The Identity Project of Young Candidates in The Indonesia 2019 Election

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Abstract. The consequence of the network society emergence in the 2019 simultaneous election is the power that the digital media must provide the issues consumed. This paper aims to explain the identity project carried out by young candidates (age 21–30) against the legitimate identity in the Indonesian political network. There will also be an explanation of the digital media network role in the success or failure of the identity project by these young candidates. The concept of identity project is a part of Manuel Castells' theory of network society, and in the network society, there is always an elite group that controls the space of flows and timeless time network. The identity project is an attempt to fight the elite in appearing and be accepted by the network. The methodology used is the analysis of the new identity that young people and their parties are trying to emerge by performing a meta-analysis of statistical data from the voter preferences and digital media network data and its political interests. As a result, the young candidates who are trying to present the issues that are contrary to legitimate identities, such as the rejection of polygamy and the Regional Regulation based on the Gospels and Sharia Regional Regulation, mostly fail. Digital media mostly exposes young candidates with controversial ideas rather than young candidates affiliated with a party or figures who do not oppose legitimate identities. The phenomenon in the 2019 election brings the critical reflection that the identity resistance in democracy appears to be more evident in the information age.

Keywords: identity project · young candidates · 2019 election · network society

1 Introduction

The democracy in the information age faces new challenges due to the accurate or misleading information that spreads easily amid society. The society attitude towards the future government representatives is determined by these varieties of information. This paper intends to explain (1) the political transformation in the network society, (2) identity politics in the Indonesian network society, (3) the strategy of young candidates and their affiliated parties to carry out identity projects in the 2019 simultaneous elections, (4) the current state of the Indonesian network society, and (5) the critical analysis of the democratic dilemma in the information age.

2   Theoretical Framework

2.1   Politics in the Network Society

Manuel Castells gives his explanation of the normative sociology, which is a meta-disciplinary about network society, to describe the spirit of the information age where everything is processed technologically and through interconnectivity [1]. The network society according to Castells in The Rise of Network Society is the result of the restructured capitalism that is influenced by the radical changes in information technology with the presence of the Internet, which finally enables globalization. Informationalism is the main logic of the network society because of its changes from a traditional mass media to the horizontal Internet-based communications. This condition also leads to a variety of new communication patterns and cultural transformations that appoint virtuality as an essential dimension of reality.

The pattern of communication and cultural transformation that occurs in the network society is a form of individual use of information technology that forms the new economic, political, social, and cultural fields. In the field of informational economics, success is measured when the economic actors can master and utilize information until the production is organized through global networks. A network is a group of nodes that are interconnected to each other in one network, as well as to other broader networks [2]. This network does not have a dominant center, there are only nodes that are interconnected through various relationships, the main purpose of which is to strengthen the networks. Networking is the center itself, not a certain node that is particular. The mechanisms within the network are inclusion and exclusion, where the nodes that do not strengthen the network will be excluded and the nodes that strengthen the network will get a place in the network [2].

The activities in the networks that connect one node to another and the inter-node communication pattern that are interactive and horizontal take place in the assumptions of space and time that are distinctive from the pattern of a public relation without networking. A space in a network society is an inter-relationship, not a space of place, whether it is a capital flow, an organizational flow, or information flow [2]. The network society is no longer dependent and limited through space of place, globalization, and sustainable locality in the space of flows. This space of flow, according to Castells, historically determines the space of place. The dominant organizational logic separates itself from cultural identity through a medium in the form of information technology power. The power of this flow constitutes a new morphology of society through the flow of power [3].

A timeless time is a time that operates when it is given a context as the network society operates. There is a sequential order of social practice in that context. The availability of the information technology and transformation enabling the network society to transcend time. Timeless time is not the only type of time, but in timeless time, the power in a network society operates until it can coexist with the biological time. Time will always be a social form and the society is constructed by different social forms that produce a variety of integrated social organizations in the period of historical transitions, for example, the transition from the state-based industrial society to the global network society [4].

The timeless space of flow and time supports the existence of a virtuality culture that later will develop into real virtuality. Virtual culture is formed through human activities, which assume that everything virtual is real because of its significant benefits are. All boundaries of space and time can be surpassed by the virtual ones, the efficiency is also a tangible result of this virtual culture.

According to Manuel Castells, the technological revolution and globalization have indeed brought an increase in productivity on the technology networks and abundance, but in a political dimension, society is faced with a disintegration between the social control representation and the political representation. Most of the world's population suddenly lose control of their own lives, access to the government, the economy, and the environment. This condition compels the resistance group to fight against the dominance of elites who control the space of flows and timeless time. Therefore, the space of flows and timeless time are also filled by battles to gain control of various flows of capital, power, or information, which time seems to never be measured by ordinary time units. The time unit of the struggle for various flows is only determined by the network where the fight takes place, in some cases of the fight to dominate the flow, as if it never ends since it is continuously discussed in the network.

