



# POSO TERRORISM NETWORK SYSTEM

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*Abstract-* The social conflict between community groups in Poso City that broke out at the end of 1998 immediately spread to all corners of the village in the Poso Regency area. Furthermore, conflicts between community groups that were held were given a segregative content and label between religions, ethnicities, and groups by irresponsible parties (provocators), so that the vulnerability and tense situation felt by the community lasted for ten years. During the Poso conflict period, four very brutal episodes were known as "Conflict Volumes 1, 2, 3, and 4". In the span of time during the conflict, it has opened up space for many domestic and foreign parties to enter Poso under the guise of humanitarian aid, both as peace workers and as donors. That is the gap that is used as an entrance by a group of affiliated people to become part of global terrorists because they are indicated to be connected to international networks. The Poso terrorism network system can be observed based on its organizational structure and the scale or scope of its coverage. The organizational structure is layered from leadership elements and active members, active cadres, active members, active supporters, and sympathizers. While the scale or scope consists of local, extra local, and global scales. The network system between elements and scales is very secretly discontinuous and one-way, directly one-way, and directly two-way for certain elements.

**Keywords:** Network, terrorist, conflict, Poso

## I. INTRODUCTION

Starting from the Poso conflict that broke out in December 1998 between Muslims and Christians which was triggered by a misunderstanding between them, then the conflict developed into a communal conflict involving symbols and sensitive issues of the two religions. The fact that the Poso conflict has become an issue that extends throughout the territory of the Republic of Indonesia, across neighboring countries, especially Malaysia and the Philippines and reaches many countries, has become a global issue. In 2000 the Poso conflict was observed as a global conflict through acts of terrorism and this condition has not ended until today, which has been more than 20 years (Ali, 2017a). Terrorism according to (Bassiouni (1981) as a strategy of violence designed to increase the achievement of desired results by gradually creating feelings of fear among the public. Crenshaw (2007) defines terrorism as a political act carried out by individuals on behalf of the community and collectively. the collective tries to justify their actions. The first definition sees terrorism as limited as a means but does not explain how the ideology of the struggle and what conditions are wanted to be changed and desired from the struggle. While the second definition has a tendency to be oriented towards politics, where terrorists represent themselves as fighters for collective interests. through its own unique and highly subjective mechanism.

In this regard, Al-Zzawi (2019) stated that the emergence of terrorism was driven by psychological factors; Crenshaw (2019) and Gurr (2020) link psychological

pressure with the political aspect that gives birth to terrorism as a strategic choice; while psychological pressure associated with ideological factors was proposed by Atran (2021) and Horgan (2017). In this regard, it can be assumed that the accumulation of opinions from several people with the same response to a certain condition, can build a conspiracy which can then develop into terrorism or groups that carry out terror movements.

This article that discusses the Poso terrorism network system is a series of three previous research results that have been published, respectively (1) Terrorism Studies in Central Sulawesi, Phase 1, 2006 ; (2) Terrorism Study in Central Sulawesi, Phase 2, 2007; and (3) Study on the Aggressiveness of Conflict Victims in the Poso Conflict Area, 2008, which has been enriched with data on the development of terrorism, then synthesized and focuses on the analysis of the Poso terrorism network system (Ali, 2016).

The model of data analysis based on observations based on the domain and cross-site of terrorism networks is carried out by combining techniques. The combined data is data from previous studies with additional data from observations. The data analysis used the Terrorism Organizational Structure model "Countering Terrorism on US Army Installations" (Ploch, 2011) and the Anatomical Structure of Terrorism Networks (Ali, 2016).

## II. POSO TERRORISM

Terminology that describes acts of violence or terror in "The Dictionary of Espionage" (J. et al., 1984), terrorism is defined as the use of force or unlawful force to intimidate, coerce, fight, and even kill people; whether individuals, communities or governments - for political or other social purposes. The following are some basic terms referred to explain some of the concepts related to the word terrorism.

1) Terrorism, is a sect/school or belief through coercion of will, in order to voice messages and/or principles by carrying out illegal actions that lead to violence, brutality, and even murder.

2) Terrorists are perpetrators or implementers of forms of terrorism, either by individuals, groups, or groups by means of acts of violence to murder, accompanied by the use of various weapons ranging from conventional to modern weapons.

3) Terror, are forms of activity in the context of carrying out terrorism through the use of threats, extortion, agitation, slander, bombing, vandalism or destruction, kidnapping, intimidation, rape, and murder.

4) Terror tools are the means used in acts of terror which can be in the form of leaflets, telephones, bombs, and various types of weapons that can cause fear and panic.

5) The purpose of terrorism is to paralyze government authorities so that they can apply the schools and/or sects adopted by terrorist groups.

