



The Impact of Infrastructure Development in the Jokowi Era on Agrarian Resource Inequality in Indonesia

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Abstract. The infrastructure development policy has become one of the important policies by the government as a fundamental basis for development. Not infrequently, infrastructure development actually leads to various agrarian conflicts in several regions in Indonesia that are the objects of development. This paper aims to demonstrate the dynamics of infrastructure development policy in Indonesia during the period of 2014-2024 under the leadership of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi). The various infrastructure development programs of Jokowi have indeed resulted in agrarian conflicts that influence the inequality of agrarian resources. This article seeks to answer the research question regarding how infrastructure development policies shape the inequality of agrarian resources. Empirically, this paper is important considering that infrastructure development, which should be beneficial, instead triggers conflicts and violence in the agrarian sector. This writing contains several arguments that will be discussed in three parts. *First*, regarding policies, ideologies, and infrastructure development issues. *Second*, about the phenomenon of agrarian conflict manifested in the 'seizure' of land and proletarianization. *Third*, a discussion on the inequality of agrarian resources and social reproduction capacity. In general, this research concludes that the narrative about problematic infrastructure development will actually encourage the eruption of agrarian conflicts and only benefit a few political-economic elites.

Keywords: Infrastructure Policy, Infrastructure Development, Agrarian Conflict

1 Introduction

Infrastructure has become one of the important aspects in development. The focus on infrastructure development, both physical and non-physical, is essential in supporting daily life. Infrastructure is a fundamental public facility system aimed at providing services and convenience to the community [Hudson, et al., 1997]. During the first term of Jokowi's administration, infrastructure development was made a primary focus. This is stated in the National Development Priority document, which mentions that infrastructure development is one of the national development priorities [BAPPENAS, 2020]. Furthermore, the seriousness of infrastructure development can also be seen from the budget allocation of the Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing for the next year, which reaches approximately Rp 149.8 trillion, the highest among all Ministries/Agencies (K/L) [BPIW, 2020].

The development of infrastructure has been prioritized as it can boost national economic growth and recovery. Unfortunately, the massive infrastructure development has become one of the causes of agrarian conflicts. Infrastructure development, which

initially aimed at regional development and the welfare of the community, has, in some cases, been recorded to cause several conflicts among the community during the construction process. According to the Year-End Report of the Agrarian Reform Consortium (KPA) Indonesia in 2023, agrarian conflicts arising from infrastructure ranked second highest among various sectors.




Figure 1 - Percentage of Agrarian Conflict Eruptions in 2023 by Sector
(Source: Processed from the Year-End Report of the Agrarian Reform Consortium - 2023)

If viewed from the percentage chart of KPA records for the year 2023 above, it shows that the emergence of conflicts originating from the infrastructure sector is 13%. This percentage is depicted as the third largest percentage in the year 2023. Investments and the land acquisition process for infrastructure development have triggered at least 30 agrarian conflicts in various regions. These conflicts occurred over an area of 243,755 hectares, affecting 4,346 families in 37 villages.

Several development projects that triggered agrarian conflicts. The most significant is the acceleration of PSN project development has become the main factor triggering agrarian conflicts in the infrastructure sector this year. Out of a total of 30 conflict incidents, 21 of them (70%) were caused by PSN projects. The complexity of the causes of agrarian conflict eruptions that occur encourages this research to focus on the eruptions of conflict caused by the infrastructure sector. This research is important considering that the infrastructure sector is the second largest sector in the record of agrarian conflict eruptions in Indonesia during the year 2023.

Conceptually, infrastructure development is a policy adopted by the government to encourage massive infrastructure development in several regions. Infrastructure development has a specific ideological pattern. The ideology that has a capitalistic nature provides benefits for the private sector and follows the logic of economic growth

while sidelining social, economic, and environmental impacts. This ideology of infrastructure development policy has subsequently become one of the triggers of agrarian conflict. The conflict is depicted between the state, which protects capital interests, leading to social, economic, and environmental inequalities in society [Ridha, M., 2016].