Historically and geographically abstracted cultural expressions are mediated through the electronic communication networks in which an inter-society interaction originates from various codes and cultural values. All codes and cultural values are massively summarized through digitization and audio-visual hypertext. Information and communication circulate through a comprehensive media system in various forms of difference, so politics is continuously played in the media space as well [4]. Castells' explanation in the base for the politics from various identities that are carried out effectively in the realm of digital media. Political identity, according to Castells must be historically situated in society, including in the context of network society. Identity and subject in the network society must consider the network structure that s in contemporary society that occurs with sociological and philosophical analysis of the network society [2].

2.2 Political Identity in the Indonesian Network Society

The social changes caused by the transformation of technology and economics according to Castells generate fundamental disunity between the abstract identities and the instrumentalism identities, between the identity that has a historical basis and the particular one. Society is divided into two opposing poles between the Net or a large network and the Self as a social group or an individual who is alienated from each other and see strangers as an obstacle. In this process, there is a spread of fragmentation, identity becomes more specific and more difficult to be given to others [4].

In The Power of Identity [3] Castells says that the dominant institutions in the identity formation in the network society has shown its success. The world society according to Castells has proven to be transformed into a monoculturalism which has emerged in the form of religious fundamentalism, especially in Islam and Christianity, ethnic identity. On the other hand, there are movements that reject the global world, such as the Zapatista movement in Mexico and the feminism and homosexual movements. The changes in structure in the network society, according to Castells, operate in a real virtuality culture that prioritizes the logic of elite groups who occupy the timeless time and space of flows.

Network society facilitates the globalization and technological advances to encourage people to seek their identities because various sources of information offer a variety of unknown identifications in pre information society. Therefore, Castells argues that there is always a spread of the spirit of collective identity that challenges globalization and cosmopolitanism [3].

Manuel Castells divides the three types of identities that exist in the network society, where all three are the result of a struggle in the space of flows and timeless time. As Firman Kurniawan [2] noted, the three identities are:

1. Legitimizing identity is the identity introduced by a dominant institution to expand and rationalize the dominance of the dominant institution towards the social actors. The attempt to rationalize domination can be explained by authority, domination, or nationalism. Castells argued that this type of identity would result in civil society. However, Castells explained this identity in Gramsci's understanding of domination. The civil society in Gramsci's explanation was formed from several apparatuses such as associations, churches, parties, cooperatives and other institutions.
2. Resistance identity is the identity raised by actors who are in a position that is not benefited or stigmatized by the dominant logic. They build a wall of resistance and try to maintain fundamental principles that are different from established institutions of society. This identity forms a collective resistance against coercion and domination. However, this identity also has a risk of leading to essentialism because it is usually defined based on history, geography, and biology. Castells exemplified this identity with religious fundamentalism that affirms and prides itself, which resulted in a defensive attitude through the self-exclusion from the network.
3. Project identity is an identity that shows when social actors ignore their cultural background, by building a new identity that redefines their position in society. They seek the transformation of the whole social structure. Castells exemplified it with the feminist movement that challenges patriarchalism and opposes the patriarchal family pattern, the entire structure of production, reproduction, sexuality, and personality associated with patriarchalism.

In the context of Indonesian politics, legitimizing identity is filled with cultural values that are considered valid by the Indonesian people, which are the religiosity and cultural locality. In Burhanuddin Muhtadi's research findings [5] on the Governor Election of DKI Jakarta in 2017, the satisfaction of the performance of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) reached 76% but in the second round of the Governor Election of DKI Jakarta, Ahok lost to its competitor, Anies Baswedan. This condition, according to Burhanuddin Muhtadi, is most likely a form of a Bradley effect, namely when ethnic and religious issues are more important than someone's ability to become a leader. Ahok's speech on the 27th September 2016 regarding Surah Al-Maidah, according to Burhanuddin Muhtadi, was only a trigger to justify the practice of identity politics that had been hidden in Indonesian politics.

In addition to the religious identity, identity politics in Indonesia also tries to maintain legitimized and dominant values, namely the pride in the cultural locality. It can be seen in the results of a survey conducted by Burhanuddin Muhtadi on 800–1000 respondents in several provinces in Indonesia, which are North Sumatra, West Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, Maluku, and Jakarta. These results indicate that ethnic and religious factors

of the governor and deputy governor candidates in these provinces greatly influence the level of electability.