According to Ali (2017), several regions in Indonesia have become arenas for terrorists such as Bali, Maluku, and Poso in the province of Central Sulawesi. The acts of terrorism in the three areas, it seems that the Poso area became the center point of terrorist acts under the name Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT). The government continued to carry out surveillance and even joint operations carried out by the Indonesian National Police and the TNI several times succeeded in arresting the movement's leaders, namely Santoso and Ali Kalora. However, like any terrorist organization in general, they have a cadre element who will take over command at any time if the commander is caught.

Factors such as delegitimization of local government, aversion, and deprivation (Ali, 2017a) which are often echoed and exaggerated by terrorists as issues to attract sympathizers, are no longer sensitive today to provoke the public. Based on observations made, today the Poso terrorists are only a small group of no more than 30 active people. Terrorists, both leaders and active members, active cadres, active supporters, and sympathizers who mingle within the community, generally come from outside Poso, especially from the island of Java. They were Indonesian citizens (WNI) who had previously gone through a series of indoctrination processes so that they were radical and intolerant before joining the guerrillas in the Poso and surrounding forests. The results of observations carried out on a regular basis indicate that the existence of those who still survive carry out their actions for some time because the network links, especially extra local and global networks are still running. Meanwhile, local networks have practically weakened and may even no longer exist because the apparatus continues to work both in countering and eradicating terrorism (Ali et al., 2017).

The terrorism network in this discussion is the connection and connectedness between certain people and other people, either individually or in groups as well as the wider community, in the domain of terrorism and terror as well as terrorists. In the model "Countering Terrorism on US Army Installations" Terrorism Organizational Structure (Ploch, 2011) consists of five elements, namely (1) the first or core elements are leaders and active members; (2) the second element of active cadres; (3) the third element of active support; (4) the fourth element of passive support; and (5) the fifth or outermost element is sympathizers in society.




Fig 1. The Anatomical Structure Of The Organization Of Terrorism

Referring to the Terrorism Organizational Structure in Figure 1, in field operations terrorists network or interact in a unique

and of course very protective. The Anatomical Structure of the Poso Terrorism Network (Ali, 2016) consists of three domains, namely (1) local networks; (2) extra local network; and (3) global network.

III. LOCAL NETWORK

Terrorism as an illegal anti-establishment movement designs and carries out its mission in a very secretive way, because they are aware that government officials through their special forces continue to counter and even pursue their groups (Helbling & Meierrieks, 2020). That is why they are always very careful in communicating so as not to be detected by the wider community because it can be valuable information for the security forces. Even internally, everything is carried out in a very secret manner. Among terrorists there are multilevel or layered slices like elements so that all accessibility can be connected and disconnected according to technical and tactical regulatory mechanisms based on these slices (Knight & Keatley, 2020). The network is indeed made in such a way as to be very complicated, on the grounds that they should not be detected by anyone except internally to ensure that logistical supplies must also continue to run (Ali et al., 2017).




Fig 2. Organizational Structure Of The Poso . Terrorism Local Network

Information: 1=reciprocal relationship between leadership and active cadres 2=reciprocal relationship between active cadres and active supporters 3= reciprocal relationship of active supporter with passive support 4 = reciprocal relationship of passive supporters with investigators 5 = one-way relationship between active cadres and sympathizers 6 = one-way relationship between active cadres and passive supporters 7 = reciprocal relationship of active supporters with sympathizers 8 = leader's one-way relationship with active supporters 9 = leader's one-way relationship to passive supporters 10 = one-way relationship between leaders and investigators.

The local network of the Poso Terrorist group (Ali, 2016) describes that terrorists, namely leaders and active members, know and know who belongs to their group and the category of quality of involvement that determines their position or membership status. However, relational accessibility is not automatically reciprocal as shown in Figure 2. Leaders and Active Members know each other and always interact with Active Cadres. Active Cadres know each other and always interact with Active Supporters. Active Supporters know each other and interact frequently with Passive Supporters. Then the Passive Supporters know everything and they know each other and often discuss with all sympathizers in the community in the Poso area and its surroundings. In order to protect various information, all of which are strictly confidential, only Leaders and Active Members (first element) and Active Cadres (second element) and Active Supporters (third element) have access to this knowledge. This does not apply to all Active Supporters. This Active

Supporting Element is a transitional element to become an Active Cadre in accordance with the levels of doctrine, radicalism, integrity, and loyalty that are manifest in him and his personality as the main requirements (Ali et al., 2021).

