of the UN as well as a permanent member of the Security Council, Taiwan's membership was hampered by efforts to retain names such as Chinese Taipei, or Taiwan, province of China.¹²⁹

The proposal of the name "Taiwan", which then triggered the pros-cons was used when Taiwan participated in the 1976 Olympics in order to distinguish from The Chinese participation. The use of the term "Chinese Taipei" came on March 23, 1981 when the Taiwanese government under Nagoya resolution agreed on the geographical area of not only Formosa Island, but Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. The proposal came as China intensifies diplomatic pressure at the International Olympic Committee (IOC).¹³⁰ Under certain circumstances, the Beijing government is also playing it safe by keeping Taiwan's status quo from demanding de jure independence from mainland China.

The use of names outside "Taiwan" as one of the provinces is reinforced by de jure legitimacy with Chinese Taipei's participation in international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). In the World Trade Organization (WTO) Taiwan's long name "Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu" is used in official documents recognized since joining on January 1, 2002.¹³¹

3.5. Redefining Sovereignty

The clarity of Taiwan's sovereignty status is an example of a case that has distinction compared to other sovereign disputes. For example, between North and South Korea, between North Vietnam and South Vietnam, between India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, between Eritrea and Ethiopia, between the breakaway states of Yugoslavia, and between the breakaway states of the Soviet Union, and between East and West Germany. Some of the examples mentioned did occur during the Cold War that divided the domestic constellation of countries in question by having an impact in the form of proxy wars, while China and Taiwan have similar historical backgrounds although later divided due to differences in ways to organize a government that became the excesses of ideological differences. Mao Zedong's government in Beijing used the ideology of communism while President Chiang Kai Shek in Taipei used nationalism ideology.^{132 133}

Sovereignty in the context of Taiwan has the following characteristics. First, there was dualism of the Chinese government at the time of the formation of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949 which resulted in overlapping claims that Taiwan ultimately lost by claim through comparison of population differences. Since the time China/PRC was founded, the existence of the nationalist government of the Republic of China/ROC was eliminated and questioned by all Chinese people who are the majority in the mainland sphere. By representation, the population on the mainland is much more numerous than the inhabitants of the Islands of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. By

comparison China in 1950 reached 546,815,000 people, while Taiwan in 1956 only 9,368 people.¹³⁴ Recognition of a much larger population than Taiwan is used as a pretext for China to claim the legitimacy of the people in international forums. As such, the support for the ROC government in Taipei is not commensurate with the government of the People's Republic of China in Beijing.

Second, in the context of the civil war between China and Taiwan that lasted for two phases, China won the war and shifted all components of the ROC government to Taiwan. When referring to the sovereignty of the Westphalia version, though China and Taiwan did not mutually agree on a peace treaty or ceasefire, Taiwan is no longer "sovereign" because it is unable to exercise effective control over most of China's territory. Furthermore, territorial control is much more effective by the communist government in Beijing considering the Taiwan/ROC government in Taipei can only show the existence of the government at 35,980 square km of the total territory of China which is 9,572,900 km² or only 0.37% of the entire territory of greater China.¹³⁵

Third, in the context of international recognition, Taiwan has only 15 remaining UN member states that recognize the existence of the ROC government in Taipei as a legitimate Chinese government. This number is vulnerable to diminishing due to the downward trend of countries that give legitimacy to the existence of the ROC government in Taipei when compared to China/PRC in Beijing.¹³⁶ The three contexts of Taiwan's sovereignty above within certain limits indicate that there is a stalemate from the Taiwanese government in maintaining a position in sovereignty games. Taiwan's sovereignty games appear to be weakening by looking at indicators that the negative sovereignty demonstrated by the legitimacy terms of the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia was not obtained by Taiwan, and positive sovereignty with Taiwan's active international exploration with increasingly minimal recognition. Efforts to place "unofficial" representatives in other countries are hampered by restrictions on the specific form of office dealing with trade and economy between Taiwan and other countries. On a political level, Taiwan is still far from China because it has embassies and consulates that are legalized in accordance with de jure recognition of the Beijing government as a representation of "China."

