



Platform Imperialism and the Algorithmic Commodification of Political Voice in Indonesia's Micro Influencer Economy

Rama Romindo Utomo¹, Raden Wahyu Utomo Martianto²

^{1,2} Universitas Budi Luhur, Jl. Ciledug Raya, Kota Jakarta Selatan,
Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta 12260, Indonesia

`rama.romindoutomo@budiluhur.ac.id`

Abstract. This study examines how Indonesia's identifiable micro-influencer economy is commercially intermediated into political communication, using the August–October 2025 TikTok TDPSE (Tanda Daftar Penyelenggara Sistem Elektronik) episode as its case anchor. Extending platform imperialism scholarship and Indonesia's buzzer-industry literature, which has centered on anonymous cyber troopers, the study asks how this micro-influencer ecosystem operates within algorithmic campaign logics and how its commodification reshapes the democratic public sphere. Using a retrospective archival netnography, this study documents seven Instagram-based cases in which mega- and macro-tier creators publicly disclosed political content offers worth IDR 85–150 million during the August 2025 protests. It also identifies a second, lower-priced mechanism: a creator was offered payment to delete critical content. Findings show that offers followed a standardized commercial template, that all documented cases were publicly refused or remain disputed, and that visible compliance appears to threaten creators' authenticity-based commercial value — suggesting successfully commodified political voice is structurally motivated toward concealment. These findings substantiate and extend a proposed framework of commodified participatory democracy, revealing suppression, not only production, as a priced commodity, and identifying an evidentiary asymmetry with implications for how researchers and regulators can detect covert political commodification in platform economies.

Keywords: Algorithmic Commodification, Commodified Participatory Democracy, Indonesia, Micro-Influencer Economy, Platform Imperialism.

1 Introduction

Platformization has fundamentally reshaped democratic participation across the Global South, embedding civic expression within infrastructures governed by transnational corporations, not public institutions [1]. This shift is inseparable from the broader expansion of the creator economy, a market segment now valued at USD 252.3 billion in 2025 and projected to reach USD 1,345.5 billion by 2033 [2], with the Asia-Pacific region identified as its fastest-growing frontier. Goldman Sachs Research [3]

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A. Kodir and A. Aminulloh (eds.), *Proceedings of the International Conference on Communication, Digital Ecosystem, and Society (ICODES 2026)*, Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research 1036, https://doi.org/10.2991/978-2-38476-622-2_10

similarly projects the creator economy could approach half a trillion dollars by 2027, driven in large part by platform-native monetization tools such as live-streaming gifts and algorithmic advertising revenue-sharing. Yet these projections overlook a critical dimension: the political function this infrastructure increasingly serves: the same monetization architecture that rewards lifestyle and entertainment content is being repurposed to mediate — and to price — political voice itself.

In Indonesia, this repurposing has created a distinct commercial layer — one that remains understudied — between political actors and the electorate. Empirical accounts of this layer describe a spectrum. At one end, Wijayanto and Berenschot [4] characterize the dominant organizational form as relatively unorganized, flexible collaborations assembled temporarily around specific campaigns rather than standing agencies. At the other end, Rasidi [5] documents a case of clear professionalization: a Jakarta-based firm registered as an IT consultancy and digital marketing agency, employing approximately twenty-eight salaried staff and serving clients that include politicians and military officials on a continuing basis — evidence that a firm-based model is emerging within an industry that remains predominantly informal.

Field investigation by Alfajri et al. [6] adds a crucial price dimension for this work, with content-producing micro-influencers (a minimum of 25,000 followers) compensated approximately IDR 300,000 per Reels post, and event-based micro-influencers paid IDR 350,000–500,000 per appearance — figures that sit substantially below what the same follower tier commands in commercial marketplaces, where commercial sponsored-post rates for the 10,000–100,000 follower tier range from IDR 1,000,000 to IDR 10,000,000, and TikTok-specific video rates reach IDR 2,000,000–15,000,000 [7]. This gap — political content priced below even the low end of commercial rates for the same audience size — indicates that the commodification of political voice in Indonesia's micro-influencer economy is not merely occurring; it is occurring on exploitative terms that would be commercially unviable in any other content category.

