



From Recipient to Donor: Indonesia's Motives in Giving Foreign Aid to South Pacific 2015-2023

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Abstract. The use of foreign aid for political gains is by no means uncommon in international relations. Emerging donors are now playing a part in contributing to international development. Seeing how they were and are still a recipient of developmental assistance, can their motives for giving foreign aid be different from traditional donors? Indonesia is an example of a developing country giving aid that mainly gives in the Asia-Pacific region, especially the South Pacific. Through the South-South Triangular Cooperation (SCCT) and the newly established Indonesian AID, Indonesia gives grants, technical assistance, and humanitarian aid to the South Pacific. It may seem like a noble cause, but with the Papua issue in mind, Indonesia's motives in giving aid must be analyzed. The paper uses a typology to analyze and found that Indonesia is not so different from its traditional counterparts as they also used aid for political, security, and prestige gains. Indonesia uses South Pacific countries' dependence on aid to bury the Papua issue. Using its financial capabilities, Indonesia are able to gain influence over South Pacific countries and flourish its image in the international community. Other than those motives, Indonesia's aid can also be based on humanitarian, altruistic, and commercial motives

Keywords: Emerging Donors, Foreign Aid, Indonesia, South Pacific.

1 Introduction

Providing foreign aid to states in need had existed since World War II when European states became the primary recipient to reconstruct themselves after the war. At that time, the most popular foreign aid program was the Marshall Plan from the United States. Continuing into the Cold War, foreign aid was used in the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union as their tool to gain support. This shows that foreign aid not only has development goals for the recipient country but can also be used by donor states to fulfill their interests. Therefore, foreign aid can be used as a tool of foreign policy.

Usually, donor states are developed states or multilateral organizations; in the study of foreign aid, they are considered traditional donors, such as states that are part of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), various UN agencies, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Palagashvili & Williamson, 2021). DAC is a committee under the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

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(OECD) which consists of 30 states, namely Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States and European Union (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, n.d.-a). DAC members are developed states that are included in the high-income category by the World Bank.

Table 1. Flow of Foreign Aid 2014-2019 (USD Billion).

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2019 (% of total)
ODA from 29 DAC member countries	151.1	143.1	157.6	161.4	164.8	151.7	86%
ODA from 20 reporting countries beyond the DAC	25.2	12.5	17.2	18.6	22.2	16.5	9%
Estimated development co-operation flows from ten non-reporting countries beyond the DAC	5.6	5.2	6.5	8.8	7.2	7.3	4%
Subtotal flows from non-DAC providers	30.7	17.7	23.7	27.5	29.5	23.7	14%
Estimated global total	181.9	160.8	181.2	188.2	194.3	175.4	100%

(Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, n.d.-b)

In the 1990s, DAC members contributed 95% of the foreign aid that was given (Seyedsayamdost, 2022). However, over time, the presence of emerging donors made foreign aid more colorful. Emerging donors refer to middle-income countries (MICS) included in the list of ODA recipients of DAC members who have also become donors (Robledo, 2015). States that are just starting their journey in providing foreign aid can also be referred to as non-traditional donors. Unlike DAC members, emerging donors have no obligation to report their foreign aid to the OECD (Palagashvili & Williamson, 2021), but there are several states that do. In Table 1, it can be seen that in 2019 foreign aid from non-DAC members reached 14%. Although smaller than the number of DAC members, this shows the presence of non-traditional donors in foreign aid.

Indonesia is one of the MICS that provides foreign aid, but Indonesia itself still receives foreign aid and is part of the list of ODA recipients, even placed 4th as the largest ODA recipient in 2020-2021 with an amount of USD 2.8 billion (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, n.d.-c). As a developing country, Indonesia is strongly committed to promoting international development. This can be seen through Indonesia's important role in forming the South-South Cooperation (SSC), where they proposed and hosted the Bandung Conference in April 1955 (Engel, 2019; Winanti & Alvian, 2021). SSC is the original form of solidarity for developing

countries to escape from their colonial history and become developed countries (Sato & Santikajaya, 2019). Under the SSC framework, Indonesia has provided 1,000 technical cooperation programs in three main areas: development, good governance, and economy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2019).

