



A Comparative Analysis of Camera Optics and Latent Space Projections for Deepfake Detection

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Abstract

The rapid shift in deepfake generation from Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) to advanced Diffusion Models has made many traditional detection methods ineffective. As synthetic media becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish from real content, the detectors' inability to generalize across architectures poses a significant risk. This paper addresses this issue by comparing two detection approaches: physics-based camera optics, which focuses on lens artifacts such as chromatic aberration and sensor noise that generators cannot replicate, and latent space reverse engineering, which identifies statistical anomalies by mapping images back to the generative model's high-dimensional space. We assess both methods using the Deepfake Eval 2024 benchmark, testing them against new generator architectures and heavy social media compression. Our findings reveal a key trade-off: Latent space methods achieve high precision on familiar generators but struggle to perform well on new ones. In contrast, Camera Optics analysis remains robust across all scenarios and outperforms data-driven methods on real-world footage. We conclude that while latent space analysis is most accurate for current threats, physics-based optical constraints are essential for detecting future, unknown generative models.

Keywords: Deepfake Detection, Diffusion Models, Chromatic Aberration, Generalisation, Zero-Shot Detection.

1. Introduction

The Erosion of Digital Authenticity

As we progress through 2025, the boundary between captured reality and algorithmic creation has become nearly transparent. The rapid advancement of generative artificial intelligence has transformed from a mere technical curiosity into a significant challenge for digital forensics and public trust. When the first "deepfakes" emerged in 2017, they were often marked by visible glitches and structural inconsistencies. However, this field has undergone a dramatic shift through three distinct technological phases.

We started with basic autoencoders (AEs) and quickly transitioned into the era of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), which greatly improved spatial detail through competitive training processes. Today, the landscape is dominated by Latent Diffusion Models (LDMs),

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D. R. Reddy et al. (eds.), *Proceedings of the First International Conference on Advances in Forensics and Cyber Technologies (ICFACT 2025)*, Advances in Computer Science Research 127,

https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6239-610-4_34

represented by powerful engines like OpenAI's Sora and Stability AI's Stable Diffusion. These models utilise iterative denoising techniques to create textures and global consistency that are nearly indistinguishable from images captured by physical sensors.

The Crisis of Generalisation

The primary challenge facing the forensic community today is not just the quality of counterfeit images but the "generalisation gap" in our detection tools. Most traditional deep learning detectors have been designed as "glitch hunters"; they are trained to identify specific mathematical fingerprints, such as checkerboard artefacts or spectral anomalies typical of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs).

Research conducted in late 2024 and early 2025 (Chandra et al.) has shown that these detectors suffer from a phenomenon known as "catastrophic forgetting" when they encounter content generated by diffusion models. The underlying noise distribution of a diffusion model is fundamentally different from that of a GAN. As a result, the detector faces a "mathematical language" it cannot understand.

This vulnerability is further exploited by social media platforms that engage in "laundering." For instance, apps like WhatsApp and X apply aggressive JPEG compression and resizing, which effectively removes the high-frequency pixel artefacts that neural networks depend on. Consequently, forensic investigators are left with a "washed" image that appears authentic even to standard software.

Philosophical Pivot: Physics versus Mathematics

In response to the growing gap in understanding synthetic media, this paper advocates for a strategic shift in our approach to detection methods. We propose that the next generation of forensic analysis should focus not just on the visible pixels but also on the underlying physical realities of the capture process. To test this hypothesis, we evaluate a "two-front" detection strategy that contrasts physical forensics with latent manifold analysis.

The Physical Argument (Method A): This approach is based on the unchanging laws of light transport. Every physical camera lens functions as a prism, creating subtle distortions, such as Lateral Chromatic Aberration (LCA), which is a radial colour fringing caused by the way glass bends different wavelengths of light at varying angles. While artificial intelligence (AI) can simulate the appearance of a face, it rarely takes into account the overall optical "signature" produced by a physical lens.

The Mathematical Argument (Method B): In contrast, Latent Space Reverse Engineering treats the generator as its own adversary. By projecting a suspect image back into the high-dimensional "latent space" of a known generative model, we can calculate the "reconstruction error." If an image can be perfectly accommodated within the mathematical manifold of that model, it serves as a high-confidence fingerprint indicating AI origin.

