



# Model of Institutionalization of PDIP, PKS and Golkar Political Parties in Minimizing Money Politics (Case Study of Mataram City DPC and East Lombok DPC)

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
**Abstract .** The research aims to identify the institutional models of PDIP, PKS, and Golkar in the Mataram City DPC and East Lombok DPC to minimize the practice of money politics and assess the effectiveness of implementing institutional models in each party. This research method uses a qualitative approach based on case studies at the Mataram City DPC and East Lombok DPC. Data collection techniques were carried out through in-depth interviews, observation and analysis of official party documents related to institutionalization. The data obtained was then analyzed and processed using NVivo 12 Plus. The research results revealed that in Mataram City and East Lombok Regency, PDIP, PKS and Golkar implemented political recruitment mechanisms according to their principles. PDIP focuses on candidate background checks and intensive training, with regulated campaign funding. PKS emphasizes political and educational development with flexible campaign funding. Golkar has a coaching system with special requirements for legislative candidates through its cadre groups. However, the practice of money politics needs to be further improved because candidates who have a strong financial background, especially those from the business world, have a significant advantage. They have the resources to invest in a broad and promising campaign, thereby increasing their chances of being elected compared to other candidates who may have fewer resources.

**Keywords:** Institutional Model, Political Parties, Money Politics

## 1 INTRODUCTION

Money politics has become a very important issue in Indonesia in recent years. This practice has undermined democracy in the country in a serious way. One of the main impacts of money politics is its ability to influence the results of general elections. As a result, elected leaders are not always the best people or have strong integrity, but rather those who are able to disburse large amounts of money. This of course guarantees the integrity of general elections as a mechanism for selecting quality leaders. Apart


from that, the practice of money politics can also make public costs very expensive [1]. Giving political dowries to political parties is one of the most common forms of money politics. This results in huge financial pressure on political parties, which then have to raise funds in ways that are not always transparent. The impact is an increase in overall political costs, which are ultimately borne by society through taxes or political donations of unclear origin. Overall, money politics is a serious problem in Indonesia that must be addressed immediately to maintain the integrity of democracy and elections in this country [2].



**Fig. 1.** Cases of Money Politics Practices in 2020

*Source: Processed by researchers (2023)*

Based on data from the General Election Supervisory Agency of the Republic of Indonesia, it reflects the serious impact of the practice of money politics in the context of general elections in Indonesia. According to this data, there are 262 cases of alleged violations of money politics that have reached the review and investigation stage, of which 197 came from reports made by the public, while the other 65 cases were the direct results of Bawaslu's findings during the simultaneous regional elections in 2020 [3]. This data underscores the high level of attention to the issue of money politics and illustrates that election monitoring institutions such as Bawaslu and especially political parties play an important role in uncovering and addressing such violations to ensure election integrity and stronger democracy in Indonesia.



**Fig. 2.** Respondents' Level of Trust in State/Political Institutions (June 2022)

*Source: Processed by researchers (2023)*

Look at the survey results in Figure 2, only 56.6% of respondents expressed their trust in political parties. This figure shows the relatively low level of trust in political parties in Indonesia. On the other hand, the survey also noted that the Indonesian National Army (TNI) received a much higher level of trust, reaching 93.3% of respondents [4]. This illustrates that the TNI has a significant level of trust among Indonesian society, while political parties face challenges in winning public trust. This data indicates the importance for political parties to improve transparency and the quality of their services in order to gain greater support from the public.

Political parties must play an important role in efforts to prevent money politics in general elections. This involves ongoing coaching of party members and their constituents, as well as increasing public participation in the strategic policy-making process in parliament. Preventive efforts carried out by political parties will help maintain constituent loyalty, reduce the potential for voter mass drift, and strengthen democracy. Meanwhile, the government also has an important role in preventing money politics by implementing fair and equitable policies and prioritizing awareness of political education and citizens' rights as an integral part of government programs [5] [6].

Subjective political culture in Indonesia, such as patron-client, has a significant impact on the practice of money politics in general elections. This culture reinforces hierarchical relationships between leaders and their supporters, with leaders gaining loyalty and financial support in exchange for policies or favors. Efforts to eliminate the patron-client culture are not only an important step to prevent the practice of money politics, but also to reduce the dominative, manipulative and corrupt behavior of regional heads after being elected. One clear example of the practice of money politics is giving political dowries to political parties, which not only damages democracy by prioritizing money over the quality of leaders, but also makes political costs in Indonesia expensive. Therefore, political culture reform is the key to building a cleaner and more transparent general election system [7].