Several developments in the study of infrastructure development and agrarian conflict are divided into several discussions. *First*, regarding the relationship between infrastructure development, which is one of the triggers of agrarian conflict [Matondang, E, 2019] and [Tarigan A. P. & Khairunasa, M, 2021]. *Second*, the occurrence of conflicts arising from infrastructure development, which should be examined through procedural and managerial aspects, including adequate planning and a complex network of stakeholders [Susman, R.; Gütte, A.M.; Weith, T., 2021]. In addition, parameters are also needed to regulate infrastructure development to avoid conflicts [Aswicahyono, H., & Friawan, D, 2007]. *Third*, the study of infrastructure development that impacts environmental and ecosystem damage, as seen in the conservation area of Gunung Leuser, Aceh [Sloan, S, et. al, 2018]. *Fourth*, reviewing infrastructure development within the dynamics of the economic-political context such as the issues of emerging private investment rents, central-regional institutions, and state-society conflicts over land [Davidson, J. S, 2015]. In a different article, Davidson also emphasizes the issues of legal and institutional re-centralization [Davidson, J. S, 2016]. Based on several existing literatures, there has yet to be a study regarding the impact of infrastructure development on the inequality of agrarian resource control. This paper aims to fill that gap in the study. There is one article that has a strong connection to the discussion in this paper, namely John F. McCarthy [2010], who argues that the existing infrastructure serves as access and facilities built to benefit agribusiness groups, not small farmers [McCarthy, J. F, 2010]. The study conducted by McCarthy has not yet shown conflicts manifested as 'land grabbing' and the phenomenon of proletarianization that occurs as a result of infrastructure development.

This paper aims to address the research question regarding how infrastructure development policies during the Jokowi era shape agrarian resource disparities. This question will be discussed in three parts: *First*, concerning policies, ideologies, and issues of infrastructure development; *Second*, discussing agrarian conflicts between the practices of 'seizure' or forced land acquisition and the phenomenon of proletarianization; *Third*, a discussion on agrarian resource disparities and the elaboration of social reproduction.

2 Findings and Discussion

Policy, Ideology, and Infrastructure Development Issues

Essentially, infrastructure development policies have a positive meaning, which is to build basic physical needs and organize the necessary systems for the common welfare [Haughwout, 2002]. The history and dynamics of infrastructure are critically depicted by J. S. Davidson [2015] in his book titled "Indonesia's changing political economy." Some existing infrastructure studies mostly discuss regulatory and technocratic aspects.

However, Davidson presents a different perspective by examining the economic-political aspects and power relations in the infrastructure development process.

The development of infrastructure has significantly progressed under the leadership of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). In early 2005, SBY held the Infrastructure Summit High-Level Conference from January 17-18, 2005, in Jakarta. Through this agenda, the Indonesian government offered 91 infrastructure projects across Indonesia [detikFinance, 2005]. Of the 91 projects offered, 38 involved the construction of toll roads that were auctioned to third parties, both national and international, amounting to US\$ 9.4 billion. At that moment, international investors predominantly participated in the auctioned projects. The term Public-Private Partnership (PPP) or *Kerjasama Publik Swasta* (KPS) gained popularity in Indonesia. This KPS scheme promises lucrative profit revenues for the private parties involved, while in return, the state receives infrastructure built by the private sector with a lower financing burden [Davidson, 2015]. Based on several facts mentioned above, it is evident that the infrastructure development undertaken provided significant profit opportunities for the private sector.

Regulations serve as a tool to facilitate infrastructure development. Essentially, development requires land elements, thus the progress of infrastructure development is inseparable from the regulations governing land function acquisition. The Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA), which is the principal regulation on land with a spirit of nationalism and socialism, was manipulated by the New Order regime to forcibly acquire people's land or 'seize' it in the name of 'collective' development under the principle of 'public interest'. The New Order regime exploited the opportunity for land acquisition or the elimination of land ownership rights, transferring them to the state (interpretation of Article 27 of the UUPA). Ideally, from a socialist perspective, the state's acquisition of private land should be allocated to the landless class and for the public good. However, if interpreted from a capitalist viewpoint, instead of being utilized for 'public interest', the land acquisition is managed by private entities, indirectly benefiting business interests.

