Rubber to Artisanal Oil Mining Narratives: A Study of Governmentality in *Dusun Tue*, Indonesia

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Abstract. The issue of resource dispossession has been an ongoing narrative of the villagers and an everlasting struggle between the ruling regime as well as the local communities. The regime tends to organize and implement a managed Governmentality with a target population. Therefore, it is fascinating to figure out the historicity of the ruling regime practicing governmentality, its influence on Dusun Tue community, as well as its strategies to construct knowledge and self-regulation techniques for survival. A three-month live-in and critical ethnographic qualitative study was conducted in Dusun Tue, Indonesia to obtain data through observations, in-depth interviews, and focus group discussions. The historicity of the socio-cultural landscape of Dusun Tue formation illustrates the history of Colonial hegemony and efforts to persuade people from rubber farming to pursue the dream of becoming artisanal oil miners. There is an expansion in the meaning of artisanal oil mining to shape various self-regulation techniques or organize personal and communal livelihoods as strategies or tactics for negotiating risks. Governmentality turns out to create the formation of a distinct subject, not entirely compliant, but also active, productive, and powerful to a certain extent. The livelihood of the villagers remains a dynamic process and continues to be negotiated. Consequently, there is a critical need for cross-sectoral thought regarding artisanal oil mining in the global south, not only the issue of mining licenses and economic development, but also the ongoing struggles of the rural communities.

Keywords: Artisanal and Small-Scale Oil Mining, Governmental Rationality, Rural Livelihood, Smallholder Farmer, Technology of the Self.

1 Introduction

The social relations of rural communities regarding natural livelihoods and land management are closely related to the governmentality of various regimes of power. For example, oil mining tends to be operationalized by the mining industry and the state [1], while artisanal oil mining managed by the local communities for survival is considered a plague and the cause of the decline in Indonesia's oil production. Artisanal

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mining is often characterized as small-scale informal, familial, low-tech, labor-intensive, and the most important income generator, which is closely linked to rural subsistence agriculture [2]. This mining frequently results in environmental degradation and is vulnerable to occupational health and safety. Even though the effort to formalize it has been promoted in Africa, the policy has been unfavorable and difficult for users due to the highly centralized licensing structure, high cost, and length of licensing [3], [4], [5], [6]. Meanwhile, in the Philippines, formalization appears to be limited to formal recognition and benefits employers, while workers are vulnerable to exploitation (Verbrugge, 2015).

The study of artisanal mining generally discusses gold mining in Africa, while the reports on oil mining are still limited. The studies of artisanal oil mining mostly take place in Bojonegoro, Indonesia, where dual employment [8], socio-cultural work relations [9], and conflict [10], [11] are discussed. However, there are limited reports in Musi Banyuasin, Indonesia [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17]. These studies have focused on describing the interconnectedness of artisanal oil mining from a meso-scale legal, economic and socio-anthropological perspective. However, they have not been able to explain the intersections with the history and governmentality of the ruling regime in their choice to become oil miners.

It is valuable to analyze the lives of artisanal oil miners in *Dusun Tue* because (1) the majority of the villagers have shifted from being rubber farmers to artisanal oil miners. The community is extremely dependent on the natural resources in the surrounding area. (2) Rural communities are the main resource driving the development wheels through a large and low-cost workforce but are often marginalized and subordinated. (3) The villagers are generally uneducated and lack job orientation, but they can strategize and negotiate to continue oil mining despite being repeatedly banned by the local government. This is because their activities are without operational licenses and are not standardized, resulting in frequent fires and accidents. (5) There are still limited artisanal oil mining studies that examine conflicts between mining authorities and various parties [11] sociologically. Therefore, it is essential to analyze them through the governmentality history of the ruling regime that shapes miners' power.