This industry, moreover, is not confined to electoral cycles. Wijayanto and Berenschot [4] trace continuous non-electoral deployment across the 2019 KPK Law revision, the 2020 Omnibus Law, and COVID-19 “new normal” messaging, sustained in part through recurring monthly retainers reported at approximately IDR 3,000,000 for image management of individual politicians — a pattern ICW researcher Egi Primayoga linked to government efforts to secure public acceptance of its policies, citing Rp90.45 billion in central government spending on influencer-related services between 2017 and 2020 [8].

The overall scale of this population in Indonesia cannot presently be established with confidence: available creator-economy market data [2,3] report only aggregate figures that are not disaggregated by follower tier, and no research-grade census of Indonesia's micro-influencer population (10,000–100,000 followers) segmented from the adjacent nano and macro tiers could be located. Because no research-grade census of Indonesia's micro-influencer population exists, this study focuses on documented cases rather than estimating total market size, restricting its empirical claims to the documented cases analyzed in the Results and Discussion below.

The stakes of platform control over Indonesia's political communication space were made publicly visible during the unrest of August–October 2025. Following protests outside the House of Representatives on 25 August 2025 that escalated into rioting,

TikTok announced a temporary, self-described voluntary suspension of its Live feature nationwide, citing rising demonstration-related violence [9] — a decision digital rights observers characterized instead as unilateral content moderation undertaken under government pressure [10]. Indonesia's Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs (Komdigi) subsequently sought direct evidence of what had occurred on the platform during the unrest: on 16 September 2025, it summoned TikTok for clarification and gave the company until 23 September 2025 to submit complete traffic, live-streaming activity, and monetization data — including gift-based transactions — for the 25–30 August protest period, alongside separate concerns over monetized livestreams linked to online gambling accounts. TikTok's response, delivered the same day via official letter No. ID/PP/04/IX/2025, invoked internal data-handling policy and declined to provide the data in full [11].

On 3 October 2025, Komdigi characterized this partial compliance as a breach of TikTok's obligations as a private electronic system operator under Ministerial Regulation No. 5/2020 and announced the temporary freezing of the platform's electronic system operator registration (*Tanda Daftar Penyelenggara Sistem Elektronik*, TDPSE) [11]. The freeze proved short-lived: after TikTok submitted the requested data the following day, Komdigi lifted the suspension on 4 October 2025 and reactivated the platform's registered operator status [12]. Read together, this six-week sequence — a platform-initiated suspension, a formal state data request with a fixed deadline, a documented corporate refusal, and a rapidly reversed regulatory freeze — demonstrates that decisions over Indonesia's platformized political expression are negotiated, contested, and on occasion resolved within days, at the level of transnational corporate policy and state regulatory power alike.

Yet the TDPSE episode also exposes the limit of what current scholarly and public attention captures. Both platform imperialism scholarship [13] and the disinformation-focused literature on Indonesia's buzzer industry [4,14–16] are equipped to explain visible confrontations between states and platforms, or the manipulation of political discourse through inauthentic accounts and coordinated messaging. What neither tradition has examined in depth is the commercial infrastructure through which authentic, identifiable individual creators — not anonymous buzzer or bot accounts — are professionally intermediated into political communication work and priced below their own commercial market rate for doing so. Creator economy market research [2,3] quantifies the scale of platform-based monetization but does not address its political application at all. Perludem's executive director has separately characterized this specific segment of Indonesia's digital political economy as a regulatory “dark space,” noting that campaign spending on buzzers or influencers goes unreported under existing campaign-finance disclosure rules [17]. The result is a scholarly blind spot precisely where visibility is lowest and regulatory attention is thinnest: the routine, non-crisis commodification of identifiable micro-influencers' political voice through commercial intermediation.

This study addresses that blind spot by integrating three literatures that have so far developed largely in parallel: platform imperialism's account of asymmetric power between transnational platform corporations and Global South states and publics [13,18]; the political economy of Indonesia's digital campaign industry, which has documented organizational structure and funding but has not theorized its underlying commodification logic [4,5]; and the mediatization of politics framework, which has

not yet extended into the algorithmic, monetized creator economy that increasingly structures how ordinary political messages circulate. By generating thick netnographic description of the micro-influencer political communication ecosystem — as distinct from the buzzer/bot phenomenon already well documented — this study proposes commodified participatory democracy as an analytical framework for a phenomenon that existing frameworks register only at its edges: the visible state-platform confrontation, or the visible inauthentic account, but not the identifiable, professionally intermediated micro-influencer whose political voice becomes a priced commercial product.

