



Critically Evaluate the Advantages and Disadvantages of Bureaucracies, Markets and Networks as Forms of Public Service Delivery

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Abstract. This essay mainly delivers the concept of Public Service Delivery (PSD) and Joined-up Governments, and combine it with the concept of markets, bureaucracy and networks to analyze the pros and cons of different forms of PSD. Analysed benefits and drawbacks of bureaucracy, markets, and networks. Given the pros and cons of each method of public governance, no single mode dominates policy. Modern public governance is mixed and diverse. In a hybrid environment, deciding how to combine three governing systems is difficult. These types of public governance may overlap and clash, making the system highly reformable. This requires theoretical and experimentally tracking changes in governance arrangements, focusing on dynamics and performance.

Keywords: Bureaucracies · Markets and Networks · Public service delivery · networks · governance · finance

1 Introduction

Public service supply is a primary responsibility of states and governments. New modes of public service delivery have been established to address the shortcomings or inadequacies of existing or earlier modes of public service supply. However, the new model of public governance has not resolved all issues in the field of public services, nor has it totally replaced the former model. Thus, three distinct modes of public service operate concurrently: bureaucracy, market, and network. It varies in weight according to sector and country. As a result, the ensuing structure for public governance has become highly heterogeneous and dynamic, and continues to encounter substantial obstacles. As a result of these obstacles, the status quo of public hybrid governance systems is undergoing significant transformation. This article analyses and discusses the major benefits and drawbacks of several modes of public service delivery. Bureaucracy is the earliest of the three modes of the process of public service delivery. It has been criticised as an excessively large, expensive, wasteful, and ineffectual type of public governance, and advocates for a more market-oriented approach. These demands have resulted in the emergence of a second type of public governance: market-based governance. This

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approach is congruent with neoliberal theory and policy, emphasising market incentives and the state's diminished role in social and economic life through privatisation, categorization, and competition policies. Nevertheless, as a result of market failures and their fragmented nature, market public service delivery face additional difficulties when it comes to addressing complex issues such as health care and education. As a result, a third type of public governance has emerged: network governance, which places a premium on the interaction and engagement of all key public and private players in the delivery of public services. It is based on a whole-of-government approach, with networks and partnerships serving as the foundation. Although this format has evolved in terms of coordination and interaction, it continues to struggle with decision-making and network management. A more appropriate approach would be to compare a given governance method's performance to that of the second-best alternative. Consequently, incremental improvements to alternate forms should be used to determine success, not absolute performance. This essay will cover the analysis of three forms of providing public services: bureaucracy, market, and network, as well as provide future tendencies and critical discussions, before concluding.

2 Public Service Delivery and Joined-Up Governments

At the turn of the twentieth century, the new public management paradigm began to wane, while the public value management theory flourished. Public service management makes the case for prioritising citizenship, reclaiming public value, repositioning government services, and establishing network governance. However, there are several flaws in the idea of public value management due to a lack of knowledge of the potential conflict of public value, the mechanism by which public value is formed, the role of public managers, and the implementation tools for value management [1]. Using appropriate strategies to resolve conflicts between public values, creating conditions for the formation of public values, recognizing the role of public managers, and utilizing various management tools pragmatically are all possible ways to address the theoretical shortcomings of public value management. NPM is a collection of underlying assumptions and value declarations about how public sector organizations should be planned, organized, managed, and run in a quasi-commercial manner. The fundamental premise of NPM is to enable public sector organizations – and the employees in them – to become more “commercialized” and “market-oriented,” that is, to focus on performance, cost, efficiency, and audit [2].

Under the influence of factors such as globalization, the state's role is shifting. It has been called the new public management (NPM), the state's hollowing-out, or the new governance, depending on the perspective. An investigation into the changing function of government in advanced industrial democracies is the focus of a special issue of *Public Administration* [1]. NPM was offered as a generally applicable framework, a “four seasons of public management,” like many earlier administrative theories. It is possible to claim universality in two ways, effortless portability and wide distribution. To begin with, many of the same commonly accepted concepts have been presented as a means of treating “management ills” in numerous situations, including businesses, policy areas, government levels, and countries. In the real world, universalism is far from

complete [1]. There appears to be less of an impact on multinational bureaucracies and less of an impact on control units than on front-line delivery units, for example, by NPM implementation. Local adjustments in management style are also necessary, as long as these changes do not contradict the fundamental framework of NPM in any way [3]. Critics, on the other hand, argue that much of NPM's "administrative flexibility" is a form of freelance brand where anything that isn't banned tends to be necessary. Second, NPM is viewed as a "apolitical" framework that allows for the effective pursuit of many diverse values.