Resistance identity, referring to Castells, is a resistance that tends to lead to identity essentialism. The group with resistant identity aims to fight the dominant paradigm globally and ends it by making their identity exclusive or force their identity on others. In Indonesian politics, the resistance identity can be seen in the religious extremist group. As noted by Burhanuddin Muhtadi [5], Islamic extremists feel subordinated by the Western paradigm and analogize all the understandings from the West as an eclipse that surrounds Islam. The solution offered to religious fundamentalists with such conditions is to migrate from modern Western *jahiliyyah* to the whole teachings of Islam. This shift in perspective into the whole teachings of Islam is not seldom to be carried out with violence whether in the persecution, the application of the label of apostasy and infidels, or other violence that ends up with assassination. All efforts made through violence were rationalized as migration to maintain the Islamic identity. In Indonesia, the group that is resistant to the dominant paradigm of the country is adopted by Darul Islam and Jemaah Islamiyah. These two groups referred to the Republic of Indonesia as *jahiliyyah* since Indonesia is not willing to fully implement Islamic law in its government. The further action on the resistance identity taken by the two extremist Islamic groups is by fighting the country.

Lastly, the identity projects in other political or activism networks, in Indonesia. This activism is carried out by gender movement, labor advocacy, and digital assistant. The advocacy movement for both gender and labor in Indonesia is organized by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). As previously said by Hans Antlöv [6], NGOs in Indonesia have various functions, they are the supervisor of the government performance, serve as formal facilitators, or cooperate with the government in making the legislation and regulations, conduct advocacy and campaigns independently about various public issues. NGOs in Indonesia are trying to push the government to allocate more funds for education, the unfortunate ones, and allocating funds to be more gender sensitive.

The #MeToo movement is an effort initiated by various gender advocacy NGOs to counter the culture of Indonesian people who think that being a victim of sexual abuse is a disgrace that must be covered up [7]. In the subsequent developments, the #MeToo movement became real activism, namely the Women 's March Jakarta [8], the Never Okay Project, and the advocacy for the victims of sexual abuse, such as the #NamaBaikKampus movement initiated by online news portals, Tirto.id, The Jakarta Post, and VICE Indonesia [9]. Not only gender-based advocacy, advocacy for labors also becomes more possible through digital media, as the Syndicate Society did by advocating workers in the creative industry [10]. In addition to gender and labor advocacy, digital media has also become an emancipatory movement carried out by the act of giving help, such as the Kitabisa.com movement that according to Ross Tapsell [11] is a techno-optimistic Indonesian digital media users.

Indonesian space of flows and timeless time are filled by the three identities mentioned above, and each identity competes to win a place in the Indonesian political network. The struggle to have a place in Indonesia's political network is gaining momentum

through digital media. The digital media, as concluded by Tapsell, has shown that the direction of Indonesian movement and politics in a divergent society, consisting of:

1. Political oligarchs that hold the reins of the government because they have legitimate background identities. The legitimized identity is the religiosity and pride in the local culture.
2. Techno-optimism, a movement that uses digital media as an effective medium for spreading messages that criticize legitimate culture in Indonesia. Both advocacy on gender and labor equality that are carried out by NGOs and online news portals also helped the movement.
3. Techno-pessimist, filled with identities which originates from religious fundamentalism. They are resistant to various movements initiated by the government and NGOs because they consider all critical movements and government programs to be a Western effort to weaken their identity.

The convergence of Indonesian politics before the digital era was discovered, especially during the Reformation [6]. However, in the digital era, convergence was more assertive, and the techno-optimists got a more flexible arena to spread the reform through identity projects. In addition to the NGOs, news portals, and the digital auxiliary movement, the unique position is occupied by young candidates who deliberately join the government circles inhabited by oligarchs with dominant identities. As young legislative candidates, together with their supporting parties, they openly opposed the legitimate identity, which is the basis of the political actions of the Indonesian people.

3   Analysis

3.1   Identity Projects of the Young Candidates

According to Anthony Giddens, a self is a constructed entity and not a passively static thing, what someone can do in searching for identity is doing a reflective project. This reflective project is an effort that is continuously carried out by oneself to gain an understanding of their self. Even though a self-identity is not an objective description of someone, identity can be pride [2].

Manuel Castells radically explained that the search for identity is not only a reflective process but also resistance through an identity project, that a project identity is the subject's attempt to define themselves. A subject is the desire to be an individual to gain the whole experience of an individual's life. Individuals need to transform themselves into subjects, and if successful, this subject will be a combination of two things: individuals against the community, and individuals against the market. According to Castells, a subject is not an individual, even though it is produced by individuals. Subjects are collective social actors through which individuals gain a complete meaning in their experience [2].

The emergence of young candidates in the Indonesian political network is a new phenomenon in the 2019 simultaneous elections in and some of the legislative candidates show an identity that was unusual for the dominant identity in Indonesia. Such young candidates are carrying out an identity project effort by redefining themselves as social actors and even ignoring the cultural code that is attached to them. However, not all

young candidates are brave enough to carry out an identity project that challenges the established identity.

