



Italy's Role and Policy Practices in Global Refugee Crisis Governance: A Case Study of the EU-Turkey Refugee Agreement

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Abstract. As a "frontline country" in responding to the Mediterranean refugee crisis, Italy has been actively promoting collective response at the EU level since the outbreak of the European refugee crisis in 2015. It is also a major advocate of the EU-Turkey Refugee Agreement. This article systematically reviews the policy practices of the Italian government. These policy practices include tightening the asylum process within Italy, that is, making the asylum process stricter, extending the detention period, increasing the duration of detention, and expanding the scope of "immigration hotspots". On the external front, the Italian government lobbied the European Union to have countries such as Turkey and Tunisia designated as "safe third countries", and also funded the establishment of "off-shore reception" facilities. Reports indicate that Italy has ensured that the EU assumes shared responsibilities by setting agendas and making financial commitments, thereby strengthening the externalization of borders and the mechanism for the repatriation of refugees. The article holds that the role played by Italy reflects the "middle state" strategy, that is, by using a multi-level governance structure to elevate Italy's own security concerns to a common norm within the EU. Although this policy has alleviated the short-term pressure from immigrants and reduced the pressure in the short term, it has also deepened the insufficiency in the protection of refugee rights. This has made the issue of refugee rights protection more serious, widened the rifts within the European Union, and intensified the internal conflicts within the EU.

Keywords: Italy, European Union, Turkey-EU Refugee Agreement, Responsibility Externalization

1 Introduction

In 2015, more than one million refugees and immigrants flooded into Europe via the Mediterranean Sea. This situation pushed the EU's asylum system to the brink of collapse.

Against such a backdrop, the agreement reached between the European Union and Turkey is regarded as a crucial turning point for the EU in addressing the refugee crisis.

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The core issue to be studied in this article is as follows: Throughout the entire process of the negotiation and implementation of the "EU-Turkey Agreement", how did Italy assume and strategically utilize its dual identities as a "frontline country" and a "policy driver"? This topic is proposed to fill the academic gap in the research on Italy's complex positioning and agency situation in this agreement. In order to break the traditional "pressure-response" analysis framework, this paper regards Italy as a shrewd medium-sized power and focuses on how it transforms the pressure it faces on the front line into a political lever. When promoting the development of the EU's externalization management strategy, Italy aims to secure more financial and policy support for itself, and to obtain favorable conditions in the subsequent asylum system reform. The final theory of this article is to take Italy as an example to explain a medium-sized major country under the background of limited multilateralism. How to achieve problem arbitrage through strategic operations, so as to maximize one's own interests under structural constraints. The final theory of this article aims to take Italy as a typical case, under the background of "limited multilateralism", to achieve "issuance arbitrage" through strategic operations and maximize one's own interests under structural constraints.

2 Literature Review

2.1 EU Refugee Policy and the Burden-Sharing Mechanism

Current research has reached a basic consensus on the core predicament of the EU's refugee policy. This core predicament is that the "burden-sharing" principle has structurally failed in practical operation, and the institutional carrier of this principle is the asylum application system that takes the Dublin Convention as its core. This asylum application system explicitly requires refugees to file their asylum applications in the first member state of the European Union. Objectively, this approach concentrates administrative, financial and social governance pressures on first-tier countries in Southern Europe like Italy and Greece. This view is supported by empirical research conducted by scholars such as Thieleman. Regarding the impact of the "Dublin System", the academic community has formed a relatively consistent critical attitude. However, there are some subtle differences in the specific mechanism of pressure transmission and the extent of the impact. Bello's research in 2020 focused more on the issue from the perspective of governance effectiveness. He pointed out that this system led to a "systemic overload" in the asylum approval system of frontline countries. Zaun's research in 2017 paid more attention to the relationships among member states. He believed that the imbalance of rules directly caused a trust deficit within the EU. It has also escalated the intensity of the political game. These two scholars have respectively provided us with a richer understanding of the flaws existing in this system from the two different dimensions of "governance capacity" and "political unity".