Elemen	Elemen-1	Elemen-2	Elemen-3	Elemen-4	Elemen-5
Elemen-1		↗	↗	↗	↗
Elemen-2	↖		↖	↖	↖
Elemen-3	↖	↗		↖	↖
Elemen-4	↖	↖	↗		↖
Elemen-5	↖	↖	↖	↗	

Fig 3. Poso Terrorism Local Network Matrix

The Poso Local Terrorism Network Matrix in Figure 3 contains four communication and information networks that are unilaterally interwoven, namely Element-1 and Element-2 against Element-3, Element-4, and Element-5. Element-1 as Leader and Active Member of the terrorist only communicates reciprocally with Element-2, namely Active Cadre. Only Active Cadres have access to Leaders and Active Members, both to convey information and logistics suppliers. As for Element-3, Element-4, and Element-5 can establish communication to convey and discuss it reciprocally.

**IV. EXTRA LOCAL NETWORK**

The Local Networks discussed in the previous section are terrorism networks within the Poso Regency area. Meanwhile, the Extra Local Network that will be presented in this section covers the area of Central Sulawesi Province, which is centered in Poso. It is known that since the outbreak of the Poso Conflict in December 1998, most of the residents of Poso Regency have fled to other districts within the Central Sulawesi Province such as Banggai, Parigi Moutong, Donggala, Sigi, Tolitoli, Morowali, and to Palu City (Ali, 2017b). Among those who fled included the families of terrorists and sympathizers who mingled in society. From there, communication and information as well as logistics continued to be channeled to the terrorist leaders and members who carried out operations in Poso (Ali et al., 2018).

As described in Figure 2, this extra local network is also very selective towards various parties and information. The main difference is that the Sympathizers in the Community (Element-5), Passive Supporters (Element-4), and Active Supporters (Element-3) know that there are friends or mujahideen (in this case terrorists) who represent them fighting for holiness in Poso. Therefore, they feel called or obligated to participate. Relationships to support various needs, especially information and logistics, are expanding and getting bigger, including moral support for the struggle. Even though they support and provide assistance, they do not know let alone know a figure called mujahideen (terrorist) whom they believe to be the enforcer of truth and holiness.

On the other hand, terrorists (leaders and members) know unscrupulous sympathizers, passive supporters, and active supporters through the information brought by Active Cadre (Element-2) as the closest and most trusted layer.

Information about these elements is needed by the leadership and its members because it must be guarded and avoided if at any time carrying out an attack. The reason is that in addition to the continuity of supply of information and logistics, they are also needed to mobilize new sympathizers to expand their network through lectures and da'wah (Basir-Cyio et al., 2019).




Fig 4. Organizational Structure of the Poso . Terrorism Extra-Local Network

Information: 1 = reciprocal relationship between leadership and active cadres 2 = reciprocal relationship between active cadres and active supporters 3 = reciprocal relationship of active supporter with passive support 4 = reciprocal relationship of passive supporters with investigators 5 = one-way relationship between active cadres and sympathizers 6 = one-way relationship between active cadres and passive supporters 7 = reciprocal relationship of active supporters with sympathizers 8 = leader's one-way relationship with active supporters 9 = leader's one-way relationship to passive supporters 10 = one-way relationship between leaders and investigators 11 = indirect one-way relationship of active support to the leader 12 = one-way indirect relationship of passive support to the leader 13 = indirect one-way relationship with sympathizers to the leader

In Figure 4 above there is a dotted line consisting of the community or sympathizers (Element-5), passive supporters (Element-4), and active supporters (Element-3), who know about the struggle and fighters (terrorists), but do not have sufficient information about who the person is. To clarify how the extra local network system through communication in the delivery of information and logistics supply while prioritizing information restrictions for security, can also be seen through Figure 5.

Elemen	Elemen-1	Elemen-2	Elemen-3	Elemen-4	Elemen-5
Elemen-1		↗	↗	↗	↗
Elemen-2	↖		↖	↖	↖
Elemen-3	↖	↗		↖	↖
Elemen-4	↖	↖	↗		↖
Elemen-5	↖	↖	↖	↗	

Figure 5. Poso . Terrorism Extra-Local Network Matrix

The relationship described in Figure 5 shows that Element-3, Element-4, and Element-5 are indirectly connected to the leader and active members, but do not know much about various things. On the other hand, with comprehensive and accurate information, leaders and active members have an understanding of who, what, and where sympathizers, passive supporters, and active supporters give their participation.

**V. NATIONAL AND GLOBAL NETWORKS**

Discourse about terrorism and terrorism is indeed a very subjective domain because it is related to beliefs, ideologies, mental attitudes, and a series of psychological symptoms that become phenomenological symptoms (Ali et al., 2020). The terrorist personality form tends to be rigid and intolerant because it is determined by radicalism which is the driving force for various interactions (Tschantret, 2020). The discussion in this section is different from the discussion on local and extra local networks because they have a very long distance of connection and are almost disconnected. The person who inspired the terrorists as perpetrators in the field is mysterious, not much information is known about it, even if there is knowledge about it, it can be suspected as manipulated information (Telford, 2020). The background issues that motivate a series of terrorist movements from a central point on a global scale tend to be in the nature of power or control, both political and economic. Executing terrorists or field actors receive distorted information through sensitive issues, for example in Indonesia, the fastest reaction is religious issues because the people are religious. In countries where the issue is intolerance, and capitalist countries are always associated with the issue of natural resource control and so on (Jarvis, 2019). The scale of the network between national and global towards the terrorism movement in Poso which tends to be unidirectional is explained as follows.




