

The Tragedy of Conflict Irresolution: Peace Dialogue in Southernmost Thailand

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the factors which make peace negotiation process between the Thai government and Southern Thailand (from 2004 to 2019) failures to reach its targets. According to analysis there are three factors that cause the failure of negotiation between both actors namely lack of mutual trust, manage conflict, and no in-depth discussion forum. This is a qualitative research and focuses on the efforts to end the conflict between the Thai government and the three southern provinces. After looking at the findings the study, the tragedy of conflict irresolution: peace dialogue in Southernmost Thailand, can be further studied in many ways, extending the study of the past to present negotiation process. This can expand the scope of the study of factors or obstacles that cause the negotiation process to fail of both parties. And apply the theoretical framework or the concept of this research to study in other contexts which is different, in order to better illustrate the various factors that make up the negotiation process of both parties. To further study whether there are other factors that affect the negotiation process to fail or not.

Keywords: *Thai government and southern Thailand, conflict southern Thailand.*

1. INTRODUCTION

In the 20th century, the countries of the world had conflicting relations. Competition for colonies. The main conflicts during the 20th century were World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. The consequences of war have caused enormous damage to human life and property. It was also due to political competition for regional supremacy, such as Napoleon's French development policies. The policies to build a great Germany, for example, may be caused by ideological, political and religious conflicts such as the Crusades between Christianity and Islam in 13th century political conflicts such as the ideology of democracy and communism after World War II, etc. Important conflicts in the 20th century arose from adherence to different political ideologies. Until the cause of war with the formation of international cooperation organizations took place to resolve conflicts or to prevent conflicts that arise. Southern Thailand, also known as the southern border province Also known as Patani State, which consists of Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat, Songkhla and Satun, is in crisis. Both political and socio-cultural if not resolved, it will cause mental, economic and other crises, including serious collisions, casualties, property damage, etc., becoming a "tragedy" that causes cracks and injuries to a person's soul. "It is a bridge to a solution to the crisis." Peace means "a bridge to a solution" to the "crisis of violence resulting from the conflict and current political circles".

The conflict between the Thai government and the Patani Malay community in Southern Thailand started in the mid-

1970s, but the roots of the conflict have been since 1902 when the Patani Darussalam state was occupied by the Kingdom of Thailand. The cause of this conflict was a policy of political integration. The Patani Malay community did not agree with the government's policies which attempted to reform and bring about national unity. This policy aims to replace the religious and cultural identity of Malay Muslims with a Thai cultural identity rooted in Buddhism. Even though in the early 2000s this conflict seemed to have disappeared to attract the attention of the outside world. But beneath the surface, the conflict continued on January 4, 2004. Since then, violent conflict has continued to the present day. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatt (At a time of intense conflict) security reform in Thailand has been implemented using more repressive policies, but over the past 14 years the conflict has flared up (Dueramae, 2019).

There are various separatist movement groups in Thailand's southern border provinces, and their ideologies and operations differ. But the general aim is to divide the territory free of Thai rule. Separatist rebels are rebels seeking special independence and therefore want to continue secession from Thailand. Usually the rebels stated that they were trying to separate from the government in order to gain independence. However, some rebel groups did not agree with the plan to be separated from the center because of the huge responsibilities and costs of becoming separate nations.

The conflict became even more violent when it took place in Muslim Malay separatists (Dueramae, 2019), a separatist movement in Thailand in the southern border province. Many

other groups emerged, such as Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Pattani (GMIP), dan Particularly the BRN-Coordinate (a faction of BRN). And the Student, and Youth Association, the Patani group or PerMAS, etc., and the last one is called the new group. That MARA Patani / MajlisSyuraPatani has been officially launched for the first time. In Kuala Lumpur Malaysia on 27 August 2015, some of these groups, several eras, operated independently. Under the "split hit" strategy, but sometimes a new strategy "separate, walk together, hit" but whether it is driven by strategy, technique or method. However, the Mara Patani separatist group will not stop fighting until it attains full independence before being handled by the Thai government.

Since the government's massive robbery on January 4, 2004 at the Pattana Battalion Camp, Cho-Ai Rong District, Narathiwat Province Followed by the "Krue Sae Mosque" event, Pattani Province, on April 28, when 108 people were killed, and most recently, the dissolution of demonstrations in front of the Tak Bai Police, Narathiwat Province on October 24, leaving 84 people dead. The body is counted as 2004, the past is a year of violence "Unusual" for southern "border" lands.

In February 2013, government representatives Yingluck and the BRN signed the "General Consensus on the Peace Dialogue Process" stating the government's intention to negotiate with the rebels in Kuala Lumpur. This is the first time the Thai government has publicly supported rebels. BRN made five requests on YouTube videos ahead of the first meeting. At a second meeting in April 2013, the government said it was considering lifting warrants for the arrest of suspected rebels as a request. At the third meeting in June, BRN representatives agreed to try and reduce violence. The talks sparked the Ramadan Peace Initiative, which aims to reduce violence during fasting. On July 12, Malaysia announced that the two sides were trying to reduce violence from July 10 to August 18. The response of the authorities and government failed to contain the violence. On August 6 there was a video from BRN saying the group had suspended talks with the Thai government. (Southern Thailand: Dialogue in Doubt, 2015)

In April 2017, the BRN issued a statement calling for peace talks with the Thai government. With a truly neutral mediator there is a director, but BRN will wait until the political parties in the group are ready and won't negotiate under pressure. So far, there have been several attempts to achieve a peaceful path, such as conflict reform, reducing military movements, overcoming the lack of state legitimacy and diplomacy. The government holds talks with the rebels to build peace. But negotiations have generally stalled, including the military administration. Until now, there is no completely effective solution to this problem. But the separatist Mara Patani has agreed with the Thai government to seek a resolution to the conflict in the negotiations that have been carried out. Until now, peace efforts have not yielded any meaningful results. To further complicate the conflict, it

involves many sources, such as political, economic, ethnic and religious conflicts that have not been found much (Dueramae, 2019).