The shift in the interpretation of regulations for land management is outlined in Law Number 20 of 1961 concerning the Revocation of Land Rights and Objects Above It. This regulation mandates the authority for the revocation of land ownership rights by the president. During the New Order era, this regulation encouraged the forcible revocation of land rights if the 'deliberation' process failed to reach consensus [Aspinall, 2005; Davidson, 2015]. During the leadership of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY)—the 6th President of Indonesia, he implemented similar actions as those taken by the New Order regime but employed a more subtle approach. The emergence of Law Number 2 of 2012 concerning Land Procurement for Public Interest Development has transformed the land procurement process, which previously granted significant discretionary ownership rights to the state through the President, into a legal process. In this context, each court and tribunal plays its role in 'defending the interests of the state.' The land acquisition process is compensated with indemnities and/or a consignment mechanism based on the Tax Object Selling Value (NJOP) of the land. This phenomenon encourages the legalization of land confiscation organized by the state for development purposes.

Some infrastructure development programs encourage agrarian conflicts. The project in question is the Masterplan Program for the Acceleration of Economic Development in Indonesia (MP3EI) and the National Strategic Projects (PSN). The data findings indicate that the implementation of the MP3EI project is suspected to have caused massive agrarian conflicts in Indonesia in 2014. The infrastructure development programs and projects carried out by the government are aimed at promoting economic growth [Smith, 1985]. This aligns with the concept of Developmentalism that has developed in southern countries such as Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Not infrequently, this concept of developmentalism is regarded as an ideology and the spirit of development. This concept assumes that development is a key strategy towards prosperity through economic growth [Lancaster, 2007]. The idea of developmentalism emerged in response to the United States' efforts to contain communism and undermine national liberation movements in Asia and Africa [Smith, 1985]. In Indonesia, the discourse on developmentalism was introduced through regulations outlined in Law No. 1 of 1967 concerning Foreign Investment (PMA). Subsequently, development was pursued vigorously to address issues of poverty and social inequality.

For critical economic circles, the concept of developmentalism is viewed as having negative impacts. The meaning of development is considered to impoverish and harm the state and society. This development benefits only the political elite and entrepreneurs who have political connections. Such circumstances create a dilemma in the discourse surrounding development [Pieterse, 1991]. The concept of economic growth within developmentalism has become deeply rooted. This concept overlooks aspects of welfare and distribution [Wallerstein, 1979]. Economic growth in the context of developmentalism primarily promotes an increase in the income of business owners, while for workers, the concept of developmentalism does not provide significant benefits in their lives [Fakih, 2002].

When the New Order regime collapsed, the reorganization of capital power and the idea of developmentalism as the basis of economy and political power continued in the Post-Authoritarian era of Suharto [Hadiz, 2003]. Projects such as MP3EI during the SBY era continued during the Joko Widodo era. The National Strategic Program (PSN) became one of the major projects during the time of Jokowi who had the idea of development and a regime of economic growth consolidating with the political elite [Watburton, 2016]. This is what gives benefits to those business people and those who have a network to politics. The development of the concept of developmentalism, also referred to as New Institutional Economics (NIE), is also a problem in the development of development projects in Indonesia [Levy & Spiller, 1994, Davidson, 2016].

Based on the explanation in the previous paragraph, infrastructure development policies are not actually neutral. Regulations become one of the tools to facilitate the implementation of development processes. Unfortunately, infrastructure development during the Jokowi era still adheres to Developmentalism, which actually benefits a select few, particularly political elites and their cronies in the private sector [Warburton, 2016]. Many of the projects have become triggers for agrarian conflicts in several regions [KPA, 2016]. Developmentalism as a development concept is unable to resolve issues of poverty and inequality [Breman, 2002].

In general, the issue of infrastructure development in Indonesia revolves around three main points raised by J. S. Davidson [2015], namely (1) the relationship between politics-government and business, with many entrepreneurs having strong connections with public officials, often being colleagues or even family; (2) extra-parliamentary regulations/the establishment of rules based on vested interests, and the reduction of technical regulations that are often unconstitutional in relation to higher regulations; and (3) the debate over land acquisition, the issue of land and the translation of public interests that are often misused, where the process of forcibly acquiring land under the pretext of public interest is used to take land owned by the community without considering the economic sustainability aspects of the landowners, limited to compensation or consignment mechanisms.