This article aims to explore the governmentality history in the socio-cultural life of the *Dusun Tue* people, who have shifted from being rubber farmers to artisanal oil miners. Therefore, the following questions were raised, namely What are the consequences of this governmentality practice for the people of *Dusun Tue*? and How do they construct their knowledge and self-organizational techniques to survive? This study theoretically expands the concept of governmentality and emphasizes that peripheral subjects are also active and productive. Meanwhile, for practitioners, it is intended to promote the awareness of social development, not only economic but to cooperate in constructing the sustainability of rural communities. The study aims to address this within the framework of the governmentality practices of Michel Foucault. This paper is organized into four sections, namely the introduction and literature review, research methods, results and discussion, as well as conclusion.

2 Literature Review

The report on the governmentality of artisanal oil mining is currently insufficient. One of the governmentality regimes is in the form of definitional power over artisanal oil mining. The predominant narrative together with the state apparatus uses the term ”illegal mining” [1] as a reflection of the power of knowledge that intends to establish the truth believed as neutral and objective “scientific truth” to conquer, objectify, and punish the population as “body politic technology”. This power is to provide knowledge in its service, since it is absent without a “power/knowledge” relationship [18]. Meanwhile, miners are resistant to such prejudice because it tends to discriminate in various social processes. The academic literature commonly uses the term “artisanal mining” that refers to a production system using simple tools, labor-intensive, and small group ownership with a familial nature in rural areas inherent to subsistence agriculture, which was also adopted [5], [19], [20], [21], [22].

Studies on mining governance are generally concerned with corporations. Its governing power is aimed at increasing resource rents as well as mining value-added for the state and corporations, including suppression actions that lead to community resistance [23]. Conflicts of environmental degradation, destruction of livelihoods, remoteness of locations, as well as vulnerability to death [24] raise distrust of the state and corporations [25], [26], [27]. The resistance does not only reject the presence of mining corporations [25], [28], [29], [30] but also the ability to negotiate with companies [11], [26], [31] or carry out defiance acts [8], [24]. These studies have not revealed the governmentality of artisanal oil mining and the historicity of the villagers' subsistence lives that produced livelihood shifts.

A thorough analysis of post-structuralist political economy guides in describing the subjects' shift from rubber farming to artisanal oil mining in Dusun Tue, Indonesia. Foucault examines power and authority, as well as how power operates or controls the consciousness of the population. Power in Dusun Tue landscape will be recognized as the articulation result of legitimacy, claims, and conventions controlled through self-discipline. Discipline is a set of rational ways for shaping and regulating behavior through various authorities or institutions at multiple levels. Foucault refers to this as “conduct of conduct” [32] or “governmentality”, which is the implication of a comprehensive way of thinking about government in the practice of modern power by controlling the population to influence, perform, govern, or discipline through regulations and surveillance [33]. These regulatory practices are increasingly essential within the framework of neoliberal rationality in constructing individuals as economic or interest subjects to support the principles of efficiency and competition.

This study construed governmentality as a strategy and technique of power in modern government for “governing others”. Therefore, it is important to examine the governance history of the lives and livelihoods of Dusun Tue community, as well as how it is practiced.

3 Methods

This study utilized a critical ethnographic descriptive approach in understanding or enhancing the natural setting, bringing out the voices of the marginalized artisanal miners, enabling the exposure, questioning, and narration of various particular voices or values exchanged, as well as illustrating the pattern of local political economy relations. Furthermore, the data were obtained through in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and participatory observation. The interview covered twenty miners in various work chains as well as twelve state apparatuses from the provincial, district, and village levels. The research team stayed for approximately three months in the family residence of an artisanal oil miner in *Dusun Tue*, Musi Banyuasin Regency, South Sumatra, Indonesia. *Dusun Tue* is not a real village name registered in the government administration, but a term recognized by the elders as the cofounder of *Marga* Sanga Desa. This study locus was chosen because the majority of the population has switched from rubber farming to artisanal oil mining, it can capture the chain of production that continues to be reproduced, there are also frequent artisanal oil well fires which are the target of government regulation and national media coverage at the end of 2021.

The process of data collection and analysis occurred simultaneously. Data analysis and writing were carried out in steps by adopting the five stages of critical qualitative research analysis starting from the compilation of primary records, preliminary construction analysis, dialogical data generating, finding system connections, and analyzing results [34]. Moreover, internal and external validity techniques were applied to check the accuracy of the results.

