



Indonesia's Maritime Security Governance: The Capacity Building of the Navy (TNI-AL) and Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla) After the 2014 Global Maritime Fulcrum

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Abstract. As the largest archipelagic state in the world with more than 17,000 islands and a large maritime territory, maritime security is essential for Indonesia's economy and security. The Indonesian government has set maritime defense as one of the pillars of the Global Maritime Fulcrum vision since 2014, establishing it as one of the maritime governance priorities for the country. Indonesia faces all forms of maritime security threats, from the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, IUU fishing, piracy and armed robbery, maritime terrorism, etc., and has been attempting to improve its maritime governance capacity to address those threats. However, the country still suffers from various maritime security capacity gaps, from the overlapping roles and responsibilities among its various maritime security agencies, its lack of maritime domain awareness capacity, as well as its inadequate assets and equipment for maritime security. This paper addresses the Indonesian government's attempts to improve its maritime security governance capacity across its various agencies since 2014, focusing on the two main agencies: the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) and the Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla). This paper then evaluates those attempts at maritime security capacity building, and finally suggests recommendations that would improve maritime security governance capacity in Indonesia.

Keywords: Indonesia, Maritime Governance, Maritime Security, Maritime Defense, Capacity Building.

Introduction

As the largest archipelagic state in the world with more than 17,000 islands and a large maritime territory, maritime security is essential for Indonesia's economy and security. The country's maritime governance priorities were announced in 2014 when President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) presented his "Global Maritime Fulcrum" (GMF) vision (Indonesian: "*Poros Maritim Dunia*" (PMD)). The vision outlined five main pillars that are considered important to develop Indonesia's maritime domain: (1) maritime culture, (2) maritime resources, (3) maritime infrastructure and connectivity, (4) maritime diplomacy, as well as (5) maritime defense force [1]. Thus, the GMF

established maritime security it as one of the maritime governance priorities for Indonesia.

Prioritizing maritime security is important for Indonesia because the country faces all forms of maritime security threats due to its large maritime territory and location between two oceans. For example, parts of Indonesia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Natuna Sea are unilaterally claimed by China's nine-dash line, and China has been increasingly making incursions into Natuna. Indonesia also faces illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, piracy and armed robbery, maritime terrorism, and other maritime security threats in its waters. To address those threats, Indonesia has been attempting to improve its maritime governance capacity, especially the capacity of its maritime security agencies to detect and respond to those threats.

Currently, Indonesia's maritime security agencies include the Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla), the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL), the Marine Police (Polair), the Ministry of Finance's Directorate General of Customs and Excise (Bea Cukai), the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries' Directorate General of Marine Resources and Fisheries Supervision (PSDKP), the Ministry of Transportation's Directorate General of Sea Transportation (Hubla), as well as other technical agencies. Aside from TNI-AL, the main maritime security agency is Bakamla, which is tasked with conducting security and safety patrols in Indonesia's territorial waters and jurisdiction and acts as the coordinating body for all maritime law enforcement agencies.

The Indonesian government has been attempting to improve the capacity of its maritime security agencies, especially TNI-AL and Bakamla. However, the country still suffers from various maritime security capacity gaps. For example, there are overlapping roles and responsibilities among the various maritime security agencies, particularly between TNI-AL and Bakamla [2]. TNI-AL also seems unwilling to renounce its maritime law enforcement roles, while Bakamla still struggles to develop the capabilities needed to lead maritime security, which Arif and Kurniawan (2018) attribute to Indonesia's strategic culture in maritime governance. Other issues include the lack of adequate assets and equipment to perform various maritime security functions.

The various maritime security capacity gaps require further examination for Indonesia to improve its maritime security governance capacity. This paper addresses the Indonesian government's attempts to improve its maritime security governance capacity across its various agencies, focusing on the two main agencies: the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) and the Maritime Security Agency [3]. . This paper then evaluates those attempts at maritime security governance capacity building, and finally suggests recommendations that would improve maritime security governance capacity in Indonesia.

