



Increasing the Role of Non-state Actors in Collaborative Governance

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Abstract. This research aims to identify the role of NGOs, which should ideally perform at collaboration stages, determine supporting factors to make NGOs perform well in collaboration, and discover a strategy to deal with the dynamics of collaboration. The research was conducted as a case study with a qualitative approach, belonging to exploratory research. The research was carried out in Pekalongan City on collaborative governance in tobacco control policy implementation. The results unveiled that the NGO was relatively weak in playing its role in exchanging resources, designing collaborative process, institutionalizing clear rules, and creating strategies to maintain sustainable collaboration. This study offers several suggestions to cover the weaknesses of the NGO to perform an optimal role in collaborative governance.

Keywords: Collaborative Governance · NGOs · tobacco control policy

1 Introduction

Non-state actors in collaborative governance studies, which in this study are represented by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), are often the ones to blame when the output of collaboration does not achieve maximum results. The government is often the superior party in front of NGOs in collaboration. This imbalance in roles or contributions between the government and NGOs is the starting point for research on optimizing the role of NGOs in collaborative governance. The balance of roles between the government and NGOs is an absolute condition for successful collaboration. As a representation of the community, NGOs have a significant function in criticizing government policies or providing input related to policy implementation. (Berman, 2010); (Lecy & Van Slyke, 2013); (Portney & Cuttler, 2010). Therefore, the collaboration between local governments and NGOs is crucial to addressing social issues (Bryson et al., 2006b).

Several studies on the role of non-state actors/NGOs in collaborative governance have been carried out. However, only some provided comprehensive, detailed and in-depth results (Cho & Gillespie, 2006); (Gazley & Brudney, 2007); (Pozil, 2015); (Johnson & Prakash, 2007). Some of these studies examined collaboration between various types of government (strong government and weak government) and various types of non-state

actors (major actors, change actors, and weak actors) (Yang, 2017). Unfortunately, they did not detail the role of non-state actors in each stage of collaboration.

NGOs in collaboration are vital because if they cannot carry out their roles properly at every stage of collaboration, the output will not be maximized, or collaboration will be dominated by the government and only produce a low scale/level of collaboration. Such conditions should be avoided as some research discovered that collaboration between local governments and NGOs has provided a positive social change to the community (Mendel & Brudney, 2012); (Tsui et al., 2012); (GREILING, D., & HALACHMI, 2010); (Bradford, 2016); (Weymouth et al., 2015) for example in the fields of health, education, or environmental management. Such collaborative governance is expected to become a new paradigm (Eran, 2002). However, in contrast to some research on collaborative governance between local governments and NGOs disclosing positive results, several others discovered negative collaboration results. Negative results were obtained when the local government could finally intervene in NGOs because the program funds came from the government, which would eventually force NGOs to no longer be idealistic and only obey the interests of the government alone (Smith et al., 2016); (Witesman & Fernandez, 2013). Moreover, each actor who did not ideally carry out the role would lead to failure (Bang & Kim, 2016).

To analyze the NGOs' role optimization, this study investigated the collaboration in implementing tobacco control policies in Pekalongan City, Central Java. The Pekalongan City Government has regulations for tobacco control in the city, Regional Regulation No. 19 of 2012 concerning Non-Smoking Areas. The Pekalongan City Government has collaborated with the Pekalongan Community Alliance Caring for Cigarette Smoke (AMPPAR) to implement the regulation. The collaboration began in 2013, but over time, collaboration regressed; even in 2019, the Mayor of Pekalongan repealed the Mayor Regulation on Banning Cigarette Advertising/Promotion/Sponsorship. Accordingly, it results in the degradation of the built collaboration and the unattainable output. Hence, a study of NGOs' ideal role in collaboration must be carried out to prevent negative outputs in collaborative governance.