Change the "configuration" of the management system without rewriting NPM's essential procedures to adapt to varied political agendas and situations, according to this article. It is not a machine, say proponents of NPM, that can be tailored to meet the demands of a single political party or platform, such as the new right. The detractors of NPM, on the other hand, lack a coherent "manifesto," with their thoughts dispersed over a variety of short-lived sources [1].

In 1997, during the "Civil Service Conference," British Prime Minister Tony Blair introduced the concept of "joined-up governance" for the first time. The British government produced the white paper "Modern Government" in 1999, outlining a 10-year strategy for implementing "joined-up government" reforms based on a review of the previous two years' work [3]. The white paper makes detailed recommendations for implementation in the areas of policy formulation, public service delivery, information technology use, and civil servant management. Pioneering countries in public administration reform, such as Australia and New Zealand, have carried out successive "whole government" reforms, while municipal governments in Canada, the United States, and other countries have also conducted similar practical experiments. Currently, "joined-up government" has emerged as a new trend in western government reform. Joined-up government (JUG) has been a central theme of Tony Blair's New Labour administration's 'modernization' policy [3]. "joined-up governments" is a term that refers to the goal of horizontal and vertical thought and action collaboration. It is envisaged that this collaboration would result in some benefits.

To begin, instances in which contradictory policies exist can be eliminated. Second, limited resources can be more effectively utilized. Thirdly, synergies can be formed by convening diverse relevant stakeholders in a particular policy area or network. Fourth, citizens can have seamless access to a collection of connected services rather than fragmented access [3].

3 Benefits and Drawbacks of Bureaucracy, Markets, and Networks: Bureaucracy

In a bureaucracy, employees are assigned work based on their abilities, and superiors can supervise their subordinates' work. Authority and information move from the top down in a bureaucratic organization. Each entity is accountable for its own work, overseeing the work of its subordinates, and reporting to its superiors in this fashion. No one works alone, and no one is free to indulge his whims. Privatists have no accountability and can impose their willingness even though it is irrational. With the following traits, a government must work in a society where the rule of law is important. Motivation to

provide results, particularly within the established framework, is critical. That means no favouritism or self-interest. As per business practise, work is assigned to employees based on their knowledge and competencies. Everyone gets their fair share, there is only a constitutional allegiance. Assume that every individual will respect the rules and will not go beyond them in order to perform well. Since the activities are based only on pre-coded laws and regulations, they are neither circumstance specific nor open to interpretation. The bureaucracy in India is characterised as the 'steel frame' of the government because it is cohesive, integrated, robust, long-lasting, and sturdy.

Accountability is also a motivating force in bureaucracies. In order to pass the rationality test and focus on the public good, bureaucratic acts are subject to public scrutiny.

Over the last two decades, there has been a reappraisal of Weberian bureaucratic structures and the critical role bureaucracy plays in shaping public policies, their implementation, and the associated socioeconomic outcomes [4–10]. Numerous crossnational and subnational studies demonstrate that politically autonomous and impartial bureaucratic structures (i.e. Weberian bureaucracy), in which civil servants are recruited on the basis of merit and have tenure protection, are associated with positive macroeconomic outcomes such as socioeconomic development, corruption prevention, regulatory quality, and entrepreneurship [11]. While literatures on good governance, which is primarily grounded in political science, has advanced the understanding of Weberian bureaucracy, still, relatively little understanding about individual civil servants and how attitudes are influenced by the administrative structure in comparative terms. On the other hand, research in public management has explored the causes of individual attitudes primarily inside an organisational context, rather than from a cross-national viewpoint [11].