In an effort to realize a democratic election process, collaboration between political parties and the government is very important to prevent the practice of political money in elections. Political parties need to take concrete steps, such as strengthening institutions by opening open recruitment for young people, giving them real opportunities to actively participate in political party structures, and thereby enriching perspectives in decision making. Apart from that, increasing transparency in the financial management of political parties is also an important aspect, so that the public can understand the sources and use of party funds more clearly. Thus, cooperation between political parties and the government in creating a more transparent and participatory political environment will be an important basis for maintaining election integrity and strengthening democracy in Indonesia [8].

Political parties, as an important pillar in the democratic system, are described in a number of crucial problems related to money politics, namely in a proportional open list system, political parties and legislative candidates must prepare resources capable of competing, including sufficient funds, so that political money often becomes part of the preparation of the "ammunition". The primary responsibility for preventing political

money falls to political parties, which need to take steps to prevent their members from engaging in this practice. Money politics also carries the risk of corruption, as candidates may feel compelled to exploit their position for personal gain in order to recoup campaign costs. A further impact is its influence on voters, where money politics can influence their choices based on the money a candidate receives, rather than their qualifications or appropriate political platform. As a result, the democratic process can be disrupted, with voters perhaps no longer making decisions based on rational considerations, but only based on the money that flows [9] [10].

This research aims to analyze the institutional model of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and the Golongan Karya Party (Golkar) which play a role in minimizing the practice of money politics. Using case studies of the Mataram City DPC and the East Lombok DPC, this research seeks to understand the concrete steps taken by these third parties in dealing with political money at the local level and the extent to which party institutionalization contributes to these efforts. Measured from the structural aspects of values, which include: (1) System Level, and (2) Value Inclusion.

## 2 METHOD


The research study focuses on looking at the institutionalization of political parties in their role in minimizing the impact of money politics. The objects of this research are the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and the Golongan Karya Party (Golkar).



**Fig. 3.** Political parties are the object of research

*Source: Processed by researchers (2023)*

Meanwhile, the specific locations for this research are the Mataram City Branch Representative Council and the East Lombok Regency Branch Representative Council. The object of research is the Chair of the DPC in each third party (PDIP, PKS, Golkar). The selection of this object is based on party administrators at the regional level as strategic actors in constructing political parties to minimize the practice of money politics and adhere to party ideals. This research uses a qualitative approach that uses content analysis techniques to identify the institutionalization model of each party sourced from observations, field interviews and official political party documents. Qualitative data analysis was carried out with NVivo 12 Plus software.




**Fig. 4.** Data Analysis Techniques with NVivo 12 Plus

*Source: Processed by researchers (2023)*

### 3 RESULT AND DISCUSSION

#### 3.1 Tier System

In the context of political parties, the system level refers to the level of order, institutions and coordination that exist within a political party. To increase the level of systematicity, efforts need to be made to strengthen order, institutions and coordination between political parties, party members and voters [11]. These efforts include improving the institutionalization process, participation of party members, and communication between parties and voters. Therefore, for a political party to function effectively and efficiently, they need to increase the level of systematicity in their institutionalization process. The Systemness Level includes questions about the qualifications and requirements to become a legislative candidate, one of the questions that appears in this indicator.



**Fig. 5.** Internal Regulations of Political Parties in the Selection of Legislative Candidates

*Source: Processed by researchers using NVivo 12 Plus (2023)*

The party that followed more complete formal rules in the legislative candidate selection process was the PDI-Perjuangan party which managed to achieve a fairly high percentage of votes, reaching 48%. Although the PDI-Perjuangan Party does not provide explicit details regarding the candidate selection mechanism in the Party's Articles of Association or the Party's technical rules, detailed procedures have been clearly regulated. The Golkar Party has official provisions in the Party's Articles of Association or in the Party's technical regulations, and also has special Party regulations that regulate the steps in determining the selection process for regional head candidates. Meanwhile,

the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) regulates the procedures for selecting regional head candidates in the Party's Articles of Association or in the Party's technical regulations. However, until now PKS does not have party regulations that specifically regulate the process of selecting legislative candidates, which must be open and democratic.




**Fig. 6.** Keywords in Selection of Legislative Candidates in (PDIP, PKS, Golkar)

*Source: Processed by researchers using NVivo 12 Plus (2023)*

In Figure 6 above, it can be explained that the PDIP-Perjuangan Party displays the keywords; party cadres, and ideology. while the Golkar Party came up with the keywords; humanitarian and moderate. Meanwhile, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) displays the keyword trust. Overall, frequency of word usage generates keywords; Trustworthy, visionary and innovative are the keywords in the selection process for legislative candidates for the PDIP, PKS and Golkar parties.

### 3.2 Infusion Rate Value


At the local level, there are personal networks and elite party organizations that play an important role in politics [13] [14] . Political parties also play an important role in local politics. They are responsible for recruiting and selecting candidates for public office, and they often have localized decision-making processes involving constituents and party officials [15] .