4 Results

4.1 Historicity of The Socio-Cultural Landscape in The Formation of *Dusun Tue*

The historicity of the socio-cultural landscape guides the exploration of the ruling regime trajectory for the formation of *Dusun Tue* in four periods [35]. First, the early formation began with a clan-based governing system (ascribed status), namely the Singa Desa clan led by *Pasirah* Syamsudin (1740-1770). The number of villages increased to nine during the time of *Pasirah* Abu Jalil (1835-1845), therefore, the name of the clan changed to Marga Sanga Desa up to the present day. During the Dutch colonization, the community unit became territorial through *Oendang-Oendang Simboer Tjahaja* which resulted in a uniform customary law system, taxation, compulsory labor, and restrictions on *Pasirah's* power. Furthermore, the New Order government continued the homogenization of villages in Indonesia and abolished the clan system through Law No. 5 of 1979 on Village Government to mobilize community participation in development.

The second period was the growth of *Dusun Tue,* where the Dutch colonials constructed highway infrastructure (the 1930s). This construction connected Palembang-Sekayu-Lubuk Linggau along the Musi River to simplify the transportation of export crops, which also changed the socio-cultural life of the local community. Furthermore, the Dutch initiated the cultivation of rubber (*hevea brasiliensis*) as a world trade commodity in 1900-1910, which soon attracted the villagers in South Sumatra to open their plantations [36]. Smallholder rubber farming production subsequently competed with the private European rubber plantations [37]. The price of rubber latex was highly volatile and dependent on the world market, however, the export tax and "rubber coupon" policy further marginalized smallholders. Moreover, oil mines were explored and exploited for the requirements of the automotive industry, which subsequently became the basis for the Japanese capture during the World War, and continued by the Indonesian army [38].

The third is the period of rubber farming where farmers in Dusun Tue only planted monocultures and were vulnerable to price fluctuations. The community suffered a period of “oedjan mas” prosperity (the 1920s) and was immediately hit by the world economic depression (1930). Small farmers were discriminated against through export taxes (the 1930s) and were not granted any assistance [39]. The history of power regimes, both Colonial and Indonesian, shows that smallholder production was unappreciated, even though it grew 80% faster and more than large-scale plantations [40].

The fourth was the period of artisanal oil mining, where the fall in the price of rubber latex to 3.000 IDR/kg (2013) was barely anticipated by the farmers, government, or private sector. The status of farmers on the frontier and the lack of direct impact on national political stability meant they were susceptible to being forgotten. Therefore, this situation forced farmers to explore and reshape their livelihood practices. The discovery of several old oil wells left by the Dutch is a signal of their natural wealth management. The villagers created a chain of mining production after some communities were first acquainted with artisanal oil mining. They started with the opening of artisanal oil wells (2013) and expanded to refinery house production (2019). Currently, there are hundreds of oil wells, the number of which continues to grow, despite being banned by the government. The Indonesian government entrusts the regulation and management of its natural resources, including oil, to mining corporations. Meanwhile, artisanal mining without an operational permit is categorized as illegal. Mining is not secretive anymore, on the contrary, it is done openly and massively.

The socio-cultural heritage of Dusun Tue is preserved and negotiated as it evolves. Cultural and religious sites are intertwined with livelihoods. The villagers continue to believe in the power of “spirits” that protect the village from danger at three cultural sites. The Rengas Gemuruh tree, like the Candi, is narrated as being related to the prince of the Srivijaya Kingdom. Besides asking for protection with the intercession of both, some people also do ritual prayers and make offerings at the Makam Keramat Tujuh Beradik. Also, the Islamic Sedekah Rami prayer ceremony at the beginning of each year is still related to these three sites and artisanal oil mining.