In 2019, Indonesia launched an agency that regulates its foreign aid called *Lembaga Dana Kerjasama Pembangunan Internasional* (LDKPI) or the Indonesian Agency for International Development (Indonesian AID). Indonesian AID is under the Ministry of Finance, where have a responsibility to manage foreign aid funds (*Lembaga Dana Kerja Sama Pembangunan Internasional*, n.d.-e). Before that, Indonesia had distributed foreign aid, but it was carried out by multiple ministries and done separately. Some ministries involved were BAPPENAS, the Ministry of State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), and the Ministry of Finance (MoF). Through the newly launched agency, foreign aid was officially included in Indonesia's foreign policy, which was also disclosed by the Vice President of Indonesia at the time, Jusuf Kalla, that Indonesian AID was a form of "hands-on diplomacy" (Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia, 2019) to improve the country's position in international development cooperation. Indonesian AID gives aid in the form of grants. However, Indonesian AID also plans to provide loans to foreign governments and institutions in the future (*Lembaga Dana Kerja Sama Pembangunan Internasional*, n.d.-c).



Fig. 1. Allocation of Indonesian aid grants (Source: Indonesian AID, n.d.).

The majority recipients of Indonesian foreign aid are in the Asia-Pacific region, such as ASEAN and South Pacific countries. It can be seen from Figure 1 that several South Pacific countries that were helped by Indonesia, such as Fiji, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) consisting of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Front De Liberational De Nationale Kanak Et Solcialiste (FLNKS). According to the World Bank report in 2014, the South Pacific is the most dependent region on foreign aid (Dornan & Pryke, 2017; Funaki, 2016). The geographical location of the South Pacific and its vulnerability to natural disasters and climate change pose challenges to economic activity and development in the region.

The South Pacific, especially the Melanesian part, is not an unfamiliar area for Indonesia which has a diversity of ethnicities, one of which is Melanesian. Melanesian ethnic groups in Indonesia are scattered in Papua, West Papua, Maluku, North Maluku, and East Nusa Tenggara (Afif & Roziqi, 2020). Melanesian ethnicity gives Indonesia

room to move into the MSG, where in 2011, Indonesia became an observer country and in 2015 was promoted to associate member. However, the relationship between the Indonesian government and ethnic Melanesians is not good, considering the issue of West Papua. West Papua is a sensitive issue for Indonesia, with human rights violations by the government and separatist efforts promoted by the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP).

With that in mind, it is necessary to question Indonesia's motives in providing foreign assistance to the South Pacific. As previously mentioned, the goals of diplomacy and development are one of the most prominent goals of aid (Lancaster, 2007). Given that Indonesia is a country that is very vocal about international development and plays an active role in promoting it, it will be unique to see whether Indonesia stays true to its commitment to contribute to international development or whether it will be like traditional donors who use foreign aid as a political tool. With that in mind, the research question of this paper is what are Indonesia's motives in providing foreign aid to the South Pacific?

2 Theory

Foreign aid can be understood as assistance provided to developing countries to improve their economic conditions and well-being. The OECD defines foreign aid or official development assistance (ODA) as government assistance that promotes and targets developing countries' economic development and welfare (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, n.d.-a). According to the OECD, three aspects must be met to qualify to be called foreign aid, such as originating from the public sector, being carried out for economic development purposes, and containing a grant of at least 25% (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, n.d.-a). Foreign assistance is not only in the form of loans or grants but can also resemble technical assistance and food, except for military assistance.

