



Comparative Study of State's National Armed Forces Reserve Component Best Practices (Case Studies of Defense Personnel Capability of Indonesia, South Korea, and Philippines)

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Abstract. This research attempts to conduct a comparative study of Reserve Component among nations with similarities, to identify planning and implementation that can be used as a valuable input for Indonesia's national interests. This is due to the defense policy's nature as an absolute variable that ensures survival of a country. Not only does it prepare active-duty military to become the front guard in national defense affairs. But the country also needs to prepare themselves by mobilizing resources nationally. This deployment is necessary considering that in International Relations, states' relations are determined by the anarchic characteristic of international order. This situation ultimately forced the mobilization of resources nationally ensuring the country can defend itself from potential future threats. A few years ago, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia formulated a mechanism Reserve Component as a manifestation of Act 23 of the year 2019 concerning Management of National Resources for National Defense. This component then of course has unique characteristics compared to the experience it has with other countries. Thus, the study focuses on Reserve Components exclusively, and that will use comparative method with a qualitative approach to gain a comprehensive understanding.

Keywords: Reserve Component, Defense, Comparative.

1 Introduction

National defense is an imminent element for a state's survival in the international structure. The study of International Relations (IR) introduces a constellation of world politics that has always been a reality, namely the anarchic nature of inter-state relations. This anarchic relationship pushes nations into making continuous efforts to protect their sovereignty from potential threats. Anarchy and security threats ultimately force states to be active in the dynamics of international politics, as amity and enmity dynamics in anarchic relations are fundamentally based on fluid, changing interests.

States ultimately live in this anarchy situation, because there is no other power besides them in the international system [1]. Hence, a state always put efforts on building its military power as a survival guarantee in an anarchic order. At the same time, a state attempts to ensure that the lives of its people are not lacking, by establishing beneficial relations through strategic cooperation in various areas and agenda(s).

The dynamics of anarchic order and the belief that military power is an important guarantee, ultimately influence domestic political dynamics also move continuously. States attempt to ensure they have an adequate military force that also has the support of their people. The extension of the need for stronger military is far-reaching. Efforts to strengthen one's state also influence a state's willingness to build an effective fiscal structure, as states understand that the ability to finance defense (and consequently, war) is vital for survival [2]. Although, efforts to build military power are not easy, concerning the unique domestic problems and needs faced by each state. The end of the Cold War and rapid globalization have broadened the security problems and issues faced by states [3], but military remains an important national variable. In principle, the need for security and freedom from threats are what citizens demand. Therefore, collectively in the context of a state, defense has always been considered one of the highest degree policies, even though at the same time it must compete with other various issues which are also experienced differently among citizens.

The dynamic situation in the international and domestic contexts regarding the importance of military power in the international political constellation is also an important concern of Indonesia. Even in domestic legal provisions, Indonesia places defense and security issues collectively and all-rounding. Indonesia adopts a Universal Defense System approach, where a national defense system involves all citizens according to their own roles and functions [4]. In dealing with military threats there are deployment of the Indonesian National Army as the Main Component, supported by the Reserve Component, Supporting Components, as well as related Ministries / Institutions. Interestingly, Act 23 of 2019 concerning the Management of National Resources for State Defense in articles 30 & 31 states that the need for a Reserve Component to be formed which is further grouped in the land, sea and air dimensions [5]. It is interesting to see the idea of the Reserve Component being realized in the field, as the discussion of Reserve Component often collides with the idea of conscription, as known by citizens that experienced conscription, or at least, live in a state that has Reserve Component.

The Act 23 of 2019 concerning the Management of National Resources for National Defense also gives the state the authority to deploy or mobilize either part, or all its national resources [5]. The existence of this law inspires a discussion where an examination could be conducted on how the implementation and similar policies carried out by other countries. Comparing similar policies from other countries would be contributive in highlighting both advantages and disadvantages that Indonesia has in its Reserve Component policy. This comparison then is useful for understanding the convergence and divergence contained in the policy [6]. The analysis of the policy comparison could be a strategic recommendation for both the government and related ministries to avoid discrepancies which occur in the field at the policy implementation level.

