



Defense as an Economic Problem from an Archipelagic Perspective: The Indonesian Case

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Abstract. Indonesia occupies the strategic region of Southeast Asia, which is not only one concept, but it is also a body of knowledge. The region covers a land and maritime sphere that Indonesia adopted as an archipelagic state. Consequently, a critical issue for Indonesia reflects some crucial threats such as maritime disputes, maritime piracy, and maritime terrorists. As an archipelagic state in the context of Southeast Asia, Indonesia views the importance of maritime security, defense, and economy to develop maritime defense according to the highest preference of Indonesia's maritime perspective. It aimed to resolve maritime challenges containing maritime threats. This article explores the importance of that preference in developing Indonesia's maritime defense. Its methodology refers to the usage of conceptual public good that is produced on the basis of the archipelagic perspective. There is a choice between maritime power and land power. The main findings are twofold. Firstly, conceptually, the defensive platform of this maritime defense is based on two cells which there is Global Maritime Fulcrum and the macro-region of the Indo-Pacific. Substantively, maritime defense is assumed to be defense as an economic problem. Secondly, as a public good, Indonesia's government develops maritime defense based on archipelagic preference to ensure continuing Indonesia's archipelagic state to achieve welfare conditions for its people.

Keywords: Indonesia, archipelagic state, maritime defense, global maritime fulcrum.

INTRODUCTION

Please note that the first paragraph of a section or subsection is not indented. The first paragraphs that follows a table, figure, equation etc. does not have an indent, either. Subsequent paragraphs, however, are indented. Southeast Asia is not only a region, but it explicitly appears more as a body of knowledge [1], [2]. As a regional concept that referred to the early regional organization [3], [4]. until current subregional cooperation [5], it may expose colonialism and imperialism [6],[7],[8],[9], state formation [10], nationalism [11],[12],[13], economic development [14], democracy [15],[16],[17], conflict [18],[19],[20],[21],[22], archipelagic state [23],[24], and maritime security [25],[26],[27],[28].

This paper concerns an academic endeavor to develop a block of the archipelagic state in producing its national defense [29],[30],[31], in Southeast Asia. This is of course a breakthrough in defense economics with a touch of archipelagic perspective which this perspective may offer different views. Moreover, there is no economist

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exploring this focus in defense economics [32],[33]. There are complicated relations between maritime security, defense, and economy in a theoretical framework of archipelagic perspective based on a locus of Southeast Asian seascapes [34],[35],[36],[37]

Southeast Asia region consists of not only mainland Asia, but it is also the maritime sphere or seascape urging security options [38]. It is more important that those strategic challenges expose maritime security in Southeast Asia insisting on security imperatives. These crucial considerations refer to maritime disputes, maritime piracy, and maritime terrorists, maritime conflicts [39],[40],[41],[28]. Cross interactions among conflictual parties reflect more threats in the Southeast Asian maritime region tending to trigger the involvement of external actors in maritime competition than other issues [42],[43]. The area conflict covers the Malacca Straits, the South China Sea, and the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas which expose continuing seascape.

Besides those critical issues that are the most insecure, borders in the Southeast Asia region are porous borders[44]. Both for land border and sea border, there is especially no maritime delimitation in the area in which they are still in negotiations. Some parties apply different approaches to delimit their maritime boundaries [45]. This development may potentially create maritime conflicts in Southeast Asia in a more complicated and unstructured. The expression of maritime conflict in the Southeast Asian region describes acute problems of maritime security in the area with many actors, overlapping strategic issues, and conflictual interests.

Those problematic maritime securities in Southeast Asia urge some countries in the region to enhance their defense and economy. These relations of maritime security, defense, and economy reflect a crucial debat regarding how to allocate economic resources in producing national defense from an archipelagic perspective on one side, and how enhancing maritime defense stimulates maritime resources in order to achieve the welfare of the Indonesian people. This is the reason why there is a need for a sort of maritime defense stronger and more sustainable. This paper aims to elaborate on defense as an economic problem from an archipelagic perspective in two directions. The first direction concentrates on allocating economic resources to build a stronger and more sustainable maritime defense. The second direction focuses on bringing maritime resources that can generate the national economy in order to achieve the welfare of Indonesia's people.