Literature Review

Scholars have been seeking to explain various aspects of Indonesia's maritime security governance. Cribb and Ford's edited book (2009) contains 13 chapters on various topics of Indonesia's maritime governance as an archipelagic state. Febrica's book (2017) analyzes Indonesia's maritime security cooperation, as well as the interests and strategies influencing its decision-making process.

Chapsos and Malcolm (2017) examine how Indonesia's maritime security actors understand and utilize maritime security using Training Needs Analysis (TNA). Agastia and Perwita (2017) identify the challenges and prospects for Indonesia's maritime security using the maritime domain awareness (MDA) concept. Arif and Kurniawan (2018) analyze how Indonesia's strategic culture, history, and civil-military relations influences its current practices of maritime security. Ikrami and Bernard (2018) discusses Indonesia's maritime governance in terms of law, institutions, and cooperation, including its maritime security cooperation. Arif (2019) explains why Indonesia's maritime security governance is a tangled mess between the navy (TNI-AL) and coast guard (Bakamla). Daxecker and Frécon (2020) examine maritime piracy in Indonesia from a multilevel politics perspective to understand its determinants and responses. Supriyanto (2021) discusses Indonesia's maritime security cooperation with Singapore, and analyzes its lessons learned, benefits and challenges, and future possibilities. Laksmana (2022) develops ways to remodel Indonesia's maritime security and law enforcement governance in the country's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Supriyanto (2022) explains the value and importance that Indonesia places on international maritime security cooperation by examining four maritime areas. Lestari, et al. (2022) analyze Indonesia's security cooperation with China to address maritime security threats amid South China Sea tensions. Permal (2023) examines Indonesia's, along with Malaysia's and Singapore's, responses to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) by the United States.

Morris and Paoli's report (2018) identify Indonesia's maritime security threats and priority areas, then assess its capability requirements and gaps. Matthews' thesis (2015) examines how Indonesia's sensitivity about sovereignty influences its responses to maritime security cooperation initiatives in the Malacca Straits. Supriyanto and Rusdi's commentary (2013) discusses how Indonesia's maritime security agencies are suffering from coordination problems among its many agencies. Dinarto's commentary (2017) examines the maritime security challenges that impede on the progress of Indonesia's blue economy initiative. Kembara's web article (2021) discusses Indonesia's conceptualization of maritime security, including the term "maritime security" in its national language, how it lacks an official definition of maritime security, its key documents on maritime security, and elements of its approach to maritime security.

As discussed above, many scholars have been seeking to explain various aspects of Indonesia's maritime security governance. Relatively many have examined the threats to Indonesia's maritime security and the country's maritime security cooperation with other states. Meanwhile, relatively few have discussed Indonesia's attempts to improve its maritime security governance capacity. This paper strives to

fill in the gap by addressing this topic, focusing on the two main agencies: TNI-AL and Bakamla. This paper then evaluates those attempts at maritime security governance capacity building. Based on the results, this paper suggests recommendations that would improve maritime security governance capacity in Indonesia.

Research Method

There are various definitions and conceptualizations of maritime security [4],[5],[6], , for example, defines and conceptualizes maritime security in relation to other concepts, such as marine safety, sea-power, blue economy, and resilience. There is no agreed definition of maritime security, including in Southeast Asia, as noted by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI). AMTI identifies the different conceptualizations used by Southeast Asian countries and external powers, and finds that they may include environmental protection, mariner safety, fisheries management, resource management, counterterrorism, law enforcement, naval operations, and military deterrence [7].

The lack of agreed definition means that maritime security has often been defined by activities perceived as threats to maritime security. The 2008 report of the United Nations Secretary-General identifies seven specific maritime security threats: piracy and armed robbery against ships; terrorist acts involving shipping, offshore installations, and other maritime interests; illicit trafficking in arms and weapons of mass destruction; illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; smuggling and trafficking of persons by sea; illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing; as well as intentional and unlawful damage to the marine environment [8]. Meanwhile, AMTI identifies twelve maritime security threats: interstate disputes; IUU fishing; climate-induced disasters; environmental crimes; occupational health and safety; forced labor; cyber-attacks; piracy and armed robbery; navigation hazards; maritime refugees; illicit maritime drug trafficking; as well as maritime terrorism [7]. From discussions above, note that there is also no agreed list of maritime security threats.

