



Strengthening Islamic political institutions Religion-Based Identity Politics in Malaysia and Indonesia

Moch. Mubarak Muharam¹, Mochamad Arif Affandi¹, Eko Satriya Hermawan¹, Agus Satmoko Adi¹, Imam Zarkachi¹, Silkania Swarizona¹, Adli Hazmi¹, Jasmine Helwa Malika¹

¹ Universitas Negeri Surabaya, Indonesia

mochmuharam@unesa.ac.id

Abstract. This study aims to analyze in strengthening Islamic political institutions-based identity politics that occurred in Indonesia and Malaysia. This study obtained primary and secondary data using library research. This means that data is obtained from literature originating from journals and books. This study argues that the identity politics that have occurred in Malaysia and Indonesia have occurred over a long period of time. This identity politics aims to make Islam the official teaching of the state. Apart from that, they want the glory of Islam in the political and economic fields. This article concludes that apart from similarities in strengthening Islamic political institutions-based identity politics, there are also differences in identity politics between Malaysia and Indonesia. In common, Muslims in both countries want a constitution based on Islam, Islam to be strong in the political and economic fields, and they are disappointed with the existence of the Chinese in the economic field. Meanwhile, the difference is that Muslims have made Islamic teachings the constitution of Malaysia, while Muslims have not succeeded in making Islamic teachings into the state ideology. Another difference is that Islam is always identified with certain ethnicities in Malaysia, whereas in Indonesia, Islam is not identified with certain tribes or ethnicities.

Keywords: Identity Politics, Islam, Malaysia, Indonesia

1 INTRODUCTION

Strengthening Islamic politics institutions has become a theme or term that has received the most interesting attention and discussion during the last two decades in Indonesia. For almost ten years, identity politics has become a discourse and practice that not only influences public opinion, but also contributes to the existence of political divisions for and against the government led by Joko Widodo (Jokowi). In fact, there are concerns in many circles that identity politics also has the potential to divide unity and integrity between citizens.

Identity politics are actions or thoughts that are constructed or imagined to fight for the interests of religion, race, ethnic environment, nationality and gender. In reality, identity politics based on religion (Islam) has attracted more public attention[1].

There are several political events that are always associated with identity politics based on religion (Islam), including the Arab Spring in the Middle East. The Arab Spring was an event of people's movements in various countries that overthrew heads of government/state, using religious narratives. The people's disappointment with the head of state/government, due to the poverty and unemployment that occurs among the people (including college graduates), gains legitimacy from religious figures/ulama. With religious narratives and support, the people's protest movement becomes stronger and more legitimate to overthrow the government.

Religion-based identity politics in Indonesia in the last ten years cannot be separated from Islam. Because most of this politics is carried out by some Islamic community figures or organizations (ormas). Some Islamic groups use Islamic symbols and narratives to criticize and delegitimize the government led by Jokowi. The Islamic group movement held a demonstration involving hundreds of thousands of people demanding that Basuki Tjahya Purnama (Ahok), the Governor of DKI Jakarta at that time be sentenced to prison in 2012. Ahok, as a governor who was close to President Joko Widodo, was accused of committing religious blasphemy. The movement to sue Ahok was actually carried out in an effort to show dissatisfaction with President Joko Widodo[2]

2 Method

This research is a literature study. Therefore, to obtain primary and secular data, the research used literature from journals and books. The research tries to analyze the strengthening Islamic politics institutions carried out by Muslims in Indonesia and Malaysia. This research identifies issues in Islam-based identity politics, which include the desire to make Islam the official state teaching, political domination and economic glory.

3 Results and Discussion

Strengthening Islamic politics institutions has occurred in this country for a long time[3]. This politics is carried out through formal institutionalization or extra-parliamentary movements, even in certain contexts using violence. Before the proclamation of independence was carried out, identity politics was carried out by Islamic figures, by proposing Islam as the religion and basis of the state at the BPUPKI Session. At first Sukarno agreed to this proposal, but one day after the proclamation of independence, several figures from non-Islamic and Eastern Indonesia rejected the proposal, so that Indonesia was no longer an Islamic country, but became a country based on Pancasila [4], [5]

The failure to create an Islamic state did not discourage some Islamic figures from dreaming of a state based on religion. They persistently and actively fought for it through the Constituent Body in the Parliamentary Era. Because of the long and "hot" debate for 3 years, between those who were for and against the Islamic State, Presi-

dent Sukarno dissolved that body (parliament), which finally marked a change in the era from Parliamentary Democracy to Guided. In this era, identity politics is not only carried out through parliamentary channels, but is also carried out through resistance against the state through armed movements, carried out by DI/TII in West Java, Aceh and South Sulawesi [6], [7].