The regional context of Indonesia refers to the Southeast Asia region. What's happening in Southeast Asia supposes some interesting features. Firstly, countries in this region firmly grasp strong nationalism and tight political identity [46]. Secondly, there is sustainable competition among external factors such as the United States of America (USA) and China [47]. This competition is not new from historical notes. Thirdly, this region now is the most interesting region because regional governance initiated by ASEAN has established stability and sustainable development in the region [48]. Countries in this region commit to creating this region as a peace generator. Fourth, some countries established subregional cooperation such as GMS [49]. IMT-GT, BIMP-EAGA [50], dan TIA-GT [51]. Fifth, the region is continuously very close to the conflict source of the South China Sea [52].

Besides many factors such as political, social, and economic sources influence the performance of one country's national defense, but its national defense also mainly

rests on economic factors especially budget [53]. In producing this public good, the country uses its geopolitical position close to its regional context in

formulating its national defense to allocate its national resources and finally to achieve military capability [54].

Allocation of national resources implicates both the mobility of human and capital resources to spread in national territory. The mobility of all types of national resources will achieve the military capability based on maritime defense reflecting some opportunities serious handicaps for Indonesia in the future.

Indonesia as an archipelagic state gives high priority to relations between maritime security, defense, and economy. Now and in the future, Indonesia applies an archipelagic perspective to the actualization of its maritime security in formulating both optimal national defense based on the sustainable allocation of national resources for maritime defense. Moreover, Indonesia has committed to improving society's welfare. It is very interesting how Indonesia engages in these interests and how Indonesia handles some handicaps.

INDONESIA'S STRUGGLE FOR THE STATUS OF AN ARCHIPELAGIC STATE.

Since Independence Day August 17, 1945, the existence of Indonesia as a sovereign state in international society is still nil based on there is no acknowledgment from the Dutch about the Indonesian independence. Since the event, there has been a conflict between Indonesia and the colonial power of the Dutch in the Indies [55]. Together with those conflicts some Arab countries give de facto recognition to the new Indonesian state because there is no impossible to reach de jure recognition [56]. Finally, this conflict invites third parties to be involved in this conflict in which the UN was supposed to be involved in solving the Indonesia-Dutch dispute [57]. Indonesia has struggled for recognition from the Dutch government through diplomacy and sometimes he launched the war. This is the first revolution for Indonesian independence [58] which it is can be categorized as the First Republic reflecting the war independence as a sovereign state.

After that time, Indonesia ideologically experienced acute political conflict and deemed domestic instability [59]. Nevertheless, in this era, Indonesia was declared an archipelagic state in the form of the Djuanda Declaration in 1957 [60]. The Declaration of 1957 states that Indonesia is an archipelagic state having its own characteristic behavior which formed unity. Furthermore, Indonesia was against the Dutch East Indies Ordonantie 1939 which was able to break Indonesia's territorial integrity. The Djuanda Declaration of 1957 only states that the sea is the unifying territory of Indonesia. Moreover, an archipelagic state means that the sea is not only a factor of unity or integral of national territory. It is also that the seas must be a protector for the islands. Therefore, the sea has two functions that is unity function and the protector function.

Those functions were ignored during the period which is well known as the Second Republic which carries parliamentary government. During this Second Republic, Indonesia failed in its experiments of parliamentarian government [61], but it is assumed a transition era in Indonesia's political development to the Guided Democracy experiment [62]. Unfortunately, President Soekarno started to dominate political life under his powerful regime as well-known the Old Order [63]. Indonesia under President

Soekarno is Third Republic which increasing conflict between domestic political camps. This period ended with the power of President Soekarno.