To overcome the current predicament, scholars have proposed mandatory burden-sharing schemes like the "quota system". However, the feasibility of this approach remains controversial to this day. Those who support this plan believe that it is an indispensable institutional supplement for achieving "EU unity", while opponents, it is the Central and Eastern European countries represented by the Visegrad Group that firmly

resist this plan on the grounds of "sovereign border transfer". This plan stagnated at the policy implementation stage (Trauner, 2016). These studies together depicted the core tension existing between "unity in refugee governance" and "sovereign autonomy of member states" within the European Union, and also provided a theoretical basis for this article to analyze the external institutional environment in which Italy is located.

It should be noted that most current research reports generally analyze Italy and Greece as similar affected objects under the "Dublin system". These research reports fail to properly distinguish the differences between the two countries in terms of the scale of refugee reception and their geopolitical location characteristics. There has been no systematic review of the unique strategic choices and the logic behind Italy's diplomatic actions in the EU's burden-sharing negotiations, nor has a dedicated analytical framework been established for Italy's diverse demands. This article will integrate the three perspectives of "institutional dilemmas", "national strategies" and "geopolitical differences", and take Italy as the core case for research, to fill the gaps in current research in aspects such as "country-specific differentiation analysis" and "strategic action deconstruction", and to improve the research dimensions of the EU's refugee policy burden sharing issue.

2.2 Externalization Governance and the EU-Turkey Agreement

To resolve the deadlock of internal responsibility sharing, the EU gradually began to adopt an "externalization" governance strategy, transferring the responsibilities of border control and refugee management to non-EU countries. The EU-Turkey agreement signed in 2016 is widely regarded as a landmark practice of this strategy. Many studies (e.g., Collett, 2016; Rygiel, 2016) have focused on the legal and moral controversies surrounding this agreement, such as its infringement of refugees' rights and its short-term role as a "crisis management tool". Scholars have criticized that this agreement actually regards Turkey as a "border", using financial aid to make Turkey play the role of a "gatekeeper". Controlling the entry of refugees into Europe can relieve the pressure within the European Union. These studies have keenly identified a new paradigm in the EU's refugee policy, which is to "outsource" its international protection obligations by signing agreements with external parties. However, most of the existing literature focuses on the EU as a whole or Greece, but seriously neglects the indirect but far-reaching impact of the "EU-Turkey Agreement" on Italy. This agreement has changed the routes of refugees, brought more attention to the central Mediterranean, and posed new challenges to Italy, a causal relationship that current research has not fully explored.

2.3 Multi-Level Governance (MLG) and Member State Roles

The multi-level governance theory provides a very useful analytical framework for analyzing the policy-making and implementation process of the European Union. This theory emphasizes that within the EU system, power and authority are shared and interact among actors at different levels, including supranational, national-level and local levels [1]. In the field of refugee policy, research shows that member state governments, such as major countries like Italy, do not merely passively accept the EU's instructions.

On the contrary, they are active participants and can shape the EU's agenda through diplomatic negotiations and unilateral actions. For instance, Italy has threatened or actually closed its ports many times during crises. This is a typical example of a member state exerting a reverse influence on the EU's decision-making. The existing literature recognizes the acting role of member states within the MLG framework, which provides theoretical support for Italy's role positioning in this study. However, the deficiency is that most studies regard Italy's port closures and similar actions as isolated "crisis events". Without systematically placing these actions within a more comprehensive analytical framework to study how Italy acted throughout the entire crisis cycle, which began with the negotiations of the EU-Turkey agreement and continued through the subsequent implementation stage, Italy continuously utilized its geopolitical leverage to defend national interests and influence the overall policy direction of the EU.

2.4 Domestic Politics and the Impact of Populism

In terms of domestic politics, the rise of populist parties is widely regarded as a key factor influencing the refugee policies of Italy and even the European Union. Many studies have closely examined how the Union Party and the Five Star Movement have successfully mobilized public opinion by adopting "protective" and "stigmatizing" approaches to the refugee issue. It has also placed the issue of immigration in a key position on the domestic political agenda. These studies show that the pressure brought by domestic populism directly led the Italian government to adopt stricter border control measures and a more uncooperative attitude when negotiating with the European Union. This research approach clearly presents that national policy preferences are generated domestically. It should be noted that most existing studies generally analyze Italy and Greece as objects affected similarly under the "Dublin system". They did not thoroughly study the differences between the two countries in terms of the scale of the number of refugees they received and the characteristics of their geopolitical positions, nor did they systematically sort out the unique strategic choices and the logic behind Italy's diplomatic actions during the negotiations on responsibility sharing with the European Union. Not even a dedicated analytical framework has been established for those different demands of Italy. This article intends to combine the three perspectives of "institutional predicament", "national strategy" and "geopolitical differences", taking Italy as the main case to fill the gaps in existing research in the aspects of "differentiated analysis of different countries" and "disassembly analysis of strategic actions", so as to make the research dimensions on the issue of responsibility sharing in the EU's refugee policy more complete.