To analyze Indonesia's motives in providing aid, this paper will use the typology proposed by Carmen Robledo in their article entitled "New Donors, Same Old Practices? South-South Cooperation of Latin American Emerging Donors." Robledo bases their typology on traditional donor motives and does not limit it to one IR perspective. Instead, they combine several aspects from various IR perspectives so that it encompasses all. There are six types: political-diplomatic, military-security, humanitarian, altruistic or development, commercial, and prestige.

In the political-diplomatic motives, the state provides foreign aid to gain political and diplomatic leverage, making it a tool to increase or expand its influence. In addition, this motive also identifies what is referred to as 'cultural aid' in which the state provides foreign aid to promote language, tradition, ideology, and religion. In short, political-diplomatic motives include the goal of the state to strengthen political alliances or to increase spheres of influence (Robledo, 2015).

Military-security motives see foreign aid as a tool to expand or strengthen the security of donor states (Robledo, 2015). Some of the things that the state can do are

strengthen alliances, strengthen physical security, gain military advantages, and form military alliances. Thus, foreign aid is provided to fulfill geopolitical interests.

Unlike the two previous motives, foreign aid for humanitarian reasons is not given because of political or security interests. This is because humanitarian motives see foreign aid as something selfless. The state provides assistance with reasons to ease human suffering and to protect human well-being in crises caused by natural and human disasters (Robledo, 2015). Usually, the state will provide humanitarian assistance in emergencies.

At first glance, altruistic or developmental motives may be similar to humanitarian motives; however, in this motive, foreign aid is provided for the welfare of society. Foreign aid with altruistic motives is shown to increase economic development (Robledo, 2015). Therefore, this type of assistance has a long-term intervention to make sustainable development (Robledo 2015).

In addition to development, the state also provides assistance on the premise of economic benefits. Commercial motives show how foreign aid can contribute to the economy of donor states by expanding export markets, opening access to natural resources and energy supplies, and promoting foreign investment (Robledo 2015).

Finally, the state provides foreign aid to enhance reputation and respect or to show a particular identity in the international sphere (Robledo 2015). The prestige motive arises when states use foreign aid to cover up mistakes or wrong actions to improve their image and show the positive side of the donor to the recipient country. In addition, especially for small or developing countries, foreign aid is a way to establish their position as part of the international community (Robledo 2015).

3 Methodology

The research method that will be used to analyze is descriptive qualitative. Qualitative research refers to non-numerical data collection and analysis techniques (Lamont, 2015). On the other hand, descriptive research explains or describes a phenomenon. Descriptive research is used to develop an understanding of the world because research is done by gathering facts so that it can provide accurate information about what is and what is not (Rich et al., 2018). The data collection techniques that will be used in this research are documentary-based research and internet-based research. Documents collected can be agreements, official reports, policy statements, laws, or media reports (Lamont, 2015). In addition, research will also collect data through internet-based research that uses the internet to access journal articles and books (Lamont, 2015).

4 Discussion and Analysis

Before Indonesian AID, Indonesia's foreign aid to the South Pacific was carried out under the South-South Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) framework, which involved development partners such as other states or multilateral organizations. Indonesia's foreign assistance through SSTC is in the form of technical assistance and can be divided into three flagship programs, development, government governance, and

economy (BPPK - Kemlu RI, 2015; Tim Koordinasi Nasional KSST Indonesia, 2017). For development, Indonesia provides technical assistance for poverty eradication, animal husbandry and agriculture, disaster risk management, planning and unemployment, infrastructure, and education. Meanwhile, for governance, training was held on democracy, peace, conflict resolution, law enforcement, and local and regional development programs. Lastly, for the economy flagship programs, assistance is provided regarding macroeconomic management, public finance, and microfinance. Some of Indonesia's SSTC programs that involve South Pacific countries are as follows:

Table 2. Indonesian SSTC Programs Involving South Pacific Countries 2015-2016

No.	Program	Year	Participating States
1.	International Training on Disaster Risk Management for MSG (Melanesian Spearhead Group) Countries	6-15 June 2015	Fiji
2.	Training on Empowering Women Through Family Planning and Economic Development Intervention	13-19 September 2015	Papua New Guinea and Fiji
3.	International Workshop on Democracy and Innovation in Good Governance 2015	07-13 June 2015	Fiji and Vanuatu
4.	Dispatch Expert to Port Moresby: INTERNATIONAL TRAINING ON SEASHELL CRAFTING 2015	22-28 August 2015	Papua New Guinea
5.	Dispatch Expert to Solomon Islands: INTERNATIONAL TRAINING ON SEASHELL CRAFTING 2015	31 August-3 September 2015	Solomon Islands
6.	Dispatch Expert to Suva, Fiji: INTERNATIONAL TRAINING ON SEASHELL CRAFTING 2015	08-12 September 2015	Fiji
7.	Dispatch Expert on Coconut Shell Product Development in Palau 2015	23-27 November 2015	Palau
8.	Internship Program for Alumni of the International Training on Seashell Crafting for Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) Countries 2015	1-7 December 2015	Fiji, Papua, and Solomon Islands
9.	International Workshop on Legislative Election: Indonesia's Experiences	3 March 2015	Fiji and Vanuatu
10.	Training Course on Functional Foods Diversification, Added Value and Competitiveness on Agricultural Products Through Zero Waste Processing System for MSG/Pacific Countries	2-15 August 2015	Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Fiji
11.	Training Course on Artificial Insemination for MSG/Pacific Countries	3-23 August 2015	Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Fiji
12.	Entrepreneur Boot Camp: International Workshop on Entrepreneurship for Asia Pacific	9-12 November 2015	Fiji
13.	Entrepreneurship Boot Camp: International Workshop on Entrepreneurship for Asia Pacific Phase II 2016	29 February- 5 March 2016	Fiji

14.	International Workshop on Public Order Management for Asia Pacific 2016	9-19 May 2016	Fiji and New Caledonia
15.	Training Course on Empowering Women through Family Planning and Economic Development Interventions	23-27 May 2016	Papua New Guinea
16.	International Training on Coconut Product Development 2016	27 May-3 June 2016	Fiji, Marshall Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, and Solomon Islands
17.	Dispatch Expert & International Workshop on Seaweed & Fisheries Product Development Management for MSG/PIDF Countries 2016	27 June-14 July 2016	Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu
18.	Multimedia Training Course for Asia Pacific and African Countries 2016	25 July-4 August 2016	Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu
19.	International Training on Disaster Recovery and Mitigation for Coastal Area (Series 3)	9-20 August 2016	Fiji and Tuvalu
20.	International Training on Automotive for Border Community 2016	15-30 August 2016	Papua New Guinea
21.	International Training on Tourism 2016	21-29 August 2016	Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, and Tonga
22.	Annual Democracy Forum 2016 (ADF 2016): Learning from Democratic Transitions	25-26 August 2016	Fiji
23.	Sharing Best Practices and Experiences on Women and Leadership	19-23 September 2016	Fiji
24.	Joint Regional Training Workshop on Surveillance and Reporting of Substandard/Spurious/Falsely Labelled/Falsified/Counterfeit (SSFFC) Medical Products	9-12 October 2016	Papua New Guinea
25.	International Workshop on Protocol and Office Management for MSG Secretariat and the Republic of Fiji 2016	23-29 October 2016	Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu
26.	Capacity building Program on Enhancing the Development of Small and Medium Industry	24-28 October 2016	Fiji and Papua New Guinea

(Source: Author's Compliance from Tim Koordinasi Nasional KSST Indonesia 2016 & 2017)