Agrarian Conflicts, Land Grabbing and Proletarianization

At the beginning of Jokowi's administration, agrarian conflicts occurred quite massively. Various agrarian conflicts were recorded during Jokowi's era from 2015 to 2023. Referring to this article, the emergence of agrarian conflicts is focused on infrastructure development, considering that infrastructure development has become one of the dominant aspects in the record of agrarian conflicts [KPA, 2023].



Figure 2 - Agrarian Conflict Data sourced from the Infrastructure Sector (Source: data processed from the Year-End Report of the Agrarian Development Consortium)

There are several cases of agrarian conflict that have occurred due to infrastructure development. It is recorded that the peak of these conflicts was during the early period of the Jokowi era in 2015-2017. The National Strategic Project policy has been a significant factor in creating agrarian conflicts. One of the highlighted projects is the

construction of the New Yogyakarta International Airport (NYIA). The two conflicting parties are the community members who own the land and the state along with state-owned enterprises that are pushing for the airport's development. The conflict surrounding NYIA arises from the competition for agrarian resources (land) for differing interests [Dewi, 2021]. The airport development policy, aimed at improving the welfare of the broader community, clashes with the dependency of the affected residents on their land. In practice, the airport construction only involves a portion of the community groups in the policy formulation process..

In addition, another agrarian conflict caused by infrastructure development is the toll road land acquisition process during the Jokowi era. The issues of land procurement and the transfer of rights have become the main problems of this development. The community complains about the compensation amount that is not commensurate with the NJOP. On one hand, landowners desire compensation that aligns with local market prices, while on the other hand, the government's available funds for land acquisition remain limited [Zulfikar, 2017]. Based on this, it is reasonable that many citizens are unwilling to accept the compensation value offered by the government [Rahmawati, 2014].

The two cases used as analysis samples in this writing have the same conflict scheme, namely regarding land conversion. The perspective in this article is not intended to be counter or anti-development. However, this writing attempts to examine the meaning of development, which should have a positive connotation by providing added value and benefits, instead benefiting certain parties and causing conflict in society. This aligns with Coser's (1956) opinion, which indicates that realistic conflicts arise concerning demands on development participants who are expected to profit from public development projects [Oberschall, 1978].

The process of land conversion through coercion can also be referred to as 'land expropriation' from landowners [Rachmawati, 2014]. Several studies indicate that forced land acquisition surveys occurred from the New Order to the Reformation era, while other records also mention that this pattern was observed during the administrations of SBY and Jokowi [Nordholt, 2003; Davidson, 2016]. This indicates that this pattern is not new; forced and unjust land acquisition can be termed as a pattern of 'land expropriation.'

The phenomenon of 'land grabbing' from land users drives landowners to lose access to their land. For rural communities, land is a basic production tool to meet daily economic needs. When communities that rely on land for their daily needs are dispossessed, it alters their production patterns. As a consequence, communities that lose their land shift to other sectors, either being pushed into non-agricultural jobs or even selling their labor and depending on those who have access to capital and production tools. The process of individuals being detached from production tools and subsequently selling their labor has historically been referred to as the phenomenon of proletarianization [Koo, 1990]. This phenomenon has a strong relationship due to the 'land grabbing' phenomenon in the name of Development.

Furthermore, the impact of proletarianization has various subsequent implications. The social class that is displaced and dispossessed of its land, transitioning into labor in

other sectors, will become unskilled labor if they do not possess adequate skills and resources [Koo, 1990]. Such conditions place them in a weak and vulnerable position in the labor market.

Social-Economic Impact and Inequality in the Control of Agrarian Resources

The phenomenon of land conversion is one of the significant factors driving the disparity in land ownership and utilization. Instead of land conversion for infrastructure development serving public interest, it is rather cloaked in business schemes and profit-taking in the process. The community of people who have lost their land has significant potential in the decline of economic capacity. This is reinforced by the fact that the majority of the communities affected by infrastructure development in the case of the NYIA Airport and toll road are rural communities. The characteristics of rural livelihoods are closely tied to work in the agricultural sector. The land they own is the primary means of production for daily production and consumption needs. Therefore, if the land, as the primary means of production for these rural communities, is taken away, it will result in a shift in economic activities from the rural communities themselves. Initially, the villagers relied on income from the land, and when their land was taken, the consequence was that they sought new means of production to continue their production activities. Not many succeeded in this process. Furthermore, it required time to adapt to habits that originally involved skills and knowledge in land management. When they no longer had land, they had to relearn to master new production tools or seek new employment to meet their production and economic needs.