These gaps converge on a central problem: while Indonesia's micro-influencer political communication industry expands the apparent reach of civic and political messaging, the commercial mechanisms through which this expansion is organized, and their consequences for the democratic public sphere, remain empirically undocumented at the level of lived practice. This study accordingly asks two interrelated questions. First, how does Indonesia's micro-influencer political communication ecosystem operate within algorithmic campaign logics? Second, how does this commodification reshape the democratic public sphere?

To address these questions, this study conducts immersive netnography [19] across the digital communities where this work is practiced — broker-to-creator messaging networks, TikTok Live interactions, and Instagram comment ecosystems — with the aim of producing empirically grounded theory that extends platform imperialism scholarship and the mediatization of politics framework into the algorithmic, creator-driven political economy of an emerging Global South democracy.

2 Literature Review

2.1 From Mediatization to Platform Imperialism: Theorizing the Changing Locus of Power over Political Communication

Understanding how political voice becomes commodified within Indonesia's micro-influencer economy requires first tracing how the relationship between political actors and media systems has been theorized to change over time. Mazzoleni and Schulz [20] established the foundational insight that media that mediatization involves more than politicians simply using media; it entails a structural transformation in how political life is organized. Building directly on this premise, Strömbäck [21] operationalized mediatization into four sequential phases, culminating in what he described, following Meyer (Meyer, as cited in Strömbäck, 2008), as the colonization of politics by media logic — a condition in which media criteria become built into governance itself rather than remaining external to it. This fourth phase matters for the present study because it names a structural absorption of media logic into routine statecraft, though Strömbäck left open the specific mechanisms through which that absorption occurs once media systems become platform-based and monetized.

Where Strömbäck (2008) treated mediatization as a phased endpoint, Hjarvard [22] recast it as an ongoing process tied to technological change itself. This processual view allows the present study to treat the shift from broadcast and print to algorithmically governed platforms not as a departure from mediatization theory but as its next empirical phase. Strömbäck [21] himself anticipated this need for revision, noting

cautiously that the internet had not yet altered mediatization dynamics in any proven way but marking this conclusion as explicitly provisional. Read from the present, that caution functions as an open invitation: the platform era remains unaccounted for in mediatization's foundational account.

Chadwick [23] responded to this invitation by describing contemporary political communication as a hybrid media system in which older and newer media logics interact rather than displace one another. His analysis of the 2008 Obama's campaign illustrates this blending persuasively. Yet Chadwick's account centers on organizational and formatting hybridity rather than on the economic logic of platform monetization – a limitation reviewers have noted in observing that his concluding chapters offer rich description without consolidating into a new conceptual framework [24]. Chadwick's contribution is therefore treated here as a transitional marker: it confirms that political communication scholarship recognized platform-era hybridity by the early 2010s, but without yet theorizing the specific commodifying function platforms would later assume.

Srnicek [1] addresses precisely this gap. His account of platforms as economic infrastructures that extract, process, and monetize user-generated content at scale implies that political expression circulating on platforms is structurally positioned as a revenue-generating input like any other content category. Applied to political communication, this means civic discourse is not merely subject to algorithmic curation but is positioned as a priced commodity from the outset. What neither Strömbäck's phased model nor Srnicek's platform capitalism fully addresses, however, is the geopolitical asymmetry between platform-owning corporations concentrated in Western and Chinese markets and the governments and publics of the Global South who must operate within infrastructures they did not design. Jin [13,18] supplies this missing dimension through platform imperialism – a framework that reframes mediatization not as a domestic negotiation between media and political systems but as one conducted under structural dependency on transnational corporate infrastructure.

These literatures form a complementary sequence. Mediatization theory [20–22] establishes that political actors progressively internalize media logic into governance; hybrid media systems theory [23] confirms this internalization occurs within complex, format-blending environments; platform capitalism [1] specifies the data extraction-and-monetization logic through which contemporary media environments operate; and platform imperialism [13,18] situates this logic within an uneven geopolitical structure that bears differently on Global South states such as Indonesia. This study defines algorithmic commodification of political voice as the point where these dynamics converge: political expression that is not only mediatized, hybridized, and platform-mediated, but explicitly priced through platform-native mechanisms controlled by transnational corporate actors operating beyond full domestic regulatory reach.