The change of leadership from Sukarno to General Suharto, which also marked the end of the Old Order government, did not eliminate the existence of religion-based identity politics. At the beginning of the New Order (Orba) era, identity politics was carried out through underground movements and in certain cases, through physical resistance. In the midst of the authoritarianism of the New Order government, Islamist groups secretly spread the idea of an Islamic state in mosques on well-known campuses[8]. In addition, the Islamist movement carried out physical resistance against the state to reject the state's desire to make Pancasila the sole principle, in Tanjung Periok Incident 198.

The state changed its approach, from being tough towards Islam to being softer towards Islamic organizations. The state provides space for the Muslim Scholars Association to carry out religious and political activities [9]. Because of this, ICMI has the opportunity to Islamize government and society

ICMI became an important instrument for the development of Islamism in the final decades of the New Order government. However, ICMI also became a means of control for President Suharto against the radicalism of the Islamic movement. ICMI was also used by Suharto to gain support from urban Islamic groups . Apart from that, through ICMI, Suharto was able to reduce his dependence on military groups, in an effort to maintain his political power [9]. In the midst of declining public support, due to corrupt practices and political collusion, ICMI became an important tool for Suharto to maintain power

In the reform era, which began with the fall of the Suharto government in 1998, Islamist activists increased compared to the New Order era [10][11]. In the era of Freedom (Reformation), Islamist activists had the courage to question fundamental matters, such as the basic issue of the Pancasila state. Islamic community (social) organizations such as the Islamic Mujahid Council (MMI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Ahlussunah wal Jama'ah Communication Forum (FKAWJ), tarbiyyah groups dream and intend to replace the Pancasila ideology with basic Islam country. Islamic-based parties in the multi-party era (Reformation) proposed and fought for the Jakarta Charter to become the basis of the state[12]

Identity politics carried out by Islamic groups or people occurred in Indonesia after the reform era, in several approaches, including through acts of violence, parliament and movements in society. Woodward, et al (2006) stated that the 2002 bomb explosion in Indonesia was carried out by perpetrators who obtained their thinking subjectivity from the teachings of Wahhabism. Woodward, et al, believe that most of today's Islamic militant movements are partly or at least influenced by Wahhabism. The Taliban in Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda, the two organizations that most often carry out suicide movements, are influenced by Wahhabism. According to Baskan & Wright, Wahhabi terrorism and extremism continue to spread their influence in Indonesia, even though Wahhabism is only supported by a few people[13].

Apart from violent movements, identity politics is fought through parliament as carried out by the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). In the 2009 elections, this party reached the peak of success by becoming the fourth largest party[14]. This party gained its ideological awareness from the understanding of religion and politics originating from the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt. This party can be considered as the largest social and political movement fighting for sharia. Therefore, if there are religious practices that are acculturated with local culture, the PKS calls them un-Islamic practices[15].

Apart from parliament, identity politics carried out by Islamist groups is carried out by raising awareness among the public about Islamic public life which is realized by the establishment of a state based on the Koran and the Hadith of the Prophet. Struggle in the same way carried out by Hizbut Tharir Indonesia (HTI). HTI, whose core cadres are dominated by alumni of well-known campuses, especially the Bogor Agricultural Institute (IPB), wants a Khilafah system, namely a government led by Islamic leaders in the world.

apart from that, there is Islam-based identity politics that has attracted public attention in Indonesia, namely the action carried out by 'Islamic Group 212' in 2016[4], [16] . This action has succeeded in gathering hundreds of thousands of people to gather together in an effort to demand that Governor Tjahya Purnama (Ahok) be sentenced to prison, because he is considered to have blasphemed religion[17]. Furthermore, by promoting an Islamic narrative, the group fought against President Jokowi not being re-elected in the 20th presidential election.

Malaysia is one of the countries in Southeast Asia that places Islam as an influential religion in politics. Similar to Indonesia, Islam has been involved in political relations for a long time in Malaysia. In the early era of Malaysian civilization, Islam became a means of legitimation to strengthen the political position of the sultans. Because of Islam, the sultan not only has the authority to make political decisions, but he also plays a role in getting involved in religious (public) matters.