Based on the above, this research focuses on peace dialogue between the Thai government and separatist groups. Moreover, the time frame chosen is also an important point, because in the last years the conflict between the Thai government and the separatist groups has been a long time and the two sides have attempted a peaceful solution.

2. RESEARCH METHOD

The research study on The Tragedy of Conflict Irresolution: Peace Dialogue in Southernmost Thailand was qualitative research. Which analyses efforts to end the conflict between the Thai government and the three southern provinces with more emphasis on case studies the qualitative methods contain information on the main phenomena surveyed in this study. The qualitative research objectives can also be discussed in the selected research design. Hence, this research can be analysed more deeply after collecting more detailed data and information.

This case study approach is a type of approach used to investigate and understand incidents or problems that arise by gathering different types of information that is obtained to find a solution so that the revealed problem can be resolved.

2.1. Techniques for data collection

The purpose of this study is to develop an effort to establish a negotiation agreement to resolve conflicts in southern Thailand. Therefore, the author collects data through literary studies as a basic for analysis. The study of literature is carried out by processing books, journals, magazines, newspapers, the Internet, interviews, research papers, academic papers, and institutional reports, and other relevant resources to support the research content.

2.2. Data Analysis Techniques

This is the data from the structured interview and the unstructured interview. (Unstructured Interview) in an open-ended manner (Open-ended Question), the researcher will bring Content analysis and using techniques for classification and systematization of information is to bring the obtained data to be classified and categorized into a system such as data by categories that have already occurred, category information, suggestions for solving problems. Other category information etc.

2.3. Literature Review/Result

The similarity of research topics that have been previously read by the author. The article entitled "The approach to political settlements in solving vertical conflicts (Case study: Conflict between the Thai government and separatist groups)," was written by Haseemah Dueramae from Gajah

Mada University, Yogyakarta. In his writing, he states that the conflict between the Thai government and separatist groups has been going on for a long time and is acting very strong again, namely from 2004 to now there has not been a stop even though there was negotiation but it had not been successful. And the story about the conflict in southern Thailand and there are many separatists in southern Thailand to fight with the Thai government. This is supported by a theory of political settlements and two concepts, namely the negotiation process and civil society. The paper emphasizes on the study of political security which focuses on the ongoing process of conflict resolution. Southern Thailand is very different in terms of ethnicity and religion when compared to other regions, giving rise to conflict.

3. DISCUSSION

3.1. Dynamics of Conflict in South Thailand That Led to The Peace Negotiation Process

The conflict between Thai government and separatist groups in the Southern Thailand region is nothing new, but it lasts for half a century. The conflicts that have continued from the past to the present are hard to stop. The conflict started when the majority of Muslim Malays in Southern Thailand were dissatisfied with Thai government of Thailand's policies on the social, political and economic balance in their regions. Then there was an attack from a separatist group who wanted an autonomous area from the Thai government.

3.1.1. Brief History of the existence Patani in Southern Thailand

Patani is the name of a minority Muslim who inhabits the three Southern regions of Thailand, namely Yala, Patani, Narathiwat and parts of Senggora (Songkhla). The name Patani, which is said to have originated from the name Pak Tani, is based on Patani's Hikayah and the history of the Patani Malay Kingdom (Chelaeh, 2020).

The country of Malay Patani Darusslam (Pattani) has a very long history, from the history of countries in the Malay Peninsula such as Melaka, Johor, Selangor, and others. The long history of the Patani Darusslam Malay Kingdom goes back to the time of Indian influence (Cheyor, 2017). Historian Paul Wheatley argues that Langkasuka State, which is located on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula between Senggora (Songkhla) and Kelantan, is the origin of the land of Patani. The capital of the kingdom is located around the Yarang area (Sasongko, 2017). The Patani State at that time had the largest port in the Malay Peninsula area. Then there was assimilation by way of marriage between Muslim traders and Malay-Patani people. This assimilation is one way of spreading Islam in Patani (Cheyor, 2017).

According to Hikayat Patani, King Phaya Tu Nakpa converted to Islam and changed his name to Sultan Ismail Syah. Since then, the Patani Islamic Kingdom began to stand. Under the name of the Islamic kingdom, Patani grew and

flourished. At that time, Patani Port was transformed into a berth for merchants from various countries, such as Siam, China, Japan, Java, India and Arabia. And, the people of the Patani Kingdom lived in prosperity (Sasongko, 2017).

