Digital Society and Islamism
in Indonesia Up to Election 2024

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Abstract — **During the 2014 and 2019 political campaigns, the Indonesian people, who are predominantly Muslim, entered an era known as the era of digital society (digital society). Digital society is characterized using electronic means in almost all areas of life, including the 2014, and 2019 until presidential elections. During the 2014 and 2019 presidential campaigns, a new force emerged that also influenced the political movement of Indonesian society, namely Islamism and then 2024 continues. Islamism is a political movement that uses Islamic symbols in winning the presidential election battle. Digital society is characterized by the strengthening use of the internet, e-mail, Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter as a means of campaigning for political ideology, interests and actors promoted by political parties, success teams and supporters of the presidential-vice presidential pair in elections. Islamic themes became one of the main themes voiced in the 2014-2019 elections by using electronic means so that they had an impact on Indonesian voters who are predominantly Muslim. This article aims to analyze the use of electronic means such as the internet, Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram on Islamic themes as a form of Islamism used in the 2014-2023 political campaign to win the presidential-vice presidential election battle in Indonesia. This article discusses the literature that shows how the networking and participation of Muslim citizens are involved in the presidential election as a form of citizen participation (civil society) as a form of political articulation of Muslims by using Islamic themes. The analysis in this article also wants to show that the participation of Muslim citizens indirectly points to the existence of the power of Islamism in social media, which is discursive with other Muslim citizens, as well as non-Muslim citizens who also participate in the political battle for the 2014-2019-2024 election. All of this shows that citizens have "emotional closeness" to the presidential-vice presidential candidate pair by using religious sentiments and networks between citizens who participate in politics as a form of citizen political participation in the Digital Society era. Articles are a method to find data and describe data from the social media database.**

Keywords — **digital era, emotional network, Islamism, citizen participation, social media**

I. INTRODUCTION

Currently it is said to be entering the digital era. An era where the use of communication technology dominates society in the world, including Indonesia. Digital user community as part of everyday life. This of course causes changes in many social events, such as politics, which are activities that consume the people of Indonesia and the world the most [1]. This is because there are many assumptions that politics is a social activity that costs a lot, is full of tricks, takes a lot of victims and does not place women on an equal footing with men. Because of this, politics gives the impression of a "negative social activity" and is full of the underworld such as bandits and the mafia [2]. This is because political activity is full of intrigue and "money politics" between the elite and businessmen and politicians and the people. There are even "political brokers" between political elites and local political elites by using the majority religion [3].

Digital society in its history did not appear suddenly but as part of the social process of an agrarian society towards an industrial society and towards a post-industrial society which no longer relies on things that are mechanical in nature and the strength of human or animal power, even machine power with strong explosives but software that is a program [4]. Thus, digital society can be said to be a social transformation from traditional to industrial and post-industrial. Digital society is a continuation of the society we used to know as a traditional (agrarian) and industrial society which was based on machine power [5]. Digital society as a form of "cyberspace" society can also create social class differences because of access to information obtained in each region or country [6].

In relation to industrial and post-industrial society, there is also a growing and developing political phenomenon that is "formalized religion" in the public sphere known as Islamism as a form of politics that wishes to present "religious law" for common interests [7]. This kind of politics is said to be an activity called Islamism which emphasizes the existence of formal forms of using Islamic attributes in many domains of social life. However, the realm of social life that gets the most influence or is "used" by those who are dominant in using formalized politics is the political dimension [8]. The politics of public space eventually becomes a kind of "political formalization of Islam" as a real form of Islamism [9].

The political conditions that lead to "formalization of Islamic law" can be seen because Indonesia as a country has a total Muslim population of 87% of the total population of Indonesia, which ranges from 270-276 million people. Where Muslims in Indonesia are most of the population [10]. Thus, all Indonesian political parties and political activists, especially Islamic politicians and Islamic parties will compete to gain the votes of Muslims in every election, including the upcoming 2024 election. Therefore, the upcoming 2024 election can also be said to be politics that will "utilize the power of Muslims" as a vote earner. This is because all presidential and vice-presidential candidates can be expected

to come from Muslim circles, both traditionalist and modernist Muslims.