Globally, public institutions are afflicted by rules and regulations that compel compliance but have no functional purpose—what the literature on ritualised bureaucracy refers to as 'red tape' [12–15]. While many laws and regulations have their place, red tape constricts the space available for innovative ideas, deteriorates organisational culture, and has an effect on employees' job satisfaction and willingness to continue working for the business. Many believed that the introduction of information and communication technology (ICT) into public institutions would provide a solution [16]. The expectation was that red tape would be eliminated or significantly reduced. Despite substantial investments in ICT [17], red tape persists as a pathology in digitally transformed public institutions [18]. According to Bozeman and Youtie's [11]. Warning about the danger of ICT not lowering red tape but 'automating' it via bureaucratic software. Indeed, compliance with functional norms and procedures occurs digitally these days, facilitated by ICT and other technologies [16].

When discussing bureaucracy, it is inevitable to pay attention to red tape, which has its advantages and disadvantages in specific public service delivery. Red tape hinders frontline personnel with discretion, experience, and autonomy in public service organisations. Organisational red tape viewed by frontline employees has a bigger influence on performance than perceived by managers [19]. Empirically, a negative association between perceived organisational red tape and performance was found. The manager believed red tape was also unfavourable but not significant. The results also imply that the association between perceived organisational red tape and performance is weaker

than previous research that did not use objective performance measures or adjust for historical performance levels [19]. It could be explained by the fact that common-source bias did not overstate the association between perceived red tape and organisational performance.

Moreover, the manager-staff hypothesis predicts that only employee perceived red tape is negatively connected to organisational performance, while manager perceived red tape is not [19]. Red tape reduction continues to be essential to public administration theory, research, and practise. Studies conducted one of the first meta- analyses and meta-regressions on the relationship between red tape, employee outcomes, and organisational performance using evidence from public administration, and concluded that these efforts to cut red tape are well justified [20] In facts, red tape is detrimental to employee and organisational performance — though perhaps not as detrimental as is frequently imagined. Additionally, red tape appears to be less damaging when it is imposed externally, implying that the type of red tape being measured is significant for determining the impact of red tape. It should be encouraged to conduct additional research on the influence of red tape on employee outcomes and organisational performance, so that future meta-analyses may draw on a larger body of empirical literature to provide evidence-based recommendations [20].

Markets:

Different socioeconomic classes have varying values, welfare preferences, and wealth, necessitating the provision of varying public services. The issue is not with the market process, but with the result of social stratification on which market segmentation is based [21]. Public service is more complicated than a centralised supply. Similarly to Maslow's demand theory, people do not have merely basic materialistic needs. On the foundation of accessible riches, individuals will want more.

The public service market must be segmented in order to establish the supply that best satisfies the desires of various groups and to ensure efficient marketization of public services through a well-designed market supply mechanism. Currently, the target market is categorised primarily by income level, with geographical segmentation being a secondary consideration. However, there is a general dearth of study on specific public service demands, and much less research on public behaviour [21]. As a result, enterprises and non-profit organisations seeking to enter the market for public services must perform extensive market research on the general population. The government must perform appropriate research during the marketization process, utilising the data and research institutes it has, in order to ascertain the various target markets and policies associated with them, establish credibility. The purpose of establishing the target market is to aid in the development of more specific public policy and marketing for public services [21].

A fundamental lesson from practitioners and academics is that structure alone cannot affect cultural transformation; processes and attitudes must also be addressed. Simply removing barriers to cross-cutting work is insufficient: additional work is required to ensure that cross-cutting policy initiatives may compete with solely departmental objectives' [22]. This concept has significant consequences for senior civil officers, professional service providers, and elected officials [3].

For politicians, ‘the signals ministers send to civil employees regarding the importance they desire for cross-cutting approaches are critical’ [22]. Ministers’ appointment letters should include a job description and a statement outlining their corporate, as well as departmental responsibilities [22]. Additionally, while some of the hurdles to JUG are inadvertent, others are the result of unresolved conflicts of interest and value (DETR 2000, Sect. 2, explores the case of sustainable development policies). In these cases, only politicians have the ability to break a stalemate between opposing policy objectives, administrative measures alone can amount to little more than bandages [3].

For civil servants: ‘We want new-style integrated civil servants but have no idea who they are or how to recruit them’ [22]. Civil officials must have the ability to communicate more quickly, more effectively, and with a broader range of stakeholders [3]. It is essential for them to develop new abilities, and the mechanisms that recruit, train, appraise, audit, and reward them must be adjusted accordingly. The concept of leadership is expanded [23].