However, most of the existing research has focused on the impact of populist discourse on domestic elections and policy-making, and how domestic political pressure is specifically and in accordance with certain systems transformed into Italy's negotiation strategies and the transmission mechanism of diplomatic behavior at the EU level. Up to now, there have been no detailed empirical studies to explore the implementation and evaluation process of key agreements like the "EU-Turkey Agreement".

2.5 Academic Gaps and the Positioning of This Study

Overall, the existing literature provides us with a relatively solid theoretical basis and a lot of practical materials for understanding the governance of the EU's refugee crisis. However, there are also quite prominent academic gaps. Let's start with the first issue, which is that there is a regional bias in the research. Although Italy and Greece are both on the front line in dealing with the refugee crisis, However, academic attention to them is unevenly distributed. Many studies have focused on Greece. As a result, Italy's role in the governance of the refugee crisis seems relatively less valued or is described too simply. Moreover, the analytical perspectives are rather scattered. Studies on the externalization governance of the European Union and those on domestic politics in Italy and the internal dynamics of the European Union are mostly conducted independently. It's impossible to combine them well. This situation hinders us from clarifying the complex causal relationship between external agreements and strategic interactions among member states. The last issue is that existing research lacks an analysis of Italian institutions. Some studies view Italian institutions as passive recipients of the EU system, while others only focus on populist resistance within Italy. However, Italian institutions have not been systematically regarded as rational participants who would proactively apply strategies and strive to gain influence within a multi-level governance system.

This article aims to fill the gap mentioned above. This research will focus on the core issue of "Italy's role and policy Practices in the governance of the global refugee crisis", and will particularly take the "EU-Turkey Refugee Agreement" as a key case for study. This article not only measures the objective impact of the agreement on Italy, the institutions of Rome were also highlighted throughout the process of negotiation, implementation and review. It combines the perspectives of externalization, multi-level and domestic politics to provide a more comprehensive, dynamic and mechanism-based description of Italy's complex role in the EU's refugee governance, which enables us to have a deeper understanding of the tensions between the state and the supranational in the EU's crisis management.

3 Research Design

This article takes the policy practice of Italy in the formation and implementation of the EU-Turkey Agreement as a case to explore how the peripheral member states of the European Union respond to external pressure and internal constraints under the framework of global governance. As a core frontline country in the Mediterranean refugee crisis, Italy's policy response is typical, while the situation is rather complex. Although the EU-Turkey agreement was mainly aimed at the Eastern Mediterranean route, it had a significant spillover impact on Italy's border governance and provided a policy template for Italy's subsequent similar cooperation with countries such as Libya. It has become a key entry point for analyzing Italy's strategic choices and role building.

In terms of research methods, this paper adopts a qualitative analysis approach, combining critical discourse analysis and process traceability to systematically examine the policy stance transformation and behavioral logic of Italy during the critical period from 2015 to 2017.

Critical discourse analysis mainly focuses on texts such as Italian government press conferences, parliamentary debate records, and EU joint statements. It takes "refugee threat" and "shared responsibility" as the units of analysis and adopts the Fairclough three-dimensional framework to step by step analyze how language structure participates in the process of policy legalization. The specific tasks to be accomplished are as follows: First, select and encode it, then identify the discourse strategy, and finally analyze the intertextual construction. The purpose of doing this is to reveal how Italy uses discourse to turn the "frontline pressure" it faces into a political lever.

Process tracking tracked some key moments, such as the 2016 agreement and the 2017 Libya mission. This was done to demonstrate how Italy's strategy in the broader EU environment changed. It combined border figures with official reports and then traced how Rome used that agreement to obtain funds. And it has also shaped the upcoming asylum rules, thus depicting the specific areas where a medium-sized power can truly play a role in the Global Council.