In the 2019 elections, there were 878 young candidates (age 21–35) who were vying for the seats as the people's representatives or regions' representatives. The number of young candidates in the 2019 election has doubled up compared to 2014, where there were only 414 candidates. The Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) was the party that has the greatest number of young candidates, which is 171 candidates. The Garuda Party was in second place with 84 candidates. The United Development Party (PPP) had 81 candidates, PKB had 78 candidates, and the National Mandate Party (PAN) had 58 candidates. In addition, Gerindra and Perindo each had 56 candidates and Nasdem Party had 52 candidates. Golkar had 45 young candidates, Hanura Party had 37 candidates, Berkarya Party had 35 candidates, and PDIP had 34 candidates. PKS had 31 young candidates, Democrat Party had 24 candidates, PBB had 21 candidates, and PKPI had 20 candidates. There are four youngest candidates, namely Azmi Zaidan Nashrullah (PKS), Lusiana Duval (Perindo), Nurinzana DG Tanaeng (PPP), and Santi Mulyana (PSI) [12].

Some of the young candidates come from families who have already plunged into politics. Like Ravindra Airlangga, the 28-year-old Golkar Party candidate is the son of the General Chairperson of the Golkar Party Airlangga Hartarto. Perindo candidates, Jessica Herliani Tanoesoedibjo (25 years) and Valencia H Tanoesoedibjo (26 years) are both daughters of Hary Tanoesoedibjo. From the Democratic Party, there was Rizki Aulia Rahman Natakusumah, the son of former People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) Deputy Chairperson Dimyati Natakusumah [12].

3.2 Young Candidates with the Affiliation Towards Legitimized Culture

The dominant parties in Indonesia up until the 2019 simultaneous elections is still dominated by the parties with the direction of Islamic or nationalist ideology. As stated in the report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the level of electability of the parties that have gotten a place in the government is greater than the newcomers' party. Such as PDI Perjuangan, Gerindra, Golkar, PKB, Democrat, PKS, and Nasdem Party, all of them have the electability in which still within the threshold of the General Election Commission's regulation, which is 4%. The electability of new parties and bringing new ideas about the state administration and various phenomena such as those carried out by the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) do not have sufficient levels of electability to get a position in parliament.

The data on the level of party electability in the 2019 simultaneous election indicated that the power flows holder in Indonesian politics had not changed much even from the Reformation era in 1998. As Anies Rasyid Baswedan [13] noted that after Reformation, many organizations claimed Islamic ideology and established Islamic parties. Then, in the 1999 elections most of the parties which had a high level of electability in the 2019 simultaneous elections in 2019 were only Gerindra, Nasdem Party, and Democrat [11].

The young candidates that come from the dominant party also could qualify as legislative members compared to the young candidates from a new party or do not have closeness with party leaders, such as Ravindra Airlangga who was supported by Golkar Party, Jessica Herliani Tanoesoedibjo and Valencia H Tanoesoedibjo who were under the

Perindo Party. Young candidates who made it to the parliament also came from dominant parties, for example Farah Puteri Nahlia from PAN who received 113,263 votes in West Java election area 9, Puteri Anetta Komarudin from Golkar who succeeded to win the votes in West Java 7 election area, Dyah Roro Wsti Way Putri who carried out by Golkar also succeed in representing East Java 10. From the Nasdem Party, the young candidate who was confirmed to qualify for the parliament is Hillary Bigitta Lasut who is the only child of the Regent of the Talaud Islands. The program ideas presented by the young candidates with the affiliation with the dominant parties also did not oppose the legitimate identity. For example, Atikah Shalihat (26 years old), who is carried out by PKS has a program to develop the Islamic economy, even Atikah clearly said that she already has a PKS identity since she was born [14].

Some of the young candidates from the dominant parties and the ones who have a close relationship with power holders or party leaders deny the influence of the close relationship with the power on the party electability. However, according to Burhanuddin Muhtadi, in Indonesian political networks that still consider identity as the main basis for political action, a close relationship with the dominant identity holder is very important. Closeness to the dominant parties and certain public officials can be considered as a sign of these young candidates' quality. The young candidates who take advantage of the closeness with the public officials and the popularity of the party only show that Indonesian political networks can be filled with young generation but with the same cultural code and capital strength as their predecessors.

3.3   PSI that Opposes the Legitimate Identity

The Indonesian Solidarity Party, or PSI, which was founded in 2014, received a lot of media attention in the 2019 simultaneous election. The attention was focused on PSI because the party gave many ideas gave that were incompatible with the identity that was dominant in Indonesian society. PSI criticized the religious paradigm by rejecting Sharia Regional Regulations and Regional Regulations based on The Gospels. In addition, the PSI defended Meliana, a Buddhist, who was on trial for insulting Islam by complaining about the sound of the call to prayer that was too loud. PSI also often campaigned for anti-polygamy [15].

In addition, the PSI paid attention to the voters who had not been targeted by the legislative candidates, such as the diaspora and the migrant workers. PSI announced its commitment to advocate for migrant workers to get legal status, especially for the migrant workers in Sabah. PSI got a lot of votes in several countries for their representation of minorities and most diaspora with minority backgrounds. In Australia, for example in Melbourne and the Sydney, PSI got 39% of the vote, the demographics of the Indonesian diaspora consisted of women, from Chinese ethnic, Christian, and highly educated. PSI also received a 50% vote in Toronto, Canada which according to the International Labor Organization (ILO), there were at least 4.5 million Indonesian migrant workers in 2017 and 70% of whom are women.