For providers of professional services, the disparate practice guidelines and classification systems employed by professional groups can create significant impediments to successful and efficient collaboration [3]. For example, among children who left care, there are significant issues regarding differing judgments of the degree of problems between social services, health care, and the juvenile care system. Such entrenched professional procedures cannot be modified overnight; their harmonization or simplicity is certain to take time [3].

Hood [1] gave a detailed table to illustrate three core values of NPM (Table 1).

These values are also central and traditional in public management, and they are institutionalised through appeal mechanisms, public reporting requirements, adversary bureaucracies, and independent oversight systems, as well as efforts to socialise public servants in ways other than ‘bottom line ethics’ or a high ‘grovel count’ [24]. Success is quantified in terms of rectitude, or the proper discharge of obligations in procedural and substantive terms, whereas failure is quantified in terms of malversation, or the improper discharge of duties in a formal or substantive sense [3].

The NPM offers some advantages over bureaucratic hierarchical governance. First, the efficiency savings from market orientation and the elimination of publically produced inefficiencies or failures are huge. When the rigid structure of bureaucracy cannot handle certain situations quickly, a business-like decentralised management approach might lead to efficiency improvements.

Similarly, outsourcing or contracting out some public functions to the private sector might result in significant efficiency improvements if the private sector is better suited and the incentives are aligned. Market-oriented de-centralized management can handle various public service challenges more flexibly than bureaucratic structure, leading to significant efficiency advantages of NPM over bureaucratic structure. Then significant cost savings. Second, market-based governance allows for defined output targets and performance measurement [25]. Even if some intangible qualities of public services are difficult to assess, this procedure allows lawmakers and the public to see if concrete gains are made. As a result, public service delivery would become more transparent and accountable.

Table 1. Three sets of core values in public management

| Sigma-type | | Theta-type | Lambda-type |
|---------------------------------|--|---|---|
| values | | values | values |
| KEEP IT LEAN | | KEEP IT HONEST | KEEP IT ROBUST |
| AND | | AND | AND |
| PURPOSEFUL | | FAIR | RESILIENT |
| STANDARD OF SUCCESS | Frugality (matching of resources to tasks for given goals) | Rectitude (achievement of fairness, mutuality, the proper discharge of duties) | Resilience (achievement of reliability, adaptivity, robustness) |
| STANDARD OF FAJLURE | Waste (muddle, confusion, inefficiency) | Malversation (unfairness, bias, abuse of office) | Catastrophe (risk, breakdown, collapse) |
| CURRENCY OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE | Money and time (resource costs of producers and consumers) | Trust and entitlements (consent, legitimacy, due process, political entitlements) | Security and survival (confidence, life and limb) |
| CONTROL EMPHASIS | Output | Process | Input/Process |
| SLACK | Low | Medium | High |
| GOALS | Fixed/Single | Incompatible 'Double bind' | Emergent/Multiple |
| INFORMATION | Costed, segmented (commercial assets) | Structured | Rich exchange, collective asset |
| COUPLING | Tight | Medium | Loose |

The decentralised and small-scale nature of market-based governance arrangements may be a drawback. A more comprehensive approach to public governance is required for many complex public services like health care, education, and housing. As a result, market-based governance's specialised approach may be inefficient in delivering complex and networked public services [26, 27]. Deterioration of bureaucratic institutional capacity and memory, which can be harmful as such qualities are required, and the

likelihood that market-based governance is not universally applicable are some of the disadvantages of a market-based governance system [1] investigates the Danish public sector's failure to adopt market-oriented alternatives. Denmark's cabinet implemented a "Modernization Plan" to address issues like high public spending, inflation, and unemployment. Denmark's decentralised public sector hampered successful market reform due to micro-hierarchies. However, the decentralisation and reorganisation of finances disproportionately affected diverse populations. Even while managers knew more about what enterprises needed funding, this budgeting framework did not motivate players to produce more effectively or efficiently. They could only handle some ambiguity.

A steady internal hierarchy of dominating institutions prevented competition amongst producers. As a result of the micro-level institutions' rigid definition of power, macroeconomic measures were ineffective, according to Christiansen's findings.

According to Christensen [26], PM may erode citizens' social obligations and loyalty to the state by treating them as mere consumers.