Artisanal oil mining activities have transformed the socio-economic life of Dusun Tue people. This economic improvement is most felt and visible in the number of permanent house buildings, gold jewelry worn, improvement in children’s education, as well as competition in the consumption of modern goods. However, the rampant circulation and use of narcotics among the youths and nightlife have also come alongside. On one hand, investing or saving for the future has not become a habit. The community preserves the tolongan culture to ease the burden of neighbors during wedding celebrations or house construction by providing food, labor, or material assistance to be returned one day.

The residents of Dusun Tue fall into two categories, namely Sekayu “natives” and transmigration residents. Both have segregated residences and livelihoods. The transmigration population still maintains agriculture, even though the growth of oil palm has eliminated their intercropping. Meanwhile, most of the local population, which were originally rubber farmers, have now become artisanal oil miners. Transmigration residents are only engaged as manual laborers in the process of making “seller tubs” or oil reservoirs, while the rest of the local population is involved in all lines of the mining production process. Although the social and economic inequality between the two is apparent, the transmigration population is nonetheless viewed negatively.

4.2 Suspending Rubber Farming

Rural communities relied on nature for their livelihoods and were integral to the global economy and development programs. The process of living begins with observation and imitation to also enjoy the results that are happening at that moment. Becoming a rubber farmer is a Dutch colonial hegemony modeled through *Pasirah* and followed by the Indonesian government to produce commodity crops with an international market orientation. Indonesia has exported about 85% of its natural rubber since 1970. Furthermore, South Sumatra has the largest production center for smallholder plantation-type rubber, with about 539,137 tons [41]. An estimated 2,500 villages derive their livelihoods from rubber farming [42]. Smallholder rubber plantations have managed to control at least 86% of the rubber area in Indonesia (2000) by producing 79% of the rubber [40], far exceeding the production of rubber farms with plantation schemes. However, neither rewards, recognition nor assistance were received, but discrimination through export taxes (the 1930s) [39].

Since 1920, the price of rubber latex has been volatile while governing regimes have been hands-off. The farmers have also resorted to survival strategies, such as relying on food crops, searching for forest timber, seeking loans, or selling land to plantation companies. For the *Dusun Tue* residents, the existence of several old oil well locations that were left over from the Dutch and several oil companies in Musi Banyuasin Regency is a mark for knowing and utilizing the natural opportunities that exist. The selling price of rubber sap reached its lowest point of 3,000 IDR/kg (0.19 USD) at the end of 2013, and the community was in debt. Therefore, they sought alternatives by strategizing and practicing artisanal oil mining tactics. Eventually, the community prioritized mining over rubber tapping due to the high income and immediate financial gain. For example, the lowest level *pemolot* or mining laborer can earn a minimum of 50,000 IDR/jerry can in a day of scavenging. Meanwhile, rubber farming does not guarantee that kind of money and the income is monthly. Oil mining has made the village dense and rich, and also attracted migrants with various interests.

4.3 The Impression of becoming an Artisanal Oil Miner

Artisanal oil mining has brought meaningful changes to the villagers. The mining production and distribution chain can create several employment opportunities that are divided into various production chains. The mining preparatory stage includes the landlords, drill masters, *kongsi* or financier team, teams drilling oil wells, and making seller tanks. Meanwhile, the mining stage consists of security guards, pickers, and oil pressers, which are subsequently followed by oil pullers and refiners. A large number of job opportunities have contributed to the improvement of the village economy. Many of them have constructed permanent houses, bought vehicles, sent their children to higher education, or opened independent businesses. The success stories of mining continue to be narrated, especially when the well is successful in *meluing* or the oil comes out on its own due to gas pressure from deep within the earth. Therefore, income increases many times over. The stories of *meluing* oil wells producing around 50,000 liters or 500 million IDR per day are not infrequent. One burning oil well at the end of 2021 is known to have an owner who can still earn 9 billion IDR within three months. This is a hope that is no more distant than a reality.

It is agreed that the accumulation of capital is increasingly available when mining for individuals who have a long-term mindset and can cultivate it. However, it was quite common for some of them to be carried away by luxuries until all their wealth was finally mortgaged. They rely on the belief that oil can improve their future, even though its mining does not guarantee profits. Mining is a job possibility and a rational choice that is now available in the village. Therefore, the government is oriented towards economic development by entrusting the operationalization of oil management to the mining industry while prohibiting and disciplining artisanal mining. Although they do not dismiss that the existence of mining contributes to absorbing labor, improving the economy, and also reducing the criminality rate.