2.2 Indonesia's Digital Political Influence Industry: From Cyber Troops to Professionalized Intermediation

Within Indonesia specifically, empirical research has documented the organizational infrastructure through which political actors mobilize social media accounts to shape public opinion, though this literature has concentrated on a particular actor type. Sugiono [14] framed Indonesia's buzzer industry as a political economy phenomenon

in which media practices are commercialized and outsourced to intermediary networks operating alongside formal party structures. Extending this organizational focus, Wijayanto, Berenschot, Sastramidjaja, and Ruijgrok [25] drew on interviews with fifty-two Indonesian cyber-troop members to define this workforce by three features: secret funding, high coordination, and reliance on predominantly anonymous accounts. This last feature is decisive: the unit of analysis across this literature is, by definition, the anonymous or pseudonymous account, not an identifiable individual publicly known to their own audience.

Sastramidjaja and Wijayanto [16] traced how such cyber-troop operations have contributed to a co-optation of Indonesia's cybersphere, demonstrating that coordinated online manipulation shaped the outcome of major legislative controversies, including the 2019 revision of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) law. Rasidi [5] provided a rare ethnographic account of professionalization within this industry — a Jakarta-based agency registered as an IT consultancy, employing roughly two dozen salaried staff serving political and military clients — while also documenting how the COVID-19 “New Normal” government campaign became a lucrative commercial opportunity for buzzers and influencers alike. Comparative work situates the Indonesian case regionally: Ong and Tapsell [15] identified comparable disinformation work models in the Philippines under similar economic logics, while Bradshaw, Bailey, and Howard [26] confirmed that Indonesia's case, though locally specific in its organizational detail, represents one instance of a broader global pattern of state- and party-linked computational propaganda.

Read cumulatively, these studies converge on a single organizational profile: Indonesia's digital political influence industry spans a spectrum from loosely coordinated, ad hoc networks assembled around specific campaigns [4] to an emergent, if still exceptional, professionalized firm model [5]. What unites nearly every account across this spectrum, however, is the anonymity or pseudonymity of the accounts under study. Even Rasidi's [5] professionalized firm is documented through its organizational structure and labor conditions, not through the public-facing identity of the individual creators it employs. None of these studies centers its analysis on the identifiable, individually branded micro-influencer whose political labor is publicly attributable by name and audience — the figure this study takes as its unit of analysis.

2.3 The Creator Economy and the Micro-Influencer as a Distinct Political Intermediary

Alongside the scale data on the creator economy already discussed [2,3], a distinct body of scholarship helps specify what differentiates the micro-influencer as a political intermediary from the cyber trooper documented above. Abidin [27] provides the foundational taxonomy: unlike anonymous or coordinated accounts, micro-influencers build their value through a publicly attributable, cultivated persona whose authenticity is itself the commercial asset.

Abidin [28] developed this further through the concept of calibrated amateurism — the deliberate construction of a raw, unfiltered aesthetic that persuades audiences of a creator's authenticity, regardless of how professionalized the underlying production process is. Applied to political communication, this concept reframes what is being purchased when a PR agency retains a micro-influencer: not simply reach, as with a

buzzer account, but a pre-built, audience-trusted appearance of authenticity that a coordinated anonymous network cannot replicate. This is precisely the asset that Indonesia's payment hierarchy [6] prices at a fraction of its commercial market value.

Methodologically, this study also draws on Abidin and Pang's [29] edited volume on researching internet popular culture and everyday politics in Southeast Asia, which cautions that scholars studying political expression in the region must navigate state-policed boundaries around what counts as acceptable political content — a concern directly relevant to the netnographic approach adopted here. Read alongside the preceding cluster, this literature suggests that Indonesia's political influence economy in fact comprises two structurally distinct labor markets operating side by side: an anonymous, coordinated cyber-troop market documented extensively in existing scholarship, and an identifiable, authenticity-branded micro-influencer market whose commercial and democratic implication remain largely unexamined.

