Internalism Versus Externalism

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Abstract. In the debate of internalism versus externalism, a bare majority of philosophers characterize themselves as externalists. This paper illustrates the debate and I present a variety of thought experiments and cases in terms of the philosophy of language and epistemology.

Keywords: Internalism · Externalism · Epistemology · the Philosophy of Language · the Philosophy of Mind · Gettier Problem · Mental Content · Supervene · Virtue Epistemology · Extended Mind

1 Introduction

Semantic externalism has become increasingly popular in the Philosophy of language since the 1970s, when Burge, Davidson, Kripke, and Putnam first published their works.

According to the externalist school of thinking in philosophy of mind, problems with a person's mental state don't necessarily get solved by their physical condition. In this view, a person's entire current mental activity are simply referred to as their "mind." In this way, the body establishes a person's biological limits, which correlate to the skin in species like humans. Of fact, the brain is also a part of the body and is typically thought of as the main influence on a person's mental existence.

Externalism takes two main forms. Content externalism is externalism that emphasises mental content—the content of mental states. It claims that at least some mental states' contents aren't entirely determined by things that happen inside the bounds of the person experiencing them. This implies that while mental states with content are frequently individuated by that content, an individual's mental states are not wholly determined by events taking place inside their biological boundaries. The extended mind thesis, also known as vehicle externalism, is externalism with relation to the forms of mental content. According to the extended mind hypothesis, the computational or physical carriers of mental content are not always exhausted or determined.

Generally speaking, in the philosophy of language, internalism is the idea that linguistic or mental content supervenes on internal features of individuals - it is content shared by doppelgangers or internal duplicates - and externalism is the idea that linguistic or mental content fails to supervenes on internal features of individuals - it is content that differs between those doppelgangers or internal duplicates situated in relevantly different external contexts (Kallestrup, 2013) [1].

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What are the key characteristics of epistemic justification and knowledge? When asked this subject, internalists and externalists respond in various ways and have distinct perspectives.

Internalism and externalism have quite different perspectives on justification in epistemology. For internalism, either a thinker's mental states completely decide whether she has reason to believe (mentalism) or believing what is readily accessible to the thinker through reflection completely determines what she has reason to believe (accessibilism). Regarding externalism, it only rejects internalism with regard to justification.

The majority of the time, a person's beliefs are supported by facts, sound logic, or sometimes even personal experiences. The same is true of reasonable beliefs that could be uninformed. These ideas are backed up by facts, convincing arguments, firsthand knowledge, or even the method by which they were formed.

I shall discuss virtue epistemology and other theories in this post that relate to the arguments between internalism and externalism in terms of semantics and epistemology.

2 Semantic Internalism Versus Semantic Externalism

In the philosophy of language, internalism refers to propositional content that does supervene on internal features (intrinsic physical, experimental, and psychological properties) or is solely determined by such internal features (Kallestrup, 2013) [1]. Externalism is mental content that fails to supervene on internal features. In this area, there are three significant thought experiments.

First of all, semantic externalism is clarified by Putnam's Twin Earth thought experiment. In this experiment, we'll assume that there is a planet called Twin Earth somewhere in the cosmos. It is exactly like the Earth that we dwell on here. One of the peculiarities of Twin Earth is that the substance known as "water" is not H2O but rather another substance with an extremely long and intricate chemical formula. Putnam refers to this chemical equation as XYZ and assumes that at room temperature and pressure, XYZ is identical to water. For example, it tastes like water, quenches thirst like water, contains XYZ instead of water in Twin Earth's oceans and lakes, showers XYZ instead of water on Twin Earth, and so on.

The hypothesis of externalism (meanings merely ain't in the head) is supported by this experiment. The content of a subject's thoughts is determined by or individuated by facts outside of the subject; alternatively, the content of a subject's thoughts does not supervene on her internal states; or that a subject having certain thoughts assumes the existence or specific nature of things outside the subject. H2O and XYZ have quite different chemical structures, although they do have some traditional qualities in common, such alleviating thirst. I guess I have a twin who is "similar" to my molecule over on Twin Earth. If you believe in dualism, then assume that my twin possesses the same verbalised thoughts, sensory information, attitudes, etc. as I do. Though he "means" H2O when he says "XYZ" and I "mean" XYZ when I say "H2O," it is ludicrous to believe that our psychological states are quite dissimilar (Putnam, 1975) [2].