The Patani kingdom reached its peak during the reign of queens. The Sultanate of Patani Darusslam in 1584-1686M was led by female queens who were descended from King Badahur. They were the Green Queen, Blue Queen, and Purple Queen. After the Purple Queen died, she was succeeded by the Yellow Queen. The sultanate had a fast developing port. So that trading activities were getting busier day by day. The development of the Patani State was not only political but also economic, social, cultural and religious. The female queens of Patani were smart and brave figures. So that it created prosperity and welfare for its people (Cheyor, 2017). The Sultanate of Patani was an independent, prosperous trading state and a renowned center for Islamic education and scholarship in Southeast Asia (Jory, 2013).

These four queens have played an important role in the history of Patani Country. During the reign of these four queens, The Malay State of Patani Darussalam enjoyed an era of glory, namely the end of the XVI century and the beginning of the XVII century. As the law of history that the world revolves, so is the glory. Then later the Malay Islamic State Patani Darusslam fell into the hands of the Siamese colony, namely the reign of the Ratu Kuning Sultanate, the son of Ratu Ungu. This was the beginning of the fall and collapse of the Malay Islamic kingdom of Patani (Cheyor, 2017, p. 5)

After the era of queens, the successor to the throne of the Patani kingdom was replaced by kings of Kelantan descent from 1688 to 1729. The end of the Kelantan dynasty, Patani experienced political turmoil of power struggles. Responding to this, in the end, Siam appointed Sultan Muhammad as the king of Patani. In 1779, Sultan Muhammad was asked by Siam to help attack Burma, but Sultan Muhammad refused. This triggered Phraya Chakri's attack on Patani. Son Surasi, the younger brother of Phraya Chakri, assisted by Phraya Senaphutan, Governor Pattalung, Palatcana and Songkhla to attack Patani in 1785, ending with the death of the sultan Muhammad (Adiwildan, 2010).

The Kingdom of Patani Darussalam was then conquered by the Kingdom of Siam, the ruler of Thailand, in 1785. Siam controlled the entire region of Patani and divided it into seven provinces (Umar Mukhtar, Muhammad Hafil, 2020) namely, Pattani, Saiburi (Teluban), Ningchick, Yaring, Yala, Rahman, and Ra-ngae (Adiwildan, 2010, p. 34).

Around the 19th century, the Siamese Kingdom of Chulalongkorn, began to plan to restructure the territorial administration and further strengthen its existence in Patani by issuing the Thesaphiban policy. This policy resulted in the kingdom of Patani Country no longer having autonomous power and eliminating the entire government system of the Malay sultanate in Patani. As a result of the abolition of the Malay sultanate, the Patani kingdom was getting weaker and under pressure from the Siamese kingdom. This action by the

Kingdom of Siam had sparked conflict between the Malay Kings of Patani and the Kingdom of Siam.

This change in the basis of the Siamese government was due to the presence of colonial power based on imperialism in Southeast Asia which had raised Siamese concerns about the integrity of its territory, especially in areas that were smaller from the control of the central kingdom in Bangkok such as the Malay Countries in South Siam. The Kingdom of Siam was worried that if these areas were not integrated under Siamese control, it was likely that these areas would be controlled by Western powers.

Finally, on March 10, 1909, the border agreement known also as Anglo Siam (agreement to divide the colony at the border) was signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Siam for the Siamese side with the British in Tanah Melayu. Of course, these efforts could not be accepted by minority groups who had a culture of life different from that of the Siamese people, especially the Chinese and Malays.

The situation in Patani then became even more urgent, in December 1938, when Phibun Songgram had been appointed Minister of Defense and with this, the strength of his army was very impressive in strengthening his role. Phibun Songgram was a strong man with an understanding of the nationality of Siam, and was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. Phibun Songgram carried out his basic administration which would change the minds of the people at home and abroad. The Siam has been formed to love their country. On June 24, 1939, the official name Muang Thai was changed to Thailand (Rosana Jehma, Sumardi, Sugiyanto, Volume. 1 (2017)).

Patani is a nostalgia for the Malay world. Those who pay attention to the Malay world map are well aware that a country called Patani has escaped the list of the Malay Nation-State today (Cheyor, 2017).

Patani is now one of the ethnic Malay minority provinces in Southern Thailand, currently facing various significant obstacles, one of which is the violation of Human Rights (HAM) committed by the Thai government. After the Malay community in Patani felt treated unjustly by the government itself, then finally the Patani Malay people rose to demand the fulfillment of their rights. Besides that, the Patani Malay people also demanded the rights to autonomy and/or full independence, they felt that they had been very tortured while being integrated under the Siam Thai colonial rule (Khairi, 2017).

Figure 1. Map of Southern Thailand region



Judging by its geographic location, Southern Thailand covers three provinces, namely Narathiwat, Pattani, Yala, and four districts of Songkla province. The Patani area is in the southernmost part of Thailand which is directly adjacent to Malaysia. The Southern Thailand region was canalized under the name 'Sam Chanwad Chaiden Pak Tai' (Dueramae, 2019).

