Dynamics of People, State, and Cyber Power in the Internet Shutdown Policy at Papua and West Papua In 2019

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ABSTRACT
The Internet Shutdown policy implemented at Papua and West Papua in 2019 has created a competing narrative between the government and the civil society. The main narration championed to justify the Internet Shutdown by the government is the concern of the national security whereas the civil society argues that Internet Shutdown is a form of human rights violation. These competing narratives brought forth a new sort of dynamics in a polemic surrounding a policy. This paper aims to discuss the dynamics between people and state where cyber power plays a huge role within the context of the polemic surrounding Internet Shutdown policy in Papua and West Papua. Data is gathered through interviews with stakeholders and various media content relating to the issue analyzed qualitatively. Results find that the interaction between people, state, and cyber power in the Internet Shutdown policy paints a dynamic picture involving repression, delegations of cyber power, and the future where Indonesia is heading into a paradox where it exists as a democratic country being under a digital authoritarianism regime.

Keywords: *Internet Shutdown, Policy Narratives, Cyber Power, Policy In Digital Era*

1. INTRODUCTION

In 2016, West [1] found that there are 81 cases of Internet Shutdown happening across 19 countries during the period of July 1st, 2015 to June 30th, 2016. Public officers have given many reasons to order an Internet Shutdown, some of them are to protect the government's authority, suppressing public dissent, countering terrorism, maintain national security, or to protect local businesses [2].

National security is most often the cited justification of the Internet Shutdown police, but it is also very close in relation to suppressing the public's opinion [3]. Prior researches have proven that preventing violence that happened due to the spread of misinformation online is the main reason why the government decided to do Internet Shutdown [4] [5].

Internet Shutdown policy is a very dilemmatic policy to enact and Indonesia has had a firsthand experience with this very dilemma. In the midst of 2019, specifically in August to September, President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo and the Ministry of Communications and Informatics (MoCI) has enacted Internet Shutdown as a response to various act of demonstrations in some areas in Papua such as Fakfak, Sorong, Manokwari and Jayapura. The demonstrations are triggered by racist acts against Papuan university students in Surabaya, East Java, where hundreds of people shouted slurs at these Papuan students in their own dormitory. These demonstrations were followed by riots and happened continuously in waves in several Papua territories and the government assessed that said "riots" happened due to the many fake news spreading at Papua. The government then decided to throttle or slow the Internet access in several regions in Papua on August 19th, 2019 and followed with total Internet blackout on August 21st, 2019 which lasted for 2 weeks. Due to this blackout, people in many districts and cities of Papua and West Papua underwent an economic backlash and difficulties in their daily lives since they are unable to access Internet.

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Rudiantara, the Minister of MoCI at the time, and the Head of Presidential Office Staff, Moeldoko have stated that the Internet blackout in Papua has to be done due to national security and emergency situation. President Jokowi further affirmed this statement, claiming that 'this policy has to be done for everyone's sake'. These statements then consistently serve as the main policy narrative of Internet Shutdown policy. This policy was heavily criticized by various Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) such as South East Asia Freedom of Expression Network (SAFEnet) Indonesia, Indonesia's Independent Journalist Association (AJI Indonesia), Legal Aid Services for Press (LBH Pers), Indonesia's Legal Aid Services Foundation (YLBHI), KontraS, Elsam, dan Institute of Criminal Justice Reform (ICJR) which then sued President Jokowi and the MoCI to the State Administrative High Court. These NGOs countered the main narration of Internet Shutdown policy with various contra-narration, suited to each organization's visions, which are ultimately rooted in the belief that Internet Shutdown is a violation of human rights. In the end, the government via the MoCI, lifted the Internet blackout in Papua and West Papua on September 11th, 2019 [6].

These competing narratives over a policy then creates a huge polemic surrounding the Internet Shutdown policy which involves elements such as the government (the state), the civil society (the people), and how cyber power sits in the middle of everything starting from the Internet Shutdown itself to the attempts done by the civil society to voice their contrasting narration. This paper aims to flesh out the polemic surrounding the aforementioned policy using various concepts available in the realm of social science, especially during the era in which our world is becoming more and more digitalized.

The decision to enact the Internet Shutdown policy is only applicable because the state has the resources to do it. In this part, I will present the research background and the literature review in a form of concepts which are presented in four subsections which serves as a basis for this paper's analysis.