2.4 Towards an Integrated Framework: Platform Imperialism, Algorithmic Commodification, and Political Voice

The three clusters above point to a synthesis central to this study. Each addresses a dimension the others leave incomplete: Mediatization scholarship [20–22] establishes that political actors progressively internalize media logic into governance itself, a process whose most advanced phase was left unaccounted for once media systems became platform-based and monetized. Hybrid media and platform political economy [13,18,23] supplies the economic and geopolitical logics needed to extend mediatization theory into the platform era. Together, these frameworks define algorithmic commodification as political expression that is priced and monetized through platform-native mechanisms controlled by transnational corporate actors. Indonesia's digital political influence industry [4,5,15,16,26] demonstrates that this commodification has, to date, been documented almost exclusively through the anonymous cyber trooper — an actor defined by secrecy, coordination, and interchangeability rather than by any personal, audience-facing identity. Creator economy and microcelebrity scholarship [27–29]. Identifies a structurally distinct figure operating within the same platform economy: the identifiable micro-influencer, whose political value depends on audience-trusted authenticity and whose labor is compensated, per Indonesia's own documented payment hierarchy, below the commercial rate that same authenticity commands outside political work.

These four dimensions converge on a configuration that existing scholarship has not yet theorized: a condition in which ordinary, identifiable citizens voluntarily commercialize their own public voice and personal audience relationships as intermediaries for political communication, under commercial terms set asymmetrically by transnational platform infrastructure and Indonesian PR intermediary agencies alike. This labor remains analytically invisible because existing scholarship has theorized either the platform-level commodification mechanism in the abstract or the anonymous cyber trooper as the sole domestic intermediary, without connecting the two through the identifiable micro-influencer who occupies the space between them. This study terms this configuration commodified participatory democracy.

This framework carries two analytical commitments that structure the analysis that follows. First, participation is commodified rather than simply mediated or coordinated. Micro-influencers are not passive channels for political messaging, nor secretly funded operatives, but ostensibly voluntary participants whose civic-sounding content is a negotiated commercial transaction. The analysis therefore attends to how this transaction is organized, priced, and normalized among participants themselves, not only to its downstream effects on public opinion. Second, the commodification is structurally asymmetric across two simultaneous registers. At the platform level, Indonesian civic expression is monetized and governed under terms set by transnational corporations largely outside domestic regulatory reach [13,18]. At the labor-market level, Indonesian PR ‘intermediaries’ price micro-influencers’ authentic political voice below its established commercial market value.

Commodified participatory democracy, as operationalized here, names the compounding of these two asymmetries onto the identifiable individual creator – the empirical figure this study’s netnographic design is built to observe directly.

3 Methods

This study uses a qualitative, case-oriented design that takes the TDPSE (Tanda Daftar Penyelenggara Sistem Elektronik) TikTok episode of August–October 2025 as its primary case anchor, not merely as background context. Because the observation period had ended by July 2026, real-time netnography was not possible. Instead, the study adopts a retrospective mode of netnography [19] that reconstructs past events through surviving digital traces, supplemented by news coverage published at the time.

Two platforms define the empirical scope of the study, each serving a distinct analytical function. TikTok constitutes the study’s structural and regulatory anchor: it is the platform whose Live feature was voluntarily suspended by the company itself (25–31 August 2025) and whose electronic system operator registration was subsequently frozen and, within twenty-four hours, reinstated by Komdigi (3–4 October 2025), making it the focal point of the state-platform confrontation. Instagram, by contrast, is where the identifiable, commercially compensated micro-influencer activity relevant to this study’s unit of analysis is empirically documented and retrievable. No comparable TikTok-native case — an identifiable micro-influencer account publicly documented as having received and responded to a political commodification offer on TikTok itself during the August–October 2025 window — was found. This absence is itself treated as a finding (see Discussion).

The unit of analysis is the identifiable micro- to macro-tier influencer account. Following Indonesian industry usage, this is defined as an account with a publicly attributable real-name persona and a follower count ranging from roughly 200,000 to several million — that publicly disclosed having received a commercial offer to produce political content during the observation window. The empirical core of the study is the cluster of cases publicly known as the “Ajakan Damai Indonesia” offers, in which several Indonesian content creators — including Jerome Polin, Vincent Liyanto, Pixmen Leonard, Rahmat Hidayat (“Aleh”), and Dhery Casper — independently disclosed via their own Instagram accounts (29 August–2 September 2025) that they had been offered approximately IDR 85–150 million to post content urging public calm

amid the protests [30,31]. This cluster overlaps with the 25–30 August protest period that directly precipitated the TDPSE dispute, allowing the TikTok/TDPSE and Instagram threads to be analyzed as part of a single timeline.