Networks:

Typically, new kinds of governance are referred to as post-NPM, joined-up, or network governance [1, 3, 22]. The primary departure points for this new strategy are market failures and fragmented public service delivery, as well as the necessity of incorporating diverse stakeholder groups into the process of public governance. Governments have a limited number of possibilities for affecting social change. Any such changes must occur inside interdependent networks, which means that change processes are frequently irregular and capricious [27–29]. Due to the diversity of parties with varied perspectives and interests, as well as their interdependence, unilateral, hierarchical solutions are rarely effective. In their stead, multilateral, network strategies are required, with important ideas such as interaction, consultation, and negotiation. (Koffijberg et al., 2012) In struggling economic times, the topic of how a significant shift occurs in a network context is critical. In many industries, there is a public demand for governments to make structural reforms and a perception that these governments have the necessary authority to do so [25].

The main benefit of network governance is its ability to involve diverse stakeholders in public service delivery. Taking into account the views and concerns of various stakeholder groups regarding public services would ideally improve their quality and social benefit. Relatedly, new governance should minimise inefficiencies caused by market-fragmented governance's structure.

As part of its modernization drive, the central government promotes the Better Government for Older People (BGOP) programme. The Cabinet Office's two-year action-research BGOP programme was aimed to explore and test the potential for an integrated, multi-level, interagency, citizen-centred and strategic response to the cross-cutting needs of older people. Evaluation is emphasised to impact government policy and practise at all levels [26].

To engage in collaborative decision-making and to commit resources for action, individuals charged with accomplishing change within multi-level governance need adequate assigned responsibility or mandate. Multi-level governance can easily become 'all talk and no action' without delegation. To help meet the needs of users and residents, partnership representatives must have appropriate status or authority inside their own organisations [26].

Networks are important in current governance, although they encounter challenges in resolving concerns among companies. For example, power asymmetries, an early conceptualization of this network problem, realised that not only is power unequal, but also a variety of organisations exist in power dependent relationships [28]. Power dependence describes why entities interact and how power is distributed within networks. Other hypotheses show that power can be used to help or hinder network processes. When lead organisations delay support for important network strategies or choices, or withhold essential agency-controlled resources, they are acting as a blocking force [28].

With regard to the Labour administration's centralising control mechanisms (inspection and audit), contradictions between centralization and decentralisation. These are the reality of power-dependence network barriers [28]. Solving such impasses by bargaining has been proposed before [22, 28]. Once a network is activated, it has internal power sources. These interactions changed relationship patterns and knowledge hierarchies, opening up new spaces and sites of activity that could not be controlled centrally.

4 Conclusion

Nowadays, government and business are characterised by interconnected, diversified communities and organisations. The effectiveness of organisations under various systems of governance is contingent on a variety of external and internal elements, including funding, the level of political backing, the degree of objective ambiguity, and the degree of consumer autonomy in decision making. Contractual governance is most effective when the service sought has a defined market. Nonetheless, conflicting interests among various parties may obstruct the efficient implementation of novel modes of public service delivery. Where reforms are too expensive, the hierarchy is a stable and consistent system. Regardless of whether disaggregation is a viable method, it is critical that public service delivery and power separation inside institutions do not jeopardise the community's protection, safety, or well-being. Three distinct modes of public service provision, dubbed bureaucracy, markets, and networks, have emerged to dominate the area of public policy during the previous decades. Each offers a number of distinct advantages and downsides.

For instance, bureaucracy, which is built on a hierarchical top-down command and control system, may function well for standardised and rule-based public services and large enterprises, but may result in severe inefficiencies and state failures in other areas. Market governance based on price signals and competition can result in large efficiency gains in narrowly defined service areas, but may fail when confronted with complicated or wicked problems. Additionally, network governance, which is based on the inclusion of related stakeholders in the process of public policymaking, has the potential to handle complex tasks more effectively through inter-agency collaborations and partnerships, but it also faces significant challenges in terms of accountability and possible operational inefficiencies in networks.

Given the benefits and drawbacks of each of the three modes of public governance, it is clear that no single mode of governance dominates the policy arena. Thus, the contemporary state of public governance is multifaceted and hybrid. Determining the best combination of three governing systems in such a hybrid context becomes a challenging

issue. Additionally, these forms of public governance may overlap and conflict, leaving the system extremely susceptible to subsequent reforms and modifications. This necessitates tracking changes in governance structures theoretically and empirically, with an emphasis on relative dynamics and performance.

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