Defining the Research Scope

This study utilises the Deepfake Eval 2024 benchmark to determine which philosophical approach is more resilient to the "black box" models of the future. Our goal is to assess whether

the universal laws of physics offer a more "future-proof" signal compared to the rapidly changing statistics of generative mathematics. In the following sections, we will outline the experimental trade-offs between precision and generalisation. Ultimately, we will provide a roadmap for a hybrid forensic framework capable of withstanding the diverse threats posed by the digital environment of 2025.

2. Literature Review

2.1 The Crisis of the Generative Frontier (2024–2025)

The rapid shift from Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) to Latent Diffusion Models (LDMs) has posed a significant challenge for the digital forensics community. We are currently facing a situation where generative technology has outstripped our detection capabilities. Recent research conducted by Chandra et al. (2025), which employs the Deepfake Eval 2024 benchmark, highlights what researchers refer to as a "catastrophic performance decay." Academic detectors originally designed for GAN-based artefacts experience a dramatic decline in their Area Under Curve (AUC) scores, often plummeting by as much as 50% when confronted with "in the wild" diffusion content. This disparity in detection efficacy is largely attributable to the high fidelity of advanced models such as OpenAI's Sora and Google's Veo. Unlike earlier versions of synthetic media, these 2025-era models demonstrate exceptional temporal and global coherence, enabling them to evade conventional frame-by-frame analysis. The 2025 DRRF Threat Report indicates that we can no longer rely solely on identifying "glitches"; instead, we must seek out fundamental departures from reality.

2.2 Physics-Based Forensics: Returning to the Hardware Fingerprint

As data-driven AI detectors face challenges with "zero-shot" generalisation, that is, the ability to detect an AI model they haven't encountered before, an emerging school of forensic thought is turning back to the physical world. Physics-based detection relies on the idea that while AI can simulate pixels, it cannot replicate the inherent physical imperfections found in optical hardware.

The study of Lateral Chromatic Aberration (LCA) is central to this discussion. This theory posits that every physical lens has a unique radial dispersion profile, which is often overlooked by algorithms focusing solely on visual aesthetics. In their 2024 systematic review, Heidari et al. argued that these hardware-based inconsistencies represent some of the most reliable "model agnostic" signals available to us. As a result, there has been a resurgence of interest in Photo Response Non-Uniformity (PRNU), the microscopic "noise" that is unique to each camera sensor. By 2025, PRNU is being used as a "hardware to pixel" verification tool, enabling investigators to identify when a synthetic region has been "spliced" into a real photograph.

2.3 Latent Space Reverse Engineering: Turning the AI Against Itself

Some researchers are focused on physics, while others are investigating a method known as "detection by reconstruction." This approach, often referred to as Latent Space Refinement

(LSR), was notably advanced by Huang et al. (2025). The fundamental concept is to evaluate how well a suspect image fits within the mathematical manifold of a known AI generator.

This process is based on the DDIM inversion technique, which effectively "unmakes" an image back into its original noise state. If an image was generated by that specific AI model, it will reconstruct with nearly zero error. In contrast, a genuine image captured by a human will display a much higher reconstruction error (as measured by LPIPS) because it does not belong to that artificial manifold.

Cai et al. (2025) further enhanced this method at ICCV by introducing Adaptive Semantic Debiasing, which ensures that these latent projections remain effective even after an image has been aggressively filtered or edited by an adversary.

2.4 The Benchmark: Moving Beyond "Clean" Lab Data

A common criticism of previous forensic studies is their dependence on "clean" or "sanitised" datasets, such as FaceForensics++. These datasets often do not accurately represent the complexities of real-world scenarios. To overcome this limitation, our study utilises the Deepfake Eval 2024 benchmark [1].

Developed by Chandra et al. (2025), this dataset is the most diverse "in the wild" collection available, featuring nearly 2,000 unique images and 44 hours of video sourced directly from social media. It encompasses 52 languages and content from 88 different platforms, making it a robust test for modern detection systems. The primary advantage of this benchmark is its focus on "laundered" media files that have been compressed, resized, and reuploaded multiple times. This presents the ultimate challenge for detection, as it requires identifying signals in files where the platforms themselves have eliminated traditional artefacts.

3. Methodology

3.1 Dataset Selection and the "In the Wild" Challenge

For this comparative study, we moved away from sanitised laboratory datasets and instead utilised the **Deepfake Eval 2024** benchmark. This corpus consists of approximately 2,000 unique images and over 100 hours of audio-visual media, all of which were harvested from active social media platforms throughout late 2024. The selection of this dataset was critical to our research because it introduces "in the wild" variables such as erratic lighting, variable focal lengths, and multiple rounds of JPEG compression that are often missing from "clean" academic benchmarks.

