



On the Experience in Heidegger's Formal Indication

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Abstract. This paper is a discussion of two kinds of experience in Heidegger's formal indication method. By reviewing the famous chapters of Heidegger's early phenomenological thought, the experience of the question and the environmental experience, it is possible to grasp the thesis and the method, the intention and the qualities of Heidegger's early phenomenological thought, a quality that is crucial to the understanding of Heidegger's thought as a whole.

Keywords: Heidegger · formal indication · the experience of the question · the environmental experience

1 Introduction

Heidegger said, "The expression 'phenomenology' signifies primarily a methodological conception". (Being and Time) His phenomenological texts are mainly included in three consecutive phases: the early Freiburg period lectures of 1919–1923, the Marburg period lectures of 1923–1928, and the work Being and Time. The academic fascination of Heidegger's thought began in 1919, and the most important "formal indication" method in Heidegger's early phenomenology was "Analysis of the Structure of Experience" in Heidegger's War Emergency Semester of 1919, "the Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview". This lecture is divided into three short sections: "the experience of the question," "the environmental experience," and "Comparison of Experiential Structures. Process and Event".

2 The Simpleness of the Experience of the Question

The frequent use of the term "simple, simply (die Einfalt, einfach, naiv, schlicht)" in Heidegger's writings and lectures highlights a quality and imagery of Heidegger's philosophy. In Heidegger's context, simplicity is used in the context of "simple questions, meaning" and "simple understanding, observation, experience" respectively. We can see that einfach, as an adjective and an adverb, is not a philosophical category or a philosophical methodology, but it plays a fundamental qualifying or guiding role, modifying the basic qualities of Heidegger's philosophy throughout and more and more thoroughly, stipulating the subject matter of Heidegger as a noun and the manner of Heidegger as a verb. Especially in Heidegger's early thought, his unique phenomenological search is highlighted in a theoretical way, in which the critical or reflective nature of philosophy is embedded.

2.1 Presentation of "The Experience of the Question"

Heidegger opens with a direct "the experience of the question": *Gibt es etwas?* The decisive point of our whole dilemma is the slight barrenness of the place with its problematic beginning (*Gibt es.....?*) Avoiding an illusion (there must already be something *etwas*), it all depends on how we understand and in understanding listen to and hold on to the pure meaning of this meager barrenness [1]. In the next section on the mental subject, Heidegger points out that the talk of various mental processes and cognitive processes is a "The difficulty lies in the absence of a "core that sustains the mental process" and a "mental subject that enables the process of knowing", as if we were about to follow Heidegger in solving this difficulty [1]. We are about to follow Heidegger in solving this difficulty. However, Heidegger says, "we have digressed too hastily" and fallen back into a stubborn habit of thinking in the midst of various factual connections, without the courage to trace a "meager and barren state of rustic meaning" [1].

In the context of the previously given "psychologism" and "scientific method" busy with research and "knowing", the complexity of the practical field "etwas The complexity of the "etwas" of the practical field overshadows the "meager and barren state of rustic meaning" of the "Gibt es" of the beginning of the pure problem, rather, the "what rather, the various "whats" obscure the generation of the "how is" itself. Here, Heidegger does not mention the phenomenological "suspension", but essentially implements the suspension of all kinds of practical connections and reverts to the mere experience of the question.

2.2 The "Experience of the Question" Component

The core of "the experience of the question" lies in the key distinction between "lived experience, I, have, what" that follows:

Lived experience (*Erlebnis*): the experience itself, what the experience gives itself, does not materialize, we "do not recognize a process (*Vor-gang*), a 'what' of the occurring event We "do not recognize a process (*Vor-gang*), the 'what' of an event", but rather enter into the process of the occurrence of the experience, which is "neither something physical nor something psychological", and hear "the pure motives (*Motiv*) of pure experiential meaning", not The "experience" itself has been worn out by all the "what" that has been fixed [1].

I: I comport myself (*Ich verhalte mich*), the verb *verhalten* means "to take an attitude, to treat, to show", and can be translated directly as I take an attitude toward me. In the vivid practice of experience, in the tracing of the meaning of experience, there is no solidified "self" (*Ich*), i.e., the solidification of the self is connected with the factuality of experience" and "the life towards something (*Lch*). The distinction between the materialization of the self in relation to the factuality of experience and life toward something (*Leben auf etwas zu*) is not found. To put it bluntly, in a purely problematic experiential commitment, the "I" has no attitude toward the "I".

There is (*es gibt*): in the diversity of "what there is" one can see the same element of meaning of "what there is", i.e., "there" itself that goes beyond diversity and points to sameness. "There" itself, and even this simple "there", which is completely vague

and almost empty of definite meaning, has its multiple mysteries precisely because of its simplicity [1].