3.1.2. The emergence of a conflict between the Thai government and the separatist group in the Southern Province

The conflict in Southern Thailand was caused by the fact that the people in the region did not get recognition from the government and the Thai majority, including the way to resolve conflicts by the central government which was still not in accordance with the wishes of the local community. There are social, economic and political inequalities that lead to the emergence of some groups of people who want to separate themselves. This desire is shown by the existence of separatist movements and rebellions from people who feel disadvantaged. (Sani, 2019)

Hatred against the Kingdom of Siam began in 1909 with the Anglo-Siamese Treaty which marked the start of the centralization and annexation of the Patani Kingdom by the Kingdom of Siam. The lost power of local elites faded after the implementation of the forceful assimilation policy in the 1930s. Along with the High Commander of Plaek Phibulsongkhram who carried out the pan-Thai ultranationalist agenda. Namely prohibiting the use of minority languages in government offices and replacing it with Thai as the national language; emphasis on Buddhism as the national religion (resulting in the prohibition of religion and Islamic law in the South); and require every resident in Thailand to change their name to a Thai name (pssat, 2020).

Finally, a movement to defend rights, culture and religion emerged, initiated by Haji Sulong, who submitted five demands to the Thai government. However, the request failed, finally Haji Sulong was arrested on charges as sedition and disappeared without a trace. Therefore, the integration policy of the Thai government was met with tough challenges from the community and led to resistance to separatism.

After the death of Haji Sulong, the emergence of various separatist movements was initiated by the Association of Malay Patani Raya (GEMPAR) with the aim of uniting the Malays to demand independence from the Thai government and the emergence of the National Liberation Front (NLF), which aims to demand autonomy and establish an Islamic state. Not only that, the separatist movement is growing and has many groups such as BRN, PULO, Bersatu. However, the movement at this time did not get much support from the community. The inclusion of violence in the 2000s increased until the occurrence of three major incidents in 2004 which killed a very high number of people. After the incident, the government no longer had any disputes with separatist groups, but people who experienced incidents carried out by the government made the conflict in Southern Thailand even

more intense and difficult to resolve. After the major incidents the government issued two policies that further compounded problems such as deploying troops and establishing special laws that violated people's human rights. (Sani, 2019, pp. 66-67)

Once state begins to use military force in solving an internal conflict, it is usually difficult for that state to seek a solution outside a military action. Any deviation from the military option by the state may be seen as a sign of weakness, an acceptance of legality of the enemy and even a step towards endangering national security. It causes a dilemma in those circumstances. The government sees that negotiation may indirectly give legitimacy to enemy's claim and also the admission of enemy's strength and the weakness of state. Therefore, state often tends to be intransigent and uncompromising until sometimes that the conflict compels the state to seek a negotiation option. (Hayipiyawong, 2014)

3.1.3. The emergence of a peace negotiation process between the Thai government and Southern Thailand during 2004-2019

The Thai government, from the past to the present, has been trying to find measures and solutions to the unrest in the southern border provinces since 2004, which is a long-standing conflict. Meetings or talks with people who differ from the state in the southern border provinces are not considered a new matter. Thailand's past talks have not yielded concrete results. With both having failed to end and that is still being done continuously today, which has been formed in many channels. Meetings, talks or peaceful discussions with groups of dissenting opinions it started from the time of the Chuan Leekpai government until the government of Abhisit Vejjajiva. It was a meeting that had not been disclosed in any way. And negotiations failed as usual. (Juilampen, 2015)

Later during the reign of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra announced on 28 February 2013 that an open peace dialogue process between representatives of the Thai government and the leaders of the BRN-Coordinate was held in Kuala Lumpur with the signing of the General Consensus on Peace Dialogue Process.

The 2013 open peace dialogue process received a lot of support from the community in Southern Thailand and received attention from both domestic and foreign media. Meanwhile, the Thai government can reach out to the mainstream media and benefit from it substantially. On the other hand, BRN Coordinate tried to attract the public's attention through the mainstream media and used a video sharing website namely YouTube to spread their voice and statements regarding their demands to the public several times.

Until September 2013 the Malaysian facilitator submitted the "secret document" proposed by the BRN-Coordinate to the Thai government. The document provides further details

of the five demands and sets out the preconditions for the peace process on behalf of the BRN-Coordinate.

The five demands of the BRN-Coordinate are;

1. The Thai government should recognize that BRN is the only representative of "Patani freedom fighter" and accept that BRN is not a separatist movement, but is a liberation organization fighting for the freedom of Muslim Malays. The BRN panel members who participate in the peace dialogue should be protected by the Thai government.
2. BRN agreed to appoint the Malaysian government as a mediator when the dialogue was enhanced from "peace dialogue" to "peace negotiation" in the near future.
3. At the peace negotiation level, ASEAN countries, OIC and NGOs should be allowed to witness the dialogue.
4. The Thai government must recognize the existence and sovereignty of Malay Muslims in Southern Thailand by emphasizing that BRN does not demand separation of territory from Thailand.
5. The BRN demands that the Thai government release all detainees and revoke all arrest warrants issued to Malay-Muslim militants.

The demands would make it equal to the Thai and Malaysian governments because the mediator could play the role of a third party rather than as a facilitator. However, the problem of domestic conflicts made the BRN-Coordinate have less power than the Thai government. Consequently, the BRN-Coordinate wanted the conflict in Southern Thailand to become an international problem so that the BRN-Coordinate would have the opportunity to reduce losses in asymmetrical power relations.