On the other hand, for entrepreneurs, development carried out in collaboration with the state provides significant benefits for the business sector. In infrastructure development, the government partners with the private sector in accordance with the adoption of various economic development concepts such as developmentalism, public-private partnership (PPP), and New Institutional Economy (NIE). These concepts provide substantial advantages for the business sector. According to research reports, various infrastructure development projects have been collaborated with foreign parties such as China Fortune Land Development, C. Ltd, Exim Bank of China, and others [Zuhra, 2016)].

Thus, the need for a thorough re-evaluation of the development scheme being implemented is essential. Not infrequently, development only benefits the rents of entrepreneurs and public officials behind it [Davidson, 2015]. The contestation between the roles of the state, business, and community becomes a major axis in the analysis of the control of agrarian resources in reviewing infrastructure development studies [Shohibuddin, 2016]. The relationship among the three axes of stakeholders in the control of agrarian resources indicates the dynamics of competition among them.




Figure 3 - Relations and Dynamics of Actors in the Control of Agrarian Resources
(Source: Processed from Shohibuddin, 2016))

The above diagram illustrates the relationships and dynamics of actors in the control of agrarian resources. In the context of infrastructure development, the business sector has a competitive interest relationship with the state. Ideally, the state should adhere to the principle of providing benefits for public interests; however, in practice, infrastructure development during the Jokowi era is shrouded in business interests. Business actors utilize the state to advance their business interests in accessing agrarian resources for infrastructure development projects. This situation has led to several conflictual relationships, particularly in the land acquisition processes involving communities conducted by the government [Bunker, 1987].

The disparity in the control of agrarian resources can be observed from the dynamics of interest actors who have relationships regarding access to agrarian resources. Referring to Figure 3, it is evident that there is a clash of interests in the control of agrarian resources among the various actors. The state, under the pretext of public interest, engages in infrastructure development that is veiled by the interests of cronies and businesses behind it [KPA, 2020]. This is carried out by forcibly taking over community land. Such actions contribute to the phenomenon of disparity in the control of agrarian resources. On one hand, the state indeed gains 'benefits' from the infrastructure that can be enjoyed collectively. On the other hand, the development process undertaken faces opposition due to competing interests with the community. Development carried out solely to promote economic growth, without considering socio-economic and environmental aspects, actually provides significant benefits to business entrepreneurs. Meanwhile, access to and ownership of land by the community is taken over, even though that land serves as a primary means of production to meet

their consumption needs. Such a process creates socio-economic crises and disparities in the control of agrarian resources.

3 Conclusion

The policy of infrastructure development essentially holds significance in adding value and benefits for the community. However, in practice, it is fraught with various polemics. This scheme is not detached from the dominant ideology employed by the government in implementing development policies. Instead of land acquisition for infrastructure development and public interest, in practice, the interests of entrepreneurs are concealed behind it. The issues in infrastructure development have led to the emergence of various agrarian conflicts in several regions in Indonesia..

The agrarian conflict arising from infrastructure development has a significant impact on land use changes and the economy of community societies. The undemocratic land acquisition process demonstrates the practice of 'seizure' carried out by the state. The deliberation scheme is merely used as an administrative requirement for the purpose of acquiring community-owned land. Furthermore, the phenomenon of community land acquisition affects the economic decline of the society. Proletarianization arises as the basis of the community's means of production, which is used as a source of daily livelihood, is taken over for infrastructure development.

The takeover of community land in the name of infrastructure development, which is controversial, actually causes disparities in access and control over agrarian resources. The business class is the social class that benefits the most from this development as they accumulate profits from infrastructure development projects. Meanwhile, the social class whose land has been taken must seek new sources of production. Many of them subsequently experience a decline in economic quality. In conclusion, infrastructure development policies have been problematic since the New Order Era. Through the National Strategic Projects program, infrastructure development in the Jokowi Era has encouraged disparities in access and control over agrarian resources.

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