3.1 Research Sources

Primary Sources. This involves official documents, relevant agreement texts and laws and regulations issued by the European Union and the Italian government, such as the Dublin Regulations and specific documents and agreements like the EU-Turkey Agreement [2].

Here are policy reports, statistics and announcements released by the Italian Ministry of the Interior, as well as those issued by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Additionally, there are policy reports, statistics and announcements released by the European Commission [3].

Parliamentary debate records, government statements, and diplomatic memoranda.

Secondary Sources. This article will analyze the EU's refugee policy from academic journal articles, monographs and research reports. It will also examine Italy's immigration governance situation and refer to the evaluation reports and annual statistics published by international organizations such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [4], the International Organization for Migration and FRONTEX.

Policy briefs and commentaries from think tanks (e.g., Migration Policy Institute, CEPS).

Media Reports and Public Opinion Data. Some mainstream Italian media outlets, such as La Repubblica and Corriere Della Sera, have conducted relevant reports on the refugee policy and also published many comments.

There are some well-known international media outlets, such as the BBC and The Guardian, which have all provided relatively detailed reports on the Mediterranean refugee crisis.

The monitoring and criticism reports released by non-governmental organizations, such as those issued by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, are like this.

3.2 Analytical Approach

This article aims to analyze the policy process, specifically by sorting out the various stages of policy from conception, formulation, implementation to evaluation, in order to identify Italy's agenda-setting ability within the multi-level governance system of the European Union and the game strategy it adopts.

Making a horizontal comparison of Italy's practices in ice and snow sports with those of Southern European countries such as Greece and Spain can better highlight the particularity of Italy's ice and snow practices. It can also be used to compare the situations during different periods of governance in Italy from a vertical perspective, such as during the Renzi government and the Salvini government. Take a look at the continuation and transformation of policies in these two different periods.

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA):

This article aims to analyze how terms like "border security", "humanitarianism", and "externalization of responsibility" are constructed and evolved in the remarks of political figures, documents issued by the government, and media narratives, revealing the underlying ideological and power dynamics that shape policies.

4 Results

4.1 Pre-Agreement Phase: Advancing Agenda Setting and Externalization Strategies

At this specific stage, Italy was particularly proactive in defining the issue of immigration control as a security problem and brought this issue onto the EU agenda for discussion. This move promoted the gradual formation of the "externalization" governance logic.

At that time, when Renzi was the prime minister, he particularly emphasized at the EU summit that "the Mediterranean Sea is the southern border of Europe, and we must all defend it together." (Council of the EU, 2015) Fundamentally, this elevated the issue of national boundaries to a common challenge faced by the EU and established a policy connection between "frontline pressure" and "collective responsibility." At the same time, Italy supported the "offshore landing platform". It also urged the EU's asylum screening centers operating in North Africa to shift the blockade on immigrants outside Italy, so as to reduce the domestic burden on immigrants [5]. Although this policy has never been fully implemented, However, its policy logic directly had an impact on the later "hotspot" system of frontline islands such as Lampedusa. According to Frontex's statistics, in 2015, the number of maritime migrants intercepted by Italy accounted for 42% of the total number of maritime migrants intercepted by the European Union. The report of the International Organization for Migration also pointed out that Italy undertook 75% of the search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea. During this period, Italy not only acted as a "border enforcement agency" at the technical level, it also relied on discourse construction and policy advocacy to transform the pressure it faced into a consensus within the EU on "outsourcing" governance, initially achieving the strategic intention of "problem arbitrage".

4.2 Agreement Evaluation Stage: From Cooperation to Unilateralism and Responsibility Reconstruction

In 2018, after the right-wing government came to power in Italy, there was a very significant change in Italy's refugee policy. This change reflected the strategic adjustment within the multi-level governance system. Interior Minister Salvini implemented the "port closure policy", which prohibited rescue vessels of non-governmental organizations from docking at ports. Although this measure reduced the number of landings in the short term, it led to a significant increase in the mortality rate along the central Mediterranean route. According to the data provided by the International Organization for Migration, this proportion rose from 21‰ in 2016 to 42‰ in 2018. This tough stance has strengthened the notion of "safety first" within Italy. At the same time, a "compulsory responsibility" mechanism has been formed at the EU level, that is, by creating humanitarian crises, to exert pressure on other EU countries and make them pay attention to the central Mediterranean route. During the period of the 2019 coronavirus disease pandemic in 2020, Italy suspended search and rescue operations at sea on the grounds of public health, which led to a serious backlog in the asylum system. After 2021, the EU wanted to promote a "voluntary redistribution mechanism", but less than half of the EU countries responded. This once again demonstrates the failure of the internal unity mechanism within the European Union. During this period, Italy gradually transformed from a "promoter of cooperation" to a "unilateral strategic actor". The change in Italy's refugee policy not only reflects the changes in domestic politics but also exposes the structural problems existing in the multi-level governance system of the European Union in terms of responsibility allocation and implementation supervision.