To prepare this raw data for forensic analysis, we developed a three-stage preprocessing pipeline designed to isolate the most relevant signals for both physics and latent-based detection:

Face Extraction and Localisation: We employed **MTCNN** (Multi-task Cascaded Convolutional Networks) to detect and isolate facial regions.¹ Since the vast majority of

malicious synthetic media focuses on facial manipulation, this ensures our detectors are looking at the highest density "crime scene" within the frame.

Contextual Patch Pairing: A unique requirement for Method A (Physics-Based) is the comparison of local versus global optical signals. We extracted a **Face Patch** (P_{face}) and a **Background Patch** (P_{bg}) from each suspect image. This pairing is vital; it allows us to test if the "optical fingerprint" of the face matches the "optical fingerprint" of the background environment.

Normalisation for Latent Space: To satisfy the input constraints of Method B's generative models, all patches were resized to 256 x 256 pixels and normalised to a range of $[-1, 1]$. This step ensures that our latent reconstructions are not biased by variations in original image resolution.

3.2 Method A: Physics-Based Detection (Lateral Chromatic Aberration)

This paradigm is built on the fundamental principle that a physical camera lens is an imperfect optical instrument. Lenses act like prisms, failing to focus all wavelengths of light onto the same convergence point, a phenomenon known as **Lateral Chromatic Aberration (LCA)**. This creates minute "colour fringing" at the edges of real photos. Synthetic generators, which operate in a purely mathematical pixel space, almost never replicate this hardware-specific artefact correctly.

A. The Mathematical Model We model Lateral Chromatic Aberration (LCA) as a coordinate transformation. For a pixel at (x, y) with an optical centre (x_c, y_c) , the radial distance is $r = \sqrt{(x - x_c)^2 + (y - y_c)^2}$. The distorted position of the Red channel (x', y') is modelled by a radial expansion factor α :

$$x' = x_c + (1 + \alpha r^2)(x - x_c)$$

$$y' = y_c + (1 + \alpha r^2)(y - y_c)$$

- α : The distortion coefficient we aim to estimate.
- $(1 + \alpha r^2)$: The scaling factor increases as we move toward the image periphery (r increases).




Fig 1: Chromatic Aberration Diagram

This Fig 1 image illustrates the physical "Method A." It shows how a lens fails to focus all colours to the same convergence point, creating the colour fringing (forensic traces) you are analysing.

B. The Estimation Algorithm (Mutual Information)

To accurately estimate α We utilise an iterative maximisation approach. We "warp" the green channel and measure its alignment with the red channel using **Normalised Mutual Information (NMI)**. The goal is to find the value of α That maximises the overlap between these channels, effectively "reversing" the lens's natural distortion to find its fingerprint.

$$\hat{\alpha} = \mathop{\text{arg max}}_{\alpha} \sum_{x \in X} \sum_{y \in Y} p(x, y) \log \left(\frac{p(x, y)}{p(x)p(y)} \right)$$

C. Defining the Forgery Metric

In an authentic photograph, the lens distortion should be consistent across the entire frame. However, in a deepfake, the "spliced" facial region will rarely match the optical profile of the original background. We define our forgery score as the absolute difference between these two coefficients:

$$S_{phys} = |\alpha_{face} - \alpha_{bg}|$$

If S_{phys} Exceeds a predefined threshold, we classify the image as FAKE, indicating an optical mismatch that cannot exist in a single lens capture.

3.3 Method B: Latent Space Reverse Engineering

Method A focuses on identifying physical traces, whereas Method B looks for a "reconstruction gap." This method is based on the idea that a generative model can effectively evaluate its own

output. A synthetic image will fit seamlessly within the model's learned "manifold," while a real photograph will appear "out of place" according to the AI's internal logic.

A. The Foundations of Diffusion and Denoising Latent Diffusion Models (LDMs) function by adding Gaussian noise ϵ to a latent vector z_0 over a series of T Timesteps. The forward process gradually destroys the data, while the reverse process (denoising) attempts to recover the original latent using a noise prediction mode. ϵ_θ

B. The Reconstruction Algorithm

To evaluate a suspect image, we use **DDIM inversion** to map the image back to its source noise representation and then reconstruct it.

1. **Inversion:** The input image x is encoded and mapped to a latent noise state z_T Using the ODE-based reverse trajectory of the diffusion model: $x \rightarrow z_0 \rightarrow z_T$.
2. **Sampling (Reconstruction):** The model performs a deterministic sampling step from z_T back to the pixel space to generate the reconstructed image \hat{x}_0




Figure 2: The Latent Reconstruction Pipeline.

