



The Implementation of Indonesia's Free and Active Foreign Policy Over the Russia-Ukraine War During Indonesia's G20 Presidency

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Abstract. Indonesia's G20 presidency will provide a great platform for the country to demonstrate its influence as a major regional actor to the international community. As the G20 Summit in Bali takes place during the Russia-Ukraine war, it will be a critical measure for Indonesia's foreign policy integrity and consistency. The participation of Russia in the G20 group has generated a split among G20 members that consider Russia to be an enemy in the Ukraine war. This isn't the first time it's happened in the near future; after the 2014 annexation of Ukraine, Russia has also been excluded from the G8 members. However, in the bigger Group of Twenty, which includes emerging countries such as China, India, and Saudi Arabia, the scenario will be different, as these countries tend to be neutral toward the western superpower bloc. The G20 Summit theme is "Recover Together, Recover Stronger" and the focus of the gathering in Bali will be on the economy, particularly economic cooperation during the recovery from Covid-19. Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs further stated that as host, the country would be impartial and would not take decisions based on pressure from other nations. Strong western superpowers, led by the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, objected the clause, threatening a boycott in the absence of those countries' leaders. Indonesia, which has previously served as an ASEAN mediator in the 1991 war between Cambodia and Vietnam, has the opportunity to boost its position and image in the G20 presidency by "punching above its weight". Indonesia holds a unique position in the dynamic global political constellation as a country with a free and active foreign policy. This is stated in Article 3 of Law Number 37 Year 1999 on Foreign Relations, which states that "free and active" is a foreign policy that is based on Indonesia's national interests to support the realization of a world order based on independence, eternal peace, and social justice, rather than a neutral policy. In arranging who will participate and what agenda will be the emphasis of the Summit, the G20 event in Bali will be a contestation of Indonesia's free and active foreign policy. The direction of the Indonesian government's policy in hosting the G20 Summit in the next months, as well as the obligations of its presidency, will serve as a model for its successors and the most significant task the G20 group will address in the coming years.

Keywords: G20 · Indonesia · Free and Active · Foreign Policy · Russia-Ukraine War

1 Introduction

The failure of the G7 to find solutions to the world's economic issues at the time led to the foundation of the G20. The G20 was founded in 1999 at the initiative of the G7 members to bring wealthy and developing countries together to address challenges, particularly those affecting Asia, Russia, and Latin America. The G20's mission is to achieve robust, sustainable, balanced, and inclusive global growth. Indonesia is seen as an emerging country with vast economic size and potential in the Asian area, and its participation in the G20 symbolizes a group of developing countries, the Southeast Asian region, and the Islamic world.

Following the COVID-19 pandemic, 2022 is a key year for the global growth of countries. Coinciding with the existence of the G20 forum, where Indonesia is presently taking over the G20 leadership from Italy, this is an excellent time for the Indonesian government to urge collaborative efforts for global economic recovery named "Recover Together, Recover Stronger." Indonesia's decision to host the G20 summit on Bali has the potential to strengthen the country's image as a beautiful, friendly, and open country to people of all backgrounds. With this capacity, Indonesia has the opportunity to become a partner and friend to countries affected by the pandemic.

Indonesia's G20 presidency is facing a greater difficulty as a result of the world's political and economic condition, such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which has resulted in the world's dynamic political position. In response to the confrontation between the two countries, Western allies have imposed economic sanctions and embargoes in an attempt to isolate Russia from the global economy and society. China, a Russian ally, on the other side, elected to abstain by not exercising its veto power as a member of the UN Permanent Security Council.

In contrast, Indonesia has a unique position as a country with a free and active foreign policy. This is stated in Article 3 of Law No. 37/1999 on Foreign Relations, which states that "free and active" is a foreign policy that is based on Indonesia's national interests to support the realization of a world order based on independence, eternal peace, and social justice, rather than a neutral policy. The national objectives outlined in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution, one of which is to establish a world order based on independence, eternal peace, and social justice.