Nonetheless, the following are some areas where this thought experiment is limited (Kallestrup, 2013) [1]. It only applies to the natural variety, to start. Second, it merely notes the broadness of propositional content. Thirdly, it only takes into account reliance

on the outside physical world. Water is also a crucial component of the human body. It would be difficult to assert Twin Earth is the same as Earth if the chemical composition of the water on these two worlds differed.

Second, in the Swampman thought experiment, a dead tree in a swamp is purportedly struck by lightning while I am nearby (Kallestrup, 2013) [1]. The tree turns out to be a tangible representation of me once my body is broken down into its constituent parts by pure happenstance (consisting of different molecules). The Swampman, my replica, moves just like I did. In keeping with its nature, it emerges from the swamp, runs into my pals, seems to recognise them, and appears to greet them in English. It moves into my home and appears to be a radical interpretation writer. Nobody can distinguish between the two of us. The difference is that because it never learned anything in the first place, my replica is unable to identify my pals or anything else. According to Davidson's concept of triangulation, determining the content of attitudes entails determining the objects of those attitudes, which in the simplest situations are the same as the causes of those very same attitudes. In order to further explain the three-way conceptual interdependence that he claims exists between knowledge of oneself, knowledge of others, and knowledge of the world, Davidson extends this theory. The results of thought experiments in the Twin-Earth approach demonstrate that a person's thoughts cannot override her inherent characteristics. Recent philosophers have also argued that Twin-Earth-style thought experiments result in conditions that are metaphysically necessary for the presence of particular conceptions. Additionally, Swampman is in a way impossible. Of course, it's conceivable that by accident, Davidson's physical replica was made. Although highly improbable, this is undoubtedly a metaphysical possibility, and no actual rules of nature appear to forbid it. Metaphysically speaking, it is impossible for nature to make Davidson's physical replica, let alone a human person. The essences of humans and other species are genuine sorts that have more to do with their evolutionary pasts than with their microphysical make-up. Importantly, evolutionary biology can a posteriori find these historical essences.

Contrasted with water, these two substances are of different natural types, and in order to differentiate between H2O and XYZ, one must use chemical structures. The Swampman thought experiment's replica can receive, produce, and distinguish between information other than only natural kinds, in contrast to the Twin Earth thought experiment's copy's inability to do so.

When referring to things we have never directly interacted with, we can use precise descriptions (for instance, "the first baby to be born next century"). I always have definite metalinguistic descriptions of the thing my linguistic society calls "water" ready. The Twin Earth experiment uses metaphysical conditions to identify the many water constituents in plants. There are causal interactions between the replica and other persons in the Swampman thought experiment. The semantics vary as a result of changes in the outside environment. The elements are undeniably present in both studies. Inter-subjective influences, however, are also present in other tests.

Thirdly, Burge's arthritic defence involves a three-step logic puzzle (the first step: the actual case, the second step: the counterfactual case, and the third step: an interpretation of the counterfactual case). Alf holds many correct ideas in the first stage (an actual circumstance), and he also agrees that "I have arthritis in my thighs," but since arthritis is

merely a joint condition, he mistakenly thinks that he has arthritis in his thighs. The circumstance is identical to the real situation in the second stage (a counterfactual situation), with the exception that "arthritis" also refers to extra-articular rheumatoid conditions, such as the one in Alf's thighs. Understanding language conventions is being aware of their objective reality. This group could be classified as realists. The opposing view maintains that there is no known foundation for language rules and that they are, as far as we can tell, not objective but rather constructed. The appropriate speaker or linguistic community stipulates their veracity. A subclass of social systems known as society includes social systems such a linguistic group, village residents, or western society. Alf cannot think that he has arthritis in his thighs in the third step's counterfactual scenario, and no de dicto belief ascription including the word "arthritis" is true of him. Instead, he genuinely thinks that the phrase "I have arthritis in my thighs" means that he has double cases of the condition. Therefore, A connection of comparative similarity between worlds is the key concept in possible world semantics for counterfactuals (Lewis, 1973) [3]. If one universe more closely matches the real world than the other, then that world is said to be closer to reality. The linguistic community and linguistic convention are the main points of this argument. In contrast to the previous two experiments, in this one settings' objective and metaphysical elements can vary but external aspects can stay the same. When just local language customs are altered and not the medical definition of arthritis, the mind and content are also affected.