1.1 Brief History of Conflict at Papua and West Papua

When discussing Papuan soil, it is nearly impossible not to mention the conflict surrounding them. If we are to trace the origin of Papua conflict, it dates back to the start of Indonesia's independence (Alhumami, 2006 in Al Araf et. al, 2011: 10) [7]. Alhumami [7] explains that the Papua conflict can be examined through two dimensions, which are the economics and the politics. This becomes even more problematic when the government uses security approach to handle and manage civil society's movements which criticized the government or refused the integration of Papua to Indonesia, be it peaceful or armed [7].

The waves of disappointment experienced by the Papuans leads to the demand for independence in 1998. The central government then lost initiative and fell into a state of confusion. The concept of Special Autonomy came as an initiative from the Papuans as a new solution to address the tension between central government and the Papuans. Special Autonomous Region of Papua is expected to act as a 'goodwill to fix broken relations' which puts high hopes on how both the central government and the Papuans will correct and trust each other in order to create a new relationship based on new approaches and values to follow.

Though the relationship between Indonesia and Papua are better these days, there are some lingering sentiments which remain. Indonesia's Science Institute (LIPI) identifies four complex problems that are still haunting the Indonesia-Papua relationship until today: 1) Marginalization of indigenous Papuans, especially in economic rights as an aftereffect of migration, 2) Failure of development programs in Papua to solve economic marginalization, 3) differing fundamental perceptions on the history between Jakarta and Papua, and 4) the state's violence against Papuans [8]. The fourth point becomes extremely relevant when analyzing how the government used security as the main concern of Internet Shutdown. Suryawan [8] further explains that that violence occurs from the long periods of time when Papua was ruled under the military-security approach which

always mentions the problem of "separatists" as justification for the unending security approach when handling the many problems of Papuan soil.

One of the areas affected by the prolonged use of security approach in Papuan soil is how closed-off information are in regards to anything which happens in Papua. The Press Freedom Index (PFI) of Papua and West Papuan Press are ranked the lowers from all 34 provinces in Indonesia with West Papua sitting on 71.06 out of 100 and Papua on 70.42 out of 100. These low PFI scores are due to the political dynamics which happened in 2019 (general election), the many cases of violence against journalists in Papua, and the Internet Shutdown case at Papua and West Papua [9].

As if these problems aren't enough, Abrar [10] explains that information from Papua is often limited by the security apparatus who will often sleep in media offices to 'keep watch' of the news that are produced and despite President Joko Widodo's policy to welcome foreign press, information around Papua is still very tightly controlled. There are many instances when local media which covers how security apparatus violate indigenous people's rights are intimidated, beaten by the apparatus, then stigmatized as pro-separatist. Komarudin [11] states that the violence-based approach and the effort to hide anything that goes in Papua have worsen the people's disappointment towards the state.

Needless to say, the state's history and strong belief that "separatists" are those who criticized the Indonesian government, indiscriminate of the fact that some critiques are done peacefully, continuously enable the state to hold on to a belief system that the security approach is the best approach when handling problems occurring on the Papuan soil. This becomes a huge pivotal point of how the Internet Shutdown policy was decided during the policymaking process.

1.2 Papua and Accessibility of Internet

Internet is a huge player to ease the information blackhole surrounding Papuan soil, yet there are many problems surrounding Papua's internet services. Extreme geographic condition is one of the main factors why some Papuans live an isolated lifestyle focusing on small groups' traditions. Differing geographical situation also caused development of Papua to be difficult, thus it needed a breakthrough to ensure that the government can reach even the most remote of places [12]. I believe that internet can serve as this breakthrough, but research done by Ibnugraha dan Fahrudin [13] proves that there are only 64 unit of internet infrastructures spread across four regions of Papua Province with such uneven numbers of 58% for Merauke District, 33% for Keerom District, 8% for Tolikara District, and 2% of Pegunungan Bintang District. This shows that internet infrastructures are not spread evenly in Papua and it creates a sentiment that no internet connection is a part of their life and this sentiment can be problematic in the future since Indonesia is heading into a much more digitalized country where sectors such as economy, education, and even public services utilize internet for its services.

Transferring information in Papuan soil has proven to be difficult due to its geographic extremities and the press has been fighting tooth and nail to advocate for the openness of information in Papua. The existence of local news outlet, such as Tabloid Jubi and Suara Papua, who constantly cover the happenings in Papua with local perspective is seen as a huge improvement and is even dubbed as 'the Oxygen of Papua' by the locals [10].

From this section, we can infer that the Papuan soil harbors a very particular history with Indonesia (the government), especially so about the security approach and the effects it has made. The long history in which the government has relied on the security approach has since then become a very entrenched belief system which then eventually becomes the driving force of the main narration for the justification of Internet Shutdown at Papua and West Papua in 2019.

