



Research on the Reservation of Public Security Fire Supervision Power from the Perspective of Collaborative Governance

Jiandong Tan

Graduate School, China People's Police University, Langfang, Hebei 065000, P. R. China
858678575@qq.com

Abstract. Against the background of fire control governance transformation, the reservation of fire supervision power by public security organs faces practical dilemmas such as vague power boundaries, insufficient professional capabilities, and misaligned assessment mechanisms. The imbalance between professional supervision and grassroots coverage has become a key bottleneck for the modernization of fire control governance. From the perspective of collaborative governance theory, this study systematically combs the institutional evolution of fire supervision power, analyzes the practical constraints in power exercise, and puts forward optimization plans from the dimensions of legal principles, models, and resources by integrating institutional analysis and empirical research methods. The research confirms that reserving fire supervision power for public security organs is an optimal choice of power and responsibility under the collaborative governance framework, which can realize the effective coordination between professional supervision and grassroots coverage, and provide theoretical support and practical paths for the modernization of fire control governance.

Keywords: Collaborative Governance, Fire Supervision, Power Allocation, Optimization Path.

1 Introduction

Fire control governance is an important part of the national public security governance system, and its power allocation and operational efficiency are directly related to social security, stability and the process of governance modernization. The 2018 institutional reform of the Party and the country promoted the transfer of fire and rescue teams to the Ministry of Emergency Management, ending the long-term "integrated public security and fire control" model; the revised *Fire Protection Law* of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the *Fire Protection Law*) in 2021 legally established the fire control governance structure of "emergency management as the main responsibility and public security coordination", clarifying that public security organs retain fire supervision-related functions and powers. This institutional design aims to integrate the professional advantages of emergency management departments and the grassroots coverage advantages of public security organs, but in practice, it still faces prominent

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C. F. Peng et al. (eds.), *Proceedings of the 2026 5th International Conference on Humanities, Wisdom Education and Service Management (HWESM 2026)*, Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research 1024,

https://doi.org/10.2991/978-2-38476-593-5_42

problems such as vague power boundaries, insufficient professional capabilities, and misaligned assessment mechanisms. Phenomena such as supervision gaps in grassroots units such as towns, villages and communities, and frequent hidden dangers in "nine small places" are prominent, and the lack of cross-departmental collaboration mechanisms has become the core bottleneck restricting the efficiency of fire control governance. Current academic research mostly focuses on a single supervision subject, lacking systematic demonstration under the collaborative governance framework, and the problem of disconnection between theoretical construction and practical operation is obvious.

This study focuses on the issue of reserving fire supervision power for public security organs, which has important theoretical and practical significance. At the theoretical level, taking collaborative governance theory as an analytical tool, this paper systematically deconstructs the institutional evolution logic and cross-departmental collaboration obstacles of fire supervision power, makes up for the perspective shortcomings of existing research, and enriches the application connotation of collaborative governance theory in the field of public security [1]. At the practical level, it puts forward a systematic solution to the practical dilemmas of public security organs performing their duties, provides practical paths for clarifying the boundaries of power and responsibilities, improving the collaboration mechanism, and optimizing resource allocation, and helps solve the dual contradiction between professional supervision and grassroots coverage.

This paper adopts the method of combining institutional analysis and empirical research. It first combs the historical evolution stages and core characteristics of China's fire supervision power, then analyzes the practical constraints of power operation, and finally puts forward the institutional optimization path from three dimensions: legal basis, model innovation and resource integration. It demonstrates the rationality and practical value of public security organs reserving fire supervision power, and provides theoretical support and practical reference for promoting the modernization of fire control governance system and governance capacity

2 Current Status of Fire Supervision Development

At present, China's fire supervision and governance has entered the collaborative governance stage of "emergency management as the main responsibility and public security coordination". After the revision of the *Fire Protection Law* in 2021, the power and responsibility allocation framework of fire supervision has been clarified, and the division and cooperation model between emergency management departments and public security organs has been gradually implemented in practice, and the efficiency of fire supervision and governance has shown an upward trend. In terms of governance effectiveness, emergency management departments focus on core functions such as supervision of major hidden dangers and professional testing, and public security organs undertake grassroots daily supervision and investigation of fire-related violations. The reasonable division of power and responsibility has improved the accuracy of fire control governance. According to the official data of the Fire and Rescue Bureau of the