5 Discussion

The transition of villagers' livelihoods from rubber farming to artisanal oil mining has raised several questions, which include how do villagers construct awareness practices and initiate work, both in smallholder rubber farming and artisanal oil mining? How are both livelihoods interconnected with governmentality, opportunities, and future expectations? The results will be elaborated by explaining the meaning of artisanal oil mining and expanding the knowledge of governmentality that turns out to produce counter-conduct.

5.1 The Meaning of Artisanal Oil Mining

Presently, the *Dusun Tue* community relies on mining, and even though oil is rarely profitable, it has brought convenience and abundance. Most of these villagers have failed to produce oil, and this has led to divorce, poverty, work accidents, and death. They consider the mining as a "bet" in getting "treasure". Moreover, some of them perform rituals, such as asking for guidance from certain "spirits", "sleeping on the land" to be mined, abstaining from sex, as well as behaving honestly and openly with fellow miners in order to have similar expectations with the oil results. Schreer (2020) also pointed out that the Kalimantan villagers who experienced the gold rush have continued to refine and rearrange their expectations in human or other non-human dialogues to create an effective, physical, friendly, but high-risk state.

Oil mining also embodies the meaning of gotong-royong. The amount of capital to open one oil well with a depth of 200 meters costs around 250 million IDR, which is especially difficult when carried alone. Therefore, they use the kongsi cooperation system to collect capital from dozens of people and anticipate greater losses in case of mining failure. They believe that one's involvement (capital) regardless of the percentage brings luck to all, and vice versa, while dishonesty will eliminate or reduce the oil that has been produced. This cooperation takes place in the entire production chain of artisanal oil mining, starting from the preparation stage, the mining process, and the post-mining.

Oil was the greatest job available in the village and it is a source of fulfillment believed to be the answer to all hopes and dreams. Mining activities have continued as though there is no obstruction despite its prohibition by the government due to the absence of operational licenses and frequent oil well fires. The Indonesian government manages natural resources in all jurisdictions to the greatest extent for the prosperity of the people through the ratification of the 1945 Constitution article 33 paragraph 3. There is also no doubt that the security apparatus and the government are involved in its perpetuation and maintenance. However, the miners have continued to create new "spaces of hope", reinforcing that prohibition is not a panacea. The state also produced its matrix of power, knowledge, and practice through legitimization to extend its control over resource exploitation. For a moment, people may receive a sense of economic improvement and prosperity. However, they are not only concerned with welfare, but also security, sustainability, and state revenues for their citizens.

5.2 Governing the Self While Farming Rubber

Rubber farmers should manage to balance their domestic and social activities with environmental conditions. It is well known that rubber tapping should be carried out in the morning with sunny weather in order not to reduce the sap quality and inhibit plant growth. This working circumstance requires that daily activities, such as cooking and childcare should be carried out on the plantation, which is located quite a distance from the main house in the village. Both men and women carry out the same work, such as tapping, weeding, and molding rubber sap. The demands for neighborhood social relations like ceremonies also contribute to the reduction in the number of working hours and income. Income is usually earned monthly, depending on the quantity and quality of rubber latex. However, the price of latex is very volatile because it depends on international market prices. This is often the case when the rubber sap is left untapped due to the high production, while on the one hand, farmers are often in debt to fulfill their daily needs. Therefore, the absence of personal precautions or government and private assistance for the decline in the price of rubber latex forces the farmers to initiate their production for survival. The farmers also carried out several practices, tactics, and strategies to adjust as "governing of the self" with the environment or society in avoiding risks (see Table 1.).

Table 1. Governing of the self rubber farmers *Dusun Tue*

No	Subject	Rubber farmers' practices, tactics, and strategies
1	Labor	• Involving family members, such as wife, and children. • Diversifying work. • Migration. • Switch to artisanal oil mining.
2	Work hours	• Extended work hours and adjusting to neighborly social roles.
3	Finances	• Going into debt with rubber *toke* and neighbors. • Adjusting daily consumption.