1.3 Cyber Power

It is nearly impossible to define cyber power without defining cyberspace itself and there are many of such definitions [14] defines cyberspace as an operational territory

framed with the usage of electronic devices to exploit information through interconnected systems and related infrastructures, and cyber power relies on the resources which characterize the cyberspace itself. This definition of cyber power is further emphasized by Langner [15], which explains cyber power as the organized capability of a society to utilize digital technologies for surveillance, exploitation, subversion, and coercion in a conflict.

Surmises [14] that there are physical and virtual dimensions of cyber power. In the virtual dimension, there are information instrument and things that happened within the cyberspace itself (intra cyberspace) whereas in the physical dimension, there's physical instruments and things that happened outside of cyberspace. There are two types of power that can be utilized, which are the hard power, or the coercive approach which uses military and economic power to influence or control, and the soft power, or persuasive approach which uses cultural, historical, and diplomatic influences [14].

Within the context of Internet Shutdown policy, it can be surmised that the state utilized their cyber power to stop the people's access to the virtual world using hard cyber power (using the MoCI to slow people's Internet access), whereas the people used soft cyber power to campaign for Internet Shutdown policy through social media. This isn't done without any threat, because nowadays, the people are unsettled by the existence of policies such as Electronic Information and Transactions Law (ITE Law) and Article 310 of Indonesian Penal Code (KUHP) on defamation which are often used to criminalize people who criticizes or share their opinion about the government .

These contexts provide insights on why it is common for Indonesian society to utilize the power they held in the cyberspace to express their opinions to the government, especially when they feel that the state is doing things that are authoritarian in nature.

1.4 Digital authoritarianism

The existence of Internet has created a new weapon for democracy which enables two-way communication with the reigning state. For the civilians in global setting, social networking applications change how dissents are organized. Leaders of social movements all over the world use online apps and digital content systems to organize collective actions, activates local protesting network, connecting with international social movement, and share their political perspective with the global media. Prior to his era, authoritarian regimes were able to control broadcasting media amidst political crisis via the destruction of print media, confiscation of radio and television stations, and blocking telephones, but the existence of Internet virtually makes it difficult to control information like such [16].

The people have the ability to utilize Internet as a medium to give out their aspirations, but the same chance of utilization is widely open for the state. The state, as the biggest stakeholder in governing the Internet, has more power towards the use of Internet be in its infrastructure-level or cyberspace-level. The technology heralded as 'tool for freedom' is now used to repress dissent and suppress the people, thus showing authoritarian tendencies in cyberspace. Authoritarianism is defined as how the state limits democratic and political participation, controlling with emotion and fear, repressing civilians, and the concentration of executive power in the hands of unaccountable elites. Whereas digital authoritarianism—also known as tech-enabled authoritarianism—is the usage of authoritarian government's technology not only to control but also to shape their people's behavior through surveillance, repression, manipulation, censorship, and enabling themselves to keep and expand their political power [17]. Based on this explanation, it can be inferred that Indonesia, to some extent, is under a digital authoritarian regime, thus making the people's restlessness a rather common thing, especially since Indonesia is a democratic country.

1.5 The Political Strive In A Conflicted Area And The Presence Of Cyber Power As A New Element

The relationship between the regional government and the central government has always been a common thing in Indonesia's political history since it most often causes tension [18]. The existence of Internet and cyberspace as a democratic media in digital era then serves as a new element in this strive. In this section, I will focus on explaining how the concept of cyber power can be a new component in discussing political strive in general.

There have been many researches which aims to explain the political strive at Papua and West Papua as a conflicted area [19] [20] [21] and give their recommendations on how to solve them. The existence of Internet brings a new dimension in this strive. explains that the existence of social media and information and communication technology created a medium for a new side in said political strives for the people who are involved in the political strive; using the studies on political strives which happened in Ukraine, Palestine, and Srpska Republic, tthey explained that Internet acts as an aspect which enables political participation yet at the same time enabling the penalization of said participation. In Srpska Republic, Internet enables the people to express themselves, organizing online support, and documenting their demonstrations on Facebook; but at the same time, the usage of Internet to do these has resulted in legal consequences for causing public unrest.

Criminalizing the usage of cyber power which endangers the government's regime is a crucial part of the debates surrounding the existence of Internet as a neutral media for all sides, especially in conflicts. This paper sees the existence of Internet as a locus which enables political strive between the people and the state to be seen with transparency as never seen before. The existence of Internet enables the entire world to witness and form their own assessment about the two narrations competing in a political strive.