Fig 6. Organizational Structure of the National and Global Terrorism Poso . Network

Information: 1. Poso terrorists' mutual relationship with Central Sulawesi 2. Poso terrorists' reciprocal relationship with the National 3. Reciprocal relations between Central Sulawesi and National terrorists 4. Reciprocal relations between National and Global terrorists 5. Poso terrorists' one-way indirect relationship with Global 6. Global terrorist direct one-way link with Poso

Poso Local Terrorists against Extra Local networks and National networks between them know each other and know each other because of communication and even occasionally they can meet for strategic arrangement and control, including logistics that will continue to be supplied and addition or exchange of terrorists with other areas of operation and cadre. Unlike the case with mutual relations on a global scale, Poso terrorists only know through limited information that their movements are globally connected. On the other hand, terrorists at the global level obtain more information about Poso terrorism and through their network information systems. Terrorist data included in the 2016 list of the Indonesian National Police who are Indonesian citizens are 21 people. Of course, this number has changed because among terrorists, recruitment and cadre does not stop. Likewise, the number of movement points increased both on the islands of Java and Sumatra, as well as on the

island of Sulawesi itself. The number of terrorists as many as 21 Persons referred to are those who are in Element-1 namely Leaders and Active Members (see Figure 1) who have also become DPO (People's Search List) by the state security apparatus. The other four elements, namely Active Cadres, Active Supporters, Passive Supporters, and Sympathizers, which are far more numerous, are not/not yet included in the DPO (Ali, 2017b). As an indication that the terrorism movement is not only a movement in one area and only involves local interests, or only a small part in one country but is engaged in a global network on a macro scale, the identification of as many as 350 foreign nationals who are included in the DPO apparatus (State Police). Republic of Indonesia Headquarters, 2016). Although the largest number of them are from Arab countries and parts of Africa where the majority of the population is Muslim, there are also those from the Philippines as well as European and American countries which are mostly non-Muslims. Likewise, its affiliates have 71 foreign organizations and only 5 have been identified as domestic organizations, namely Jamaah Islamiyah, Al Haramain Foundation Indonesia, Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid, Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia, and Mujahidin East Indonesia. The latter is a terrorist group based in Poso (State Police of the Republic of Indonesia Headquarters, 2016). The relations in the national and global network systems as mentioned in the previous section are only one-way. Or in other words, the leaders and active members of the East Indonesia Mujahideen terrorists based in Poso, have never met, let alone comprehensively know the figures of national and global leaders who drive the terrorism they carry out. The main characters of the movement they carry out are basically mysterious, but on the contrary, they are known more by the figures at the national and global levels because it is related to support, especially funding and other logistics (Asongu et al., 2019). So great is the influence that is built in the terrorism network system because if it is studied comprehensively about the teachings that cause them to be exposed and become radical and brutal, it is suspected that most religious individuals will state that it is heretical.

Elemen	Elemen-1	Elemen-2	Elemen-3	Elemen-4
Elemen-1		←↑	←↑	---↑
Elemen-2	←↑		←↑	
Elemen-3	←↑	←↑		←↑
Elemen-4	←↑		←↑	

Fig 7. Matrix of Poso . National and Global Terrorism Networks

Figure 7 above shows that the relationship between elements is reciprocal, except Element-4 to Element-1 has very complete information, but not vice versa. Element-1, namely the leadership and active members of the Poso terrorists, is only limited to knowing that there is a highly respected and respected figure whose orders must be carried out altruistically.

## VI. CONCLUSION

The Poso Regency area, especially in the Blue Mountain area to the west of Poso City, is known as one of the spots where terrorists carry out guerrillas to carry out their brutal actions at certain moments. Terrorists who claim to be the East Indonesia Mujahidin (MIT) group are affiliated with movements and terrorism elsewhere in the country and abroad. Thus the existence of terrorism in general, they do not stand alone but are related widely and systematically, they have a network that is not easy to detect. The Poso terrorism network system consists of: 1. The network is based on its layered organizational structure consisting of leadership elements and active members, active cadres, active members, active supporters, and sympathizers. Not all elements can be freely connected to one another, some are connected in two directions back and forth and some are only one way or disconnected. This network system is tactical elementary. 2. Networks based on their scale or scope consist of local, extra-local, and global scales. The network system

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is the same, some are connected in two directions back and forth and some are one-way or disconnected. The network system is ideologically manipulative.

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