Ministry of Emergency Management in 2025, the number of national fire accidents in 2024 decreased by 22.3% compared with 2019, and the rectification rate of hidden dangers in "nine small places" increased to 89.7%. At the same time, various regions have actively explored cross-departmental collaboration practices. Some regions have set up joint command centers and joint offices of emergency and public security to realize supervision information sharing and joint law enforcement [2]. Hangzhou City, Zhejiang Province, relying on the Asian Games fire security collaboration system, has achieved "zero remaining" fire hidden dangers in competition venues, providing a local practical model for collaborative governance of fire supervision.

However, in the process of implementing the collaborative governance framework, there are still many prominent problems in China's fire supervision work, which have become the key obstacles restricting the further improvement of governance efficiency. Firstly, the boundary of fire supervision power is still vague. The existing regulations only make principled provisions on "emergency management as the main responsibility and public security coordination", and do not refine the specific division standards between daily supervision and professional supervision, leading to the coexistence of repeated supervision and supervision gaps in practice. According to the official statistical data released by the Fire and Rescue Bureau of the Ministry of Emergency Management in 2025, 38.7% of rural "nine small places" have never received fire supervision, and 15.6% of national rural fires in 2024 occurred in such supervision gap areas. Secondly, the professional capacity of public security organs for fire supervision is significantly insufficient. As a technology-intensive work, fire supervision has high requirements for professional knowledge and practical ability. However, fire training for public security police is mostly fragmented and short-term, and the training subjects lack professional theoretical support. Grassroots police's hidden danger identification is superficial, which is difficult to adapt to the professional needs of fire supervision [3]. Thirdly, the internal assessment mechanism of public security organs is incompatible with fire supervision work. The existing assessment system focuses on law enforcement and case handling, and the weight of fire supervision assessment is extremely low, making it a "side business" for grassroots police. Some police stations even assign fire inspection tasks to auxiliary police who have not received professional training, leading to prominent formalization of supervision work.

3 Practical Constraints

3.1 Vague Power Boundaries

Vague power boundaries have become the primary obstacle to the performance of fire supervision duties, which is rooted in the principled legal provisions and the lack of collaboration mechanisms. The current *Fire Protection Law* only makes a macro definition of the division of power and responsibility of "emergency management as the main responsibility and public security coordination", and does not refine the specific boundaries, identification standards and performance scope of daily supervision and professional supervision, leading to differences between departments in the identification of supervision subjects for the same fire hidden danger in practice.

3.2 Insufficient Professional Capabilities

Insufficient professional capacity is the core practical obstacle for public security organs to perform fire supervision duties. Fire supervision is a technology-intensive work, which has strict requirements for professional knowledge and practical ability such as building fire prevention, electrical safety, and fire facility testing. However, the talent training system of public security organs has always been built around the core function of law enforcement and case handling, and fire professional capacity training has long been in a marginalized state. Fire training for grassroots police is mostly fragmented and short-term, and the training subjects are mostly non-professional police within public security organs, forming a training model of "non-professional teaching non-professional", which cannot form stable professional capacity^[4].

3.3 Misaligned Assessment Mechanisms

The misaligned assessment mechanism is the deep-seated institutional incentive for the insufficient efficiency of fire supervision performance. The current performance appraisal system of public security organs takes the detection rate of criminal cases and the number of public security cases investigated and dealt with as core indicators, which account for more than half and are directly linked to police's evaluation, promotion and rank advancement. However, the weight of fire supervision work assessment is extremely low, which has almost no impact on the overall assessment results. What's more, some police stations assign fire inspection tasks to auxiliary police who have not received professional training, resulting in prominent formal inspection, a large number of fire hidden dangers being missed in the inspection, and supervision efficiency cannot be guaranteed^[5].