Based on the explanations in the Introduction and Research Background, I propose the theory that both the state and the people utilize cyber power to achieve their desired goal. The state uses hard cyber power to achieve their goal to enforce national security whereas the people (civil society) use soft cyber power to criticize the state and voice their dissent towards the Internet Shutdown policy.

2. METHODOLOGY

This research uses the qualitative approach in adherence to its main purpose to explain the polemic surrounding Internet Shutdown policy at Papua and West Papua in 2019. Moleong [22] defines qualitative research as research done to understand a phenomenon holistically through description and narration in its natural context using empirical method, hence why this research has to use qualitative approach.

This research is done using explanatory qualitative content analysis method. The data is gathered through interview with stakeholders (which consist of the NGOs who are involved with the suing of President Jokowi and the MoCI such as South East Asia Freedom of Expression Network (SAFEnet) Indonesia, Indonesia's Independent Journalist Association (AJI Indonesia), Legal Aid Services for Press (LBH Pers), Indonesia's Legal Aid Services Foundation (YLBHI), KontraS, Elsam, dan Institute of Criminal Justice Reform (ICJR) and the MoCI itself), media content analysis, and literature studies. The data is then analyzed with Miles and Huberman's [23] qualitative data analysis method of data gathering, data reduction, data display, and conclusion.

3. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

In this section, I will present a series of findings and discussions in a form of several subheadings which touch upon each and every argument I believe is a part of what makes the dynamics between state, people, and cyber power in the Internet Shutdown policy at Papua and West Papua in 2019.

3.1 The Use of National Security as a Policy Narrative as a Form of Repression towards Papuan Soil

The usage of particular narrations to justify a policy which eventually harms the people is not a new thing in Papuan soil. Suryawan [24] in his anthropological works often mentions how 'welfare' or 'empowerment' narrations are used to justify the regional expansion which becomes the source of new conflict for the Papuans. Historically, national security has become the main drive for most solutions proposed by the government for issues surrounding Papuan soil and in turn, it has become pushed 'security' as the main narration for all policies enacted in the Papuan soil.

Though the state's concern for national security during the demonstrations on August-September 2019 was a valid one, we also consider Williamson and Malik's [25] thoughts that national security is often used to justify repressive actions; in their research, they explained that as long as the state (security apparatus) controls narrations to justify a policy, the people are most likely to support the state's policy, but if said narrations are contested by other organizations which brought upon human rights perspective into their contra-narration, people's opinion will change. This description of Williamson and Malik's research fits perfectly to this case.

The long history between the Papuans and Indonesian government, along with the many organizations involved in human rights watch in Papua caused a condition in which the government cannot fully control the narration that was given. The existence of Internet and social media as a free-for-all space enables the state and the people to interact and narrate their versions of narrations in the same, equal, footings.

In the same research, Williamson dan Malik [25] also explains that authoritarian regime often tries to justify repression by accusing their opposition of using violence. This also happens in Indonesia, where the government insisted that there is a 'specific and abnormal' situation which requires security approach due to 'the Papuans' characteristic' without ever specifically explaining said situation which in turn makes it difficult to trust since demonstrations (which then leads to riots) are common in various regions in Indonesia and is not a defined characterizations of Papuans alone, as mentioned by Samuel Abrijani Pengerapan, Director General of Informatics Application in MoCI, and Albert Rudolf Rodja Head of Papua Regional Police Force in Judgement No.230/G/TF/2019/PTUN-JKT State Administrative Court.[1] But the belief held by the government that security approach is the main approach for every policy enacted in Papua causes them (the government) to view demonstrations as 'specific and abnormal situation which requires security approach'. This belief, in turn, causes various other stakeholders who are involved in suing the MoCI and the President (Elsam, AJI, LBH Pers, YLBHI, KontraS, SAFENet, and ICJR) believes that the narration of 'national security' is not viable for the case of Internet Shutdown because all demonstrations in Indonesia can pose as much security risk as the one in Papua[2]. SAFENet even does as far as saying

[1] Pengerapan's Statement was in Indonesian, the direct translation is that: "The condition in Papua cannot use the normal procedure (to eliminate content in the Internet) because (the normal procedure) needed a long time and no one can guarantee the control needed to be exercised to impede escalation in Papua, so we have to block (internet) access". Rodja's statement, also in Indonesian, with its direct translation being: "Due to what is known of the Papuans' characteristics, they will definitely do a demonstration in Papua due to what the act of racism against Papuans in Surabaya, hence Rodja decided to make a meeting to coordinate with church pastors to quell the people's anger, make security plans for the potential demonstration which was an excess of what happened in Surabaya."