This article further aims to compare Reserve Component policies carried out by Indonesia with other states. The comparatives will be determined by several classifications, including developed countries, countries with similar characteristics, and countries that have smaller territories but are comparable in strength to Indonesia. Specifically, this article seeks to answer, 'how are the comparatives of the personnel capabilities aspect within defense policy among existing best practices?'. This is to construct a study that can provide strategic input on Indonesia's ability to identify political constellations, not only in the region, but also internationally, when it comes to Reserve Component policy. The novelty of this research is on the topic and case studies used, as there is a very limited amount of past research that focuses on a national military reserve component, let alone a comparative study on multiple states' personnel capability. Existing research(s) are mostly limited to Indonesian Reserve Component's role [7] or issues and policies surrounding it [8], [9], [10]. Therefore, this research can enrich academic discussions for the development of defense issues in Indonesia, especially in matters of personnel or human resources.

2 Literature Review

The idea of comparative analysis in the context of defense has several references that can be used as a comprehensive discussion. One of the references on comparative analysis in defense is the writing of Andrew M. Dorman and Joyce P. Kaufman entitled 'Providing for National Security, a Comparative Analysis'. Dorman & Kaufman's article focuses on analyzing how a country approaches the formulation and implementation of national security [11]. The explanation above arises from the initial assumption that state in contemporary time does not monopolize management of interpretation and presentation of national defense and security issues. This is because a state will consider how formulation of an issue develops in international bodies or organizations, whether it is the United Nations or other global/regional organizations. This article further adapts Dorman & Kaufman's idea by considering the following points: First on how defense mechanisms are formulated in a country; Second on how the policy will be carried out along with changing its experiences. Third, on how similarities and differences can be compared between each country's defense policy; Finally on how deployments are made to maximize the country's defense policy. Those four points are highly subjective, in the sense that in identifying those considerations from existing data, which was created based on each state's point of view, are necessary to focus the discussion on accordance with the findings obtained from the data search.

The final stage in this research is then carried out by comparing the selected countries. The researcher selected several countries with the following classification: First, by selecting one of the developed countries that has a similar policy on Reserve Component. Developed countries are chosen as a representation of the level of countries that have maximum resource deployment compared to Indonesia. Second, by selecting a country that has the same characteristics as Indonesia. This second choice is needed to provide an equal comparison in identifying similar defense policies to Indonesia. Third, selecting countries that have different characteristics from Indonesia

but still have similar defense policies. This third country choice is needed to include an asymmetrical comparative, to comprehensively understand Indonesia's Reserve Component in comparison to 'stronger', similar, and 'weaker' countries.

3 Research Method

This article is qualitative-based research, in which the method will be utilized to describe the policies comparisons. This method enables the article to provide a deeper understanding of the object and its contextual setting, which also provides an explanation of the reasons and associations, evaluates effectiveness and helps in developing theories and strategies [12]. Descriptive analysis of policies comparison is needed as the primary analytical method to see the specific characteristics of similar policies in several selected countries. The use of this method is carried out to facilitate data collection, which is then carried out to collect, analyze and interpret the data.

This article uses secondary data sources, which are literature studies, through references related to the research problem. Data in qualitative research emphasizes more analyzing the meaning behind numbers, the meaning of data exposure, and the meaning of an event or phenomenon under study [13]. Data(s) are sourced from official government documents, books, papers, articles or other literature sources that can support the course of research. The descriptive approach provides a thorough description of objects, cases and situations. This approach assembles reality into a narrative through an orderly description of a problem, situation or event. Using this qualitative descriptive research method, the data obtained can be analyzed and written in a series of comprehensive stories.

4 Results and Discussion

This section will then discuss three main substances in the policy comparison on defense personnel. The discussion begins with an explanation of defense capabilities among the three countries. Then it continues with a comparison of defense personnel policies between Indonesia, South Korea and the Philippines. Finally, an in-depth analysis of the policy context of the Reserve Component is conducted based on similar policies in South Korea and the Philippines.

4.1 Defense Capability of Indonesia, South Korea, and Philippines

Indonesian military is highly reckoned in Asia, or even globally. Based on data obtained from the Lowy Institute Asia Power Index in the 2023 edition, Indonesia ranks 13th in terms of its conventional military capabilities [14]. Meanwhile, according to Indonesian military expenditure, it was recorded that Indonesia in 2022 had allocated funds amounting to USD 8,986 million for its operations, or, 0.7% of Indonesian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) [15]. The allocation does need to be dissected to understand the implication of military expenditure on defense capability. This is due to a large

allocation accompanied by a large active army has and will continue to significantly affect the absorption of government funds allocation.