As one of 141 nations that agreed to the UN resolution demanding Russia to stop the attack on Ukraine, this does not imply that Indonesia favors Western countries, but rather that Indonesia will continue to press for the use of military action to be ended because ending the war is crucial to ending violence. The use of Indonesia's G20 leadership, supported by a free and active foreign policy, demonstrates Indonesia's independence in articulating foreign policy among other countries. Furthermore, Indonesia's political attitude supports international efforts to maintain world peace based on the principle of independence, which is not only politically independent, that is, not subject to colonial domination by other countries, but is also independent in making decisions when pressured by other countries.

The Indonesian presidency of the G20 will provide an excellent chance for Indonesia to demonstrate its capabilities as an important regional player to the world community. The G20 Summit in Bali takes place during the Russia-Ukraine crisis, and it will be a critical measure for Indonesia's foreign policy integrity and consistency. Russia's

position in the G20 group splits members who label Russia an enemy in the war with Ukraine. This is not the first time this has happened in the near future; following the 2014 annexation of Ukraine, the western giants expelled Russia from the G8 group conference. The scenario will be different in the bigger G20 group, which includes developing countries such as China, India, and Saudi Arabia, which are generally neutral toward the western superpower bloc.

The Indonesian government underlined that the agenda for the G20 Summit in Bali was centered on economic issues, particularly economic cooperation during the Covid-19 recovery period, with the theme “Recover Together, Recover Stronger.” Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs further stated that as the host, the country would be impartial and would not make judgments based on flows initiated by other countries. However, this was met with opposition from the western superpowers, led by the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, as well as the threat of a boycott in the absence of the heads of state of these countries.

Indonesia, which has previously served as an ASEAN mediator in the 1991 conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam, now has the opportunity to bolster its position and image in order to “punch above its weight” in the G20 presidency. This research explains how Indonesia’s free and active foreign policy is being implemented over the Russia-Ukraine war during Indonesia’s G20 presidency. In arranging who will participate and what agenda will be the emphasis of the Summit, the G20 event in Bali will be a contestation of Indonesia’s free and active foreign policy. The direction of the Indonesian government’s policy in conducting the G20 Summit and the obligations of its presidency will be a benchmark for its successors and the largest challenge the G20 group will ever face in the near future.

2 Research Method

This study utilized a descriptive qualitative research method to explain the implementation of Indonesia’s free and active foreign policy over the Russia-Ukraine war during Indonesia’s G20 presidency. In this study, a comprehensive understanding of the issue being studied is explored, specifically the relevance of Indonesia’s free and active in today’s dynamic world. The method used in this article is to go into some depth regarding a number of qualitative research topics in the subject of international relations and some related areas.

The first step in this study research is data collection. The data was obtained in order to produce the results that were desired for the objectives and range of this study. In order to improve the paper, secondary data are employed in this study. The published data are gathered from a variety of sources, including: i) various research reports produced by research scholars, universities, etc.; ii) books by various authors, handbooks, magazines, and newspapers; iii) articles in online media; iv) journals; v) official websites; and vi) historical documents and other published sources. To support this library material, statistical information about Indonesia’s historical leadership in various international forums was obtained. Data were collected from various sources, processed, and then examined. In addition, in order to keep researchers from becoming entangled in discussions that are overly narrative in style, this study makes an effort to explain causal, conditional, contextual, and fundamental aspects of the research object.

3 Indonesia's Free and Active Foreign Policy

Since its independence and the formation of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945, through its years of existence, Indonesia's foreign policy at certain points of time can be seen to be very synonymous to the character of which president was in power during the different periods. Hence, leaving Indonesia's foreign policy to have different tendencies at different periods of time. Despite so, the baseline of Indonesia's foreign policy has been consistent through a single doctrine, which defines and guides Indonesia's foreign policy. Since its adoption in 1948, the free and active doctrine has been the foundation of Indonesia's foreign policy ever since, as its objective is for Indonesia to carry out an active non-bloc foreign policy (Anwar, 1994). The free and active doctrine is legally binding under Indonesian Law, as stated in Article 3 of Law No. 37/1999 on Foreign Relations. When Indonesia adopted the doctrine in 1948, the world was at the midst of the Cold War and was divided into two opposing blocs, in which one was led by the Soviet Union and the other by the United States. Through the free and active foreign policy doctrine, it was Indonesia's response to the situation at that time, in which Indonesia chooses not to side with any of the two blocs and go its own independent way (Anwar, 1994). Indonesia chooses to be outside of the two giant blocs, and also doesn't intend to be in a third bloc that opposes the existing two blocs, but rather commit on the basis for international solidarity, meaning that Indonesia doesn't position itself either as a neutral impartial party in the international community (Hatta, 1953).