[2] There are 43 statements (5 statements from Elsam, 13 from AJI Indonesia, 6 from LBH Pers, 3 from YLBHI, 3 from KontraS, 10 from SAFENet, and 3 from ICJR) which reflects that they do not believe that the narration of national security justifies the Internet Shutdown. SAFENet specifically states, in Indonesian, that if translated means:

that the national security concern is a big 'nonsense'[3] whereas YLBHI noted that the national security justification is 'unreasonable'.[4] This then highlights the findings that the main reason for enacting Internet Shutdown is for the sake of control and not for law or security reasons. Security as a narration is an extremely repressive thing for the Papuans since it strengthens the existing stereotypes for Papuans who are always at odds with the Indonesia (read: the government).

Social injustice, international economic gap, and the effects of elite/powerful groups to defend their power have created a position of "sub-human" which is a form of violence. This "sub-human" condition then caused a continual tension in the people, which then sparked dissent among civilians and eventually lead to other violence. Since the conflict, protest, and dissent appear in the public space, the powerful saw it as their duty to maintain public order, even using violence [24]. This explanation on Camara's spiral of violence theory fits with the chronology of the polemic surrounding Internet Shutdown policy at Papua and West Papua in 2019. The injustice and inequality experienced by the Papuan students in Surabaya who are victims of intimidation and verbal violence caused them to feel the "sub-human" position. The feeling of being "sub-human", which has become scars for the Papuans, angered them to the point of demonstrations which then led to riots. Responding to this, the state saw it as their duty to keep the public order and in turn felt compelled to enact the Internet Shutdown policy out of concern to national security. This is even evident in a nationally-aired television show where the government, represented by MoCI and Office of Presidential Staff, debated with NGO, represented by KontraS.[5] Specifically, the MoCI representative Henri Subiakto stated that "…issues of social gap, racism, and other issues related to manipulation of facts and hoax is much more sensitive to the Papuans compared to other regions. Since the condition is as such. This is the main reason why the government has to take clear action, which is to not take the risk of letting riots happen in several big cities". If we are to examine this chronology with Camara's spiral of violence theory, the usage of security as a narration is not just a repression, but also a form of structural violence.

The recurring theme of the discussions on the polemic surrounding Internet Shutdown

"If we are to mention (what) threatens national security, the (internet) shutdown case in Papua, which does not correlate to armed forces (in Papua), is a demonstration. Every demonstration is like that (posing security risks) since the '98 (Indonesia's New Order demonstrations are famous as violent), all demonstrations are noisy. If not (noisy), then no one will hear, so the noisier the better, unfortunately. It's different from the guys overseas, if they are represented, then they'd be heard. Us? We have to be loud to be heard."

[3] SAFENet's direct translation of the statement is: " So then, I don't know exactly about national security, but I believe that (the government's justification) is nonsensical, except if they're transparent about it, because as I know it, national security is when the threat is from outside force. For example, separatist movements, but that also has multiple interpretations. I believe what's in Papua is not separatist movement, because what they did as I record, remember, and watch, was not war. But demonstration…"

[4] YLBHI's direct translation of the statement is: "The thing is, this is for a necessary situation such as national security. What kind of national security needs something like the Internet Shutdown, it's unreasonable. The Judge from State Administrative Court stated that what constitutes as a national emergency situation is when the government announces the state of war or national emergency, and that has to be a President's decree. President first declared, then according to the Law in that decree, consult to the House of Representatives, approved, then the emergency law can come to effect. Then they can say it's an emergency. Now, emergency, what emergency? There's none."

[5] We have created the transcript of this talk show and treats this as a qualitative document. The video in question is publically available at Youtube <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4YFeNF7PChw> in Indonesian.

policy is the existence of cyberspace as a free platform where the public can witness how the government's main narration competed with the NGOs' contra narration, thus opening the court of public opinion. The power that comes with the ability to utilize digital technologies to influence events which happened in operational environment and other power instruments counts as the cyber power. In the next section, I will discuss the existence of cyber power influences the dynamics between people, state, and policy in the context of the polemic surrounding Internet Shutdown policy at Papua and West Papua in 2019.

3.2 The existence of Cyber Power as a New Element in the Dynamics between a Policy's System

The presence of cyberspace does indeed create the need to do Internet governance, but said presence also brings a new resource that can be utilized as a form of power, namely cyber power. The discussions on cyber power have been mentioned in the previous sections, thus in this section, I will explain how cyber power influences the dynamics between people, state, and policy as elements of a policy's system.