The 2024 election can also be said to be an election that will be full of various "political surprises" as well as "political uproar" if it is not properly anticipated from now on. Because of the trend towards "utilization of religious identity", especially the religion professed by the majority Muslim population facing fellow Muslims because of sentiments of support for the candidate being promoted. Political practice in 2024 will likely still be dominated by "emotional politics", namely selecting presidential-vice presidential candidate pairs based on emotional attachment to the candidates, not on rational choices that can lead to the political openness and democratic civility expected by many social scientists.

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study uses a theoretical approach on digital democracy to describe digital society as well as theories about the Islamism movement that developed in the country during the 2019 election up to the 2024 election which shows a revival of Islamic sentiment in society which is driven using social media and electronic media as sentiment generators. The community against the candidates for (Bakal Calon Prsiden-Bacapres), who currently have three candidates representing the three strengths of society. With the two theoretical approaches used, it is expected to be able to explain and analyze problems connected with digital democracy and Islamism that are happening in Indonesia towards the 2024 elections.

Digital society refers to a society that is very active in using electronic means in communicating so that "space and time" are no longer a barrier in communicating between citizens in various parts of the country. Digital society is thus one of the characteristics of "electronic media users" in communicating between citizens [1]. People who are active in utilizing electronic communications are post-industrial societies since the development of the internet and various social media such as Instagram, Facebook, LinkedIn, and email. After the emergence of these electronic means, the community then switched to communication tools that were faster, efficient, and easy to change at any time according to the needs of the community [11].

Whereas Islamism is a community activity that leads to a desire to make the state or government more oriented towards Islamic "activities" such as Regional Regulations like Islamic Regulation (Perda Syariat) related to halal drinks and food, halal tourism, halal hotels, and regulations on reading and writing al- Qur'an [12]. In short, it can be said that what is called Islamism is a political activity of Muslims who prioritize Islamic "symbols" in the public sphere rather than matters of an Islamic substance. Islamism is the use of Islamic symbols in politics by slightly forgetting the substance of Islamic norms [13]. To encourage Islamism activities, initiators and supporters carry out activities that are connected between provinces, between elites, and politicians and entrepreneurs with the aim of gaining political support in the field [14].

Digital Society and Digital Democracy

Digital society is a condition of people who are very familiar with the world of communication technology as part of everyday life. There isn't a day without technology involved. Therefore, humans in the technological era can be said to be humans and society who depend on information technology, even though there are negative impacts from information that can easily be obtained [15], [16]. In fact, society in the technological era is a society with very high pressure and risk, because communication technology, especially using social media, is a "nesting place for "social ghosts" that users cannot control as evil media [17].

The development of a digital society, which has now penetrated the world of electoral politics, such as elections held in Indonesia every five years, such as presidential and vice-presidential elections and regional head elections, cannot be considered simple. Presidential elections and regional head elections use quick counts, due to the use of electronic means, so they no longer take too long [18]. The calculation becomes efficient, even though it gives a negative record, because if at the time of counting the server or electronic signals as part of information technology experience congestion [19]. However, in its development, the use of information technology facilities in the implementation of elections is unavoidable in Indonesia. This is an era where people prefer digital over manual for almost all matters.

Of course, there are other positive and negative sides of using communication technology facilities in the implementation of Indonesian elections. One positive side is that it is effective and efficient in terms of vote counting time, unlike when using manual counting, humans count the ballots one by one because of the voting [20]. Meanwhile, one of the negative dimensions is that control over the misuse of tools by Election executors or committees is almost impossible for those who do not serve as election executors because they do not directly deal with the vote counting tools. One of them is if there is manipulation of the number of ballots for the benefit of the election winner. Of course, the implementation and voters do not intend to manipulate votes, but the negative elements of digital democracy are of course the responsibility of all parties to avoid them [15].