- Discontinued education.
- Selling assets and farmland.

Source: obtained from primary data.

5.3 Governing of The Self Artisanal Oil Miners

Indeed, as rubber latex prices reached a low cost of 3,000 IDR/kg (2013) from the previous 16,000 IDR/kg [13], smallholders attempted to diversify their incomes along with reshaping livelihood practices. It is not a coincidence that there is an interconnected and symbiotic relationship between agriculture and artisanal mining [44]. Artisanal oil mining is formed and driven by the poverty of rural communities as a result of the reliance on commodity production and global market price fluctuations for their subsistence and livelihoods. The villagers personally created their enterprises without support or assistance from the government and also became artisanal oil miners based on mimesis that was introduced in the colonial era. Although *Dusun Tue* is not a leader in this type of mining in Musi Banyuasin Regency, however, the pressure of work and the demands to continue life have forced them to consider the opportunities and anticipate this work.

A wide range of tactics and strategies are carried out following the type of work and occurrences in the mining process. Furthermore, all lines in the mining production process practiced the maintenance of work to improve the economy and the future. Governmentality is not only related to self-capacity improvement, but also social and spiritual reliance. It is not infrequent that the occupational diversification and multiple works carried out are both still related to mining production and outside of artisanal oil mining. In the unfortunate occurrence of fires at the mining sites, *toke* will normally strategize by compromising with several parties, such as fellow miners, village officials, and the state apparatus. This negotiation can be seen as a manifestation of power as well as resistance and struggle to preserve access or control over the mine. This demonstrates that the mining does not solely fulfill the economic needs of the local community, but is politically and interest-laden.

Artisanal oil mining production involves risks, in terms of legality, economics, occupational health, and safety. Work accidents are prone to occur during mining. Apart from the non-standardized production system, worker negligence can also be a trigger. The most prevalent and feared workplace accident among miners is the occurrence of fire, at the drilling, collecting, transportation, and refining sites. Therefore, miners, both as individuals and as part of a group, have strategized to avert such accidents. Self-discipline is the key to preventing accidents and fires. Similarly, sensitivity to the technicalities of operating a mining work system and social support among peers are also part of the safety mechanism. These self-control experiences and practices are shaped by the process of power relations or control over oil resources. They establish governance, behavior, as well as targets for artisanal oil mining production along with improvements in welfare and life expectancy. Not only do they conduct the mining process as in *Figure 1*, but have also expanded the production to refining in *Figure 2*, to produce refinery oil according to market demands, such as gasoline, diesel, or kerosene. Moreover, the miners constitute a *paguyuban*, and the village has started to conduct regulation in the form of registration to propose mining formalization.

Figure 1. Artisanal Oil Wells

Figure 2. Artisanal Oil Refinery

Source: obtained from primary data.

5.4 Dynamic Processes of Renegotiated Livelihoods

The discourse of rubber farming and artisanal oil mining in *Dusun Tue* illustrates the outcome of the ruling regime's involvement in organizing, managing, disciplining, and deceiving the community. According to Foucault (2020), this procedure characterizes anatomical political power of multiple disciplines, interference, and population control through diverse techniques or institutions. The shift in context is evident in *Dusun Tue* when the shifting authority of *Pasirah* as the clan leader is under the control and manipulation of Dutch colonial power [36]. The colonials constructed village communities to participate in supporting the local economy of crop production for the global market. The smallholder rubber farming remained capable of serving the needs of Western markets despite rejecting plantation farming schemes. The Dutch also responded to the growth of the automotive industry by exploring and exploiting petroleum reserves throughout the country. The petroleum refinery in Sungai Gerong, Palembang became a battle between the Netherlands, Japan, and the Indonesian government. This is because, in 1943, it was successful in producing 20.46 million barrels, far exceeding the oil refineries of Balikpapan, Kalimantan and Wonokromo, Java which produced 5 and 1 million barrels respectively.