Nye Jr. [14]has explained that there are two dimensions within cyber power, namely the physical dimension which exists outside of cyberspace and the virtual dimension which is contained within the cyberspace itself; and the form of power that can be utilized is also divided into two kinds, namely the hard power and the soft power. If we are to apply Nye Jr.'s explanation on cyber power in the context of its usage during the polemic surrounding Internet Shutdown policy at Papua and West Papua in 2019, then it will be as pictured in **Figure 1** below.

Target of Cyber Power		
	Intra Cyberspace (Online)	**Extra Cyberspace (Offline)**
Information Instrument	**Hard Power**: Using ITE Law to enact slowing Internet access and Internet blackout (Government) **Soft Power**: Using the national security narrative as policy justification (Government) Giving contra narration of human rights violation as a form of disagreement towards the policy (NGOs)	**Hard Power**: - **Soft Power**: Various statements in print and television media to lead the national security narrative as justification of Internet Shutdown at Papua (Government) Efforts to dialogue with the government on how limiting Internet access is a form of limiting human rights (NGOs)
Physical Instrument	**Hard Power**: The government orders Internet Service Provider (ISP) companies to slow and block access to Internet (Government) **Soft Power**: Using other cellular services (television and telephones) to give information in Papua when Internet is unavailable (NGOs)	**Hard Power**: - **Soft Power**: Demonstrations to protest against Internet Shutdown policy done in Papua and other regions of Indonesia (NGOs) Suing the government for the Internet Shutdown policy to the State Administrative High Court (NGOs)

Figure 1. Usage of Cyber Power by the State (Government) and the People (NGOs) in the Polemic Surrounding Internet Shutdown Policy at Papua and West Papua in 2019
Source: Researcher's interpretation

If we are to examine the four quadrants of this cyber power usage, then it can be concluded that cyber power in Indonesia is hinged on the state, who is able to utilize both hard and soft cyber power in its efforts to do and justify Internet Shutdown whereas the people are only capable to use soft cyber power. Since the ISP companies are not involved in the usage of cyber power, it shows that the power over Internet resources in Indonesia is centered on the government alone. In the multi-stakeholder model, which is the most common model of Internet governance [26], ISP companies should have had some involvement in determining whether or not Internet Shutdown should be done or not. But, as discussed with the expert from Elsam, it seems that in the case of Internet Shutdown in Papua and West Papua in 2019, ISP companies as the main controller of Internet technology, seemed powerless since they can only follow the government's order.[6] Whether or not ISP companies have a responsibility to protect human rights can still be debated according to company's policies, but inferring that nearly half of the Internet governance in Papua is handled by the state, I surmise that ISP companies does not have power to offer their views on human rights because it may endanger their business.

[6] Elsam's direct translation of the statement is: "One of the most important things (to prevent internet Shutdown) is to hold the Internet Service Providers' companies accountable since they also have the responsibility to respect human rights. And the condition here is that the business sector does not have leverage to reject the government's request to block internet service. Although they (ISP companies) have responsibility to… I don't know, this represents the problem of content moderation, not only Internet Shutdown, even when internet shutdown has a lot of aspects such as blocking certain contents."

Despite their disadvantage, the people did not lie in silence. Using the soft cyber power available to them, they launched various campaigns which directly criticizes the government in social media, as can be seen in Figure 2. In the context of the polemic surrounding Internet Shutdown policy at Papua and West Papua in 2019, I concluded that the efforts done by various NGOs through their campaigns are a valid part of the people's effort to force their way into the policy's system by criticizing the government and the policy they took.

Figure 2. Social media campaigns launched by NGOs during the Internet Shutdown case

The existence of cyberspace has given a huge stage for the people to utilize soft cyber power as a medium to spread their concern on how Internet Shutdown is a form of human rights violation, thus the next section will discuss the basis of the people's sentiment that Internet access is a form of human rights.