The South Pacific is an area vulnerable to natural disasters and the effects of climate change. In 2015 Indonesia sent USD 2 million in humanitarian assistance to Vanuatu after they experienced a natural disaster. A total of USD 450,000 was given in cash, and the remainder was in food (The Jakarta Post, 2015). A year later, Fiji was hit by Typhoon Winston, and Indonesia provided US\$5 million in humanitarian assistance, which was divided into two, where US \$2 million was handed over in cash, and US \$3 million was given in goods (BBC News Indonesia, 2016). Fiji was hit again by a natural

disaster in 2020, Typhoon Harold, where Indonesia also provided humanitarian assistance of USD\$7,500, of which \$5,000 was in cash and 100 food packages worth \$2,500 (Sinaga, 2020). Indonesia also returned to providing humanitarian assistance to Vanuatu in 2023 after they were affected by natural disasters again, Typhoons Judy and Kevin. This foreign aid reached USD 512,820 in the form of goods (Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia, 2023).

In addition to technical assistance, Indonesia also provides grants to several South Pacific countries, which were carried out after establishing Indonesian AID. In 2020 Indonesia provided grants to Fiji and the Solomon Islands of IDR 2.88 billion to deal with COVID-19. In addition, Indonesia has also provided Fiji with Rp. 20.77 billion was used to renovate the Queen Victoria School (QVS) that Typhoon Winston damaged in 2016 (Institute for International Development Cooperation Fund, n.d.-d). Furthermore, in 2021 Indonesia provided grants to Papua New Guinea, IDR 3.6 billion, for handling COVID-19 (Lembaga Dana Kerja Sama Pembangunan Internasional, n.d.-b). In the same year, Indonesia gave Palau a grant amounting to IDR 7.6 billion. The grant was used to purchase ten police patrol vehicles and four protocol vehicles to support the Our Ocean Conference (OOC) 2022 (Lembaga Dana Kerja Sama Pembangunan Internasional, n.d.-a). In addition, the funds provided will finance technical assistance programs related to protocols in organizing international-scale activities (Lembaga Dana Kerja Sama Pembangunan Internasional, n.d.-a). Lastly, in 2022 Indonesia gave foreign aid to MSG, IDR 31 million.

4.1 Humanitarian

Indonesia's foreign aid can be said to include humanitarian motives because, several times, it provided humanitarian assistance to Fiji and Vanuatu after they were affected by natural disasters. This shows Indonesia's determination to ease human suffering and to protect human well-being in crises generated by natural and human disasters (Robledo, 2015).

4.2 Altruistic or Developmental

The motive that is often associated with Indonesia in providing foreign aid is altruistic or developmental motives. The programs implemented under the SSTC framework demonstrate this. Indonesia carried out SSTC to increase Indonesia's role in international cooperation (BPPK - Kemlu RI, 2015). For Indonesia, SSTC is a product of the southern countries' commitment and contribution to international development based on solidarity, equality, and equal opportunity (Tim Koordinasi Nasional KSST Indonesia, 2017). With that, the 26 programs implemented by the Indonesian government from 2015-2016 that involved many South Pacific countries manifested Indonesia's altruistic or developmental motives.

As for the grants provided through Indonesian AID, the foreign assistance provided to Fiji in the amount of IDR 20.77 billion for rebuilding schools is proof that there is a development motive behind the Indonesian AID. Apart from Fiji, the grants given to Palau also have the same motive, bearing in mind that the assistance is used as an empowerment for the Palau government in overseeing the 7th OOC Conference in

2020. The OOC is a conference in the maritime sector that seeks to increase awareness of marine conservation in a sustainable development scheme.

4.3 Commercial

Commercial goals in Indonesian foreign aid can only be seen after establishing Indonesian AID. As an extension of economic diplomacy, Indonesia hopes to expand its market through the grants provided. This was also proven by the seminar held by Indonesian AID on November 3, 2022, with *Perluasan Ekspor Melalui Pemberian Hibah Kepada Pemerintah/Lembaga Asing* as the theme (Puspitasari, 2022).