The allocation needs to be understood deeper from the ministry that manage it in Indonesia, namely the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia. In the post-Covid 2021, the budget allocation of the Defense Ministry (and including the Indonesian National Army) is used for four main posts, namely, (1) support for national priority projects; (2) maintenance and procurement of defense equipment; (3) welfare of National Soldiers and Employees; and (4) anticipation of Covid-19 pandemic [16]. While the pandemic was still rampaging, the budget allocation has been allocated much to relieve the situation. One of them, for example, is by accelerating the Covid-19 vaccination for personnel and family members under the auspices of KEMHAN RI totaling 7,687 shots [17]. The acceleration of vaccination was in line with the government's efforts to make the handling Covid-19 carried out jointly by ministries and institutions.

Interestingly, even in a situation of limited budget posts, there was a policy to prepare reserve components as part of national defense. Based on Act 23 of 2019 concerning Management of National Resources for State Defense, it is stated that the reserve component is one of the voluntary (not mandatory) programs that need to be built and targeted at civil society [5]. Although it is not mandatory, it opens a new chapter in mobilizing the nation's strength in accordance with the universal defense system in Indonesia. This implies the consequence of the 1945 Constitution, in that every citizen has the right and obligation to participate in the defense of the country. The reserve component policy will be discussed further in the next section.

This section will start the discussion of other states' reserve components. The South Korean military was chosen by authors as a subject to compared with Indonesia because it has a more prestigious profile, compared to Indonesia. One example from the Lowy Institute Asia Power Index data in the 2023 edition places South Korea at number 5, eight ranks adrift of Indonesia [14]. Meanwhile, when viewed from its military expenditure in 2020, it is stated that South Korea's allocation was 46,365 million USD or 2.7% of its GDP [15]. Basing the calculation with Indonesia's allocation, South Korea's allocation is five times more than Indonesia. Therefore, South Korea's capabilities were chosen by authors as a representation of a developed country with a higher military allocation but a similar policy on the reserve component to Indonesia.

It is somewhat different from the obligation in Indonesia's reserve component program, which is voluntary, while South Korea's policy is mandatory and regulated in the constitution. Based on Article 39 Paragraph 1 in the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, it is stated that all citizens must play a role in national defense, and specifically men are required to participate in military duties in accordance with applicable regulations [18]. From the existing provision, it specifically mentions certain genders that are charged with military service, while in Indonesia it is not specifically mentioned. The need to organize conscription in South Korea has been an important part of history since the founding of the Republic of Korea. The main consideration for organizing this military service is the dynamics of the East Asian region, and the vulnerability of shifting perceptions of security threats faced by South Korea from time to time.

The spread of Covid 19 in South Korea also adds to South Korean military's task to be able to contribute as well for the situation. The agenda also continues to be developed from time to time considering that South Korea is located close to the epicenter of the outbreak of Covid 19, which also has a high number of victims. The South Korean military is also involved in training civilians to use masks and personal protective equipment, carry out disinfection and assist in the logistics distribution process for daily needs [19]. The South Korean military together with its alliance, namely the United States, designed a series of agendas in handling Covid 19, including vaccination efforts, and information transfer involving the United States Department of Defense - Korea Disease Control & Prevention Agency - South Korean Military [20]. The military response has proven successful in helping with the handling of Covid 19 after previously experiencing an extreme spike in cases.

Lastly for the Philippines, Philippine Military was chosen as a country whose military capabilities are below Indonesia. Based on data from the Lowy Institute Asia Power Index in the 2023 edition, the Philippines is ranked 17th, five ranks below Indonesia [14]. S Meanwhile, from the expenditure of its military allocation, the Philippines allocated funds amounting to USD 3,965 million (1% of GDP) in 2020, or one-third of the allocation owned by Indonesia [15]. Apart from the ranking and funds that are lower than Indonesia, the Philippines was chosen for comparison considering that it is geographically close to Indonesia. The perception of threats is also more or less like that perceived by Indonesia.

Furthermore, looking at the context of conscription in the Philippines, there are several classifications that need to be discussed. First, 'military service shall be mandatory'; this refers to the constitutional provisions proposed by the senate in Article 1 on Employment of Persons and Resources in paragraph four [21]. Second, the reserve component can be pursued through two paths, namely the Reserve Officer's Training Corps (ROTC) and Basic Citizen's Military Training (BCMT) which are regulated in the provisions of Republic Act 7077: Citizen Armed Forces or Armed Forces of the Philippines Reservist Act of 199 [22]. Third, there is a binding provision on conscription or reserve components in the Philippine constitution in Article 4 Section 2 which states that the government may call upon citizens to defend the country as needed and under conditions consistent with the provisions of Philippine law [22]. Those three classifications became a comprehensive legal building and can be adjusted to the needs of the Philippine Government to conduct future force projections.