2 Literature Review

The study of governance has been widely discussed by experts, starting from the concept of good governance, which emphasizes the principle of good governance, network governance, which discusses networking in governance (Provan, Keith & Kenis, Patrick, 2007), sound governance (Farazmand, 2012), and partnership governance, which attaches importance to cooperation in the long term (Munro et al., 2008), new public governance (Osborne, 2010), which criticizes the concept of NPM, adaptive governance (Eakin et al., 2011), as well as an explanation of the theory and practice of governance implementation by Bevir in (Newman, 2012), and collaborative governance (Chris Ansell & Gash, 2008b). Cullen's thoughts cited in (Zaenuri, 2016) on the need for a government transition due to the high dynamics leading to the cooperation or collaboration of three governance actors are considered the initial momentum for the birth of collaborative governance. Then, it is reinforced by Lasker and Weiss (Lasker et al., 2001), providing arguments regarding the benefits of collaboration. Lasker mentioned that collaboration would make the decisions more comprehensive and transformative because

it involves other governance actors. However, the implementation of collaboration will encounter obstacles, especially regarding how to build communication between actors (Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002) in (Hudson et al., 2013).

Previous perspectives often used as a reference to discuss collaborative governance examine the factors determining the success or failure of collaborative governance and focus more on the study of networks, network structures, institutional factors, power and trust, mix frameworks. These perspectives have not touched on discussing the risks that arise in collaboration and how to properly address the risks of collaboration from an institutional point of view. Therefore, another perspective is needed to close the gap in the weakness of perspective. Risk is an inevitable part of collaboration in addition to the emergence of problems (Carr et al., 2017), (Hansen et al., 2020), (Terman et al., 2020), (Vangen & Huxham, 2003). Thus, studies on realistic institutions, especially NGOs, are necessary to minimize collaboration risk. Institutionalism has become an important part of collaboration because the framework of the institution would be a reference in taking decisions (Chris Ansell & Gash, 2018), (Baird et al., 2019), (Lahat, 2020). In addition to the institutional framework, good and appropriate institutional design is a demand to create more collaboration and is expected to last longer (Christopher Ansell et al., 2017), (Batory & Svensson, 2020), (Bell & Scott, 2020), (Berardo et al., 2020), (Cain et al., 2020), (S. Kim, 2016), (Bryson et al., 2020).

Another study of institutionalism in collaborative governance highlights organizational variables as an essential part of the collaboration process. Thoughts from (Hotte et al., 2019), (K. Kim et al., 2020), (Latusek & Vlaar, 2018), (Meehan et al., 2016), (Park et al., 2019), (Steele et al., 2010), (Krause et al., 2021), and (Swann, 2017) contribute to building collaboration with the right organizational characters, organizational efficiency to strengthen collaboration, organizational competence, good communication, and organizational adaptation in collaboration. These reasons justify that studying NGOs as crucial organizations in collaboration is necessary.

3 Research Methods

This study utilized a case study with a qualitative approach, belonging to exploratory research. Data were gathered through two methods. Initially, interviews were conducted with the stakeholders, encompassing the Pekalongan City Government represented by the Health Office, Satpol PP and the AMPPAR as an NGO invited to collaborate by the local government. Interviews were employed to obtain information about the role of each stakeholder in the collaboration stage and determine the factors influencing the collaboration and the dynamics in collaboration. Subsequently, secondary documents were utilized to collect information regarding the collaboration activities and identify the rules of the game.

Purposive sampling was applied, arguing that the informants sought were clear. Meanwhile, regarding data analysis, Cresswell argued that in qualitative research, several procedures must be carried out: managing data, reading data, describing data, classifying data, and interpreting data. In this study, these steps were also taken to acquire the reliability and validity of the data.

4 Discussion

To identify the role of the AMPPAR in all stages of collaboration with the Pekalongan City Government, it is necessary to determine the stages of collaboration used. Following the thoughts of several scientists: (Morse & Stephens, 2008); (Chris Ansell & Gash, 2008); (Bryson et al., 2006a); and (Chrislip, 2002), the first stage of collaboration is brainstorming, covering analyzing the importance of collaboration, identifying actors, analyzing resources, and analyzing potential collaboration constraints.

The second stage is an initial collaboration, consisting of managing issues, building networks, and designing the collaboration process. The third stage is thought maturation, comprising making clear rules, identifying mutual benefits, and establishing consensus. The fourth stage is the implementation of collaboration, covering setting strategies to achieve goals, maintain sustainability, divide tasks, and implement collaboration activities, monitoring and evaluation.