One of Indonesia's developing industries that has the potential to be expanded is health. The Ministry of Trade categorizes medical equipment as one of 10 potential Indonesian commodities, indicating a significant growth in the local industry (Kementerian Perdagangan Republik Indonesia, 2015). In 2020 the Indonesian pharmaceutical industry experienced annual growth of around 10-13%, while the medical device industry grew by 25% in 2018 (Bahtera Adi Jaya). The COVID-19 pandemic did not stop the growth of the Indonesian health sector but instead saw an increase in the chemical, pharmaceutical, and traditional medicine industries by 5.59% in early 2020 and 8.65% in the second quarter of 2020 (The German-Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (AHK Indonesia / EKONID), 2020). Thus, the Indonesian health industry has excellent potential to be developed in foreign markets (Kementerian Perdagangan Republik Indonesia, 2015).




Fig. 2. Number of Indonesian exports to Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and the Solomon Islands 2015-2021 (Source: UN Comtrade).

Even though it caused Indonesia to fall back into the lower-middle income category, the COVID-19 pandemic offers an enormous opportunity for the health sector, with an increasing demand for medical tools and devices. Grants for COVID-19 countermeasures provided by Indonesia to Fiji, Solomon Islands, and Papua New Guinea are excellent opportunities for Indonesia. This has also been realized by Indonesian AID, where the procurement of medical devices produced by Indonesian manufacturers is the goal of providing aid. Indonesia's commercial motives have proven successful, as there is an increase in exports to the three states that were given foreign aid for handling COVID in 2021 (Figure 2). For Papua New Guinea, from \$139.01 million in 2020 to USD 196.73 million, from USD 20.9 million to USD 29.14 million for Fiji, and USD 13.98 million to USD \$14.95 million for the Solomon Islands.

4.4 Political-Diplomatic; Security-Military; Prestige

In analyzing political-diplomatic, security-military, and prestige motives, it is necessary to consider the issue of Papua so that the analysis of the three motives will be combined. Despite all the good motives that exist in Indonesia's foreign aid to the South Pacific, these three motives are the most dominant of all. Papua is an issue that already existed in Indonesia before Indonesia established its sovereignty in 1945, which was further worsened after Papua integrated with Indonesia in 1963. The issue of Papua is caused by four aspects, that is human rights violations, development, limited media access, and poverty (Lantang & Tambunan, 2020). However, the issue that is always highlighted when talking about Papua is human rights violations.

Human rights violations Papua occurred when Papua was part of Indonesia and intensified during the era of President Soeharto. The New Order era was marked by human rights violations, such as restrictions on fundamental freedoms to acts of violence by security forces against those who were considered a threat by the state (Blades, 2020). The people of Papua are oppressed and tortured by the state through operations carried out by the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), which were orders from President Soeharto with the justification of fighting separatist groups (Lantang & Tambunan, 2020). The military operations included cases of torture, rape, and murder that were documented, as well as shelling villages in certain Highland Papua areas, triggering migration in which more than 10,000 refugees moved to Papua New Guinea in 1984 (Blades, 2020).

Repressive actions against Papua were carried out during the Soeharto era and still continue and are evident today. Some of the events were the Biak Numfor case in July 1998, the Wasior incident in 2001, the Wamena incident in 2003, the Paniai incident in 2014, and the Mapenduma case in December 2016 (Erdianto, 2017). Reports from Amnesty International stated that in 2010-2018 there were around 95 people who were allegedly killed by security forces in Papua (Blades, 2020; Lantang & Tambunan, 2020).

Over time, the issue of Papua has experienced internationalization where with the existence of technology, the Papuan people can publish what they experience. The issue of Papua gained attention following the fall of the authoritarian regime of Suharto and Indonesia's opening up to a more critical public opinion on various issues (Wangge &

Lawson, 2023). Stories of human rights violations spread to the broader world through those fleeing the province and through the media courtesy of concerned journalists and academics (Wangge & Lawson, 2023). With that, Papuan voices regarding Indonesian rule, including human rights violations, militarization, and cries about self-determination, are attracting international attention and concern, especially in neighboring Melanesian states (Blades, 2020).