Continuing Indonesia refers to the change of regime when President Soeharto continues a powerful regime type under the New Order [64]. This is the Fourth Republic which refers to concentrating on economic development with controlled political development. It is a fact that this period initiated to submission status of the archipelagic state during the negotiation of the Law of Sea. Firstly, the Indonesian government under the New Order developed *Wawasan Nusantara* as an Indonesian worldview [36]. After that, Indonesia began to introduce the archipelagic concept to the international community at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958. After Indonesia's team negotiator spiritly endeavors in those conference series, those conferences reached a monumental agreement of the sea titled United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea in 1982 [65]. The Indonesian archipelagic status was internationally acknowledged through the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea in 1982 (UNCLOS 1982).

Unfortunately, this regime then ignores the consequences of archipelagic state status so the actualization of Indonesia as an archipelagic state has declined. This condition is the first type of failure of maritime defense. Based on the *Djuanda Declaration* of 1954 then acknowledged by the UNCLOS 1982, Indonesia has a unified national territory that integrated the whole of territory consisting of islands and waters [66]. Indonesia's border waters cover international borders with ten neighboring countries [67] in the Andaman Sea, Malacca Straits, South China's Sea, Sulu Sulawesi Seas, the Philippine Sea, the Timor Sea, and the Indian Ocean which those border waters generate maritime threats.

Indonesia needs to negotiate the maritime border delimitation through bilateral meetings with them. It is a long process and of course, also it contains difficult and crucial issues. Indonesia involves long and sensitive negotiations to delimit maritime boundaries with several countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, Papua New Guinea (PNG), and Timor-Leste [68]. Currently, Indonesia and Vietnam have agreed on the bilateral maritime boundary delimitation in the South China Sea based on the 1982 UNCLOS. They signed on December 22, 202 in Jakarta, after they had negotiated for 12 years [69]. It is important that this bilateral agreement is the result of the Indonesia-Vietnam Strategic Partnership signed in Hanoi in 2019. Prior to this, there was a successful bilateral mechanism of long-dormant negotiation of Indonesia-Philippines diplomacy in delimiting the maritime boundary in the South China Sea. Both countries signed the agreement on May 23, 2014, in Manila [70].

Three of them are the most critical for maritime security. Malacca Straits is an international border area between Indonesia with Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore. As part of the Southeast Asian region, the Malacca Straits expose maritime threats in the form of piracy, and maritime terrorism [71]. Moreover, there is an open occasion to launch multilateral cooperation [72] while it contains limitations [73]. The South China Sea is the border between the Southeast Asian region with its external area. It extremely involves some parties as claimant states of the South China Sea [74],[75],[76]. This condition invites other external actors mainly such as the US and its allies to intervene in military presence in the Southeast Asian region [77],[78],[79],[80]. In the Sulu Sulawesi Seas, there is an asymmetric maritime threat in the tri-border area covering the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas [81]. This includes the existence

of the Sulu arms market aggravating and deepening the maritime threats in the area [82],[83].

Besides those preferences, Indonesia has types of archipelagic sea lanes in the West, Middle, and East of Indonesia. It is intended to realize the right of passage based on the UNCLOS 1982. Indonesia's Archipelagic Sea Lanes (IASL) really affirm that Indonesia has the capacity to ensure international shipping and flights are carried out continuously, directly, as soon as possible peacefully, and normally [84]

Those preferences for Indonesia's border waters containing maritime threats may influence high priorities for strengthening maritime defense. Moreover, there is no bilateral agreement on delimitation between Indonesia and the neighboring countries. In this case, Indonesia still negotiates nowadays, except for Vietnam and the Philippines.

Based on the archipelagic perspective, Indonesia's maritime defense relies on maritime power insisting Indonesia's Navy is the main pillar on one side and diplomacy on the other side. Indonesia's maritime power may to both global and Asia in the grand strategy framework [85],[86],[87],[88]. It means that Indonesia's Navy as the main pillar of its maritime power is designed more modern and stronger than before and towards neighboring countries. Whatever name all seas or oceans in Indonesia's territory is not only united our island but protector for our islands. It includes that our seas and oceans are designed to support Indonesia's economy by utilizing maritime resources for the welfare of our people.