Candidates from PSI had no relationship with the holders of power or capital flows. PSI was an anomaly in the presence of young candidates, in addition to the young candidates who wanted to join the political arena because of their closeness to public officials or they came from the parties with high electability. PSI was present in the

Indonesian political arena by relying on their identity as a party for young people and women [16].

PSI increasingly becomes a manifestation of resistance to religious fundamentalism, some of its cadres have gained the most votes in several electoral districts in Jakarta. This condition needs to be considered since the 2017 governor election in Jakarta was filled with the issue of SARA, which was influenced by the existence of digital media [17]. PSI's victory in several regions in Jakarta for the People's Representative Council of Indonesia candidates for the popular names such as Tsamara Amany and Grace Natalie fell because PSI did not reach the party's electability threshold set by the General Elections Commission of Indonesia, which was 4% [18]. Such a phenomenon indicates that the party's attitude towards various matters, such as migrant workers, religious law, and ethnicity, is a sign of the success of its candidates in the Indonesian political arena.

3.4   Digital Media in Indonesia and the Identity Projects of Young Candidates

The replacement of traditional media with Internet-based media using the World Wide Web system (WWW) is an unavoidable consequence of the presence of a network society. This network-based media (web) communicates horizontally and interactively so that there is no barrier between the mass media and all other forms of communication. The combination of online news with interactive blogging and e-mail, and Really Simple Syndication (RSS) has transformed printed media into a component of a different form of communication, which is mass self-communication. This new form of communication comes along with the development of network technology (web), which is the technology that enables the expansion of a social space, which supported by broadband capacity, free download applications, improved computer graphics, and interface technology, including avatars [4].

The horizontal communication network is built on the initiative, interests, and passion of society. In this horizontal communication, society created a forum to share documents, share information, and hold debates. This communication horizon then becomes the basis for the use of social media. Interpenetration occurs between traditional media and network-based communication. Mainstream media also uses blog pages and networks to distribute content and interact with consumers. The mainstream media combines vertical and horizontal communication modes simultaneously. However, that does not mean that the mainstream media takes over content distribution. This means that there is a convergence process created a new media reality where the influence is determined by the struggle of business and political power of media owners to choose their business partners and consumers [4].

In Indonesia, according to Ross Tapsell [11], the digitalization attracts the media, politics, and society into two directions: to the conventional mass media oligopoly businesses that adapt to digital media, and to another direction where there are bottom-up movements of society who want to make changes quickly and meaningfully. Digital media is a prominent place for contestation between media oligarchs alongside strong parties and people who make movements outside the political arena. Converged media oligarchy, which is supported by political affiliation in Indonesia, as said by Tapsell, influences the formation of the uniformity of opinion and even influences the results of the 2014 election. However, Tapsell did not explain it in the digital context that there

were other groups that tried to enter the political oligarchy in Indonesia by bringing new ideas about various cultural codes that had been approved and legitimized by government institutions in Indonesia.

Furthermore, the effect of digital media networks will be analyzed on the success or failure of the identity projects carried out by young candidates in the 2019 simultaneous elections. The analysis will be carried out through three important factors in forming opinions about identity in digital societies, which are: digital media network and its political affiliation, religious fundamentalism, and the spread of false news on digital media.

3.4.1 Indonesia Digital Society

Indonesia, as shown in *Year in Search: Google Insight for Brands 2018* data, has experienced an increase in the usage of Internet access up to 56% in 2017, which previously was only 29% in 2013. The daily Internet usage also increased sharply, which was initially 49% in 2013 and increased to 79% in 2017 [19]. In the latest data, in January 2019, the Indonesian population increased by 3% or around 3 million people and Internet users increased by 13% or around 17 million people in 2018–2019, with the social media users increasing by 15% or around 20 million users, and mobile device users are reduced by 13% or around 83 million people. Even though mobile device users are reduced, mobile users for social media in Indonesia have increased by 8.3% or around 10 million users. Smartphones are the main device used to access the Internet, which is around 60%. Of the total Internet users in Indonesia, which are around 150 million people or 56% of the total population, 53% of them use mobile devices. The sites that are accessed by Internet users in Indonesia are mostly online shopping sites, news portals, and search engines [20].

For social media users in particular, in Indonesia, the top seven social media used in January 2019 are Youtube (88%), WhatsApp (82%), Facebook (81%), Instagram (81%), Line (59%), Twitter (47%), and Facebook Messenger (38%). The age range of social media users in Indonesia is dominated by the productive age, which is the age of 18-2? years with 15% female users and 18% male users and the age of 25–34 with 14% female and 19% male. The social media that experienced the most increase in users in Indonesia was Instagram, which increased by 5.1%, followed by Twitter with 4.2%, while Facebook users did not have any increase.