The suspect image is inverted into the model's latent manifold; the degree of deviation during reconstruction serves as the primary forensic signal.

C. The Error Metric (LPIPS + L2)

The final forgery score, S_{la} , combines pixel-level intensity differences (L_2) And high-level perceptual features (LPIPS) to ensure the detector is sensitive to both structural and textural anomalies:

$$S_{latent} = \|x - \hat{x}\|_2^2 + \lambda \cdot LPIPS(x, \hat{x})$$

In this paradigm, a low error indicates that the image "belongs" to the AI's manifold (classified as FAKE), while a high error suggests the image is an authentic, "out of distribution" capture that the AI cannot perfectly replicate.

4. Experimental Results and Discussion

4.1 Experimental Configuration

Our experimental framework was designed to challenge both detection paradigms under conditions that reflect 2025's adversarial landscape. We utilised the **Deepfake Eval 2024** benchmark. ($N = 1,975$ images) To provide a statistically significant sample size. For **Method B (Latent Space)**, we established Stable Diffusion v1.5 as our reference manifold to evaluate reconstruction accuracy. For **Method A (Physics-Based)**, we implemented an iterative search range for the expansion factor. α in $[-0.05, 0.05]$ with a granular step of 0.001. This allowed us to capture even the most subtle chromatic shifts that might be present in high-resolution imagery.

4.2 Test 1: Performance on Known Architectures (The Accuracy Benchmark)

The initial phase of testing focused on a "closed loop" scenario where the suspect images were generated by the same architecture used for Method B's reference manifold.

Method A (Camera Optics): While still effective, this method yielded a lower **AUC of 0.82**. Our analysis indicates that Method A occasionally struggled with fakes where the generator's post-processing unintentionally mimicked global sharpness levels consistent with the background.



Figure 3: Physics-Based Optics Map for Deepfake Detection.

Fig 3 visualisation illustrates the estimation of **lateral chromatic aberration (LCA)**. The "Optics Map" tracks the radial colour fringing across the frame. In this example, the detector identifies a mismatch between the optical fingerprint of the facial region and the background, serving as a robust signal for forgery even when visual textures appear realistic.

Method B (Latent Space): As hypothesised, this method achieved a near-perfect **AUC of 0.98**. Because the suspect images shared the exact mathematical "DNA" of the detector's reference model, the reconstruction error was negligible. This allowed the system to classify synthetic content with absolute precision.




Figure 4: Latent Error Map and MSE Score for Stable Diffusion

This figure 4 demonstrates Method B (Latent Space) performance in a "closed loop" scenario. Because the suspect image shares the same mathematical "DNA" as the reference model, the reconstruction error is negligible, resulting in a low Mean Squared Error (MSE) score of 0.000659. This low error allows the detector to classify the content as synthetic with high precision.

Practical Implication: These results suggest that latent-based methods are the superior choice for controlled environments such as internal corporate verification, where the specific generative models in use are documented and accessible.

4.3 Test 2: The Generalisation Gap (Zero-Shot Detection)

The second phase of our study addressed the most critical vulnerability in modern forensics: the ability to detect "unseen" threats. We exposed both detectors to high-fidelity "black box" models, specifically **Midjourney v6** and **OpenAI's Sora**, neither of which were included in Method B's reference set.

A. The Performance Collapse of Latent Methods

Method B experienced a significant catastrophic decay, with its accuracy plummeting from 98.7% to a mere 52.4%.

This failure highlights the "template matching" nature of latent-based forensics. Because Method B relies on the specific noise schedule and latent architecture of Stable Diffusion, it lacks the flexibility to recognise the unique mathematical signatures of Midjourney or Sora. To the detector, these high-quality fakes appeared as "unidentifiable noise" rather than synthetic content, essentially rendering the system as effective as a coin flip.




Figure 5: Latent Performance Collapse on "Black Box" Generators

Figure 5 visualisation highlights the performance collapse of latent-based methods when encountering unseen threats like Midjourney or Sora. The detector fails to recognise the unique mathematical signatures of these models, resulting in an increased MSE score (0.005365) and rendering the detection no more effective than a coin flip.