**Fig. 7.** Background of Legislative Candidates in Mataram City and East Lombok Regency

*Source: Processed by researchers using NVivo 12 Plus (2023)*

Figure 6 depicts the professional background of the 2024 legislative candidates in Mataram City and East Lombok Regency from PDIP, PKS and Golkar. In the legislative elections in the Mataram City and East Lombok Regency electoral districts, legislative candidates from the PDIP, PKS and Golkar parties displayed a variety of professional backgrounds. From the third political party, there are 22 people from business backgrounds, 9 lawyers, 9 academics, 6 Instagram celebrities and 11 social activists. In line with the concept of elite circulation, the dominance of entrepreneurs in the list of legislative candidates indicates the hostility of business elites in the political arena, which has a significant impact on policy direction and decision making. In conclusion, although there is representation from various professional backgrounds, the significant presence of entrepreneurs indicates the continuity of business elites in politics. This shows the potential for this elite group to influence policy in favor of business interests, given their strong position in the political and economic structure.



**Fig. 8.** Considerations of Political Parties (PDIP, PKS, Golkar) in Determining Legislative Candidates from Entrepreneurs in Mataram City and East Lombok Regency


*Source: Processed by researchers (2023)*

The potential for big wins among entrepreneurs is caused by a number of factors, but the most prominent is their excellent logistics capabilities. In the context of elections, logistics can mean access to significant financial resources, extensive networks, and the ability to organize an effective campaign. This advantage allows them to promote themselves more widely, reach voters in various regions, and communicate their vision and mission more efficiently. For supporting political parties, supporting candidates from business circles can be a profitable strategy. A positive electoral effect means that the party has a greater chance of getting votes and seats in the legislative body. Apart from that, support from entrepreneurs can also increase the party's credibility in terms of economic and development capabilities. However, it is important for political parties to maintain their integrity and not be too dependent on one elite group, so that they can represent the interests of all levels of society.

Opening opportunities for the business sector to create political investment portfolio elections by implementing financial incentive strategies and personal access. By donating funds to parties or executive and legislative candidates (financial incentives), or placing company officials in public, executive or legislative positions (personal access), access to management, defense and maintenance domains will be more guaranteed.

The involvement of local elites in political parties can limit the number of potential candidates and cause the circulation of political elites not to run smoothly [16]. Overall, the involvement of personal networks and elite party organizations in local politics can have both positive and negative effects. While they can provide valuable support and resources to politicians, they can also limit the diversity of candidates and lead to the concentration of power among a small elite group.

Political party networks can be an alternative for achieving democratic accountability [17]. In this context, an effective political party network is one that is able to filter the interests of ordinary people to political party elites. This shows that personal networks and elite party organizations at the local level can play an important role in building effective political party networks.



**Fig. 9.** Personal Networks and Organizations of Party Elites at the Local Level

*Source: Processed by researchers using NVivo 12 Plus (2023)*

Figure 8 depicts the main entities that hold control in the PDIP, PKS and Golkar political networks in Mataram City and East Lombok Regency. The business sector and bureaucracy are the groups that dominate the networks of these parties. PDIP and PKS have strong ties to the business sector, while Golkar is more linked to bureaucrats. The involvement of political elites in these large entities increases interest in the selection of legislative candidates. Several groups in this network can influence the decision-making process in political parties [18].

### 3.3 Collective Action and Rational Choice in the selection of legislative candidates

An institutionalism approach based on rational choice provides an understanding of the social nature, structure and actions of individuals within an institution. Through this lens, institutions are defined as sets of rules and incentives that create boundaries of rationality. In this context, political actors are interdependent in terms of functionality. Although every politician is oriented towards self-interest, the choices they have are



limited. Individuals act with constraints because they function under rules established by one or more institutions. However, there is an understanding that the aspirations of small groups can only be realized through joint action within the wider group, an approach known as collective thinking [19]. Apart from being influenced by collective thinking, decisions based on rational choices in achieving goals are also influenced by the size and diversity of the group [20].

Institutional performance is determined by the diversity and scale of the group. Individuals in groups who utilize resources together face various opportunities and obstacles. Groups that have high levels of natural wealth tend to form institutions that facilitate mutual benefit, complement each other, and strengthen the basis for collective action. While larger groups may have greater transaction costs, they also have the capacity to use more shared resources compared to small groups engaged in joint action. The use of these shared resources is regulated by internal group agreements in their collective actions [21] [22].

In its application, the collective action view will determine how the rational choice-based institutionalism approach is applied to three institutional models in selecting legislative candidates in political parties, which include principal-agent, game-theory, and rule-based [23].

### **3.4 Principal-Agent Model**

The institutionalism approach based on rational choice has two key aspects: first, how institutions regulate and influence actor behavior; and second, how these actors try to use institutions to achieve their interests [24]. Even though actors feel that existing institutions do not support the achievement of their goals, there will still be initiatives to change the institutional structure [25].