2021 showed a new chapter of the Philippines' military orientation by considering regional dynamics. The projected allocation is to 'address threats and combat terrorism', which specifically refers to combating domestic insurgents and the protection of the South China Sea region [23]. This focus forces the military to adapt quickly given the urgent nature of threats in the region and beyond, like the intensifying separatist movements in the southern Philippines, as well as the aggressiveness of China's presence in the South China Sea. On several occasions incidents have also occurred that forced the Philippine military to react directly militarily to the two threats mentioned above.

4.2 Comparatives on Defense Personnel Policies in Formulation, Implementation, and Mobilization Aspects

Formulation Aspect

First, the initial discussion was to look at the experience in the aspect of policy formulation in Indonesia. Constitutionally, the mobilization of military resources in Indonesia has several stages in terms of the accompanying legal aspects or laws. First, the mandate regarding national defense with efforts for national resilience, reserve components, and supporting components has been formulated in Act 3 of 2002 concerning National Defense. This law was then specifically continued in Law Number 23 of 2019 concerning the Management of National Resources for National Defense, which was specifically formulated to regulate human resources, natural resources, and artificial resources needed in national defense.

Both laws were formulated in an integrated manner between the executive branch and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia as the main actors, along with the People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia from the legislative body. Indonesia does not recognize the idea of conscription in mobilizing human resources but instead introduces it as a reserve component. Based on its urgency, the reserve component is seen as a form of saving on military personnel expenditures during peacetime so that soldiers can remain prosperous amidst the ongoing modernization of defense equipment [24]. The reserve component is also only intended to support the main components, namely the national military and police forces, when needed for mobilization [25]. At the very least, when viewed from the allocation of human resources in the field of defense in, it relies on three sources using the People's Defense System, namely the main component, the supporting component, and the reserve component.

Second, following the experience of South Korea, based on the legislation in effect in South Korea, the mobilization of military resources has been ongoing since the early days of independence. Since 1949, the Military Service Act has been enacted, which was then implemented as the main defense tool in 1957 post-Korean War [26]. Legally, the mobilization of these resources is regulated under the Military Service Act, which has been in effect since 2012. Based on the Military Service Act, it contains mechanisms and implementations for the mobilization of military resources in the field of defense, which have substantively evolved over time.

The Military Service Act serves as the fundamental reference for the mobilization of military resources for defense in South Korea. However, some critics have pointed out that the legal framework in South Korea is not gender-friendly at all and contradicts the principle of conscientious objection. Because the military conscription regulations do not have an option to refuse, and even if there is an option to refuse, it comes with specific and difficult criteria. Military conscription in South Korea, despite being a remnant of the Korean War, persists today due to the significant potential threat from North Korea [27]. Although the position of mandatory military service is becoming less popular among South Koreans, even amidst the instability of the Korean Peninsula.

Third, based on the experience of conscription in the Philippines, it has had a unique journey over time. Chronologically, from the colonial period to the present era,

conscription appeared for some time and then been discontinued. Based on Section 4, Article II, Constitution of the Philippines, it is stated that 'the government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service'. Based on the clause, it is stated that military service is regulated in the constitution with provisions to be activated according to the needs and conditions of national defense. Therefore, in the national history of the Philippines, there have been several instances where the country's leaders activated this clause considering situations of conflict and defense issues.

After the constitution of the country, the legal provisions that subsequently allow for the mobilization of military resources in the Philippines are also regulated in The National Defense Act, which has been proposed since 1935 and has undergone a series of changes and adjustments to this day. The National Defense Act fundamentally prioritizes efforts to ensure the safety and sovereignty of the Philippines as the main objective of defense policy. Including how the recruitment process to the discharge after service is no longer used in the military

Implementation Aspect

First, from experience in Indonesia, compared to other countries that mobilize human resources in defense matters, Indonesia can be considered as one of the relatively early countries to accommodate the allocation of human resources through military assignments, known as reserve components. The reserve component in Indonesia is voluntary with an age range of 18-35 years, and candidates must pass the national military selection. Subsequently, these volunteers undergo basic military training for 3 months while still receiving their rights from their original institutions and incentives from the state, including pocket money, insurance, and needs [28]. Specifically, the public who wish to register can directly access the page provided by the Defense Ministry for registration as reserve components.