5 Discussion

Theoretical Significance: Reexamining Issue Arbitrage and Multilevel Governance.

This article examines how medium-sized powers, under the framework of multi-level governance in the European Union, transform their interests by resorting to the "problem arbitrage" strategy when there are situations of "vertical overload" and "horizontal gap" in the system. During the period from 2015 to 2016, Italy turned the supranational agenda of the "EU-Turkey Agreement" into a bargaining chip in its negotiations. The core mechanism here is to transfer the externalized costs to third parties like Turkey and keep the internalized benefits within the country. These internalized benefits include quota reduction, the say in the reform of the European Common Asylum System, and structural funds. From this process, it can be seen that power in multi-level governance is not only "upward" transferred as assumed by classic theories. It can also be redistributed by following the path of "first outward and then inward". Externalized governance can be regarded as a "lever for multi-level games", rather than merely an "extension of the defense line" in terms of physical or institutional aspects.

Policy Implications: The Efficiency-Legitimacy Paradox of Externalized Governance

In terms of policy implementation, Italy has taken "reducing the number of deaths at sea" and "controlling the scale of arrivals" as short-term performance indicators. As a result, the number of arrivals via the central Mediterranean route has been successfully reduced from 181,000 in 2016 to 119,000 in 2017. However, this strategy that only values efficiency has been gradually eroding the normative legitimacy of the European Union. The Prosecutor General of the European Court of Justice clearly pointed out that Turkey's "detention exchange" control model has a "systemic insecurity" situation. The European Parliament has frozen financial aid to Turkey several times, which actually reflects the cautious attitude of the EU system towards its externalization measures. Ah, European civil society has also clearly shown moral fatigue towards the practice of "trading funds for border security". This tension between efficiency and legitimacy indicates that externalized governance is not, as some scholars claim, "sustainable simply by relying on technological optimization". On the contrary, while enhancing effectiveness, it may continuously deplete the governance foundation of the EU as a "normative power", eventually leading to a cyclical predicament where "the higher the efficiency, the lower the legitimacy".

Research Limitations and Future Directions: The research of this article mainly focuses on the policy actions taken by Italy during the peak of the refugee crisis from 2015 to 2017. However, the conclusions drawn have certain limitations in terms of time and geographical scope. When conducting future research, two aspects can be approached. On the one hand, the "problem arbitrage" method can be implemented. Conduct comparative studies on small countries in different policy areas, such as the climate field and the trade field, to see if they have developed a set of universal behavioral patterns. In addition, it is necessary to analyze the long-term impact of external governance on the legal order and identity politics of the European Union. In the extended border regions such as the Eastern Mediterranean and the Western Balkans, explore the structural roots and institutional feedback of the "efficiency-legitimacy" paradox. Studying these two directions can help us clarify the action logic and system effects of medium-sized powers in the fragmented multilateral order.

5.1 Policy Implications

The Ultimate Flaw in EU Burden-Sharing. This case in Italy can prove that the "First entry state" principle mentioned in the Dublin Treaty iii will automatically transform pressure into capital for "political blackmail" when a crisis occurs. There is no mandatory enforcement clause between the Dublin system and the temporary resettlement plan, namely the resettlement Decision 2015/1601. This has led Italy to adopt a "partial cooperation" approach, such as threatening to allow unrestricted movement of personnel, closing ports, and relaxing search and rescue areas. As a result, Italy has increased the pressure on the front line. This situation forced the European Commission to launch the "Voluntary Humanitarian Corridor" and allocate an additional 170 million euros of solidarity fund in advance in June 2016. In other words, the failure to share the burden was not a "systemic loophole", but a "leverage loophole". Italy strategically exploited this loophole. Here to obtain more resources [6].