4 Institutional Design from the Perspective of Collaborative Governance

4.1 Legal Basis: Standardizing Power Operation

The legal basis is the foundation for the standardized operation of fire supervision power. Firstly, formulate a detailed list of fire supervision power and responsibility allocation, dividing the responsibilities of emergency management departments and public security organs according to the whole process of pre-prevention, in-process disposal and post-accountability. Public security organs are responsible for daily inspection of grassroots places, investigation and punishment of public security violations, and handling of fire-related criminal cases, while emergency management departments focus on professional testing of high-risk places, supervision of major hidden dangers and emergency rescue, realizing precise matching of power and responsibility. Secondly, revise supporting regulations such as the *Fire Protection Law* and *Provisions on Fire Supervision and Inspection*, add a special chapter on power and responsibility division in the *Fire Protection Law*, clarify the supervision subjects of new fire risks,

distinguish the punishment boundaries between fire safety violations and public security violations, and add administrative counterpart relief clauses. Thirdly, build a three-level power dispute resolution mechanism of grassroots consultation, county-level ruling and municipal-level review. Disputes that fail to be resolved through consultation between grassroots departments shall be ruled by experts organized by the county-level joint office of emergency and public security, and those who refuse to accept the ruling may apply for municipal-level review, taking into account the efficiency and fairness of dispute handling.

4.2 Model Innovation: Building a Practical Collaborative Governance Platform

Model innovation is the core for the implementation of fire supervision collaborative governance. On the one hand, draw on the Fengqiao Experience to build a four-level collaborative governance mechanism of "municipal overall planning, county-level collaboration, township linkage and village-level underpinning". The municipal level sets up a joint command center to coordinate resources and top-level design, the county-level sets up a joint office to be responsible for daily hidden danger transfer, information sharing and joint law enforcement, the township level promotes the linkage inspection and technical support of police stations and township emergency offices, and the village-level establishes an underpinning model of "police + grid member + mass supervisor", realizing the full administrative level coverage of fire supervision. On the other hand, build an AI digital collaboration platform and implement modular management [6], setting three core modules of hidden danger management, AI assistance and collaborative disposal, realizing closed-loop management of hidden danger discovery, classification, transfer and rectification; empower the platform with YOLOv8 deep learning algorithm, Hadoop distributed computing framework, blockchain technology, etc., realize real-time AI identification of fire hidden dangers, big data analysis and judgment of fire risks, and blockchain guarantee of data security and traceability, fill the professional capacity gap of grassroots police, and improve the efficiency of cross-departmental collaborative disposal.

4.3 Resource Integration: Improving the Talent Guarantee System

Resource integration is an important support for fire supervision collaborative governance. In terms of talent guarantee, create a talent architecture integrating two-way training, technical talent pool and full-time fire auxiliary personnel [7]. Establish a two-way secondment system between emergency and public security organs, regularly carry out joint training combining theory and practice, promote cooperation between public security colleges and fire colleges to offer fire supervision courses, and recruit full-time fire auxiliary personnel to optimize the talent structure. In terms of funding guarantee, establish a funding framework of financial budget guarantee, multi-level funding sharing and special reward incentives, refine the funding budget items of public security organs' fire supervision and realize dynamic adjustment, build a four-level funding

sharing mechanism of central, provincial, municipal and county levels, clarify the requirement of earmarked funding, and publicize the funding use regularly by financial departments at all levels and accept audit supervision to ensure funding support for professional equipment purchase, training and publicity of fire supervision.

5 Conclusion

Taking collaborative governance theory as the core perspective, this study systematically discusses the core issue of public security organs reserving fire supervision power, confirming that this institutional arrangement is not a simple functional regression, but an optimal allocation of power and responsibility in line with the needs of professional division of labor and grassroots coverage from the perspective of public security governance. The professional and technical advantages of emergency management departments and the grassroots network advantages of public security organs are significantly complementary. Through systematic institutional design, the functional collaboration of the two can be realized, effectively solving the structural contradiction between grassroots fire supervision gaps and weak professional supervision. The improvement of the fire collaborative governance system is a dynamic development process. The institutional design ideas of this study can provide a practical model for the allocation of fire supervision power and responsibilities, and help the steady progress of the modernization of the modern fire control governance system and governance capacity.

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