The ability of the replica to identify Davidson's friends, mental attitudes, and mental representations, as well as the addition of mental verbs with propositional substance, are all examples of metaphysical situations where semantics is relative. For instance, Peter looks at the birds (Sterelny, 2004) [4] illustrates the meaning of the word "sees" since the experiencer "Peter" just notices the birds. The observer makes no attempt to view the birds. While in the case below, the verb "looks at" conveys the idea that the experiencer did make an effort to notice the birds. Metaphysical contexts, causal relationships, and community are all included in the category of external variables that affect an individual.

Propositional K (S knows p) is widely accepted in epistemology. The explanation for knowing and its evidentiary foundation, which, unlike guessing and fortunately true B, also contains dependable process, epistemic good tastes, and progress, can be traced from semantic externalism to epistemic externalism. Dealing with semantic issues is crucial since our opinions on semantics do not entirely determine how we answer epistemic problems. We could arrange our inquiries differently, for instance, by first determining if epistemic externalism (or internalism) is true, and then analysing what that means for semantic externalism (or internalism).

3 Epistemic Internalism Versus Epistemic Externalism and Other Theories

In the first place, epistemic internalism is a thesis regarding the foundation of either knowledge or a justifiable belief. According to the first type of internalism (Carter et al., 2014) [5] a person either has or is able to obtain the foundation for knowledge or a justifiable belief. The crucial notion is that the subject can be or may already be aware

of this foundation. Externalists, on the other hand, contest the idea that one can always have access to the sources of one's knowledge and valid beliefs.

The second type of internalism, which only applies to justified belief but may also be extended to knowledge, is more focused on the precise foundations of a justified belief than on access (Carter et al., 2014)6. The idea of mentalism states that an epistemologist's particular mental state is what ultimately supports any view. In this sense, externalism is the belief that justifications come from sources other than mental states.

The third type of internalism focuses on the idea of justification rather than the availability or characteristics of justifiers. The deontological concept of justification, which is the third type of internalism, holds that the concept of epistemic justification should be examined in terms of upholding one's intellectual obligations or responsibilities (Carter et al., 2014) [5]. The idea that this concept is to be studied in terms other than unique obligations or responsibilities is known as externalism for the concept of epistemic justification.

There is little basis for any of the three varieties of epistemic internalism against externalism. Epistemic goodness and assessment are more expansive. As with the Gettier dilemma, even when justification is met, it still cannot produce the best outcomes. Knowledge therefore has an epistemological edge over justified true belief. Some justification-granting aspects of a belief are allowed to exist outside of the subject's awareness and outside the scope of the subject's reflective access in an externalist account of justification. In spite of its ability to logically justify why justified ideas are likely to be true, externalism misses the significance of the sceptical challenge since it ignores the subject's point of view. The most prevalent type of internalism, access internalism, asserts that the variables that bestow justification must be reflectively accessible to the subject so that he can determine whether his ideas are justified. The pre-theoretic intuition that having good reasons for a belief is necessary for that belief to be justified is captured by internalism. Additionally, it addresses the issue of scepticism head-on and demonstrates how internalism is the root of it.