In the first stage, brainstorming, the collaboration between the Pekalongan City Government and the AMPPAR could be explained by analyzing the importance of collaboration. Based on the interview results, the Pekalongan City Health Office, the leading sector in implementing the No Smoking Area (KTR) and the AMPPAR, have shared a common vision to oversee the regulation.

The AMPPAR's vision to realize Pekalongan City clean from cigarette smoke has been in synergy with the substance of tobacco control in the KTR Regional Regulation. However, an important note at this stage is that the AMPPAR was established to respond to the Pekalongan City KTR Regional Regulation. It means that the AMPPAR was not born before the KTR Regulation, coupled with the information that the AMPPAR was established on the initiative of the Mayor of Pekalongan. This condition has provided an unbalanced position between the local government and NGOs. Due to their limitations, the local government felt the need to collaborate with civil society elements to implement the KTR. However, the representation of civil society was invited to implement collaborative governance in an organization indirectly formed under the local government initiatives. This condition has opened up opportunities for local government intervention to the AMPPAR more easily, considering that the AMPPAR formation has made the organization quite marginal in front of the local government.

Although the two stakeholders have shared a common vision to collaborate to realize each vision, the position of the AMPPAR, from the beginning, has been quite marginal in front of the local government. Accordingly, it became a large hole, making it difficult for the "collaboration ship" to dock to reach the final destination.

In the subsequent activity, the identification of collaborating actors, the information revealed that the AMPPAR has been an alliance of many elements: students, activists, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), the community, and the media, which then united to form an organization with a vision, mission and management. Meanwhile, from the Pekalongan City Health Office, the non-communicable disease prevention section is a unit given the authority and responsibility to oversee the KTR. In this activity, no problems were detected because the collaborating actors were extremely clear about their existence.

In exchanging resources, problems arose due to resource inequality between NGOs and the local government. The only potential resource owned by the AMPPAR was the

social capital of human resources because it appeared to respond to the KTR Regional Regulation, not an NGO established for a long time with institutional resources. On the one hand, with all its advantages, the local government has resources, both human resources, facilities and infrastructure, and finances much higher than the AMPPAR.

This resource inequality is a loophole that can hamper collaboration because NGOs will practically be highly dependent on local governments, and potential NGOs will be suppressed easily by local governments. Concerning the next activity, analyzing potential obstacles, at the beginning of the collaboration, according to information from the Health Office and the AMPPAR, coordination and equalization of visions have been frequently carried out, resulting in a well-run collaboration. Coordination was carried out monthly, and activities were evaluated every three months. At the beginning of the collaboration in 2013, activities often carried out were socialization of KTR to the community, monitoring places where smoking was prohibited, affirmation of advertising bans and cigarette sponsorship. At the beginning of this collaboration, no significant obstacles were discovered because the two stakeholders shared one vision, and there was government funds support for implementing the KTR Regional Regulation.


The second stage encompassed several activities. It began with managing issues. A strategy was employed to create a grand meeting attended by all stakeholders and the community. In the meeting, the Mayor of Pekalongan at that time, Achmad Alf Arslan Djunaid, publicly declared himself to quit smoking. This strategy for managing the issue is remarkable because there is an example of the main character, a role model.

In addition to the exemplary strategy, some of the steps taken to manage the issue of tobacco control were road shows of socialization to many elements of society and campaigns on the roads and in public places. The management of the issue from the beginning has gone well, at least until Mayor Achmad Alf Arslan Djunaid was still in office because, in 2017, he passed away and was replaced by Saelany Mahfud. This event has become one of the beginnings of the turning point in the collaboration retreat in Pekalongan City.

In networking, the AMPPAR network was relatively good because it consisted of many elements of society. Moreover, not many problems were discovered in this activity. The Pekalongan City Government at that time was also a member of the alliance of Cities in ASEAN, which owned and implemented regulations on tobacco control. However, problems arose in designing the collaboration process. The information gained from the stakeholders unveiled that collaboration was not followed by binding rulemaking for the collaborating actors. It will be difficult to control the behavior of the collaborating actors if they have other interests counterproductive to the vision of collaboration.