Based on the above conceptualizations of maritime security, this paper defines maritime security governance as the framework of laws, regulations, policies, and institutions generated by state governments to establish maritime security as well as to prevent maritime security threats. This definition consists of two main elements: the establishment of rules and the enforcement of those rules. The capacity building of maritime security agencies is related to the enforcement element of maritime security governance. This paper discusses maritime security governance capacity building using three main indicators: equipment, budget, and exercise cooperation conducted by two agencies: TNI-AL and Bakamla.

Equipment data is discussed as one of the major factors of enforcement capacity is the inventory of equipment holdings that may be deployable for maritime patrol and other maritime security enforcement functions. For this purpose, this paper focuses on naval and naval aviation equipment, such as submarines, surface ships, anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft, and other maritime-related aviation equipment. Budget data is used to indicate the level of

economic resources allocated to support TNI-AL and Bakamla's capacity to fulfill their duties. Finally, exercise cooperation is used as this paper considers it as the form of international cooperation that is the most suitable to improve maritime security governance capacity. This paper focuses on exercises done in cooperation with international partners, not those done internally, that are necessary to improve the agencies' level of capacity. This paper focuses on practical cooperation that may improve real capacity, not dialogue-based ones.

1 Findings, Analysis, and Discussion

As previously stated, this paper focuses on the capacity building of two main agencies in Indonesia's maritime security governance: the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) and the Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla). However, before this paper discusses the two agencies, it first describes the overall Indonesia's maritime security governance for the big picture.

1.1 Indonesia's Maritime Security Governance

According to the latest regulation in 2022, Bakamla is a non-ministerial government agency tasked with conducting security, safety, and law enforcement patrols in Indonesian territorial waters and jurisdiction. Other agencies are referred to as "related agencies" and "technical agencies". The regulation defines related agencies as agencies that have patrol authority and fleets, apart from Bakamla. Related agencies include ministries whose functions are in the fields of customs, supervision of marine and fisheries resources, shipping, as well as the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and the Indonesian National Police (Polri). Meanwhile, technical agencies are agencies that do not have patrol fleets but have related duties in the Indonesian territorial waters and jurisdiction. Technical agencies consist of various other ministries and agencies whose fields are related to the maritime domain [9].

As a civilian maritime security agency, the current version of Bakamla was established in 2014. However, it has been established as the Maritime Security Coordinating Agency (Bakorkamla) since 1972, whose function was only to coordinate the various maritime security-related agencies. It was renamed as Bakamla in 2014 to become the leading agency in maritime security governance. Meanwhile, TNI-AL has been established since Indonesia's independence in 1945.

Bakamla was established by a presidential regulation that tasks it with conducting security and safety patrols in Indonesian territorial waters and jurisdiction. To fulfill that duty, it has the functions to establish national policies; organize early warning system; conduct safeguards, supervision, prevention, and prosecution of law violations; coordinate and monitor the execution of maritime patrol with related agencies; provide technical and operational support to related agencies; as well as provide search and rescue assistance in Indonesian territorial waters and jurisdiction. It has the authority to conduct an immediate pursuit; dismiss, examine, arrest, carry, and deliver vessels to related agencies for further legal process execution; as well as

synergize the information system of maritime security and safety [10]. Meanwhile, TNI-AL is regulated by the TNI Law that tasks it with conducting naval defense, enforcing law and maintain security in national jurisdiction, conducting naval diplomacy, establishing and developing naval forces, as well as empowering maritime defense areas [11].

Both Bakamla and TNI-AL have authorities in Indonesian territorial waters and jurisdiction up to the continental shelf (350 nautical miles from the baselines). Aside from Bakamla and TNI-AL, other maritime security-related agencies include the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (KKP), the Ministry of Finance's Directorate General of Customs and Excise, the Ministry of Transportation's Directorate General of Sea Transportation, and Polri's Marine Police (Polair). Related to maritime security, KKP is tasked with supervising marine and fisheries resources and has authorities up to the exclusive economic zone (200 nautical miles from the baselines). The Directorate General of Customs and Excise is tasked with preventing and punishing infringement of customs laws and regulations and has authorities up to the contiguous zone (24 nautical miles from the baselines). Meanwhile, the Directorate General of Sea Transportation is tasked with managing shipping and Polair is tasked with law enforcement at sea; both have authorities up to the territorial sea (12 nautical miles from the baselines).