The peace initiative process came to a halt after submitting a bid because Yingluck Shinawatra's cabinet faced a crisis of government legitimacy. The peace dialogue process was stopped abruptly when Thai politics fell into political turmoil which led to constant conflict between political factions. Finally, on 22 May 2014 the Thai army staged a coup ending the reign of Yingluck Shinawatra and was replaced by General Prayuth Chan-o-cha by forming the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) to govern his country. In fact, the five demands of the BRN-Coordinate have not received any consideration and action or response from the Thai government.

In a short time, the military junta government still prioritized Malaysia as an influential facilitator in decisions by several separatist groups. It can be seen that on 1 December 2014, General Prayuth Chan-o-cha, prime minister and head of the NCPO, visited Datuk Seri Najib Razak, the Prime Minister of Malaysia and consulted with each other to promote the peace dialogue process in the following year.

December 1, 2015 marked one year of the Southern Thailand peace dialogue process called the 2nd Dialogue. After the 22 May 2014 coup the incumbent General Prayuth

Chan-o-cha indicated that the peace dialogue process was continuing.

During an official visit to Kuala Lumpur, Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha met with Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak on 1 December 2014, agreeing on three principles: Period without violence had to precede talks; dialogue had to include all militant groups; and the demands of all groups must be aggregated before they are presented to the Thai side. Prayuth laid out a cursory three-stage sequence for talks: a reduction in militant's attacks; a signed agreement to end the conflict; and implementation of the agreement.

The two agreed to continue the peace dialogue process that was stopped at the end of 2013 due to political turmoil in Bangkok. The peace dialogue process initiated during the Yingluck Shinawatra government which was signed on 28 February 2013 can be considered the first dialogue. Meanwhile an umbrella organization consisting of six Patani movements was formed under the name Majlis Syura Patani (Mara Patani) or Patani Consultative Council (PCC) on March 15, 2015. Initiated by the BRN action group as Majlis Amanah Rakyat Patani on October 25, 2014, in a conference held on 5 June 2015 which was attended by representatives of the six groups of the Mara Patani formation movement consisting of BIPP, GMIP, BRN, PULO-DSPP and PULO MKP.

The meeting of the two parties on 8 April 2015 was held in Kuala Lumpur, considered to be the first informal secret meeting. The commitment of both parties to continue the peace dialogue process.

In the second meeting on 8 June 2015 both parties including the Malaysian facilitator attended as a full team. In the short meeting General Aksra informed that he not only represented his government but also represented all of the Southern Thai community to speak with Patani's representatives. He proposed that the Mara Patani party mutually agree on a safety zone to be built in the month of Ramadan.

The third meeting called the "second informal meeting" was held on August 25, 2015, and was attended by a full team by all parties. At the end of the meeting the two parties were given a draft Terms of Reference (TOR) proposed by Malaysia as a facilitator. All parties are required to study, change, delete or add, each part according to their respective perspectives.

After five years of vague and fruitless negotiations, a new chapter was finally resumed in February 2018 which resulted in a principle agreement between the Thai military and Mara Patani to create a safe zone (Safety Zone) held in Kuala Lumpur. On September 20, Mara Patani issued a statement expressing concern about the announcement of the Nong Chik region as a special control zone as it would have a negative impact on the civilian population who felt terrorized and were seen as militants even though there was no clear evidence. On September 21, the Patani Student and Youth Federation (Persekutuan Mahasiswa Anak muda dan Siswa Patani:

PerMAS) issued a statement regarding an international day of peace. In this case they called on the Thai government to repeal the martial law law, eliminate the source of fear and make peace negotiations for Patani a national agenda.

In late 2018, General Prayut said that although the uprising was considered a domestic issue, peace dialogue would soon resume with Malaysia as a facilitator without giving a specific deadline for new negotiations. But a few weeks later, the peace dialogue process nearly failed after Udomchai failed to attend a meeting with Mara's representatives. Patani is scheduled for February 4 in Kuala Lumpur. According to Thawee Changching, these disputes shocked Malaysian facilitators and drew angry reactions from the rebel leadership. Udomchai claimed that he would only meet Mara Patani chief Sukree Haree, and never agreed to a pre-arranged meeting with the rebel delegation. Mara Patani's comments denounced the unacceptability of the Thai panel and the hidden agenda calling for Udomchai to be replaced by someone with higher credibility. (Yarang, 2021)

On 3 February 2019, an apparent misunderstanding led MARA Patani to suspend the dialogue. At issue was General Udomchai insistence on meeting only with the chief of the MARA Patani delegation, Shukree Haree, rather than the group's dialogue team; Shukree Haree rejected the offer and suspended MARA Patani's participation until after the Thai general election on 24 March. He subsequently resigned, citing health problems, leaving the official dialogue process in disarray. Since April 2018, there has been only one brief meeting of the technical teams, in August 2019.

The extent of Thai communication with mainstream BRN is uncertain, but security officials concede that it is essential to talk with those who can "control the situation on the ground". A senior Thai intelligence official told MARA Patani in August 2019 that Thailand was willing to talk with them in the expectation that "others" would join the process. A security official went further, telling Crisis Group that under General Wanlop Rugsanoah, the new Thai dialogue panel chief who replaced Udomchai in October 2019, "we will give priority to the BRN mainstream, based on the principle of an inclusive dialogue". On 29 November 2019, General Wanlop publicly stated that Thailand had called on Malaysia to help bring BRN to the dialogue table. "Personally, I think there will be change [in the dialogue partner]", he told reporters.