At the end of 2018, Google also published and provided five important descriptions of the current state of the digital world in Indonesia. Google showed that Indonesia is one of the countries in Southeast Asia which economic system has grown rapidly to 49% in 2015–2018, with the condition of the digital ecosystem as follows [19]:

1. There is a change in the relationship between smartphone users and their devices, being: from mobile and only for mobile. In the last five years, at least 60% of human activity
2. migrated to mobile devices. Economic actors must adapt to these conditions by showing themselves in mobile devices.
3. The Internet network and information flowing in it are no longer can only be experienced by the people in metropolitan cities. Now, the people who live in the cities

outside the metropolitan cities can also show themselves in the digital networks, or non-metros, go online.

4. Indonesia's cultural reality changes as the use of mobile devices increases. Certain stereotypes slowly disappear through the habit of using digital devices. For example, there are no more stereotypes about men who master electronic use, in fact, both men and women, hold the same control in digital transactions.
5. The emergence of new types of consumers who are curious, demanding and impatient which numbers is up to 62% of Indonesian consumers. This new type of consumers will find information about various commodities through search engines before deciding to buy.

The condition of Indonesia's digital ecosystem that is related to such economic growth cannot be separated from other dimensions in the network society, such as the political, media, and cultural dimensions. As Castells said, the Internet is a computer network consisting of various networks. Likewise, electronic hypertext is connected with various global and local media. The Internet that allows the spread of electronic hypertext consists of communication production networks from studios, newsrooms, computerized information systems, mobile device units, and the interaction of message senders and recipients.

The character of Internet users in Indonesia, whether for the devices used, age, gender, distribution of Internet user areas, preferences to sites visited, platforms, or attitudes as consumers in dealing with commodities will influence the assessment of Internet users on other phenomena encountered, including the prospective public officials. In addition, the Internet and social media users in Indonesia are increasing in 2019, so it cannot only be seen as a business opportunity but also as an analysis basis in deciding the choice in the 2019 simultaneous elections. The total of Internet users, especially social media, in Indonesia is large enough to drive the opinion of an identity and influence voter preferences for certain prospective leaders.

3.4.2   Digital Media Network in Indonesia

The presence of the internet has the consequence of eroding the conventional media, but the media conglomerates in Indonesia can adapt to the emergence of digitalization. According to Tapsell, conventional media conglomerates are likely to migrate to digital media since they can finance the migration. On the other hands, small media, such as radio channels which are initiated by the locals, cannot survive. The convergence of digital media in Indonesia is increasingly evident because the owners of media companies are only controlled by several conglomerates who have had conventional media companies from the beginning. For example, CT Corp oversees Detik and CNN, Global Media Com is the parent of Okezone and Sindonews, Emtek has Liputan6, Lippo has Beritasatu, Kompas Gramedia with its Kompas and Tribune News, Bakrie Group with Viva, Jawapos with jpnn.com, and Media Group owns Metronews.

The digital media that is a derived from the efforts of the conventional media conglomerates have been known to have political affiliations, such as Surya Paloh, Media Group owner who is also a senior at Nasdem Party, Bakrie Group with the Golkar, and Harry Tanoe Soedibjo who is the owner of the Perindo Party. The partisanship of the

media will determine the direction of media coverage. The 2014 election is an example of the most obvious media partisanship, which can be seen when the results of the difference of quick counts between the supporting media for Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla (Media Group) and the supporting media for Prabowo Subianto-Hatta Rajasa (Bakrie Group). Based on Tapsell's analysis [11], the digitalization of media only drives big media companies to be multi-platform companies and helps multi-platform media owners to freely reach political power. For example, Chairul Tanjung as the owner of CT Corp, Aburizal Bakrie, Dahlan Iskan as the owner of Jawa Pos, and Harry Tanoesoedibjo as the successful owner of MNC Group use digital media to strengthen their political agencies.

In the 2019 simultaneous election, media affiliation with the presidential candidates is added with the presence of Erik Thohir or the owner of Mahaka Group, which in charge of Harian Republika and republika.co.id who joined Joko Widodo and Ma'ruf Amin's side who previously had cooperated with Surya Paloh and Hary Tanoesodibjo [21].

The partisanship of digital media towards certain political camps can be expressed through the framing of the news delivered. For example, a news portal prefers to report a particular elite or see a politician from a certain side. Framing, as said by Wasisto Raharjo Jati [22], is the dominant strategy used by the media to present political messages in the news by emphasizing information on certain parts. This information, which is taken from the attitude of a party, scandals, campaigns, etc., is used to appreciate the party's figuration in democracy or to depreciate the party's figuration.