In terms of the Gettier problem's justification, correct belief without knowledge is justified (Lycan, 2006) [6]. Epistemic chance and danger are involved in the justification. For instance, even when a stopped clock is unable to keep time, it can nonetheless display the accurate time twice daily. In this instance, knowledge does not exist, and the clock's ability to display the correct time twice daily is a result of epistemic chance. Another scenario, using "fake" barns, is fundamentally one of information acquired through perception: learning that a barn is on a hill just by observing that a barn is on a hill. It does contain reflecting or high-order K but not animal K in the stopped clock scenario, and it does have animal K but not reflective K in the case of the phoney barns. This strategy eliminates the possibility that all the intuitions reported by epistemologists, regarding both knowledge and achievement, are explained by a complexity that has been neglected in the fake barn situations. The following methodological formula will therefore be followed in this study in order to avoid excluding this possibility: if at all possible, our theory about knowing should accept all common intuitions prompted by hypothetical barn scenarios.

A collection of recent methods for studying knowledge from a philosophical perspective known as virtue epistemology plays a significant part in the idea of intellectual

virtue. Reflective knowledge turns out to be a meta-competence for epistemic agents, enabling them to deal with philosophical scepticism (Sosa, 1980) [7]. That is, the ability or tendency to appropriately assess the situation. Depending on how we define this competency, the evaluation may or may not be able to distinguish between evaluative outcomes, as our potential reading of the canvass shows. Our functional knowledge and hypotheses are typically embedded using Boolean networks, partial differential equations, stochastic differential equations, ordinary differential equations, and other similar frameworks. The examination of more complicated models has been possible thanks to developments in numerical and simulation methodology. The traits or abilities of an excellent thinker or learner are known as intellectual virtues. As a result, virtue epistemology's direct emphasis on the knowing subject or agent is a key component. An AAA explanation of performance normativity includes three components: accuracy or success, which refers to achieving the attempt's goal, adroitness, and aptness, which refers to when accuracy exhibits adroitness. In addition, virtue epistemology supports epistemic externalism (Sosa, 2007) [8] and does not transcend the argument between these two schools of thought. This is thus because the AAA is an external, objective factor.

4 Conclusion

Other aspects that have an impact on this discussion include active externalism, connected systems, and the expanded mind.

Regarding the extended mind, it proposes that the data and functions found in extraneous items like laptops and computers can be regarded as a person's mind in the same way that the functions found in the brain itself (Clark et al., 1998) [9].

The human body is a coupled system that can be viewed as a cognitive system in and of itself because it interacts in two directions with an external object. The system's components all perform active causal roles and work together to regulate behaviour in a manner similar to how cognition often operates. Just as we may have anticipated if we had eliminated a portion of the system's brain, the system's behavioural competence will decline if the external component is removed.

When we use a computer, a pen and paper, or even language, which Clark and Chalmers believe to be the earliest technology, cognitive processes are said to expand into the outside world, according to active externalism. When we utilise things and states of affairs, like diaries and address books, as external memory stores that we can reference as needs dictate, Clark and Chalmers claim that cognitive states extend into the world (Clark et al, 1998) [9]. If we can tell by looking at Bill that he has wavy hair and brown eyes, we don't need to remember that.

Free-floating mental content does not exist. Everywhere, there is a content vehicle—something that holds mental content. Beliefs, wishes, hopes, fears, and other mental emotions constitute ideal content delivery vehicles. Similarly, mental exercises (believing, desiring, hoping, fearing, etc.). In general, the concept of extended mind holds that not all mental states or behaviours originate completely within the person who believes, desires, hopes, fears, and so forth. Instead, some mental states or behaviours contain components (such as structures or processes) that are not inherent to the biological makeup

of the individuals who exhibit them. Therefore, there is no such thing as free-floating mental information. There is a content vehicle—something that stores mental content—everywhere. The best content delivery vehicles are mental emotions including beliefs, wants, hopes, fears, and others. The same goes for mental activities (believing, desiring, hoping, fearing, etc.). According to the theory of the extended mind, not all mental states or behaviours are entirely derived from the individual who believes, desires, hopes, fears, and so forth.

In conclusion, the argument over internalism vs. externalism is crucial to the study of philosophy. The many internalisms, however, have faced greater difficulties and scepticism within the various fields of philosophy, whereas externalism has been simpler to uphold.

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