Despite having some weaknesses, several activities were carried out in the third stage, the maturation of thoughts for collaboration. Initially, rulemaking was conducted by the collaborating actors. Unfortunately, it did not run well because the previous activity (designing the collaboration process) failed to perform well. The next activity, building a consensus, was carried out properly under the coordination of the Mayor of Pekalongan at that time, Achmad Alf Arslan, because of the strong commitment to controlling tobacco. Nevertheless, after the change of leadership, there was a setback because the Mayor lifted the Guardian on the ban on advertising.


Table 1. Violations of no-smoking areas in Pekalongan



In the fourth stage, the implementation of collaboration, some strategies were employed to achieve the goals. Coordination was carried out monthly. Unfortunately, maintaining the continuity of collaboration failed because when the Mayor lifted the Guardian of the ban on cigarette advertising, no action was boldly carried out by the AMPPAR and the Health Department to prevent it. It is understandable for the Health Service to do so due to its position as the subordinate to the Mayor, making it powerless to provide criticism on actions counterproductive to the vision of collaboration.

The AMPPAR also did not provide criticism because, from the beginning of this organization’s emergence, its position was marginal in front of the local government, and it did not have adequate resources. It was coupled with the absence of binding rules in collaboration to prevent one from committing actions counterproductive to the vision of the collaboration being built. The collaboration did not run well since the Mayor’s leadership moved in 2017. In the same year, the Health Department did not dare to openly carry out anti-tobacco campaign activities because the Mayor had lifted the ban on cigarette advertising and sponsorship. Data from the Health Department and a meeting with the Mayor of Pekalongan revealed that the reason for lifting the ban on cigarette advertising was because in 2018, during the anniversary of Pekalongan City, the funds needed to carry out activities were felt to be lacking as well as the need for sponsorship for youth activities coupled with the need for street lighting with neon boxes. This condition caused the collaboration not to run well, as evidenced by the many violations described in the following Table 1. The analysis using NVivo 12 plus disclosed that 22% of violations related to the no-smoking areas occurred in workplaces, 44% in schools and 33% in public places. These data demonstrate problems in the implementation of collaboration in Pekalongan City.

Following the results of the NVivo 12 plus analysis, the obstacles to implementing collaboration in Pekalongan were caused by a lack of resources of 20%, environmental conditions of 48% and bureaucracy of 32%, as depicted in the following Table 2. The lack of resources was caused by the AMPPAR having few resources. Environmental conditions did not support the implementation of KTR, and bureaucracy could not carry out

Table 2. Obstacle Factors of Collaboration

	Karakteristik Birokrasi	Kondisi lingkungan	Sumberdaya
■ Persentase	32%	48%	20%

Table 3. Ideal Role of NGOs in Collaboration

No	Stages	Ideal Prerequisites for NGOs
1	Brainstorm	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Vision in line with the local government - Independent position - Having enough resources - Able to map potential collaboration constraints
2	Initial collaboration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Able to manage issues well - Having an extensive network - Able to design a collaboration process including clear rules of the game
3	Maturation of thought	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Able to maintain the behavior of actors -Managing and obtaining mutual benefits -Able to maintain consensus and commitment
4	Implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Having a strategy to achieve goals and the continuity of good collaboration -Able to carry out tasks and collaboration activities well -Able to carry out <i>monev</i> activities

its roles properly. In short, the collaboration between the Pekalongan City Government and the AMPPAR has encountered problems.

Finally, the cigarette industry re-entered Pekalongan City in 2018 by sponsoring its anniversary and youth activities. Roads in the city of Pekalongan were decorated with neon boxes of cigarette advertisements. The activity was counterproductive to the initial vision of collaboration built to control tobacco products. Learning from the collaboration built in Pekalongan City, the ideality of the role of NGOs in the collaboration can be seen in the following Table 3.

5 Conclusion and Recommendations

The AMPPAR could not perform its role ideally due to several weaknesses. Its position and insufficient resources could be addressed if it had the initiative to establish clear collaboration rules to protect its position in collaboration. Unfortunately, it was not conducted. The AMPPAR did not utilize external networks to prevent lifting the Cigarette Ban Regulation. Accordingly, it caused inappropriate collaboration in Pekalongan City. Several ideal roles have been provided in the analysis. Hence, NGOs could perform well in each collaboration stage.

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