3.3 Internet Access as a Vital Human Rights in the Digital Era

If we are to analyze from the contra narration championed by the NGOs, who are essentially representatives of the people, then the biggest violation of human rights was the violation of the right to access Internet for information and the rights to express opinions freely. Various stakeholders hailing from Elsam, YLBHI, and AJI Indonesia also express their sentiments on how the loss suffered by the people, starting from how the civilians who are not involved with the demonstrations/riots being unable to access public facilities which uses the Internet such as ATMs[7] to the journalists whose advert deals are canceled due to their inability to publish news.[8] It is also surmised that the economic loss due to the Internet Shutdown in Papua and West Papua totaled up to 7 billion rupiahs and this also did not account for the immaterial loss such as the feeling of anxiousness and worry the Papuans experience due to their inability to contact their loved ones.[9]

[7] Elsam's direct translation of the statement is: "If I am not mistaken, some reports says that BPJS (Indonesia's National Social Security equivalent) and hospitals cannot give healthcare because the Internet is dead. They also cannot access ATMs. So it feels like 'well, ok, it's such a riot right now, just turn it (the internet) off'. It feels like that…"

[8] AJI Indonesia's direct translation of the statement is: "…And if we can compare with what happened in May (another internet shutdown case in Jakarta), the slow (internet) causes non-video material to still go through, but the total blockage in Papua renders everything useless, not just video. You can read this in the Judgement files, but our friends in Cendrawasih Pos, JUBI, but especially Cendrawasih Pos (local news outlets in Papua), that when the Internet dies, they cannot send news from outside regions to Jayapura, which is the center of all news outlets. Practically, this causes Cendrawasih Pos unable to publish for two or three days since there aren't news from the regions. How will they send it, because it's impossible to deliver news (from reporter) with bikes or cars, so impossible. So the effect is rather direct, the losses are more real in the Papua case and this is the reason why I believe that it became a trigger that cannot be ignored…"

[9] AJI Indonesia's direct translation of the statement is: "…I think there's research done

This is extremely concerning especially because Indonesia, like other countries in the era of information technology, is heading towards a more digitalized nation with the many programs proposed to optimally utilize technology. With said goals and changes in mind, then it becomes vital by Indonesia as a whole to understand and protect the people's digital rights, especially in the aspect of Internet access itself.

The existence of cyberspace as a space where the government, policy, and the policy environment (including the society as a whole creates a more transparent space than never before, this also enables the possibility of people's direct participation in policymaking. Information, which used to be closed-off and tightly controlled by one party, are now open and can be criticized by virtually everyone. But looking at how cyber power are distributed (where the state holds most of the power) through the case of Internet Shutdown at Papua and West Papua back in 2019, it is obvious that there is a glaring concern that Indonesia is heading to a digitally authoritarian regime. This concern will be addressed in the next section.

3.4 Indonesia in the Paradox of Democratic Country in a Digital Authoritarianism Regime

Indonesia is a democratic country. This is stated in Pancasila as the state's ideology and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia which serves as the main constitution of Indonesia. But Indonesia is not yet free from the shadows of authoritarian regime. But it wasn't the coercion approach used by the current government which sparked the authoritarian ghosts of President Soeharto to resurface, rather it was how the current government methodically works and frames participant of demonstrations as rioters or pawns of anti-government organizations which reminded everyone of the repressive tactic and propagandas used by Soeharto's regime to suppress political tension [27].

In the context of Internet Shutdown, the repressive tactics and propaganda are done by the state by the reason of 'security situation' and 'riot prevention'. According to Digital Rights Situation Report 2019, the government has enacted the Internet Shutdown thrice, in May 22nd until 24th right after the general election to prevent widespread conflict all over Indonesia, in August 21st at Papua and West Papua to hasten the process of solving security-related situation, and in September 23rd until 20th to prevent widespread riots and hoaxes. Outside of these statements are the reason why these conflicts happened in the first place. In May, it was due to some people's disappointment of the loss of one president and vice president candidate which triggered those people's need to demonstrate and said demonstrations eventually lead to conflict between the police and civilians [28]. Whereas the August and September one was due to the anger Papuans felt towards the racist attacks suffered by Papuan students in Surabaya.

If we are to analyze further, then Internet Shutdown is a reaction towards the people's dissatisfaction towards particular sociopolitical situations which warrants them to demonstrate and ask for justice and it is a common a thing in Indonesia for demonstrations to pose security risks as previously mentioned by SAFENet [29]. Yet instead of facilitating said demonstration, the government enacted Internet Shutdown to slow or halt the flow of information entirely. Afterwards, the government uses the security narrative to justify their actions and control the narrations, and this placed Indonesian

which says that the losses from the (internet) shutdown incident reaches 7 billion rupiah, yeah, since internet is also about business. And that's the visible economic losses. How do we measure the losses which the civilians felt? For example, people who did not know the situation. How do we calculate the psychological losses of a person who wants to know news on their family who is in the conflict area, not knowing whether or not they are safe? Such psychological conditions are immaterial."

government as an 'authoritarian regime' proposed by Williamson and Malik [26].