Moreover, Indonesian diplomacy is intended to achieve the prime national goal of the integrity of the national territory. Indonesia has success in achieving Dutch acknowledgment as an independent and sovereign state, the Asia-Africa Conference, Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation [89],[90],[91],[92]. Furthermore, Indonesia was also successful as the main party in the long negotiations on UNCLOS 1982 formalized archipelagic regimes [93]. It is assumed that Indonesia is the main pillar of the Third World [94]. Next in the future, Indonesia may firmly expose maritime interest in international relations [95]

The Fourth Republic domestically concentrated political development which failed democratic development driving to fall of the New Order [96]. After this republic type of President Soeharto, Indonesia was labeled as the new political era under the Reformation Regime [97]. which is called the Fifth Republic. During the reformation era, some presidents gave no concern and little political will to accentuate this archipelagic status in their policy [98],[99],[100],[101],[102].

The archipelagic state perspective was backward until President Joko Widodo declared his Global Maritime Fulcrum in 2014. President Joko Widodo's political penetration impacts both domestic development and Indonesia's foreign policy behavior [37],[103]. With this archipelagic state perspective, Indonesia under President Joko Widodo is the Fifth Republic trying to actualize national development, especially its national defense and economy in the context of archipelagic state status. This means that Global Maritime Fulcrum will strengthen two functions of Indonesia's sea as unity and protector function of all of Indonesia's islands.

GLOBAL MARITIME FULCRUM: INDONESIA'S ARCHIPELAGIC PERSPECTIVE

When President Joko Widodo took national leadership in 2014, it was only almost one month after that he conveyed a new development agenda named Global Maritime Fulcrum. It is very interesting that his presentation occurred at his first participation in the 1st Indonesia's government can be classified into some kind of republics that the First Republic during 1945- 1949, the Second Republic during 1950-1959, the Third international sphere of the Ninth East Asian Summit, on November 13, 2014, in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar. This new development agenda is substantially based on the geopolitical standpoint of Indonesia as the archipelagic state across the world of Southeast Asia region. This Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum gives new geopolitical practice to Indonesia's across-the-world status. Moreover, this role may enrich the implementation of Indonesia's foreign policy according to the principle of free active politics [104],[105]. Its consistency with the execution of Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum strengthens Indonesia's grand strategy for the future [106].

Based on President Joko Widodo's speech, Global Maritime Fulcrum explained Indonesian geopolitical and geoeconomic position in the new era of global transformation from West to East Asia [107]. Indonesia is in the pivot of the changing process to take its role in dynamic of the global development.

Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum really expresses Indonesia's grand strategy. It is visionary that Indonesia poses in central global shift containing multipolarity, unresolved Russia-Ukraine war, and continuing strategic competition between USA and China [108],[109],[110],[111],[112],[113]. Involving through this intriguing global shift Indonesia launched two dynamic strategies implementing a new developmental agenda based on two dynamic cells consisting of the Indonesian Sea Policy and the macro-region of the Indo Pacific.

Firstly, in 2017, President Joko Widodo adopted Indonesia's Ocean Policy that strived for the Global Maritime Fulcrum [114]. This policy contains various action plans to attain the level of maritime power reflecting maritime capabilities. Beginning in 2016 until 2025 with the new Action Plan of Indonesian Maritime Policy 2021-2025 [115], these proposed actions intensively may materialize the dynamic phases of Indonesia as a modern and democratic archipelagic state. It is not enough because Indonesia's maritime power and capability are still minimal which is formulated in the Minimum Essential Force [116]. Indonesia still needs a long time to realize an optimal archipelagic state.

Based on this policy, Indonesia may utilize the maritime resources to advance the Indonesian economy and the level of living for Indonesia's people, while giving some fundamental bases for improving Indonesia's maritime defense and creating Indonesia's maritime military capability. This enhancing maritime Republic during 1960-1965, the Fourth Republic 1966- 1998, and the Fifth Republic during 1999-now.

military capability is important for increasing Indonesia's maritime military operations for securing maritime threats in Indonesian national territory. This creates maritime security in the national maritime territory. This condition is basically the foundation for economic growth based on increasing the maritime economy. Through this maritime policy, economic spectrums of national economy and development will be based on maritime economy.