On October 7, 2021, Indonesia officially established reserve components for the first time. Numbering around 3,103 people from various professional backgrounds, their main duty is to be on standby when called by the state in a military emergency, state of war, or other mobilizations by the President with the approval of the Indonesian House of Representatives [25]. Principally, reserve components cannot conduct independent activities and must be ready for mobilization when necessary. However, there are concerns that the mobilization being carried out may have political motives, therefore it is necessary to clarify the control mechanisms held by the Indonesian House of Representatives to avoid mobilization driven by the unilateral political agenda of the leaders.

Second, from South Korea in terms of organization and management in the mobilization of military resources, South Korea has a series of complex configurations. However, the constitution stated that the deployment of military resources is divided into preliminary military service, active-duty service, supplementary service, reserve service, and wartime labor service. This division has consequences for the active-duty period or service term, which can be identified from active-duty enlistment, full-time reserve enlistment and conscription, social work personnel service, public health doctor

service, expert research personnel and industrial technical personnel service, mobilization summons, training exercise summons, wartime labor summons, up to educational summons [29]. South Korea has a series of defense personnel duties that not only cover combat aspects but also include support fields needed in both peacetime and wartime conditions.

Conscription in South Korea is currently undergoing several adjustments that are described as more lenient or flexible. One thing that has not changed is the criteria stipulating that healthy male citizens aged between 18 and 28 must undergo two years of training [30]. One of them was in April 2018, when military conscripts were allowed to use mobile phones after completing their duties, and this was reinforced in July 2020 with time and site restrictions. In August 2018, participants were even allowed to leave the barracks under conditions set by the South Korean Ministry of National Defense [31]. These leniencies were offered to re-popularize conscription and to prevent trainees from becoming depressed.

Third, for the Philippines, it was mentioned that conscription has not been reinstated in the Philippines since 2016. The policy was then followed by a shift in orientation within the Philippine military, which began to pay attention to non-military issues. This change was used as a momentum for the military to keep up with the evolving global conditions, whereas some potential threats are non-traditional [32]. This shift and responses from the Philippines are an interesting step, considering that several countries around the world are in the same shoes to ensure their military remains professional. This is because the shift in threats is fundamentally a natural occurrence amidst the numerous recent developments in the international political landscape in every part of the world.

Mobilization Aspect

First, when looking at Indonesia for the mobilization of military resources as discussed in the previous subsection, it is mentioned that the reserve component in Indonesia can only be mobilized by the President with the approval of the Parliament. Moreover, one of the reasons Indonesia does not refer to the mobilization as conscription is due to the consideration of respecting the right to refuse on the grounds of conscientious objection [9]. Principally, in the deployment of reserve components, if indeed necessary, there is no principle of human rights being violated because those who are willing to become reserve components have declared their voluntary acceptance of the assigned duties [33]. This principle then becomes very important to avoid getting caught up in human rights issues if it later requires the entire society, which is feared to cause legal consequences.

The deployment of military resources through this reserve component is not without criticism from the Indonesian public. There are several concerns about the potential abuse of power and the very broad scope of assignments. One example is that, when viewed in terms of current defense needs, the urgent issue is not an external threat or territorial problems. Therefore, the existence of reserve components is considered a wasteful allocation of the budget [34]. This contradicts what was previously stated by the Defense Ministry, which mentioned that reserve components impose a smaller

budget burden compared to the need to ensure the welfare of soldiers and the ongoing modernization of defense equipment.

Second, in South Korea, the deployment of military resources in the defense sector implemented by South Korea has been determined by the Military Service Act. Military conscripts during their service period have the possibility of extension as needed. During their service period, the military conscripts perform national defense duties and remain on standby in matters of national defense, whether in the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Police [31]. In terms of command, military conscripts are under the control of the Chief of Joint Staff, who coordinates with the Minister of National Defense and is led by the Supreme Commander, namely the President of South Korea. The command is related to the necessary mobilization assignments, both in the field of defense and in humanitarian efforts such as disaster response in South Korea.

South Korea, with its deployment of military resources, faces criticism and opposition to its mandatory military service policy. One report state that since the 1950s, there have been 18,098 people punished for refusing military conscription, and this number is likely higher because many cases have been hidden or covered up from the public [35]. This becomes an issue that will need special handling in the future. Because currently, there is increasing awareness among South Koreans regarding the fulfillment of human rights, which should receive protection and fulfillment from the state.