The meaning of "free" in Indonesia's foreign policy doctrine can be seen as having no participation in any military alliances, which includes defence arrangements, which defence arrangements was a very prominent trend during the period of the Cold War, and on the broader sense it is seen as a resistance, with nationalism as the basis, to any form of bondage and obligation with an external party which might detain Indonesia to autonomously carry out the variety of policies for the country (Anwar, 1994). Indonesia's first vice-president Mohammad Hatta, introduced the backbone of the newly independent nation foreign policy, the free and active doctrine.

As Mohammad Hatta elaborated in his journal article in *Foreign Affairs* (Hatta, 1953), with the trend of the collapse of colonization in which it led to many new countries gaining independence, the world is now drawn into a new era in which it witnesses a Cold War of two superpowers which divides the world into two blocs, the Eastern and Western blocs, lead respectively by the Soviet Union and the United States. In such situation, Indonesia chooses to not stand on either sides of the two blocs or does it stand neutral amongst the blocs, but rather independent (free) as Indonesia wishes to follow its own path. The country also aims to be active, taking part energetically in preserving peace and ease conflicts that might be caused either bloc. The shape of Indonesia's foreign policy would be a projection of the nation's national philosophy, *Pancasila* (Five Postulates), which is based on the belief of divine omnipotence, humanism, nationalism, democracy, and social justice. Indonesia believes that through its national philosophy it clearly shows that the nation aims to strengthen the ideals of peace and international solidarity as based on the Charter of the United Nations, and through the independent (free) and active foreign policy doctrine it expresses such aims.

During the transition period the President Sukarno's Old Order regime to President Suharto's New Order regime, Indonesia's foreign policy was not really getting attention from the global world as it was viewed as passive and defensive and Indonesia is said to be at lack of interest. After the mid-1980s, Indonesia decided to play a more active role by reintroducing its free and active foreign policy doctrine, and reaffirming the core philosophy of the doctrine. The reintroduction of the free and active doctrine is not revival of Indonesia's past self, which was a history of a confrontational foreign policy, expansionist behavior, and the big brother syndrome, but rather a redemption of its past guilt (Sukma, 1995). This is followed by efforts of Indonesia which encompass strengthening its image as a leading developing country through the Non-Aligned Movement, playing a more active role regional-wise with greater engagement in the Southeast Asia and Asia Pacific region, and playing a more active role in settling regional disputes (Sukma, 1995). Post-Cold War, and domestically post-Suharto's regime into an era of post-reformation, these ideals has served as the backbone of Indonesia's implementation of the free and active doctrine in its foreign policy, to remain relevant in the changing trends of international relations.