Together with the MSG, founded based on decolonization for Melanesian nations, the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) worked to liberate Papua from Indonesia. The issue of Papua has been raised several times in international forums such as the Pacific Island Forum (PIF), the UN Millennium Summit, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. In addition, in 2015, as many as 40 Pacific Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and individuals raised concerns about the human rights situation in Papua (Wangge & Lawson, 2023).

Papua's self-determination efforts pushed Indonesia to be defensive by branding the ULMWP as a separatist organization. Binding the Papuan issue to sovereignty, Indonesia sees the problem as a threat to sovereignty and national security (Indira Aryani et al., 2021; Solomon, 2014). As a country that has always prioritized sovereignty and independence from the colonial period (Wangge & Lawson, 2023), Indonesia's image has suffered damage. Thus, the government can use foreign aid as a tool to defend its sovereignty and improve its image.

Seeing several aspects faced by Melanesian states, such as economic vulnerability caused by extreme dependence on foreign aid and international trade, lack of infrastructure, limited institutional capacity, and their political reality, Indonesia, as the largest economy in Southeast Asia, can exploit their economic vulnerability for their own political interests (Solomon, 2014). Through foreign assistance, Indonesia can show that they uphold human rights, especially humanitarian assistance such as those given to Fiji and Vanuatu, as well as grants from Indonesian AID which are used to handle COVID-19. From there, Indonesia shows a sense of solidarity and humanity. It conveys the message that they care about people outside their sovereign territory as they do in their domestic sphere (Wati et al., 2018). The same thing can also be seen in its assistance through the SSTC framework, which helps empower other states based on solidarity and contribute to international development.

Through foreign aid, Indonesia can build a good image and cover up its mistakes in Papua. The Indonesian government itself also stated the aim of enhancing its image; for example, in giving foreign aid to Fiji, it was stated that the reason the aid was given was "to improve the image, posture, and influence of Indonesia, both at the level of bilateral relations with Fiji and in the sphere of international diplomacy" (Lembaga Dana Kerja Sama Pembangunan Internasional, n.d.-d). Statements for image building and strengthening relations between South Pacific countries are also mentioned in the other aid to other South Pacific countries (Lembaga Dana Kerja Sama Pembangunan Internasional, n.d.-a, n.d.-b). With this image, Indonesia will gain high leverage in the South Pacific region so that it can narrow or even close Papua's opportunity to secede. Thus, there are political-diplomatic, military-security, and prestige motives in providing Indonesia's foreign aid.

Indonesia's motive can be said to have been successful by getting the associate member status at the MSG in 2015. The South Pacific countries that strongly support Indonesia on the Papua issue are Fiji and Papua New Guinea. However, following the arrival of Indonesian foreign aid, Kiribati, Nauru, and Tuvalu, who initially supported Papuan independence, began to change their position (Lantang & Tambunan, 2020; Sihaloho et al., 2022). The leaders of Nauru and Tuvalu expressed their support for Indonesia (Blades, 2020; Radio New Zealand News, 2018).

5 Conclusion

It can be concluded that Indonesia as an emerging donor or non-traditional donor is not that much different from traditional donors. Although carrying values of solidarity, promotion of international development, and anti-colonialism, Indonesia has political goals in providing foreign aid. This can be seen in the case of the South Pacific, where Indonesia uses the economic vulnerability of states in the region as a tool to maintain its own sovereignty. The issue of Papua, which has always been investigated by the South Pacific, especially the Melanesian sub-region, was attempted to be buried by the good intentions of Indonesian foreign aid. However, other motives underlie the provision of foreign aid, such as humanitarian, altruistic or development, and commercial, the political-diplomatic, security-military, and prestige motives are more dominant.

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