As explained above, Bakamla and TNI-AL are the main two maritime security-related agencies with the most important tasks and functions as well as the highest authorities. Thus, this paper focuses on these two main agencies in discussing the capacity building of Indonesia's maritime security governance.

1.2 Indonesian Navy (TNI AL)

Capacity building of TNI-AL, especially in terms of naval modernization, has been implemented as part of the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) program to develop the TNI's capabilities. The MEF is defined as "a force level capable of guaranteeing the attainment of immediate strategic defense interests" [11]. The Ministry of Defense published the MEF blueprint in 2010, laying out TNI's modernization and build-up plan for the 2010-2024 period. For TNI-AL, the MEF requirement was for around 300 ships of various classes and at least twelve submarines, compared to TNI-AL's 2010 fleet standing around 115 ships of various classes and two submarines (Kemhan, 2010). The requirement has been adjusted to 182 surface vessels and eight submarines, as well as 100 aircraft. By early 2023, with only one year remaining in the MEF planning, only 65% of the MEF target for the whole TNI has been achieved, and only 66% of the MEF target for TNI-AL has been fulfilled (Kompas TV, 2023). This lag of achievement, far behind the target, means that it is impossible to achieve the MEF requirement by 2024. Still, the government continues the attempt to modernize TNI-AL.

Equipment

In 2014, TNI-AL consisted of two fleet commands: the 1st Fleet Command (Koarmada I) based in Jakarta and the 2nd Fleet Command (Koarmada II) based in Surabaya. By 2023, it has expanded to three commands: the 1st Fleet Command (Koarmada I) based

in Bintan, the 2nd Fleet Command (Koarmada II) based in Surabaya, and the 3rd Fleet Command (Koarmada III) based in Sorong. In 2014-2023, TNI-AL equipment increased the number of its submarines, corvettes, patrol crafts and boats, landing platform docks, tank landing ships, maritime patrol aircraft, transport aircraft, as well as helicopters. However, the number of its frigates, mine countermeasures ships, as well as logistics and support ships decreased. Three submarines were delivered in 2017-2021, but a submarine named KRI Nanggala-402 sank in 2021 due to alleged poor maintenance (Kompas, 2021). There are significant increases in the number of small patrol craft and boats, while the naval aviation center acquired anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and combat search and rescue (CSAR) helicopters which were previously non-existent in its inventory.

Table 1. TNI-AL's equipment, 2014 and 2023

TNI-AL's equipment		2014	2023
Naval equipment	Tactical submarines	2	4
	Frigates	11	7
	Corvettes	18	24
	Patrol craft	16	23
	Patrol boats	38	91
	Mine countermeasures ships	11	8
	Landing platform docks (LPD)	5	6
	Landing ships, tank (LST)	20	25
	Landing craft	55	54
	Other logistics and support ships	32	19
Naval aviation equipment	Maritime patrol aircraft	23	29
	Light transport aircraft	28	32
	Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters	-	11
	Multi-role helicopters	4	4
	Combat search and rescue (CSAR) helicopters	-	4
	Transport helicopters	15	15


Comparing TNI-AL's equipment inventory in 2014 and 2023, it is evident that TNI-AL has built up its equipment capacities, but the effort has been abysmal. Many

ships are very old and are entering the end of their in-service life cycle. Maintenance has always hampered TNI-AL's capabilities as well as TNI's in general, leading to various accidents involving Indonesian weapon systems [12]. In 2014-2023, there have been four accidents involving TNI-AL's equipment: the sinking of KRI Rencong-622 fast missile boat in 2018, the sinking of KRI Teluk Jakarta-541 landing ship in 2020, the sinking of KRI Nanggala-402 submarine in 2021, and the crash of a G-36 Bonanza trainer aircraft in 2022. Those accidents are symptomatic of poor levels of maintenance.