4 Indonesia's Presidency in Various International Forums

When ASEAN was established in 1967, Indonesia was one of the five founding members of the organization. Due to President Sukarno's confrontational foreign policy towards Malaysia, before ASEAN was formed Indonesia was not liked very much by its neighbours in Southeast Asia. This was not helped with the "Crush Malaysia" slogan that was popular during Sukarno's era as a form of an attack to Malaysia through propaganda during his regime (Anwar, Reinvention in Indonesia's Foreign Policy Strategy, 2013). The perception towards Indonesia only started to change when President Suharto came into power as he implemented a more peaceful foreign policy approach in Southeast Asia and committed to maintain peace in the region by not abusing its power. In implementing his New Order government, President Suharto's foreign policy sought for cooperation rather than the use of force and putting an end to Sukarno's foreign policy legacy in Southeast Asia (Reid, 2012). Even though ASEAN holds its main principle of non-interference and self-determination, Indonesia was still able to establish two new principles that aligned with their interest in peace and security in the region and countering external threats. The Asian Zone for Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971 and the TAC in 1976. Indonesia was also a prominent frontrunner in the Cambodia-Vietnam conflict that ended with the formation of the UN Transnational Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1991. Indonesia through its foreign minister, Ali Alatas, conducted several meetings and served as a mediator for the two parties at conflict between 1979 and 1992, which includes Ho- Chi Minh City Understanding in 1987, and Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM) I and II held in 1988–1989. Indonesia brought the issue to the UN and arranged a framework of peace to resolve the conflict. The outcome of the conflict didn't only expand the membership of ASEAN, but also promoted ASEAN's prominence in the region and cemented Indonesia's position as a major power in Southeast Asia that has strong influence (Sudrajat, et al., 2020). However, things started to get shaky for Indonesia and ASEAN when the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and 1998 started to hit

the region. This led to a domestic issue as Indonesia experienced a reformation due to the student protest demanding for reform of democracy in Indonesia which led to the eventual downfall of President Suharto.

When President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono took office in 2004, Indonesia was at a much better place as it started to recover from the Asian Financial Crisis. With Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, Indonesia started once more to call out for peace and cooperation in the region. A Geographic Proximity in the priorities of his foreign policy was formed as in a three-layer inner circle it went with ASEAN being the main, then East Asia, and lastly Asia Pacific (Anwar, *Reinvention in Indonesia's Foreign Policy Strategy*, 2013). President Yudhoyono under the basis of the free and active doctrine combined it with his Million Friends and Zero Enemy concept in the international community. ASEAN as the cornerstone of Indonesia's foreign policy through Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa's Dynamic Equilibrium, a middle power regional mechanism with no dominant or excluded entity (Poling, 2013). During the administration of President Yudhoyono, Indonesia managed to play an active role in managing the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia over the Preah Vihear Temple in 2011 (Table 1).

Indonesia free and active foreign policy doctrine is no coincidence as it is embedded in the opening Indonesia's 1945 Constitution, after achieving independence through struggle it is a responsibility as a sovereign nation to push for a world order based on freedom, perpetual peace, and social justice. Hence, such a responsibility can't be achieved without an active participation in the international community. Indonesia upholds the respect for each country's sovereignty but it can't remain passive in the ongoing dynamics of its international surrounding. From both the cases in which Indonesia acted as a mediator for neighboring countries, Indonesia remained consistent in pushing its free and active doctrine even in conflict resolution. In both cases, Indonesia used the same approach in which it respects both sides of the conflict, hears out information from both parties, and involves international organizations to engage after tensions deescalate. Indonesia use of dual-track diplomacy proves to be effective in the Vietnam-Cambodia conflict as it sparked dialogues between both parties and open up the concerns in which rooted the issue (Frederick & Worden, 1993).

In the Cambodia-Thai border dispute, despite the issue not being resolved under Indonesia's chairmanship of ASEAN, the bigger objective was still achieved as peace negotiations continued after the chairmanship. Indonesia's effort deescalated tensions between Thailand and Cambodia and bridged communication between the two sides which was very much lacking from the beginning of the conflict. This proves a proactive organization can be achieved in peace settlements while still upholding the principles of non-interference as long as there is an assertive and committed efforts from member states to push the organization in being involved. With Indonesia's track record, it's clear that Indonesia diplomatic capacity is not limited and rather is more of a question of consistency in pushing its diplomatic limitations to uphold its core ideals of the free and active doctrine.

Indonesia should continue its efforts though the four overarching role conceptions carried on from former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration, which are: regional leader, a voice for developing countries, an advocate of democracy and liberalism, and bridge-builder (Santikajaya, 2016). Through Indonesia's history, the first

two points are the nation's self-identification from its past whilst the last two are expectations from the international community that could act as a reflection to build upon in the future (Karim, 2022).