Data collection took place in July 2026 in three stages. First, publicly available primary disclosures — screenshots of commercial offers uploaded by the creators themselves to their own Instagram accounts — were located and, where still accessible, archived via the Wayback Machine to prevent deletion. Second, secondary journalistic documentation of the case cluster [30,31] was cross-referenced across outlets to corroborate offer amounts, stated conditions, and creators' individual responses. Each claim was corroborated against at least one identifiable source. Third, the regulatory chronology of the TDPSE episode was reconstructed directly from Komdigi's own press releases [11,12] rather than relying on news summaries, using primary government documentation instead.

To situate the case cluster within the broader information environment of August 2025, the study also draws on social network analysis findings from Drone Emprit reported via secondary media coverage [32,33]. These findings documented the cross-platform spread of protest-related narratives and the involvement of anonymous, buzzer-indicated accounts during the same period. This macro-level evidence serves strictly as contextual triangulation: it establishes that the information environment surrounding the case cluster was contested and partially coordinated. It is not used as a data source for the identifiable micro-influencer unit of analysis, which is analytically distinct from the anonymous cyber-trooper activity that Drone Emprit detects.

Data were analyzed thematically, using the two-part analytical framework from the Literature Review: commodification (how the transaction was organized, priced, and normalized) and asymmetry (how platform-level and labor-market power differentials shaped creators' choices to accept, refuse, or publicly disclose the offers they received). Coding focused on the language of the offers themselves (framing, required hashtags, prohibited words), the stated or implied rationale creators gave for accepting or declining, and the temporal alignment between individual disclosures and the broader TDPSE regulatory timeline.

This retrospective design limits the study to retrievable digital traces. First, the dataset reflects digital traces that remain retrievable as of July 2026, not a complete capture of activity as it occurred in real time between August and October 2025; content that has since been deleted, and TikTok Live sessions, which the platform does not archive, could not be recovered. Second, the case cluster is self-selected in a specific direction: it consists entirely of creators who chose to publicize the offers they received, typically framed as a refusal or a critical response; the study therefore cannot observe, from this data alone, cases of creators who accepted comparable offers without public disclosure, a population that may differ from the documented cases. Third, data collection for the broker-to-creator messaging networks through which such offers are understood to circulate had not been completed at the time of writing. WhatsApp was the only documented channel, based on Jerome Polin's disclosed chat. That chat remains contested (see Results), and this study does not assume Telegram or any other specific platform without case-level evidence. This channel was not directly observed.

4 Results & Discussion

Figure 1 situates the two empirical threads of this study — the platform-regulatory sequence surrounding TikTok's TDPSE status and the creator-commercial “Ajakan Damai Indonesia” offer cluster — on a shared timeline spanning 25 August to 4 October 2025. The two tracks are analyzed together, because their temporal proximity is itself evidence.




Fig. 1. Two-Track Chronology of the TDPSE Episode and the “Ajakan Damai Indonesia” Offer Cluster, August–October 2025

Source: Author’s compilation, based on *Kementerian Komunikasi dan Digital RI* [11,12] *Tempo.co* [9,10,32], *Tirto.id* [30], *IDNTimes* [31], *AVN Media* [34], *PosKota* [35], and *TribunNews.com* [35].

4.1 The Commercial Architecture of the “Ajakan Damai Indonesia” Offers

Between 29 August and 2 September 2025, at least seven Indonesian content creators publicly disclosed they had received commercial offers connected to a campaign publicly labeled “Ajakan Damai Indonesia” (Call for a Peaceful Indonesia), timed for the most intense week of the August 2025 protest wave. Table 1 summarizes the documented cases, including the disputed Marshel Widiyanto case (see below). The offers followed a strikingly uniform template: proposals sent to Jerome Polin, Vincent Liyanto, and Pixmen Leonard, each specified an Instagram Reels upload timed for simultaneous release at 15:00 WIB on 1 September 2025, required specific hashtags, prohibited “negative” language, and instructed each recipient to use different clickbait wording, suggesting centralized coordination rather than individual negotiation [30,35].

As Table 1 shows, compensation scaled loosely with audience size, ranging from IDR 85 million for a macro-tier creator to IDR 150 million for the only mega-tier case in this cluster; several offer amounts and follower counts were not disclosed in the

sources reviewed and are not estimated. These figures fall at the upper end of payment ranges independently documented in Indonesia's broader buzzer economy [6] and substantially exceed the commercial-market rates reported for equivalent follower tiers [7]. This premium reflects the reputational risk: politically charged content exposes creators to personal backlash, so it commands higher pay than ordinary commercial posts.