The Indonesian government also regulated its citizens by abolishing the clan system (Village Law No. 5 of 1979), prioritizing economic development through plantation schemes and promoting the mining industry, as well as implementing transmigration programs. However, this regulation with transmigration programs is a national business and project scenario which is an extension of the colonization program of the 1920s [37]. The objectives are to relocate people from densely populated areas to less dense islands in order to utilize the land and transfer knowledge or skills in the agricultural sector. The transmigrants were highly pressured by circumstances to adapt to physical, geographical, and social inequalities that some of them decided to return to their regional origins out of frustration.

Foucault helps to emphasize that the miner subject is active and productive, as well as a dispersal reflection of positive power relations to the micro level. This manifested in the form of the governmentality of subsistence farmers who are capable of decision-making, creative or rational action, market orientation, and making risky investments by becoming oil miners. The research team did not intend to impose a choice between "moral economy" or "rational" subjects, but rather determine how subjects are powerful and capable of making decisions in the framework of personal considerations and community norms. It is recognized that the subsistence economy in Dusun Tue exists alongside the market economy, hence, the people's actions follow their self-interest.

Becoming an artisanal oil miner means detaching rubber farmers from the entanglement of market prices at the global level. The mining also reveals the operation of power that is relational, ubiquitous, coming from everywhere, and produced all the time [18]. This governmentality transcends the centralizing perspective of power because its power presupposes the micromanagement of the relations through the technology of the self. Miners do not solely carry out adaptation strategies for survival, but also construct personal or collective consciousness strategies through the governing of the self-based on knowledge and mimesis for their survival in the artisanal oil mining production chain. This governmentality implies elements of self-control that operate outside formal boundaries. This includes how to adjust rubber farming that allows the subsistence farmers, how tactics for survival to escape depend on fluctuations in world rubber prices, and empowerment with oil, as well as developing demands awareness for the formalization of mining even amid prohibition.

Governing of the self can be regarded as the result of the will to govern others by the ruling regime, such as how to produce effective, efficient, or intensive agriculture, and how to manage the population to support development programs as well as the mining that generates foreign exchange for the state. This is the operation of a modern government that considers it imperative to create numerous technicalities in regulating and restricting its citizens. However, this circle of action-reaction seems endless as power continuously moves and tries to create some new techniques. Therefore, a set of technologies of power will always be produced and updated between the two to support efficiency. Miners are enabled to play out micro-power relations that are perpetually produced and renegotiated.

Peluso (2017a) investigated artisanal mining activities including forms of disciplinary and resource governance without the imposition of formal state institutions or rules. It further proved the complex entanglement of power between legality and illegality in artisanal mining spaces that cannot be controlled by the central state regulatory institutions. This informal governance of the mining frontier imitates the formal. At the same time, it critiques the lack of formal state regulations and operational licenses for artisanal mining by showing the existence of a "shadow state" as an arrangement without the formal presence of the state, although the state actors are involved in personal gain.

The Dutch and Japanese colonizers, as well as the Indonesian government, have directed their administrative or economic power at the local level in the form of civic arrangements, agricultural transformation, and exploitation of oil resources to serve the needs of Western markets [37], [38], [39]. Furthermore, the colonials and the Indonesian government have practiced "governmental rationality" [33] in navigating the Dusun Tue community. Their political and policy goals were economic growth, exports, trade, development, industry, as well as inflation. This modern government manages and pursues economic growth through population productivity measured by efficiency and effectiveness criteria. The colonial regime based its governance by involving three combinations, namely the target population, knowledge of political economy, and the state apparatus as a technical instrument. In addition to applying coercive power techniques through forced labor and colonization, the colonials also cultivated awareness through persuasive techniques with the aim of the economic outlook in directing villagers to productive targets of rubber agriculture and oil industry mining. Afterward, the discourse-based persuasive techniques of the Indonesian government are aimed at productive goals to support development growth through plantation agriculture and transmigration programs as well as corporate mining. Furthermore, the techniques are to imprison, ban, and negatively label small farmers as well as illegal drilling and refinery.