Table 1. The Role of Indonesia in Mediating Past International Conflicts

Conflict	Mediation Process
Third Indochina War between Vietnam and Cambodia (1978–1991)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Indonesia Foreign Minister at that time, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, was the chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee when Vietnam invaded Cambodia • Under Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, Indonesia was at the driving seat of ASEAN in the midst of the ongoing conflict • ASEAN pushed for the matters to be placed on the agenda of the UN Security Council • A conflict of interest in ASEAN between member states occurred regarding the conflict whilst upholding the non-interference principle held the organization back to make firm actions • Indonesia saw the prolonged conflict not suiting for the interest of the region and took matters through a series of negotiations from 1982 to 1991 through Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and his successor, Ali Alatas • Through ASEAN, a breakthrough was made in 1987 when Mochtar Kusumaatmadja met with Vietnamese foreign minister, Nguyen Co Thach, in which an informal dialogue with the party on the other side of the conflict was agreed upon • This led to the first Jakarta Informal Meeting in 1988, in which both parties set the basis in settling the conflict and discussing the core problems • Eventually it was followed up with a second Jakarta Informal Meeting in 1989, where Vietnam accepted international control mechanism in Cambodia • The efforts spurred on international attention and led to the Paris International Conference in 1990 which channeled the UN Security Council and set the framework for a peace agreement to deploy the UN Transnational Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)

(continued)

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Conflict	Mediation Process
Cambodia-Thai border dispute (2008–2011)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia has been ongoing when Indonesia took chairmanship of ASEAN in 2011 • Indonesia saw the opportunity to set the cornerstone for ASEAN Centrality in settling regional conflicts • Indonesia under foreign minister at that time, Marty Natalegawa, pushed for peaceful means in settling the dispute with dialogue and negotiations • Foreign minister Marty Natalegawa as ASEAN's representative visited both Thailand and Cambodia respectively in 2011 • Indonesia brought matters to the UN Security Council with both parties in hope of enlightenment for the issue • This is eventually followed with a ceasefire from both parties at the disputed region • Foreign minister Marty Natalegawa initiated an informal meeting in Jakarta hoping to build upon a bilateral meeting between both parties • A bilateral dialogue was able to be achieved with the Thailand-Cambodia Joint Commission on the Demarcation for Land Boundary (JBC) in Bogor • An informal meeting followed in Jakarta in which both parties agreed to send an Indonesia Observer Team to the disputed border • With the matter still ongoing, the issue was brought up at the ASEAN Summit in 2011, which did not find a solution • Another informal meeting was again initiated in Jakarta in which foreign minister Marty Natalegawa a package solution, which was eventually backed by the International Court of Justice • The issue continued after Indonesia's chairmanship but Indonesia's effort in such a short period of time gave path for further concrete arrangements between both parties in settling the dispute

After the 2014 elections, President Yudhoyono was replaced by President Joko Widodo. With them coming from different backgrounds, both have different approaches

in tackling their foreign policies. President Yudhoyono, a formal army General, uses his lengthy list of military experience and leadership in formulating his foreign policy, meanwhile President Joko Widodo, whom comes from a much humbler background as he climbed to reach the top spot as Indonesia's number one man, realizes his limited experience in diplomacy hence, he relies on the views and inputs of his advisors (Conelly, 2014). Under a new foreign minister, Retno Marsudi, she highlighted the outline of President Joko Widodo's foreign policy priorities includes maintaining Indonesia's sovereignty, the protection of Indonesian citizens abroad, and economic diplomacy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015).

In 2020, Indonesia ended its tenure as president of the UNSC through its membership as a non-permanent member. A much active role was played by Indonesia within the council compared to its previous tenure back in 2007. As president of the council, Indonesia pushed forward for ideals to ensure inclusivity amongst developing nations in order for there to be a common ground where all countries can be heard. Indonesia puts strong emphasis peacekeeping by setting an example through soft diplomacy and encourages the role of women in peacekeeping process (The Jakarta Post, 2020). As UNSC non-permanent member, Indonesia tries to bridge the gap between international and regional organisations to work together in tackling global issues, with the concept of inclusive peace as Indonesia doesn't only represents itself in international forums but also its region and developing countries (Sitamala, 2020). Indonesia will always try to put itself as a forefront of Southeast Asia in the international arena and connect the aspirations between the developing and developed countries as Indonesia's position lies as the prominent middle power.