How Italy leveraged the Crisis to Amplify its Voice. Through the three-step "issue arbitrage" strategy:

quantifying frontline pressure (daily arrival numbers, SAR costs);

Openly linking the EU-Turkey agreement with its own quota reduction is like the Renzi government sending a letter to Tusk, stating that if the immigration quota is not reduced by 40 percent, Italy will take measures to cut it.

② "reassess" its funding commitment to Turkey);

③ At the Judicial and Interior Committee, Italy, along with Malta, Greece and Spain, formed the "Southern Front" alliance and successfully elevated the issue of "border management" to the level of "the survival of the European Union" [7]. As a result, Italy was able to obtain the voting rights in advance during the North-South negotiations. Regarding the later revised common European asylum system, Italy also holds the "red line" veto power. The policy implications here are that under the multi-level governance of the European Union, if a medium-sized major country can associate "humanitarian emergencies" with "institutional violations", then this country can transform the crisis into an increase in structural voting rights.

5.2 Limitations and Future Research Directions

Although the research conducted on this single case has provided us with an analysis of the triangular relationship among Italy, Turkey and the European Union, this does not rule out another explanation, that is, when this agreement began to be implemented, it coincided with the continuous spread of the civil war in Libya. Secondary sources such as the EUAA report, parliamentary investigations, and media disclosures have reported relatively little on the internal memorandums of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which may underestimate the role of "path dependence" in bureaucracy [8]. For the research to be carried out in the future, some aspects need to be addressed:

This article will conduct a cross-national comparison of the use of externalization in Greece and Spain during the same period to see if the phenomenon of "issuance arbitrage" exists only in Italy, that is, to examine whether "issuance arbitrage" is a unique situation in Italy [9,10].

By tracking whether the "Central Mediterranean route" will rebound after 2020 (155,000 arrivals in 2023), this tracking approach reduces the arbitrage opportunities, thus verifying the existence of an "effective half-life" in externalized governance.

This article adopts the process tracking method and combines it with the initial interview approach to distinguish between the two different situations of "cabinet political calculation" and "front-line execution deviation", and at the same time clarifies the intermediary role played by humanitarian non-governmental organizations and the coast guard in the "arbitrage" process.

The EU will be affected to some extent in the future. If the next round of CEAS reform does not link "automatic responsibility redistribution" with "sharing externalization costs", for instance, replacing the funds given to Turkey with "fair distribution among all member states based on GDP", then in the next crisis, the situation of issuance arbitrage like that in Italy will occur again. Once this situation occurs, it will continuously erode the institutional legitimacy of the European Union.

6 Conclusions

This article analyzes the policy practice of Italy during the formation and implementation of the "EU-Turkey Agreement", and proposes that Italy, as a "bridging actor", has a dual role in the multi-layered governance system of the EU. It is the "gatekeeper" of the external border, responsible for safeguarding the external border, and also the "conveyor belt" of humanitarian governance. It is necessary to convey relevant content about humanitarian governance. This role not only reflects the structural contradiction that Italy faces in bearing the externalization costs of the EU and striving for internal discourse power, but also reveals that Italy uses the "problem arbitrage" mechanism to transform crisis pressure into policy levers, thereby maximizing its own interests under the limited conditions of multilateralism.

This case in Italy holds a crucial warning significance for global refugee governance. The current outward-oriented governance model, which aims for efficiency, although it can reduce the number of inbound travelers in a short period of time, cannot avoid human rights risks and ethical controversies. This situation also indicates that the responsibility-sharing mechanism has deficiencies in both institutionalization and standardization. In the future, we need to explore more methods for collaborative governance, such as integrating border control with development assistance and establishing a regional asylum coordination mechanism. This is done to achieve a balance between security needs and rights protection.

This research starts from the theoretical aspect, taking Italy as an example, to clarify the possible paths for medium-sized countries to achieve strategic operations in the context of the global governance structure. This also provides a new perspective for understanding the initiative of non-core actors under institutional constraints. In future research, we can conduct further comparative analyses across regions and issues to see how extensive the explanatory scope of the "bridging actor" model is and what its evolutionary logic is. Only by linking the aspects of shared responsibility, respect for rights and institutional sustainability can global refugee governance get out of the current predicament and truly achieve multilateral cooperation.

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