Days later, a media report, citing a Malaysian source within the facilitator's team, stated that Thai officials had met mainstream BRN in Berlin. This appeared to confirm progress in efforts to establish direct talks between BRN and Thailand, though the source said Malaysia did not recognize the meeting as part of the official dialogue process. A Thai official would not confirm the meeting, but affirmed Thailand's continuing willingness to talk with all parties. (Group, 2020)

One year ago, Thai negotiators were preparing to engage in direct talks with Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) rebels

for the first time. That meeting, held on 20 January 2020, was considered a breakthrough in efforts to resolve separatist violence in Southern Thailand, marking the first time Bangkok had engaged in formal dialogue with the group in control of most fighters on the ground, thought to number 400. The initial talks, mediated by Malaysia, were followed by a second round in Kuala Lumpur from 2–3 March.

Both parties hailed early progress, with the Thai panel led by Gen. Wanlop Rugsanaoh labelling the talks as “constructive,” while the BRN delegation, led by Anas Abdulrahman, indicating that it would participate in future negotiations. Then the COVID-19 pandemic struck, stalling momentum. No talks have been held since. Yet it did have an initial positive effect: on 3 April, the BRN announced it would “cease hostilities” on humanitarian grounds to ease the situation for health workers tackling the virus in the Deep South.

Despite talks being placed on hold, the BRN’s COVID-19 ceasefire reflected the goodwill brought about by the peace process. It held for four weeks last April. Monitoring group Deep South Watch recorded 350 incidents and 148 deaths in the same period in 2019. The last few months however, have seen an uptick in violence, indicating a gradual return to low-level warfare. (Hart, 2021)

3.1.4. The failure of the peace negotiation process between Thai government and Southern Thailand

Past efforts to end the insurgency have made little progress. Separatists have fought for autonomy or independence for the four Muslim-majority provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, Songkhla and Yala, which border Malaysia, for decades. Many residents in the Malay-speaking south, where Islam is the dominant religion and cultural reference point, reject full assimilation into Buddhist-majority Thailand, which has exercised sovereignty over the region since the 1909 Anglo-Siamese Treaty marked the modern border.

In 2013, Bangkok initiated talks with Mara Patani, a political organization representing a loose coalition of rebel forces. The dialogue fell flat as the BRN continued its attacks, undermining the process. Adding to a string of local shootings and ambushes, the BRN at times launched more audacious attacks aimed at disrupting talks. In May 2017, rebels bombed a shopping center in Pattani, wounding 56 people, while a November 2019 raid on a security checkpoint in Yala left 15 armed civilian defense volunteers dead. The inability of Mara Patani to prevent such attacks forced the government to enter into dialogue with the BRN.

The first informal talks between the two sides took place in Berlin in late 2019, with back-channel talks also rumored to have taken place in Indonesia, ahead of the historic two rounds of formal negotiations held in Kuala Lumpur in early 2020. Both parties expressed cautious optimism last March. The Thai panel said early talks had gone well but called for “time, continuity and support” and a “reduction of violence in

order to create a conducive atmosphere” ahead of future meetings. Yet after the onset of COVID-19, there have been no further rounds of talks and the fleeting peace process has been stopped in its tracks. (Hart, 2021)

For Thailand’s part, there is evident contradiction in official approaches to dialogue and conflict resolution. Peace dialogue has been official policy since 2013. But the Thai delegation under the National Council for Peace and Order, as the junta ruling the country between 2014 and 2019 was known, twice declined to sign documents negotiated with MARA Patani.

Many officials believe that signing any agreement would legitimize the insurgents or confer upon them legal parity with the Thai government. They oppose dialogue because they see it as a separatist tool and a path to losing the Deep South. (Group, 2020)

Basically, all types of government system should be based on the Thai constitution, and could not against the constitutions as the supreme law of Thailand. Thai government offers the decentralization. But the goal of separatist in the peace process is BETO separated (independence state) from the Kingdom of Thailand. This is the one of many facts that the peace process has failed.

The failure of the negotiation happened when government of Thailand strictly rejected any kind of separatism demand which jeopardized the sovereignty of the state. (Hayipiyawong, 2014)

Although there are many forms of negotiations, the conflict between the Thai government and Patani has not been resolved and continues to be resolved in the future.

3.1.5. Factors of conflict between the Thai government and the Southern provinces that have not been successful in negotiations

The conflict in southern Thailand took a long time to resolve. Peace negotiations have been held, whether open or closed. To solve the problem in the South. The peace negotiation process took a long time to end this conflict, and each time the negotiations eventually failed or the negotiations ceased. This is because there are a number of factors that can cause the negotiation process to fail:

3.1.5.1. Lack of mutual trust

The failure of the talks: lack of mutual trust, there was no framework of the talks that both sides must follow, the BRN was forced to enter the peace talk’s process by Malaysia and the Thai government was not ready for the talks as they lack a clear cut framework and strategy for talks. (Hayipiyawong, 2014)

BRN Group. The Thai security agency believes it has played the highest role in the unrest situation in the southern border provinces over the past decade. Issuing a statement in

English Concluded that it was from the movement's public relations department as of Monday 12 October 2015.