But apart from the negative dimensions of the use of information technology facilities in the era of digital society, it can be said that digital democracy will one day be the choice of the world community, including Indonesia, with a large enough population and a very large number of provinces and a very wide national territory [17], [21]. By using communication technology facilities, digital democracy can be said to be the most profitable political tool, especially for people who have good access to communication technology. Meanwhile, people who lack communication technology skills in the digital democracy era will eventually become a society that is "left behind in digital democracy". Thus, digital society will eventually use digital democracy as a choice for implementing elections in the future [22].

The growth of digital democracy has been carried out in various European countries such as England, Sweden, Norway, France, the Netherlands, Finland and Malaysia. In these countries, the public elects a candidate for Prime Minister through electronic means provided by the election organizing committee in each province [23]. People don't even need to come to the polling place, they just need to use the election application that has been provided by the committee so that they can vote from each person's home or office or place of work. Therefore, people can easily vote

without wasting much time going to the polls. The use of electronic means in the implementation of elections is an election that can be said to be effective, efficient and makes it easier for the community [5].

Islamism Sentiment

Sentiment Islamism occurs due to encouragement from political elites and Muslim political activists who wish to become symbols of Islam in the country as a whole or in part in the state system. This kind of enthusiasm has started since the Islamic revolution of Iran in 1979 when the Reza Pahlavi regime was overthrown by Mullahs who were highly respected throughout Iran [24]. At that time, Mullahs like Imam Khomeini and Murtadha Motahari, with the support of Iranian scholars and people, demonstrated to overthrow the authoritarian Pahlavi regime. Apart from that, there was also the overthrow of Hosni Moubarak in Egypt by the Islamist group because they considered Hosni Moubarak to lead Egypt in a secular way. After various incidents, Islamism continues to run as in Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, and Afghanistan until now [25].

The development of such Islamism apparently also occurred in Indonesia. In the 2014 and 2019 elections as well as regional head elections in several provinces and regencies, the use of Islamic symbols has become an integral part of electoral politics. Presidential candidates in the 2014 and 2019 elections used Islamic symbols to bring down their political opponents [26]. Likewise, regional head elections in several provinces also use the power of Islamic symbols to bring down their political opponents. In fact, Islamic symbols are used by political parties that are not directly affiliated with Islam, such as PKS and PPP, but the Gerindra Party, Democratic Party and PDIP Perjuangan. Both political parties affiliated with Islam and not use Islamic symbols to gain political support from the majority Muslim community, such as in West Nusa Tenggara, West Java, East Java, West Sumatra, South Kalimantan and DKI Jakarta [27].

The interesting about the use of Islamic symbols in the electoral political process is that people are eroded by various kinds of expressions and videos that are often uploaded by the success team of presidential candidates and regional head pairs, so that society becomes socially segregated, especially on social media and society. Urban social media users [28]. Meanwhile, in rural communities who are not users of social media, the cases of the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections, as well as the 2014 and 2019 regional head elections, did not cause social segregation. This is because they are "free from the political burden of social media". Islamic social sentiment can be said to occur in urban community groups who use massive and emotional social media [29]. Meanwhile, in rural communities who do not use social media, they are not infected with the disease "religious social sentiment".

The use of Islamic sentiments is understandable because Indonesia is predominantly Muslim. Even if it does not mean that the use of Islamic sentiments can be justified, because by using Islamic sentiments, it means those who are not Muslim are outside the "group of Muslims who are the target of the campaign" [30]. Even though it is known that Indonesia is not only inhabited by Muslims. Indonesia is a country not based on a particular religion as proclaimed by our founding father and mother at the time of independence [31]. Especially if by using Islamic sentiment with the aim of eliminating non-Islamic groups or groups that are not supporters of Islamists.

Such a thing, of course, cannot be said to be a just and civilized democratic process without discriminating between "citizens political rights" [26].