Budget

Inadequate equipment is often the result of an unsatisfactory budget. TNI-AL's budget is part of the budget of the Ministry of Defense, which has five organizational units for program and budget management: the Ministry of Defense itself, the National Armed Forces (TNI) headquarters, the Army (TNI-AD) headquarters, the Navy (TNI-AL) headquarters, and the Air Force (TNI-AU) headquarters. In 2015-2022, the Ministry of Defense's budget gradually increased, from a budget of IDR 101,363 billion in 2015 to IDR 133,407 billion in 2022 (Picture 1). In this period, the Ministry of Defense's budget is approximately 10%-15% of the government ministries and agencies' spending, or 0.7%-0.8% of Indonesia's gross domestic product (GDP).

Fig. 1. Picture 1. Indonesian Ministry of Defense's budget, 2015-2022




Out of the Ministry of Defense's budget, the naval branch usually receives an allocation of 14%-18%. For the naval branch alone, the Ministry of Defense's budget has four programs: naval branch readiness support program; naval modernization and development of equipment, facilities, and infrastructure program; naval branch personnel professionalism improvement program; as well as naval branch

management and operational implementation program. Most of the budget for the naval branch (57%-64%) is allocated for the management and operational implementation program. Approximately 14%-24% is for the modernization and development program, while about 14%-18% is for the readiness support program, and the personnel professionalism improvement program only receives 1%-2%.

In 2015-2020, the budget for the naval branch gradually increased, from a total of IDR 16,819 billion in 2015 to IDR 19,782 billion in 2020 (Picture 2). Each of the programs for the naval branch, except for one program, also increased. Only the budget for the modernization and development program decreased, from IDR 4,193 billion in 2015 to IDR 2,860 billion in 2020. This decrease in the modernization budget reflects the lamentable effort of TNI-AL's equipment capacity build-up. The government has not allocated adequate budget to modernize and build up the navy, hence its capacity building effort suffers. Even the maintenance levels have been poor.

Fig. 2. Picture 1. Indonesian Ministry of Defense's budget, 2015-2022



Looking at the Ministry of Defense's budget and especially the naval branch, it is evident that TNI-AL's budget and the overall defense budget has been dreadful. A defense budget at 0.7%-0.8% of GDP is inferior in a region with the average defense budget of 1.7% of GDP. The government must increase the defense budget share to 1.5%-2% of GDP, which has been a part of the current government's political promise hampered by economic and financial problems. With the rise of the defense budget, the naval branch budget will also increase. Next, the government must also increase the modernization program share of the naval branch budget. Only then will TNI-AL be able to maintain its equipment readiness levels as well as build up its equipment capacities to better be able to respond to maritime security threats.

Exercise Cooperation

TNI-AL has been hosting naval exercises as well as participating in several naval exercises in cooperation with other navies (Table 2). It has been hosting Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo (MNEK) since 2014, a biennial exercise with wide multilateral engagement and sizeable international partners. The MNEK has been held four times: the first one in 2014 with participation from 18 countries (TNI-AL, 2014), the second one in 2016 with participation from 36 countries (TNI-AL, 2016), the third one in 2018 with participation from 43 countries (TNI, 2018), while the last one was held in 2023 with participation from 36 countries (TNI, 2023).

TNI-AL has also been a regular participant of multilateral exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) and Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT) held by the US Navy. RIMPAC is the world's largest multilateral naval exercise held biennially by the US Navy (US Navy, 2022), while SEACAT is focused on Southeast Asian partners (US Navy, 2023). With the US Navy, TNI-AL has also been involved in bilateral exercise Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) since 1995, as well as Sea Surveillance Exercise (Sea Survex) since 2012. Exercise CARAT is a series of annual bilateral exercises held by the US Navy's Pacific Fleet with several South and Southeast Asian countries (US Navy, 2022), while Sea Survex between TNI-AL and the US Navy was held in 2015 [13]

Other important partners in TNI-AL's exercise cooperation are Australia and India. TNI-AL has been involved in various exercises with the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), such as the multilateral exercise Kakadu and the bilateral exercises Cassowary and New Horizon. Exercise Kakadu is Australia's largest maritime exercise (Royal Australian Navy, n.d.). Meanwhile, TNI-AL has been involved in multilateral naval exercise Milan hosted by the Indian Navy since 1995, as well as in bilateral exercise Samudra Shakti with the Indian Navy since 2018.