Third, looking at the organization and management of military resource deployment in the Philippines, it is entrusted to an elite executive body. The body is The Council of National Defense, which consists of the President, Vice President, Chief of Staff, and six other members chosen by the President with the approval of the legislature. The body functions to provide recommendations and considerations to the president and vice president on defense issues faced by the Philippines. Geographically, the Philippines is currently facing defense issues that are not only domestic, such as separatist movements, but also external, with the increasing presence of major countries in its maritime region.

The mobilization of conscription in the Philippines is ultimately opened and deemed necessary if there is an urgent consideration to address the situation at hand. The perception of mobilization is not based on potential or possibility, but rather on the leader's consideration that a real threat has already occurred that needs to be addressed by the Philippine Government. Another consideration in the Philippines is the existence of a cooperation pact with the United States, which can at least reduce the urgency of conscription, due to the security protection supported by the United States [36]. The Philippines, although it temporarily postponed the continuation of cooperation with the United States, eventually resumed it.

4.3 Comparative of Reserve Component Policy between Indonesia, South Korea, and Philippines

This section uses the comparisons that have been made previously by providing arguments and critical considerations regarding the policy on the deployment of military resources. The author then determines this identification based on several

considerations, such as (1) Policy Basis, (2) Policy Implementation, and (3) Mobilization Mechanism. These three considerations will then be discussed specifically in the following chart, which also serves as a comparison between Indonesia, South Korea, and the Philippines.

Table 1. Defense Policy Comparative on Military Resources

Country	Policy Basis	Policy Implementation	Mobilization Mechanism
Indonesia (Rank 13)	Acr 3 of 2002 on National Defense, Law Number 23 of 2019 on the Management of National Resources for National Defense	The mechanism for the Reserve Component is voluntary, recruited based on criteria and passing the selection from the Armed Forces.	On standby for mobilization by the President with the approval of the Parliament. Cannot engage in independent activities.
South Korea (Rank 6)	Military Service Act (1949, effective 1957) and has been amended again in 2012	Mandatory for men, and voluntary for women. There are comprehensive criteria at each level and assignment period.	The command system is based on the assignments needed by the state. Carrying out assignments according to their duty period
Philippines (Rank 17)	Section 4, Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines, National Service Training Program – Republic Act 9163	Mandatory, if opened and required by the Government.	The Ministry of Defense, Armed Forces of the Philippines, and The Council of National Defense play a significant role.

The characteristics of military resource deployment for defense among the four countries have unique features. First, in basis of implementation, it is evident that Indonesia can be categorized as relatively new compared to the other three countries. Meanwhile, the other countries have more extensive experience, with legislative mechanisms that continuously adapt to their respective situations and conditions. Second, in policy implementation; South Korea has maintained the same position to this day in mandating military service for their citizens. Although there are differences in how to manage ethnicity and gender to allow involvement in mandatory military service. Meanwhile, Indonesia has a different characteristic by placing military resource deployment not as compulsory or mandatory, but rather voluntary. Meanwhile, the Philippines constitutionally regulates conscription, but the initiation and necessity for conscription to be enacted are very flexible, depending on the leader's considerations. Third, fundamentally speaking, the command system and the

organization that then deploys conscripts or reserve components for Indonesia have similar characteristics.

5 Conclusion

Indonesia has characteristics of military resource deployment that are relatively new compared to other countries. Meanwhile, in the implementation of military resource mobilization in Indonesia, the reserve component policy respects an individual's right to refuse the duty. In contrast, in South Korea and the Philippines, this is not practiced, or the right is not granted for national security considerations. Then, in the deployment of military resources, more or less all countries have similarities in the command system used. The comparison conducted above shows that Indonesia, with its reserve component policy, has taken a new step in the deployment of defense personnel. This new stage not only increases the number of personnel ready for deployment but also provides a new mechanism to prevent subjectivity in deployment decisions made by leaders. Several experiences from the selected countries, representing military power rankings from higher, equal, and lower, indicate that these experiences can illustrate that the considerations and urgency of armed forces' needs increasingly need to consider the current situations and conditions. Looking at the current situation, there have been many changes in the international world regarding international political constellation. Not only at the international level, but the dynamics and sharpening of interests also occur in certain regions down to the domestic level within the internal scale of the country.

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