Indonesia's Ocean Policy principally aimed to make Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum an optimal vision specified twelve missions describing ocean resources, maritime human resources, maritime science and maritime technology, maritime defense and security, maritime enforcement law, maritime governance to the welfare of the coastal community, economic growth and maritime industries. Both vision and mission hold six principles archipelago concept, sustainable development, blue economy, integrated and transparent management, participation, equality, and distribution. Furthermore, this policy relies on seven pillars that is maritime resource management and human resource development; defense, security, law enforcement, and safety in the ocean; maritime governance and institution; maritime economy and infrastructure and raising welfare; maritime space management and maritime environment protection; maritime culture; and maritime diplomacy².

This first cell is designed to internally enhance the position of Indonesia as an archipelagic state with strong and enhancing Indonesia's maritime doctrine [117],[118]. This strengthening vision of the archipelagic state impacts Indonesia's foreign policy and regional governance in Southeast Asia [119].

Secondly, President Joko Widodo installed the macro-region Indo-Pacific. There is the second dynamic cell that the macro-region of the Indo-Pacific is intended to be a basis of locus for increasing Indonesia's role in international forums. In this concept, Indonesia utilizes macro-region making in erecting macro-region Indo Pacific. This is an enlargement from region-making in which Indonesia has developed ASEAN as a prime regional organization [120]. After that, Indonesia also used sub-region making in creating subregional cooperation in ASEAN [121] such as the Indonesia Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT) in 1993 [50] and Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia Philippines-East Asian Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) in 1994 [122]

² President Joko Widodo speech at the ninth East Asia summit in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, November 13, 2014, explains only five pillars.

This dynamic cell presented Indonesia's global view that the globe is divided into only two oceans in which Indonesia has great interests. The first ocean is the Indian Ocean [123] and the second one is the Pacific Ocean[124]. Unfortunately, Indonesia ignores one ocean such as the Atlantic Ocean because of that Indonesia has no significant interest.

In developing maritime defense, Indonesia designed two types of forces. The first forces were based on naval forces and the second consisted of Coast Guard. These two layers of Indonesia's maritime defense are essential for securing the large island in the national territory from enemy military attacks [125],[126].

This maritime defense may ensure the integrity of Indonesia's territory at the time it straightens up the state's sovereignty in the maritime territory. Following this maritime security in all of Indonesia's oceans, Indonesia can overcome illegal fishing activities and the economic potential of maritime resources can be fully utilized for modest welfare of all people in the islands. There are various programs and projects of the seven pillars of the newest Indonesia's Ocean Policy in 2022 that generate economic empowerment of people and civil societies.

DEFENSE AS AN ECONOMIC PROBLEM FOR THE INDONESIAN ARCHIPELAGIC STATE

Defense is the same with other themes in the economy such as industry and trade both in producing and consuming. Nevertheless, defense is the most different from others in terms of monopolist's usage of military forces. It is the responsibility of the national government to expose the allocation of the expense of defense [127]. Defense activities do not always contain military aspects. But military aspects are the prime element of national defense. Moreover, national defense also depends on various determinants such as technology, quality of human resources, natural resources, research and development, economy, and political system.

From a microeconomic view, goods and services in the economy are differentiated into private goods and public goods so that actor interactions in the economy are very different for the public goods. There is market failure in producing defense output, and all people can freely consume defense output as public goods [128]. There is any possibility that government may fail to produce national defense what we call government failure [129],[130].