What (etwas überhaupt): this general thing is easily misunderstood, especially when Heidegger refers to something completely universal, the most universal thing, something that every possible something that every possible general object has, Heidegger in no way refers to Being as a whole or the universal nature of Being. Heidegger adds, of this general thing one can say: it is something (es ist etwas) - and when I say this, I speak of the minimal value of the declarability of the object [1], rather, the “something” here is what the “there” refers to, what is associated with the “there”. The generativity and the generative process given by “there” [1].

2.3 The Meaning of the Experience of the Question

The questioning experience gives itself in a strangely rudimentary and primitive way. The questioner, in the questioning experience, is a certain “self” that “has” to give, not an object associated with the meaning of the question, not the factual I [1]. Heidegger again emphasizes the “I” as the “inquirer”: The “I” is not an individual I, and in the experience of the question does not refer back to a visible, materialized, factual I, but at the same time some I, some unseen I given by the experiential motive and therefore by “there” itself - an ‘I’ that neither returns to the factual experience nor disappears [1].

We can see the relevance of the distinctions made by Heidegger and the vividness of the thought that is being thought. Although Heidegger in this initial period still uses the traditional conceptual categories of words in his expressions, he tries to distinguish them within the limits of negativity. The distinction is ultimately between the long shadow of ontology, of the philosophy of the subject and the simple thought of facing things in themselves, between the highway-like roots of modern technology and it is a highway-like modern technical foundation and a forest path in the mountain of Tottenau, which distinguishes itself within philosophy in a philosophical way, with philosophy as metaphysics as its opponent. This rustic search leaves a deep mark at the beginning of Heidegger’s thought.

3 The Meaning of the Environmental Experience

The Analysis of the Structure of Experience has two other parts, of which the environmental experience is easier to understand, but Heidegger said, but we do not just want to understand easier, and with the help of the revelation of the first experience as a contrast, also it also pushes us in the direction of the problem.

3.1 Directness of the Environmental Experience

What is striking is the pure seeing into the experience (Hineinschauen) - I saw the podium almost immediately, not the bad, misinterpreted interpretation of the box-table-university-table-lectern [1]. We can see and understand that this direct, simple environmental experience is inexplicably obscured in the theoretical, scientific way of thinking, and that in the purely experiential immersion, there is something meaningful given to

me from an immediate environmental: the meaning (das Bedeutsame) is the original. It is something that is given to me directly, without any thoughtful inflection caused by a kind of practical grasp (Sacherfassen) [1].

3.2 The Meaning of the Environmental Experience

For the "I" there is meaning everywhere in the world around me, "it worlds" (es weltet) [1]. In the experience of things, even in the making of things, and even in the creation and invention of unknown things, meaning is given directly beforehand. Heidegger, through the simple search of the structural analysis of experience, makes a profound reversal of the theoretical cognitive method of science, which is something seemingly insignificant, but in fact profoundly touching [1].

Finally, Heidegger distinguishes between process (Vor-gang) and event (Ereignis). The process is an objectified experience extracted from the true experience and known as objectivity, which is only a remnant of the true experience, a kind of disembodied life (Ent-leben). It is also worth noting that in this short text many "basic words" of Heidegger's later thought already appear, such as worlding, event, echo, and of course simple, which again echoes the saying that beginnings always foreshadow the future [2].

4 Conclusion: Heidegger's Phenomenological Method

The actuality of the formal indication method, the directness and specificity of the attitude of commitment, is shown visually, and this primordial experience is marked by the fact that the perceptual activity is actually carried out [3]. The simplicity of this reversal of meaning is also shown to us directly, as Heidegger said, implication is not the character of things (Sachcharakter), but the character of being (Seinscharakter) [4].

In the first period Heidegger enters being from the phenomenology of the present hermeneutic, and in the second period he enters being from listening to the call of being in language itself, a shift from interpretation to thinking. The seventh section of the introduction to *Being and Time* is devoted to clarifying the phenomenological method of exploratory work, while the early Freiburg period he explicitly expresses the true phenomenological method as formal indication. The formal indication is a direct and simple method that maintains the situation and actuality in suspense, which was abandoned by Heidegger after the turning. The later Heidegger's thinking is not the practice of the earlier phenomenological method, for Heidegger explicitly expresses thinking as experience, manual work, and emphasizes that in thinking there is neither method nor thesis [5]. After the turning, Heidegger's thought became more phenomenologically specific.

The essence of consciousness as described by phenomenology is nothing but the essence of a real thing (Wesen des Wahre), not the essence of a general truth (Wesen der Wahrheit) as set by Husserl as an end in itself, and the difference between the search for meaning of cognition and experience is one of direction rather than of degree. The difference between the search for meaning of cognition and experience is one of direction rather than of degree, and the answer to what is the thing in itself, Heidegger said, if the answer is available after all, it must lie in a transformation of thought, not in a statement of a state of affairs [6].

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