In the context of the identity project that was attempted by young candidates in the 2019 simultaneous elections, framing that was carried out by digital media against the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) by asserting that PSI was a party with low electability, for example detik.com wrote in its headline, "Hanum Rais vs Tsamara Amany on Nasakom Party (the fate of one comma)", "Call the PSI the Nasakom Party, Hanum Rais: Should Not Be *Baper*". In addition, the PSI's refusal on Sharia Regional Regulations and polygamy, detik.com created news headlines as if the PSI had attacked all parties, both Islamic and nationalist parties. The headlines are as follows: "PSI Strong Criticism of the Nationalist Party, Including Jokowi's Party", "Refuse to be Called *Lebay*, PSI Attack PDIP Back", "Refusing Sharia Regional Regulations, Farhat Abbas Proposes to Kick Out PSI". Detik.com does not highlight the reasons behind the PSI rejecting the Sharia Regional Regulations and polygamy or the PSI's idea of the gender diversity and equality, but rather places PSI as the conflicting party, whether with Islamic parties or nationalist parties that come from Prabowo Subianto or Joko Widodo's sides.

Detik.com is one of the most accessed pages by the Indonesian people in January 2019, which is ranked sixth after tribunenews.com and facebook.com. News from detik.com, which did not confirm the PSI's idea behind its rejection of the Sharia Regional Regulation and polygamy and did not conduct a search of the cause of the PSI's failure, greatly affected the voter perceptions of the party, which was mostly filled with young people. In general, the news in detik.com about the General Election is always filled with the politics of elites or party leaders, and there is not a single piece of news that raises the issue of the emergence of young candidates in the 2019 simultaneous elections.

The news carried out by other online news portals about young candidates is only about the young candidates' background, not the ideas or views of the young candidates about various Indonesian issues, nor about the programs and the constitutions that will be defended by the young candidates. The analysis in reporting on the failure of young candidates still uses an identity politics perspective, such as the Tirto.id news entitled "Zero Figures & Lack of Grassroots: Causes of the PSI's Failure" which still assume that politics in Indonesia must always depend on figures not ideas.

The digital media that does not show the existence of young candidates with their ideas is an obstacle to the identity projects carried out by young candidates in 2019 simultaneous elections. Even though they are campaigning directly down to the important electoral district, if the party's electability and popularity of young candidates are only controversial because the media reported that they were also partisans, there will not be positive perceptions about the young candidates. Moreover, Internet users in Indonesia are dominated by young people (age 18–25) who are also a large number of voters in the 2019 election, which is up to 40% of the total voters. Young voters are more likely to seek information from digital media. If digital media does not provide much information about the attitudes of young candidates and their parties on identity issues, it is unlikely that the identity projects carried out by young candidates to redefine legitimized identities to be succeeded.

3.4.3 Religious Fundamentalism Through Digital Media

The big moment that shows identity politics in Indonesia, especially religious fundamentalism, is the DKI Jakarta Governor Election in 2017. The expression of religious fundamentalism cannot be separated from the role of digital media, as previously said by Burhanuddin Muhtadi [5], there is a political survey of the DKI Jakarta Governor Election in 2017, which a response rate problem. The respondents that are interviewed were only the ones who were on the lower middle class and were Muslim, and as a result, the survey was not representative enough. On the other hand, the media, both conventional and digital, still proclaims the raw results of the survey that methodologically problematic. The media does not care about the respondent's problem, the media only cares about the news that triggers electability. When Ahok was involved in blasphemy cases, the survey showed that ethnicity and religion became a significant factor in explaining the voter's behavior. This condition is exacerbated by the mobilization and media coverage which according to Burhanuddin Muhtadi becomes the primordial effect in the 2017 DKI Jakarta Governor Election became stronger.

The debate about identity politics at a more extreme level directs attention to the religious fundamentalism which must be applied in the government practice. In Indonesia, religious fundamentalism has often been a discourse since 1950, when Masyumi wanted to avoid secular-nationalist ideology and Darul Islam religious fundamentalism [23]. In the digital era, the mode of spreading religious fundamentalism changed. As Harun Rosid noted [24], there are at least two ways to spread religious fundamentalism in the digital era, namely: religious preaching and the spread of false news (hoaxes).

Religious speech carried out by religious leaders who disagree with Islamic countries is easily accessible on various social media platforms. For example, the *Surabaya Mengaji*, *Indonesia Bertauhid Official*, *Mercusuar U*mat, and *Indonesia Bertauhid Reborn*

accounts. All social media accounts that spread the teachings of religious fundamentalism have the same direction, namely, abandoning everything *bi'ah*, limiting women's movement, fighting democracy, and campaigning for migration (*hijrah*) [24].

In addition, the spread of religious fundamentalism is also circulated through false news or hoaxes, which in this information age are difficult to distinguish from the real truth. The Daily Social Survey [25] on hoax distribution shows the majority of respondents received hoaxes through Facebook (81.25%). The second and third rank of hoaxes spread were occupied by WhatsApp (56.55%) and Instagram (29.48%). Line and Twitter place in the fourth and fifth positions with each getting respondents of 11.37% and 10.38% respectively.