Another observable trend of Taiwan's sovereignty is that Beijing government's response to the selected sovereignty efforts to keep Taipei government from being able to access the roads to international recognition under political pressure. Political pressure efforts include economic coercive and diplomatic lobbying in various international organizations. Diplomatic efforts were made to keep Taiwan from becoming a full member of international organizations or maximally participating under other names such as "Chinese Taipei" to avoid mentioning the ROC.¹³⁷

Lastly, Taiwan experienced a phenomenon called shared sovereignty is limited with China.¹³⁸ The two countries are

competing for positions of recognition internationally even though Taiwan has lost out on various aspects that have been mentioned. Taiwan has so far relied on democratization as an issue raised to compare with China as a competitor. Since 1971, UNGA Resolution no. 2578 gives de jure recognition of China and instead keeps Taiwan cornered by only having de facto status as a country.¹³⁹ However, the name "China" ultimately remains used by both countries regardless of the Beijing-based government position of the People's Republic of China much stronger than in Taipei.

Taiwan under pressure from the Beijing government must recognize that there is an intertwined relationship between China and Taiwan in cross-strait relations (Gold, 1987), including the cooperation of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and the Strait Exchange Foundations (SEF).¹⁴⁰ In contrast, the Beijing administration in the One China Policy continues to seek peaceful international recognition of Taiwan as a province of China.¹⁴¹ China's persuasion includes granting Taiwan special autonomy status in order to be willing to join China through the Anti-Secession law established in 2005 under President Hu Jintao.

4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

To conclude the case of Taiwan's sovereignty, it can be understood from the view of the excluded aspects of the prerequisites of a sovereign state that rests solely on the existence of the ROC government in Taipei. In such prerequisites as the people and territories, the Taiwanese government in Taipei did not have the right to claim the entire mainland Taiwan and mainland China resulting in de jure recognition of the world's countries towards Taiwan weakened. Although Taiwan's government continues to urge full membership in the UN and is active in conducting bilateral diplomacy with developing countries that have interests with foreign assistance from the government of Taipei, Taiwan, until this article was written has not gained a loose space to demonstrate sovereignty over the territory and the people. In addition to Taiwan's efforts have always been

hindered by the political pressures of Beijing's government at both bilateral and multilateral levels, the Taipei government cannot claim to be the legitimized government of the whole of China.

In the author's analysis there are three propositions that surface, among others: the dualism of government determined by the competition of the number of people in favor, China's victory in the civil war between the PRC and the ROC that resulted in effective geographical control of the territory in Beijing government, and the recognition of international countries to the Beijing government as a de jure and de facto representation of "China" by 15 countries alone that recognize the Taipei government. These three propositions within certain constraints indicate Taiwan lost the sovereignty games with China both in positive sovereignty which means the legitimacy of the country derived from international recognition is established; and also, negative sovereignty consisting of a triumvirate of governments, people, and territories as a prerequisite of the state.

Furthermore, with China's efforts to ensure sovereignty through political pressure on Taiwan, it is certain that the Taipei government is cornered by shared sovereignty with the Beijing government. To that end, the author gave two recommendations to the Taiwanese government in order to improve the way to obtain recognition of sovereignty from other countries. The first recommendation is that Taiwan should reorient its foreign policy strategy to both China and the international community. The measures in question include a more pragmatic stance in building consensus in national politics between the pan-blue and pan-green coalitions. The second recommendation, a recalculation of Taiwan's government to redefine the scope of ROC sovereignty with the real capabilities of diplomacy and foreign politics given Taipei's recognition of China's entire territory is not yet acceptable to the international world. Another alternative strategy that can be pursued is to establish a multicultural "Taiwan" identity but still not release the Chinese identity that is the ancestor of 95 percent or 23.6 million of Taiwanese in the contemporary era.

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