Table 2. TNI-AL's exercise cooperation

Bilateral	Multilateral
	Hosted by TNI-AL: MNEK Komodo
With the US: Exercise CARAT, Sea Survex	Hosted by the US: Exercise RIMPAC, SEACAT
With Australia: Exercise Cassowary, New Horizon	Hosted by Australia: Exercise Kakadu
With India: Exercise Samudra Shakti	Hosted by India: Exercise Milan

Aside from increasing diplomacy and engagement with international partners, such exercise cooperation builds up TNI-AL's capacities to respond to maritime security threats. It also enhances TNI-AL's professionalism and readiness for joint military operations and contingencies with other regional partners.

1.3 Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla)

As a “new” agency established in 2014, which previously was only tasked with coordinating other agencies, Bakamla did not have high level of capacity to begin with. After the name change to make it the leading agency in maritime security governance, Bakamla still struggles to develop the capabilities needed to lead maritime security. There is the issue of what Bakamla was envisioned to be: a coast guard or another maritime security agency. It has always referred to itself as “Indonesian Coast Guard” with “single agency, multitask” characteristics in its regulations, insignia on uniforms, assets, and social media. However, there is no regulation that states that Bakamla as a “coast guard”; it has only been referred to as the “agency”. Meanwhile, there is already another government agency named a “coast guard”: the Indonesian Sea and Coast Guard Unit (KPLP) under the Ministry of Transportation, whose role is related to sea transportation. This confusion also leads to uncertainty of Bakamla’s role and, therefore, its capacity building. In fact, the latest regulation in 2022 gave a different mandate to Bakamla from what it was intended for originally: a full-fledge national coast guard, not merely a coordinating agency [14].

Equipment

In 2014, Bakamla only had three patrol boats and several smaller craft, as it was previously only a coordinating agency named Bakorkamla. Its three patrol boats were 48-meter patrol boats named the Bintang Laut-class which entered service in 2013-2014 [15]. By 2023, Bakamla has ten vessels and other smaller craft (Table 3). Its largest vessel, KN Tanjung Datu-1101, is a 110-meter offshore patrol ship built in 2016-2018 which entered service in 2018 [16]. Its next largest vessels were three 80-meter patrol ships named the Nipah-class built in 2017-2019 which entered service in 2019 (Kompas.com, 2019), as well as three other 48-meter Bintang Laut-class ships delivered after 2014 [17].

Table 3. Bakamla’s equipment, 2014 and 2023

Bakamla’s equipment	2014	2023
Offshore patrol ships	-	4
Patrol boats	3	6


Looking at Bakamla’s equipment inventory, Bakamla clearly does not have the equipment capacities to fulfill its “single agency, multitask” vision of being Indonesian national coast guard. Its equipment is abysmal compared to TNI-AL’s. In 2014-2023, there was fear from other maritime security agencies that this vision would mean that their institutions would be dismantled, and their equipment would be transferred to Bakamla, which eventually does not happen [14]. With a very limited number of ships and the very restrained increase, Bakamla’s capacities to conduct

patrols remain very limited and it can only organize joint patrols with other maritime security agencies that do their own jobs.

Budget

Bakamla’s lack of equipment capacities can also be attributed to the insufficient budget. In 2016, Bakamla had a budget of IDR 1,876 billion, of which only IDR 759 billion (40%) was realized. It led to a steep decrease of budget for the agency in 2017, when it was only given a budget of IDR 956 billion, almost half the budget of the previous year, of which only IDR 38 billion (4%) was realized. In the following years (2018-2021), Bakamla was given a budget of IDR 400-500 billion, with realization above 90% each year. In 2022, Bakamla’s budget increased to IDR 764 billion, of which IDR 756 billion (99%) was realized (Picture 3).