B. The Robustness of Physical Signals

In stark contrast, **Method A (Camera Optics)** demonstrated remarkable stability, maintaining a detection rate of **79.2%**. The reasoning here is grounded in the universality of physics. Midjourney and Sora prioritise visual aesthetic perfection over physical lens accuracy. They consistently fail to simulate the specific radial colour fringing caused by light passing through a physical glass lens. Because the laws of optics do not change regardless of which AI is used, Method A provides a "future-proof" forensic signal that transcends model updates.




Figure 6: Physics-Based Optics Map for Deepfake Detection

This figure 6 illustrates the estimation of Lateral Chromatic Aberration (LCA) by mapping radial colour fringing. While AI generators prioritise visual aesthetic perfection, they consistently fail to simulate physical lens inaccuracies caused by light passing through a glass lens. This provides a stable, "future-proof" forensic signal that remains robust across different generative models.

C. The Generalisation Verdict

As visualised in **Figure 7**, there is a clear "generalisation gap" in data-driven forensics.

- **Stable Baseline:** Physics-based methods provide a lower but highly stable accuracy floor.
- **Model Decay:** Latent-based methods provide high-performance peaks but suffer from catastrophic decay as soon as a new generator is released.




Fig 7: Generalisation Gap Graph

Figure 7 Comparative Analysis of Generalisation Resilience. The plot illustrates the stability of Method A (Optics) against the performance collapse of Method B (Latent) when exposed to out-of- distribution generators like Sora and Midjourney v6.

4.4 Test 3: The "WhatsApp Test" (Resilience to Compression)

To simulate the "laundering" that occurs on social media, we compressed our dataset to **JPEG Quality 50**, mirroring the aggressive down-sampling used by platforms like WhatsApp and X.

Method A (Camera Optics): Remained highly resilient, holding an **AUC of 0.71**. This is because lateral chromatic aberration is a structural, mid-frequency colour shift. Unlike pixel-level noise, these fringing patterns are robust enough to survive the smoothing effects of heavy compression.

Method B (Latent Space): Suffered a **45% performance drop**. We found that JPEG quantisation noise effectively "smothers" the subtle AI artefacts the latent detector looks for. The man-made noise of the compression masks the machine-made noise of the generator.

The comparison of methods were shown in table 1

Metric	Method A: Camera Optics	Method B: Latent Space
Highest Accuracy	No (Peak ~82%)	Yes (Peak ~99%)
Zero-Shot Generalisation	Excellent	Poor
Resistance to JPEG	High	Low
Computational Speed	Fast (Signal Processing)	Slow (Requires GPU Denoising)

Table 1: Comparison between Camera optics & Latent Space

5. Conclusion and Final Verdict

5.1 The Duality of Detection

This study has conducted a rigorous comparative analysis between two opposed forensic philosophies: the immutable laws of physics-based optical forensics and the high-precision world of data-driven latent space reconstruction. Our data highlights a fundamental duality in the 2025 security landscape. We have found that while **Latent Space Analysis (Method B)** offers an unparalleled level of accuracy, achieving a peak of **98.7%**, it is essentially a "specialist" tool. It excels in environments where the source model is known, but it is fundamentally brittle, as evidenced by its dramatic performance collapse (falling to **52.4%**) when faced with the "black box" architectures of Sora and Midjourney.

5.2 The Resilience of Physical Truth

In contrast, the "generalist" approach of **physics-based detection (Method A)** provides the stability that modern digital forensics currently lacks. By centring our detection on **Lateral Chromatic Aberration (LCA)**, we are not hunting for a specific AI's mathematical handwriting; rather, we are verifying the presence of physical light transport. Maintaining a robust **79.2% accuracy floor** across all platforms and remaining largely unfazed by the aggressive JPEG compression common on social media, Method A proves to be the most "future-proof" strategy in our arsenal. It operates on a simple, irreducible truth: while AI can simulate a pixel, it cannot yet simulate the physical imperfections of glass and sensor noise without incurring massive computational overhead.

5.3 The Final Verdict: A Hybrid Roadmap

The final verdict of this research is that the forensic community must move away from the search for a "silver bullet" algorithm. As generative models continue to evolve with unprecedented speed, the "generalisation gap" will only widen for data-driven detectors. Therefore, we propose a tiered forensic framework:

Tier 1 (Physics First): Use optical lens fingerprints (LCA) as a universal, model-agnostic first pass to flag out-of-distribution media.

Tier 2 (Latent Verification): Apply manifold reconstruction only when a specific generator is suspected, allowing for high-confidence attribution.

By anchoring our defence in the immutable laws of optics, we can ensure that our forensic capabilities remain resilient, regardless of how many new generative architectures emerge in the coming years.

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