The survey results showed that most hoaxes were spread on Facebook, indicating that most Indonesians were exposed to hoaxes. As the most widely accessed social media in Indonesia (130 million users that can be reached by content creators) and quite high levels of user engagement (7,22% for video content), Facebook can be quite influential in determining the direction of political issues in Indonesia. Furthermore, hoaxes are spread through a more private message sender application rather than a social media platform, as a result, the mechanism of the proof of right or wrong that may be carried out by anyone without having to be the recipient of the message is increasingly difficult.

In the 2019 election, religious fundamentalism is still the main issue presented. Supporters of Prabowo Subianto use Islam as the basis of their support. It was aggravated by the act of mobilizing themselves to show the supportive mass in the name of religion, for example, the 212 Movement and the major protest that took place around Bawaslu on May 22, 2019.

Even though Joko Widodo's side is considered not use any religion in its political actions, the decision of the coalition party bearer of Joko Widodo to appoint the Chairman of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) as his deputy candidate is often seen as an affirmation of identity politics, especially religious fundamentalism. Religious fundamentalists that responded to the presence of young candidates with ideas that are contrary to the Islamic teachings also firmly reject the idea of banning polygamy and Sharia Regional Regulations.

The implications of religious fundamentalism experienced by young candidates who try to create a new identity have almost no chance of succeeding. Even if young candidates with ideas that oppose legitimate identities like PSI has done by trying to attract the attention of young voters also did not have much hope. Religious fundamentalism has penetrated the millennial generation. At least 19.5% of the millennials agree that Indonesia is a caliphate country and 22.4% of the millennium does not support non-Muslim leaders. Furthermore, 60.2% of the millennium views polygamy as a morally wrong practice [26].

Young candidates have the opportunity to get a place in Indonesian political networks simply by being part of the legitimate identity, namely the ethnic identity and the closeness to the power holders in the state institutions. The young candidates' identity projects in Indonesia will also not get a chance to develop if it does not correspond to the resistant identity that opposes state power, namely the Islamic religious identity.

4 Conclusion: Network Society and Democracy

In a democracy, participation in the public culture not only requires a willingness to consume information, but also a willingness to create, share, and use information. The Internet and digital media enhance the ability for the people to participate in social movements such as dissemination or information spreading, coordination, and decision making, as well as building a common identity of a network society [27]. Therefore, the dilemma is faced by democracy in this era of technological determinism because understanding the dynamics of society today cannot be separated from the analysis of technological devices [27].

Democracy relies on the ideas and information exchanges, but freedom must also be limited to maintain the quality of the debate in democracy. The fear that the academics and democracy practitioners experience in seeing the digital era and democracy has always been revolved around the information that is massive and cannot be controlled by the government. Therefore, the question that always arises is; how can people protect themselves from the heavy flow of information? [27].

The uncontrolled flow of information is always seen as a disturbance to democracy because the government officials are always faced with a choice between political stability and openness of the information flow. The information does indeed help the government to understand what is happening in its people better, to be able to perform the government tasks better, as well as to maintain market stability. The problem is that the information about the community is also used by authoritarian leaders to implement the rules. The Internet allows authoritarian governments to deliberately direct disinformation to certain groups of people. Information flow can also be manipulated and become a propaganda tool with unproven facts [27].

In Indonesia, democracy and the information age have not changed Indonesia's political network much. The digitalization in Indonesia only clarifies that the Indonesian political networks were filled with media oligarchs with their political affiliations who are adapting to the digitalization. The popularity of a political figure and the opportunity to gain power are often determined by the elite group. The media oligarchy with the ruling political affiliation is opposed by the resistant identities, by religious fundamentalists. Religious teachings have always been the main discourse to procedurally reject the legitimate government. Religious propaganda is easily spread on various digital media channels. The third group is the activists from the society who seek change through digital media.

However, most of them are only there for the sake of social interests and do not go directly into politics. The action of entering the political network in Indonesia by challenging the dominant identity without any capital affiliation with the media oligarchy has been carried out by the young legislative candidates from PSI. The PSI's actions did not make the PSI an important entity in Indonesia's political network. However, for young candidates whose party attitudes do not conflict with the dominant identity, the chance to get a political place in Indonesia is greater.

The openness of information provided by the Internet as the main pillar of CMC (Computer-Mediated Communication) does not bring the diversity of identities in Indonesian politics. CMC, which is an important factor in the presence of virtual communities, is only one of the types of communication that strengthens the existing and

dominant social networks. Space of flows and timeless time supports the existence of a virtuality culture and develops into real virtuality. In the end, virtual culture in Indonesia only strengthens the political character in Indonesia, which is always based on identity, manifested in concrete actions in the form of mass action. New identities that challenge dominant political social networks will not be much helped by the presence of digitalization [2].

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