Artisanal oil mining, like rubber farmers, has also supported this development with its distinctive characteristics. This mining is widely recognized as contributing to poverty alleviation, absorption of unemployment, and decrease crime rates in rural areas. A unilateral ban without a solution is considered irrelevant because they will continue to reproduce in their way. Therefore, a critical mindset is needed to see the value in their usefulness, including thinking about the community's dependence on non-renewable resources.

The system of top-down and controlled power from the center cannot be fully channeled back as in the past. The issue of institutional regulation in artisanal oil mining is not only about efficiency and effectiveness, but also economic growth for macro development. However, it is necessary to consider the problem from a wide and fluid network of relations in the community. A rebirth of persuasion and negotiation techniques is also required to accommodate the subject's freedom in choosing and determining their future.

The homo economicus liberalism framework places humans as basically self-interested with rational calculations. However, it is inappropriate for both miners and the state to entirely use this liberal framework in the context of artisanal oil mining. Miners are beyond economic orientation as their meaning, solidarity, and subjectivity are considered part of the identity of the Musi Banyuasin community. They are also rooted in spiritual, religious, and cultural rituals in mining productivity, even constructing awareness to mine according to state regulations. Therefore, it is time to reconsider the logic of regulating artisanal mining licensing and perceive it from a wider perspective, beyond the issue of mining and economic development.

6 Conclusion

The historicity of artisanal oil mining in *Dusun Tue* crosses geographical, ecological, economic, and socio-political boundaries. The historical, cultural, social, economic, and political landscapes that constitute it stretch from the time of the Srivijaya Kingdom, Dutch colonialism, Japanese colonization, and the early independence of the Republic of Indonesia, to the period of regional autonomy. In other words, artisanal oil mining is indeed not something new, but accumulated governmentality of the power regime and the parties in the struggle for resources. This landscape as a form of governmentality effect is also tightly related to the sense of belonging as the arrangement of the living space and identity of the local community.

The existence of rural communities that depend on the environment for their livelihoods is linked to the global economy and development programs. Becoming a rubber farmer or artisanal oil miner is in essence only mimesis and the observation of the developments which occur at that moment, tactics, and strategies to form self-governmentality and also participate in the benefits. Therefore, its presence is certainly not negligible. The reduction of joblessness, the amount of labor absorption, the decrease in crime rates, and the improvement of the socio-economy of village communities have an important contribution at the sub-national, national, and global levels. However, rather than recognition, assistance, or appreciation for the innovations that were made, marginalization and discrimination are being accepted.

This report fills a gap in artisanal oil mining studies, both locally and globally. Most of these studies discussed artisanal and small-scale gold mining in Africa. However, only a few addressed governmentality and power relations at the local level of mining. Therefore, the differences in mining features and socio-cultural circumstances are unique to this study. The limitations of this ethnographic study include the coverage of one village with employment characteristics in the field of artisanal oil mining and refining. Meanwhile, there are various characteristics of oil mining in other villages in Musi Banyuasin Regency, some of which include illegal tapping activities. The results are not intended to generalize the phenomenon of subsistence farmers' shifting to artisanal miners, let alone other types of artisanal mining.

However, it points to an extension of the meaning of livelihood switching concerning resources that are constantly under regulation and power struggles. The new feature of this study is that the governmentality of the ruling regime, which intends to regulate the village community, actually produces a distinct subject that is not fully obedient. Also, the subjects are capable of strategizing to create and adopt governing of the self in diverse situations, as well as a form of resistance. This report did not further elaborate on how the discourse of power relates between subjects in governing and contesting artisanal oil mining resources, hence, further studies are highly needed. This article conveys that the mindset that artisanal oil mining is one of the alternative livelihoods of the village community should be shifted. This study is not merely a mining issue, but also rural development that requires collaboration between government and civil society organizations. Therefore, a switch of mindset is urgently needed regarding licensing for artisanal oil mining, especially to provide sustainable living space for the local communities.

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