Fig. 3. Picture 3. Bakamla’s budget and realization, 2016-2022



With a very abysmal budget, it is no wonder why Bakamla still struggles to build its capacities needed to lead maritime security. There are various factors that may contribute to Bakamla’s minuscule budget. The uncertainty over its role may have led the government to allocate a meager budget for Bakamla. If Bakamla is considered as merely coordinator of other agencies, there is little need for budget to procure patrol ships and aircraft for itself as it can organize other agencies to conduct patrols. There is also the issue of corruption, as there was an alleged corruption case in Bakamla’s procurement of backbone coastal surveillance system (BCSS), including satellite monitoring and drones, in 2016. Two Bakamla officers allegedly accepted bribes and were tried in court.

Exercise Cooperation

As a “new” agency, Bakamla has been participating in fewer exercise cooperation than TNI-AL. As a self-referred “coast guard”, it has been participating in exercises with other coast guards as well as navies and other maritime security agencies (Table 4). Similar with TNI-AL, Bakamla has also joined exercise SEACAT held by the US Navy [18], [19]. Bakamla has also exercised with the US Coast Guard [20].

Other important partners in Bakamla's exercise cooperation are Australia, India, and Japan. Bakamla has joined the National Pollution Response Exercise (Natpolrex) held by the Indian Coast Guard to train responses to marine pollution such as oil spill incident[21]. Bakamla has been involved in exercises with the Japan Coast Guard (TNI, 2018). Other than that, Bakamla has also participated as an observer at the Sea Lion SAR Avitex held by the Turkish Coast Guard Command [21].

Bilateral	Multilateral
With the US	Hosted by the US: Exercise SEACAT
With Australia	Hosted by India: Natpolrex
With Japan	Hosted by Turkey: Sea Lion SAR Avitex (as observer)

Table 4. Bakamla's exercise cooperation

As a “new” agency, it is understandable that Bakamla does not have as many international partners nor exercise cooperation. But it is good that Bakamla has been increasing the number of its partners as well as its cooperation year after year. The activities and scenarios of the exercises have also been as diverse as Bakamla's supposed roles should be.

Conclusion

This paper has addressed the capacity building attempts at the two main maritime security agencies in Indonesia: TNI-AL and Bakamla. As discussed, both agencies suffer from the lack of equipment to fulfill each of their supposed roles, and both have attempted to remedy this by modernizing and building up their inventory. However, their efforts have been very limited and restrained. TNI-AL is plagued by the age of many of its ships and the poor levels of maintenance, while Bakamla still has a very modest number of ships for an agency that is supposed to lead joint maritime security patrols. Both agencies also receive an insufficient level of budget to support each of their capacities to fulfill their duties. Nevertheless, both agencies have participated in exercise cooperation with other international partners, to improve each of their maritime security governance capacities. Both TNI-AL and Bakamla need to continue

doing their current exercise cooperation while expanding the number of partners and frequency and intensity of exercise cooperation, to improve their operational capacity while still having limited equipment and budget.

With equipment and budget remaining an issue for both agencies, the government needs to improve international cooperation that can address these gaps. First, the government needs to improve cooperation related to the procurement of equipment such as warships, patrol vessels, radars, and other equipment needed to fulfil maritime security roles. It needs partners that can supply the equipment while offering offset and technology transfers so that each dollar of the budget spent in those procurements are money well spent, improving not only the agencies' equipment inventory but also the domestic industry's capacity to manufacture the equipment. The government needs to focus on cooperation in shipbuilding and repair industry, including the education and training of engineers, transfers of naval technologies, research and development for shipbuilding, and other forms of industry cooperation.

Finally, the government needs to improve practical cooperation involving the deployment of assets at sea or offshore, including information-sharing initiatives and field exercises, or other related capacity-building exercises to improve real maritime security governance capacities at sea. The government also needs to continue and improve the exchange and fusion cooperation with neighboring countries, regional organizations, and international partners, as well as multilateral and regional initiatives, such as the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)'s International Maritime Bureau (IMB), and Singapore's Information Fusion Centre (IFC), so that both TNI-AL and Bakamla can optimize each of their own current capacities in responding to maritime security threats.

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