The essence of the statement is similar to the content in the video clip stated by Abdul Karim Kalib, who came out on Tuesday, September 8, 2015, is distrustful of the current peace dialogue process in the southern border provinces. Because they do not trust the Thai government. In which if the movement is to be trusted. There must be intermediaries and international observers to observe the talk.

Issues that are proposed. It corresponds to a part of BRN's claim. When he joined the peace talks table with the Thai government in 2013, which was led by BRN leader Hassan Tayyip. Is the head of the discussion group, the dissident of the state, while the Thai side at that time was headed by Lieutenant General Paradorn Pattanabhat, former secretary-general of the National Security Council.

For a summary translation of the BRN Statement, the Pattani National Revolutionary Coalition or BRN said that from 1960 to today, it has been 55 years since BRN has protected the freedom of Pattani through the people's revolution. Which BRN has been given a valuable lesson in this time of the struggle for independence, that the fight relentlessly. This makes the great sacrifice and the steadfast decision to keep the trust of the hurt people come true. All are Independence does not come through occupation. Or pass the restrictions of the request.

This does not mean BRN rejects the peace process through peace talks and diplomacy. But the process of peace must be dignified and sincere. Must have sincerity in practice the peace process must not be used as a political tactic. To deceive and weaken the progress of the Pattani people strategy Negotiations must be made formally. Conforms to international standards and norms this requires involvement of mediators and observers from other states. Because the concern of Pattani is that one state occupies another state. Also, the status and existence of the Pattani nation must be recognized.

Figure 2. BRN issued a statement of distrust of the Thai government to negotiate peace in the southern border provinces Mediator and international observers joined the conversation





Figure 3. BRN issued a statement



(Source: Issara News Team, 2015)

BRN believes that all people of Pattani Regardless of their background or religion Deserves a better life in the future That is, free from occupation, free of Oppression, and free from discrimination. Final part of the statement BRN stated that "It is not impossible for Pattani to achieve freedom, freedom, and freedom." (Team, 2015)

One of the most fundamental problems facing peace dialogue relates to the level of distrust between the two parties. On the one hand, the Thai government recognizes the BRN as the main component and player in this matter, but on the other hand they doubt that the BRN delegation has the full mandate of the BRN leadership. In other words, Thailand doubts whether BRN itself can really deliver what it promised in the peace dialogue process. The failure of the previous covert dialogue attempt was suspected to have been due to this issue. They question whether this initiative is really real; or is it an attempt by the government to mislead them and expose these groups to the open. (Yarang, 2021)

3.1.5.2. Management Conflict

The unity of the government makes its administration unclear in practice. The counter-insurgency operation has a slow bureaucracy and a lack of professionalism is a hindrance. Including human rights violations (Juilampen, 2015). According to Ekachai Srivilas, Director of the Office of Peace and Governance King Prajadhipok's Institute said negotiations must move on based on talks with BRN leaders. Some have made reorganization efforts. The military has a role in the negotiation approach is defined as well as the political parties. However, the problem is that BRN is still claiming to represent the people of the area, which is a problem in the negotiation process that denies the public sector that has a role in the area. That local operations come from the BRN 30%, which the Thai and Malaysian security departments know well, but the chronic problem is that the Thai government does not make the law sacred. Therefore allowing a long accumulated complication.

According to Chekamin Totayong, a former member of the House of Representatives Narathiwat Democrats said it

agreed to use a basic dialogue process to address issues in the southernmost provinces, but talks should not weigh on either party. But talk to all groups involved in the southern border problem, because if talking to only one demanding group, there may be a problem, as is the case with the BRN during Ms. Yingluck Shinawatra's government. In the end, the charges arose for not being able to find the center of the negotiation.

According to Mark Tamtai, vice president of the Strategic Peaceful Action Research Fund (TRF), said he felt that the peace-building process for the southern region was still at a high level on both sides. Whether it is the government or the BRN, no other group has yet to design the negotiation process. Looking at the talks between the government and the BRN, it is unclear what the concrete goal is. Investing in finding a common destination is not enough.

According to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Panithan Wattanayakorn, a security scholar from Chulalongkorn University. Former Deputy Secretary-General to the Prime Minister Acting as a spokesperson for the Prime Minister's Office in the government, Abhisit Vejjajiva said that the violence in the past has created two overlapping images: people are not confident in their safety. Which has always been but another picture that is overlaid is the authorities could not protect the people. Because it is more difficult to protect yourself this weakens people's hopes for the peace dialogue process.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Panithan continued that there are three principles or theories in dialogue that are the factors for success:

1. Must have a clear political will. The initiative must come from the political side. From the policy level then there are civil society, religious and spiritual leaders supporting it. For this factor it is now considered. Because the government has expressed a clear intention to talk peace by doing it openly.
2. Must have the support of the operations department. If only addressing problems in the southern part of Thailand the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) must organize a new work system. There is a completely new security plan. Because of the government's policy to talk and negotiate would mean stepping into a new area Anticipate in advance that the situation in the area will be heated up by opposition groups. And government officials will be the target immediately.
3. There is support from civil society. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) "the readiness of political parties the unity of action must go hand in hand. Not for daily interviews Or come sit and ask each other about when and when to go to the area Moreover, there are mechanisms from outside the system coming in. And the lack of support from the operations department confusing this is the state we see today. "

According to En. Ekachai Srivilas, Director of the Office of Peace and Governance King Prajadhipok's Institute said that he and the institute had been conducting a peace dialogue for many years. This is done in the three southernmost provinces and other conflicting areas around the world. Peace talks have to have the right process. There is a clear working structure. Fully funded with academic and civil society information but the process that the government is working on is nothing.