Islamism seems to have continued to grow until now in Indonesia in the regional head election and is likely to occur again in the upcoming 2014 presidential election because the prospective presidential candidates, as stated above, represent three groups of people. Therefore, if it is not properly anticipated, the possibility of social segregation due to the impact of using social media in building Islamic sentiment will get stronger [32]. The direction towards that direction has begun to appear in the sentimental expressions of Islamic and non-Islamic tones aimed at the presidential candidates that have appeared on the surface. Will the power of Islamic sentiment win the presidential election in 2024 or will it become a source of defeat that we will see in time?

Religious Networking

After using Islamic sentiments in political battles such as presidential elections and regional head elections, another thing that is of concern is the use of religious (Islamic) networks as vehicles for winning in battles. The use of Islamic groups with all their attributes is considered capable of putting pressure on political opponents who do not use religious vehicles in elections [33]. Conservatism groups are often used by those who like to use the majority religion as a driving force to win the election battle. However, not all religious groups can be "tamed" to become vote prospectors in elections, so groups that do not use religious symbols always lose the battle [34].

In the case of the 2014 and 2019 Indonesian Presidential Elections, the support groups that used Islamic attributes even suffered defeat from groups that did not use Islamic attributes. In the 2014 election, Prabowo Subiyanto, who was partnered with Hatta Rajasa, lost to the Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla pair. Meanwhile, in the 2019 elections, Prabowo, who was partnered with Shandiaga Uno, also lost to the Jokowi-Ma'ruf. It is known that the Prabowo-Hatta and Prabowo-Shandi were pairs that used Islamic attributes to gain votes, but in the end, they lost to Jokowi-JK and Jokowi-Ma'ruf who did not use Islamic attributes in the two elections [35].

Therefore, it is interesting to pay attention to the context of the Indonesian elections in 2024. Will there be a presidential-wapres candidate pair that will use Islamic attributes to gain votes, even though in the previous two elections they lost? If this continues, won't it repeat the third defeat? Especially if in the upcoming 2024 election all presidential-vice presidential candidate pairs are figures close to Islam in Indonesia [36]. Thus, it can be said that if you continue to use Islamic attributes by utilizing a network of "established" Islamic organizations and conservatism, then it can be said that this will only prolong religious sentiment which results in social segregation in the social media space [37].

In addition, the strength of religious networks will only be in urban areas that have strong social media access. Whereas in rural areas where access to social media is not easy, the power of religious networks will not have much effect on the votes for the 2024 election. It's just that "there is excessive fear" of the use of the power of religious networks in winning the 2024 elections, by using the existing religious networks in Indonesia, especially the Islamic network [38].

The fear over the use of Islamic networks is understandable because it often gives rise to social hatreds that are uploaded on social media in a vulgar manner.

III. CONCLUSION

After describing the existence of social society and Islamism in Indonesia in the 2014 and 2019 elections, ahead of the 2024 elections until the possibility of the 2024 elections, it can be said that Indonesian society cannot be separated from the use of electronic media, especially social media in national politics and local politics. The use of social media and electronic media will mainly be carried out among urban communities who have easy access to information and electronics. Meanwhile, in rural communities the use of social media will not be carried out much because of the difficulty in getting access to information through the internet network.

In addition, the influence of social media can also be said to be influential in urban communities who actively use social media. Especially supporters who have "Islamic sentiment" in accordance with presidential candidates and regional heads. Whereas in people who do not have "Islamic sentiment", social media will not influence their attitudes and actions in determining their choices. In fact, it will further strengthen solidarity not to vote for those who use "Islamic sentiment".

In the upcoming 2024 election, Islamic sentiment will continue to be used by using social media and other digital media to gain the votes of Muslims. The Islamic network will also be used in every province throughout Indonesia, but it is not certain that it will be able to gain the candidate's votes to win the battle. In fact, if one is not careful, the use of Islamic sentiment and Islamic networks will worsen the vote acquisition of the candidates being promoted in the upcoming 2024 election.

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