Based on Indonesia's archipelagic state, defense activities contain various scope and span of activities or operations. The most important is how to produce naval defense output and several military operations to overcome the enemy's external maritime threats [131],[132],[133]. Its function is dependent on the navy [134],[135],[136], naval equipment [137], and others such as naval operation [138], and naval command [139]. Based on Military Balance 2021, the Indonesian navy reached 65,000 personnel who were deployed to several sea bases in all parts of the national territory. This amount reflects a pattern of military recruitment in Indonesia [140] which is not enough for Indonesia as an archipelagic state especially to support Global Maritime Fulcrum. Having relied on this navy capability, Indonesia's naval force depends on limited naval equipment as a Minimum Essential Force. This combat power covers four submarines, seven principal surface combatants, and one hundred twenty-two patrol and coastal combatants. In this case, the weak condition urges the modernization of naval equipment to support the Global Maritime Fulcrum [141]. Post the Djuanda Declaration of 1957, Indonesia operated 12 submarines Whiskey-class which were purchased from the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s. Currently, Indonesia's naval capabilities have decreased to the lowest level with only four submarines. Unfortunately, one of them went missing off the coast of Bali in April 2021 during a torpedo drill. It is a good time for Indonesia to increase its naval capabilities to support Global Maritime Fulcrum in which Indonesia needs a minimum of twenty-four submarines, especially to destruct external threats or maritime attacks in the South China Sea.

This production function of naval defense output aimed to destroy external military attacks in sea and ocean and all maritime threats in which its forms are various [142],[143],[144]. These double attacks may be stopped in those maritime zones so that they cannot be reached by islands. Indonesia's current external threats cover both China's naval military threat in the South China Sea, and maritime security threats on Indonesia's sea border with neighboring countries [145].

This naval defense output is very difficult to measure so there is no quantity of naval defense output. Here, it was measured on its input basis which is assumed to equal the value of the output [146] In a formal expression, it can be formulated as

$$Q = f(A, K, L) \quad (1)$$

where Q is naval defense output and A , K , and L are inputs of naval technology (A), naval capital (K), and naval labor (L)

Currently, Indonesia's government prioritizes submarine procurements to build the capabilities of Indonesia's Navy. It is not an easy task that Indonesia's Navy has big responsibilities in securing Indonesia's maritime territory. This priority focuses on the modernization of the naval weapon system based on some factors that cover historical legacies, budgetary constraints, institutional and operational arrangement, strategic environment [147], and presidency. Especially based on the Minimum Essential Force for its naval power blueprint, Indonesia's Navy depends on the acquisition of twelve submarines at the end of 2014 to actualize the functions of oceans in an archipelagic state [148]. Furthermore, Indonesia's Navy also holds Global Maritime Fulcrum as the basis of its operationalization mechanism. The development of Indonesia's Navy may reflect its maritime power in the next several decades to reach the hypothetical of Indonesia's new strategic arena as a macro-region of the Indo-Pacific [149].

From a macroeconomic view, a state's defense activities of an archipelagic state occur in an institutional framework in which it is different from one state to another state [150], especially between an archipelagic state and a non-archipelagic state. Moreover, a globalized world under hegemonic states also dominates this national framework so that small countries may be trapped in the defense mechanism of several global actors[151].

There is another interesting factor that producing defense needs preference that the nation or state may select military capabilities. This is concerning the geopolitical position of the state. In Indonesia's case, its preference is mainly archipelagic perspective following that Indonesia is an archipelagic state [152]. This factual geopolitical position may drive Indonesia's military to strengthen maritime defense driving Indonesia's navy as the main pillar.

It is very interesting that there is competition in Indonesia's military to get great allocation financing of the state's budget. This competition prevails between ministries to get huge financing allocations in the government budget. Furthermore, the government may determine the number of military persons from productive national human resources. Besides those standards, Indonesia's military needs strategic design for military equipment being needed now and in the future.

From the Indonesian archipelagic perspective, its national defense may adopt three war regions. Firstly, it is a prime maritime twin-war region in sea and air battlefields. Before threats come to hurt or kill people and land, Indonesia's military is obliged to strike the object of military attacks coming into national territory in both Indonesia's sea and air borders. Secondly, it is core sea war regions that enemy attacks may face deadly war in sea and coast regions Thirdly, it concentrates on deadly war in islands covering all parts of the islands.

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