Political party leaders will refer to organizational rules when achieving goals, while legislative candidates will look for loopholes in party regulations to gain support. If the second party, namely the leader of the prospective party and the legislature, feels that the party and its regulations do not support the achievement of their goals, they will implement changes in regulations or institutional norms. Party leaders provide special opportunities for legislative candidates, which can ultimately benefit both individuals and groups.

### **3.5 Game Theory Models**

The principal-agent model does not offer a balanced relationship between the leader (principal) and his subordinates (agent). There are levels in the relationship between principal and agent. On the other hand, in the position game model, all political actors have comparable interests based on their own interests. Interactions between actors follow the rules set by the competent authority. These rules contain a series of incentives and obstacles that influence parties in achieving advantages in the political arena. In the process of selecting legislative candidates, a new political identity can be formed by the candidate by obtaining support from party mechanisms. If such support is not obtained, candidates with large capital, especially those from the business world, have a chance

with a different political identity. In line with this, there is a balanced relationship between party branch leaders and legislative candidates. Candidates are not just representatives arranged by party leaders. Every political actor moves according to their agenda and interests. Legislative candidates with a business background are a priority for political parties when looking for candidates. This approach stimulates competition between political parties.

### **3.6 Rule Based Models**

The rule-based model emphasizes institutional aspects and no longer focuses on the interests of individual actors. This model overhauls interaction patterns that depend on free market mechanisms, which tend to be competitive in nature. Institutions are implemented to address market deficiencies in the management of shared resources (Ostrom, 2015). Without clear regulations, it becomes difficult for regional head candidates to take advantage of the opportunities provided by political party regulations to gain support. When the main actors, both political party leaders and regional head candidates, think that the political party and its internal regulations are unable to support the achievement of their goals, both will push for changes in the main regulations or rules that apply. Political party leaders can also give special treatment to regional head candidates, which may have personal or group benefits. This aims to control the behavior of the actors so that a balanced situation is created and does not interfere with common interests. The main institutions and regulations themselves are formed with the aim of achieving balance and stability in the organization. Agreement on these key rules will help control the irrational actions of actors and reduce the level of darkness.

In the process of selecting candidates, all political parties have issued official regulations governing the selection and stages of legislative elections to prevent unwanted political practices of candidates using money. The mechanism for selecting candidates is usually regulated in the Party's Articles of Association or in the Party's technical regulations, as well as in the political party's organizational guidelines. These rules cover various aspects, such as selection procedures, requirements, stages and implementation of candidate selection. The more detailed and clear the selection rules are and the stronger the commitment to implementing these rules, the higher the legitimacy of every decision taken by the leadership of a political party. Political parties that have a strong candidate selection system will usually not face internal resistance from their members to the decisions they make.

The problem faced is whether all regulations and formal institutions can run efficiently in the entire selection process for legislative candidates. In practice, the official regulations that exist in the organizational structure of political parties are often still the object of negotiation by the informal behavior of political party leaders, elites and candidates. The process of stages, selection mechanisms, as well as requirements for obtaining legal support, often give advantages to certain political networks and groups. Some candidates can even reach party leadership positions at the national level without having to go through a selection process at the local level as a shortcut.

### 3.7 Legislative candidate entities shape the practice of money politics

Money politics is a form of campaign violation where supporters, cadres, or even political party officials give money to voters before election day (Satria, 2019). An open proportional electoral system designed to represent a true representation of society, has ironically opened the door to the prevalence of money politics. Under this system, candidates from the same party are in a competitive situation with each other to gain voter support (Ismail, 2020). This creates an environment where there is pressure to attract and captivate voters, and one way to do this is through large amounts of funding. In this scenario, candidates with a strong financial background, especially those from the business world, have a significant advantage. They have the resources to invest in a broad and promising campaign, increasing their chances of being elected compared to other candidates who may have fewer resources.

## 4 Conclusion

The institutionalism approach emphasizes that political party actors consist of a group of individuals who have a pragmatic orientation. When they interact with a political institution, the decisions they make are influenced by external factors. In this context, their attitudes can be changed through cooperative interactions within the institution. The individual consciousness of political party elites, which was originally irrational for the sake of individual interests, changed to become rational for the sake of the common interest. Collective action views institutions as tools for organizing relations between political actors and achieving their common goals. The election of legislative candidates by political parties is a concrete example of joint action which is influenced by the Level of Systemness and Level of Value Infusion. The rational choice institutionalism approach through the principal-agent concept, game theory, and rule-based models in practice can reveal the dynamics in the selection of legislative candidates by political parties. This rational choice institutionalism approach can also minimize the practice of money politics in the selection and selection process for legislative candidates.

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