5 Indonesia's Momentum in the G20 Presidency During Russia-Ukraine War

Indonesia will hold presidency of the G20 for the very first time. This includes hosting of the G20 Summit that will be held in November 2022. Indonesia's presidency comes at challenging times, as the world is slowly recovering from the Covid-19 global pandemic and at the brink of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War. Indonesia now holds the responsibility as G20 president to be the in the steering wheel of the group that consists of the world's top 19 economies and EU to bridge for a common interest amongst members in order to tackle the ongoing global issues. Within the G20 itself, there are nations who takes a strong stance in condemning the actions taken by Russia in its ongoing conflict with Ukraine. This leads to uncertainty surrounding the summit as there are nations who are not favourable in the attendance of Russia. However, the Indonesian government through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has made it clear that the nations stance regarding the ongoing conflict will not be interfered by other nations and remain impartial. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has consistently stated that they will invite all member states of the G20 without exceptions. President Jokowi ensures that his country will remain impartial in the conflict and the greater good in global politics is still the main discussion for the G20 Summit and not geopolitics (Channel News Asia, 2022). Indonesia has also gone as far as to invite Ukraine in the G20 Summit in the midst of the pressure faced

by Indonesia, which indeed invites a lot of questions rather than providing answers the uncertainty (The Diplomat, 2022).

Hence, what does this all mean for Indonesia's presidency in the G20? With the tagline of "Recovering Together, Recovering Stronger", the Indonesian government wants to ensure that the momentum of the G20 summit does that get carried away by ongoing geopolitical issues leaving much of other ongoing global issues to be left undiscussed in the Summit in November 2022. Though the Russia-Ukraine War does add challenges for the G20, there are other dimensions of problems that must be faced collectively. It is the responsibility of the Indonesian government through the sherpa of the summit to ensure a fruitful discussion on November 2022. This challenge can cement Indonesia's influence not just as a regional power but also a global. The direction of the agenda in November greatly relies on Indonesia hand to lead a summit that can produce outcomes that serves for the greater good of the world. Issues that range from trade engagement between members especially in the era of post-Covid19 recovery and renewable energy, are all on the table for discussion (The Diplomat, The Challenges Facing Indonesia's G20 Presidency, 2022).

6 The Implementation of Indonesia's Free and Active Foreign Policy Over Russia-Ukraine War

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has been going on for more months and shows no signs of ending soon. Since Russia invaded Ukraine, the war has had a global impact. While the West has been united in its support for Ukraine (to varying degrees), many others have looked hesitant to blame Russia for its conduct. In addition to imposing unilateral economic penalties against Russia and mass expulsions of Russian diplomats, Western nations have assisted Ukraine with armaments. The United States and its allies, including Australia and members of the European Union, have suggested that Russia be excluded from the summit because of its invasion of Ukraine, putting Indonesia, the country hosting this year's G20 summit, into the attention (Karman, 2022). If President Jokowi wants the G20 summit to be his legacy, he must accept that discussing post-pandemic (and post-war) economic recovery is impossible during wartime, especially if the perpetrator of aggression is in attendance.

Despite the challenging situation and complex problem, President Jokowi, as G20 President and a member of the UN Secretary General's Global Crisis Response Group, has decided to seek to make contributions rather than remain silent. Although Ukraine is not a member of the G20, the group's chairs have the authority to invite guest countries. In an effort to ease tension, Indonesia has invited Ukraine to the meeting even though it is not a G20 member. Some countries have warned to boycott if Putin attends. Jokowi has invited Putin, a member of G20, and Zelensky as observers to the G20 Summit, which is scheduled to be held in Bali in November 2022, despite pressure from some Western countries to exclude Putin. In the other hand, non-Western country like China is trying to lobby Indonesia to take the conflict off the agenda at the group's summit in Bali since it should stick to economic matters (Shi Jiangtao, 2022). Nevertheless, it is also unwise for Indonesia to follow China's lead and remove the conflict off the G20 agenda in favor of a primarily economic agenda. The Russia-Ukraine war, according to some economic

experts in Indonesia, would probably be a topic that couldn't be avoided (Karman, 2022). This is so because the war has made the global economic crisis worse, particularly by causing changes in the price of commodities and oil. Additionally, more than half of the G20 members have firmly allied themselves with one of the fighting sides. Instead, the G20 meeting can serve as a catalyst for Indonesia to demonstrate its concrete support to the peace process by acting as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine.