Gen. Ekachai explained that the peace process or peace process of the whole world must have three components:

1. The structure of the working group must be complete. Both the National Intelligence Agency Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Justice and others, not just 4 people.
2. Structure of the work must be widely available at all levels. Proposed "Kanom Chan Theory" must listen to the opinions of local people at the same time. There is no place in the world that talked 4-5 people and finished the policy of administration and development in the southern border provinces. There are 9 items. Talk to a group that disagrees with the state. The correct way is to do other things. Go along with
3. There must be a good working process, a clear plan, starting from building trust first. Do not agree to anything. Not just the first stage, it was said to reduce the violence even though there was no trust. There is no basic information of each other yet.

According to Dr. Mark also addressed the issues of the current government's ongoing dialogue process and solutions that the violence that has occurred in the past is definitely related to the talking process. But not dissatisfied with talking But I am not satisfied with the process of starting the conversation as to how it started, and if it starts wrong, the adjustment may not be possible. Therefore, it may have to start all over.

Another point to be aware of is some groups in the Pattani movement want to find alternative solutions to problems that are not separating or separating territories. But the past situation has caused many generations to die. The current version might be the 3rd generation if some groups in the process are willing to downgrade what is required. Will it equal to reduce the level of combat? And is equal to not keeping or respecting the sacrifice of those who fought before or not. "The Thai state must understand psychology here. And the Thai side has lost a lot of personnel the people at the table talk have a lot on their minds. Therefore a lot of participation must be created It would be difficult for a warrior to write a solution to the problem. Must have an academic team to help the movement's department also has academics. But he needs participation. Not we think for or think instead". (Pungnet, 2013)

3.1.5.3. No in-depth discussion forum

Thailand has always expressed its stance that the southern border provinces are internal problems. Because the opening of a formal discussion forum is an escalation of the problem to the international level, it is the duty of the government to explain to the international community. Especially the Muslim community to understand that Thailand still sees it as an internal problem and strive to resolve through peaceful means. (Juilampen, 2015)

Abdul Karim Khalid, representative from the National Revolutionary Front (Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), told BBC Indonesian language department that BRN intends to negotiate peace with the Thai government directly. And have witnessed Representatives from other countries to observe because the government did not participate in the peace negotiation process. Malaysia is the coordinator for the Thai authorities to negotiate with MARA Patani. That included various groups of insurgents due to BRN "Disagree with the regulations and see that the operation is not equal

On Monday (April 10), BRN issued a statement stating three conditions before conferring with the Thai government:

1. Talk must be based on the needs of both parties involved in the conflict and must voluntarily find a solution together. Talk must have a third party. (International community) as an observer and witness

2. The mediator must be credible and qualify in accordance with international practice standards. No conflicts of interest and the mediator must continue the talks in accordance with a process agreed upon by the negotiators.

3. The negotiation process must be clearly designed and agreed upon by both negotiators before negotiations can be initiated.

Pol. Maj. Sittakulwong, Secretary of the Peace Dialogue in the Southern Border Provinces. Addressed to the BBC Thai To the request Involve impartial international organizations in the negotiations that Malaysia is currently a facilitator. And does the job quite well with the other parties being pulled back, look at an example of the rebellion in Sri Lanka. In the end, there were many other parties joining the circle. In the end, the negotiations will not progress and return to the use of force on both sides, the best conversation should be left with the actual conflict.

"The Thai government has always insisted that Problems that arise in the southern border provinces are domestic problems. By looking at different people is a Thai person Therefore, international organizations should not be involved," said Maj. Sitti. (BBCTHAI, 2017)

4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Based on the discussion above, it can be concluded that there are four factors that prevent the success of negotiation between the Thai government and the separatist movement. The first factor is a lack of trust with each other. According to

the discussion of this factor, the Thai government cannot prove that a group of people with a separatist movement who came to meet and talk is a true person who has a role In order to command the insurgent groups in the southern province of Thailand and there have been many talks to resolve conflicts in the past. But the outcome of the negotiations has not made any progress until now. Second, there is also a factor in managing conflict. According to the discussion of this factor, the unity of the government makes its administration unclear in practice and is not committed to solving conflicts in the southern provinces. And last, there is the factor of no in-depth discussion forum. According to the discussion of this factor, The Thai government has always shown that the problem in the southern provinces is an internal problem. Therefore, there is no formal forum to discuss and there is no public discussion, making solving problems through peaceful means of conflict more difficult.

Learning from the above factors, this research suggests that successful negotiation among parties is the trust-building between the Thai government with the separatist movement, must have full management and be committed to negotiations, there must be an in-depth discussion forum to enter into serious negotiations in order to achieve the goal of resolving problems with a facilitator to resolve conflicts, and the negotiators on the separatist movement must disclose the leader, structure so that the Thai government can analyse the conflict and speak to the opposing leader directly. It makes easier to fix problems.

This research is limited to negotiation process between Thai government and southern provinces conducted from 2004 to 2019. Future research can discuss this topic from the perspective of economy.

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