The political movements carried out by Malaysian Islam were also carried out during the era of British colonialism. In that era, Islam merged with the Malay ethnic group. In that era, the connection between Islam and Malays became real and intertwined, being a Malay also meant being a Muslim. Therefore, in that era, it became commonplace that fighting for Islam meant fighting for the interests of the Malay people, whereas when the interests of the Malay people were accommodated in public policy, it meant that the interests of many Muslims were being fought for. In this context, the 1957 Malay Constitution is one of the constitutions that provides special rights for Muslim citizens, especially those of Malay nationality, namely by making Islam the official religion in both federated countries (central government) and states. Apart from that, the constitution specifically explains the existence of Malay Muslims. In the constitution, Malays are identified as people who embrace Islam, always speak Malay language and practice Malay customs.

The 1957 Malay Constitution also regulates the obligation for Muslims to carry out religious obligations, and provides sanctions for Muslims who do not comply with Islamic law. This is almost the same as the wishes of the Jakarta Charter which was proposed by Muslims in 1945. Towards Indonesian independence in 1945, Islamic

representatives at the session of the Investigating Committee for Preparatory Efforts for Indonesian Independence wanted the Indonesian state to be an Islamic state. Therefore, they chose the Jakarta Charter over Pancasila as the basis of the state. But then, on August 18 1945, one after Indonesian Independence Day, non-Muslim people from Eastern Indonesia rejected the Jakarta Charter, so that the basis of the country became Pancasila[18]. Overall, the principles in Pancasila and the Jakarta Charter are the same, the difference is only in the first principle. In Pancasila, the first principle is "Belief in One Almighty God", while in the Jakarta Charter, the first principle is "Belief in God with the obligation to implement Islamic law for its followers." "

The existence of regulations that require Muslims to carry out their religious teachings as stated in the Malay Constitution and the 1957 Jakarta Charter shows the existence of identity politics[19]. The mention of these regulations is synonymous with the desire to make Islam a religion that occupies a higher position in the state system. Granting special privileges to Islam is believed to be important, which should not be ignored[18]. There is a belief and a construction has been raised that if you do not make Islamic teachings a formal rule, government practices will not be in accordance with religious teachings and could result in people's welfare not being achieved.

The identity politics that occurred in Malaysia in the 1970s were almost the same as those that occurred in Indonesia during the Reformation era (1998-present)[20]. Apart from the desire for Islamic teachings to become the official teachings of the state, the dominance of Islam in politics, there is a desire from the people in both countries, that Islam must be victorious in the economic world. In the 1970s, Malay Muslims were disappointed with the dominance of Chinese and Indians in the economic and educational fields, they wanted Malay Muslims to have economic access equal to that of "foreigners". This also happened to an Islamic group known as 'Islamic Group 212', which challenged Chinese economic control in Indonesia. This group carries out movements either involving large masses in demonstrations or by forming opinions on social media and online[17]. The "Islamic Group 212" held large demonstrations in Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia in 2016-2017[21].

4 Conclusion

Islam-based identity politics has existed for a long time in Malaysia and Indonesia. Identity politics in Malaysia has been carried out from the beginning of Malaysian civilization, British colonialism until today. Meanwhile, in neighboring countries, namely Indonesia, identity politics occurred from the era of colonialism, the Old Order, the New Order to the Reformation.

Identity politics in both countries is carried out for the purpose of making Islamic teachings a constitution, political domination and economic control. In Malaysia, Muslims have made their teachings into the constitution, this has given special rights to Islam in the 1957 Malay constitution. Apart from that, the constitution also validates the obligation for Muslims to practice Islamic teachings. On the other hand, in Indonesia, Muslims did not succeed in making Indonesia an Islamic country, because

of the rejection of the Jakarta Charter as the basis of the state in 1945. Identity politics in both countries was also carried out in an effort to ensure that Muslims had a strong economy. Muslims in both countries are disappointed with the dominance of Chinese entrepreneurs in the economic sector. Finally, what is interesting about the practice of identity politics in these two countries is that the glory of Islam is always associated with a certain ethnic group, namely Malays, whereas in Indonesia, the glory of Islam is not specifically associated with a particular tribe.

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