Indonesia has an important voice on the global stage as one of the world's largest developing countries and a friendly ally of both Russia and Ukraine (Lamb & Widianto, 2022). After the G7 meeting in Germany, President Jokowi will travel to Kyiv to meet Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy and to Moscow for talks with Russian President, Vladimir Putin. With his upcoming visits to Ukraine and Russia, Indonesia's President of the G20, Jokowi, is demonstrating that his country is leading the way in promoting peace, putting an end to the humanitarian catastrophe in Ukraine, and eliminating a potential global food crisis. The visits are meant to examine in depth what the two warring nations can agree on to achieve a cease-fire. Indonesia's initiative to contribute to fostering world peace, as required by the 1945 Constitution, is reflected in the visits. As a result, the President is conducting the visits while maintaining the country's free and active foreign policy.

By acting as a practical and strategic peace mediator between Russia and Ukraine while holding the G20 presidency, Indonesia can build on its previous success. By acting as a trustworthy intermediary, Indonesia can demonstrate its ability to uphold global peace and enhance its reputation. Instead of viewing the Russia-Ukraine conflict as a threat that could jeopardize Indonesia's intentions to hold the G20 chair, the country needs to see the opportunity it presents to promote peace (The Conversation, 2022).

7 Conclusion

The free and active foreign policy initiated by the proclaimer Mohammad Hatta and implemented by Indonesia after its independence is still important today. The present situation of the world is experiencing significant changes. Today, Indonesia is no longer "rowing between two corals," but rather "rowing among countless corals." Nonetheless, Indonesia's free and active foreign policy is still relevant in today's world. Many theories are no longer valid, and the world order has shifted, but a free and active foreign policy remains important in advancing national interests. It also contributes to the realization of global peace. In the face of diverse changes in the world, free and active politics may adapt and survive, respond to current difficulties, and serve as a theoretical bridge between academics and real-world realities. The notion of a free and active foreign policy is not going away anytime soon. However, by prioritizing a win-win solution approach, it will continue to contribute and be a part of the answer to the nations' challenges.

As we all know, Indonesia is a co-founder and active member of the Non-Associated Movement (NAM), a forum of 120 countries that are neither aligned with nor opposed to any major power bloc. With the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, the chances of the G20 being a 'regular' economic gathering are impossible. In this situation, Indonesia does not support Russia or Ukraine. President Jokowi emphasized that the country is just supporting efforts to promote international peace and put an end to the humanitarian

tragedy, and that it is neither giving weaponry assistance to Ukraine nor backing Russia's special military operation in Ukraine. Indonesia has chosen to stay out of open wars with major nations and has refused to support one side while provoking the other based on its principle and commitment.

In order to succeed, as the host of G20, Indonesia plays an important role in organizing the participants of the summit. This would provide the nation a diplomatic advantage, the chance to mediate disputes and demonstrate a more greater global role. President Jokowi is attempting to demonstrate that Indonesia can pay attention to western concerns while avoiding directly backing Russia by hosting Ukraine and Russia. The pressure is put back on the other parties—the west, Russia, and Ukraine—when both countries are invited.

Future research needs to examine that Indonesia should be more confident in being more assertive in issues or conflict outside its own region to reflect its diplomatic capacity. Indonesia efforts through its free and active doctrine in mediating conflict should be a guideline for middle power nations with similar capacity in order to break the over reliance towards major powers in resolving conflict, hence further studies could be done to show how such an approach can relate to different scenarios.

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