Returning to the first statement of this section, Indonesia is a democratic country, yet as it stands, Indonesia is a digitally authoritarian country. SAFENet's representative and I discussed that this paradox is often found in large democratic countries such as India, Pakistan, and Turkey. Like Indonesia, these countries held general elections to elect their public officers, and said public officers are open to criticized in cyberspace, thus they have to occupy these digital spaces for the next 5 years. Realizing that the Internet can be weaponized to challenge their position, they compartmentalize the Internet to those who are for and against them and worked to make sure that those who are against weren't seen. We also discussed why this paradox is much more prevalent in democratic countries rather than authoritarian countries, and we found that most authoritarian countries already have complete control over their own Internet, thus rendering concerns over freedom of expression over the Internet invalid; whereas the democratic countries felt threatened over said freedom and prone to available means to assert control. When a country elected their people's representatives through democratic means, said representatives' power are easily threatened by political strives in various regions. The existence of cyberspace enables everyone to see information freely becomes threatening because it is nearly impossible to control said information to maintain the illusion that 'everything is okay'.

Digital authoritarianism emphasizes on how authoritarian government relies on technology not only to control but also to repress, manipulate, censor, and facilitating the elites' ability to keep and expand their political power [17]. Khalil also mentions that one form of digital authoritarianism is to do disinformation campaign to manipulate the people, along with penalizing and censoring opinions which rebelled against the regime in online media channels by policing them as 'fake news'. Then what does it say about Internet Shutdown, which is an effort to eradicate 'fake news' before they even came to existence?

I argue that my earlier assumption that Indonesia, to some extent, is under a digitally authoritarian regime, is true. Adding on to this, there is the fact that since 2016, the conviction rate of ITE Law has reached 96.8% or as much as 744 cases and out of those 744 cases, 88% of them ended with imprisonment. This was horrifying because in 2013, there was only 25 cases and those numbers shot up to more than 700 in less than 7 years [30].

Indonesia's government bodies are made with democratic principles in mind. But this research finds that the Internet Shutdown policy itself was decided in hurry by the MoCI, which is democratic body, by the request of security apparatus since the MoCI has no power to go against the wishes of security bodies. But this finding becomes even more complex when paired with other finds that the MoCI itself also held the same belief that security approach is the best approach to resolve what happened in Papua in August-September 2019. Hence, I concluded that as long as the belief that security approach is the best approach persists, then all Internet Shutdown policies taken under said approach will make Indonesian government a part of digitally authoritarian government.

The paradox in which Indonesia claims itself as democratic-Pancasila country along with the reality that Indonesia is under a digital authoritarian regime is an ironic yet interesting discussion to be had. I hope that in the future, there will be another, deeper, study on how this paradox influences Indonesian society and other public policies concerning people's digital rights.

4. CONCLUSION

The dynamics between people, state, and cyber power happened a few points of findings such as the usage of security approach as the main narration to justify Internet Shutdown at Papuan soil which sparked the argument that the Indonesian government used national security narrative as a tool to repress the Papuans and deepened the scar of prior human rights violation which makes the dark history between Indonesia and the Papuans. The belief that Papuans

have to be approached using security approach creates tendencies to act militaristically for the sake of 'keeping the union of the Republic of Indonesia' which in reality is harmful for the Papuans. When the government used national security narrative as justification for their duty to protect public order without detailing how the situation at hand warrants security approach, this creates a gap which caused the people to think that the national security approach is just a big nonsense and how it becomes a form of the government's repression towards the Papuans' rights to access information and express their opinion.

The polemic surrounding Internet Shutdown policy at Papua and West Papua in 2019 also gives interesting examples of how elements to a policy's system in Indonesia interact with the existence of Internet as a new resource. This paper's findings shows that cyber power in Indonesia is dominantly held by the state, whereas the people only held soft cyber power. With the state's control over ISP companies, they are enabled to misuse their power over Internet infrastructures in physical and virtual level while simultaneously pressuring the people, who only utilized soft cyber power to express their opinion and criticization over the people's loss caused by Internet Shutdown, which is fundamentally a violation of human rights.

The state's dominance over cyber power in Indonesia also implies on a paradoxical situation where Indonesia, as a democratic state, is under a digital authoritarian regime. This concerned the people, who felt the shrinking of the civic space, especially with the existence of ITE Law which are often misused to repress (or even criminalize) opinions which criticized the regime. The existence of Internet Shutdown is an extremely interesting thing because not only the government is able to repress opinions which are thought to go against the regime, but they are also enabled to stop any information which had the same purpose instantly and unilaterally.

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