Table 1. Documented Cases in the “Ajakan Damai Indonesia” Offer Cluster, August–September 2025

Creator	Tier	IG Followers	Offer (IDR)	Mechanism	Documented Response	Sources
Jerome Polin [‡]	Mega	9,100,000	150,000,000	Content production	Publicly refused	<i>PosKota</i> -[35]; <i>Tirto.id</i> -[30]
Vincent Liyanto	Macro	235,000	85,000,000	Content production	Publicly refused	<i>Tirto.id</i> -[30]; <i>IDN Times</i> -[31]
Pixmen Leonard	Macro	443,000	Not disclosed	Content production	Did not comply by deadline	<i>IDN Times</i> -[31]; <i>Tirto.id</i> -[30]
Mella Carli	Not disclosed	Not disclosed	110,000,000	Content production	Publicly refused (satirical response)	<i>AVN Media</i> -[34]
Rahmat Hidayat (“Aleh”)	Not disclosed	Not disclosed	110,000,000	Content production	Publicly refused	<i>IDN Times</i> -[31]; <i>AVN Media</i> -[34]
Dhery Casper	Not disclosed	Not disclosed	95,000,000 (3–5 posts /week)	Content production	Refused (per campaign framing)	<i>IDN Times</i> -[31]
Azka Salsa Nabila	Not disclosed	Not disclosed	3,000,000	Content deletion	Refused; publicized the offer	<i>AVN Media</i> -[34]
Marshall Widiant o [†]	Not disclosed	Not disclosed	Alleged 150,000,000 (unconfirmed)	Content production	Disputed — denied payment	<i>Tribunnews</i> -[36]

Source: *Author's compilation.* † *Marshel Widiyanto's case is treated as disputed rather than confirmed compliance; no independent verification of payment was found in the sources reviewed (see Discussion below).* ‡ *Jerome Polin's underlying offer chat was publicly contested by a fellow creator as possibly fabricated; no independent verification in either direction was found (see Results below).* “Not disclosed” indicates the figure was not reported in any source reviewed for this study and was not estimated (2026).

4.2 Divergent Outcomes: Public Refusal, Disputed Compliance, and a Second Commodification Mechanism

All creators with disclosed fees — Jerome Polin, Vincent Liyanto, Mella Carli, and Rahmat Hidayat — publicly refused the offer and disclosed it via their own accounts, framing their refusal in moral terms. Jerome Polin's caption the IDR 150 million, compared the fee to teacher salaries, framing acceptance as a moral failure [35]; Mella Carli responded with pointed sarcasm referencing her own foreign background [34]; Rahmat Hidayat responded with irony, not direct condemnation. Tirto.id's review [34] found that none of the creators it tracked had produced the requested content by the stated deadline. Yet this pattern of refusal contrasts with one disputed case: comedian and content creator Marshel Widiyanto uploaded a post on 29 August 2025 — a video appealing for unity that referenced the death of ride-hailing driver Affan Kurniawan during the unrest [37] and closely matched the campaign's message: a call for unity among the government, the House of Representatives, the police, ride-hailing drivers, and the public. Commenters immediately accused Widiyanto of accepting the same IDR 150 million offer publicized by Jerome Polin, and the video was deleted within hours. In a public apology, Widiyanto called his own judgment foolish and explicitly denied having been paid [38]. His wife, fellow public figure Yansen Indiani, defended him further four days later, stating that Widiyanto had attended as a volunteer medic, not as a paid participant, and offering to make his bank records public [39]. No independent confirmation of payment — nor any indication that the bank-account offer was ever taken up — was found in the sources reviewed for this study; the case is treated as disputed, not as confirmed compensation. The scale of the defensive response it provoked, extending beyond Widiyanto himself to his spouse's public intervention is itself analytically significant: it illustrates the reputational stakes of even appearing to commodify political voice [36].

The evidentiary basis of Jerome Polin's disclosure — the highest-value case in the cluster and most frequently cited case — was publicly contested. On 2 September 2025, fellow content creator Zarry Hendrik publicly questioned whether the leaked offer chat had been fabricated by Polin and other participating influencers to fabricate a convincing story and requested that Polin produce contact details for the alleged sender so they could verify the claim together [40]. Notably, Polin's brother and manager, Jehian Panangian Sijabat, had already responded to earlier skepticism by posting the sender's phone number in the comments. This occurred before Hendrik's specific challenge, as evidence of the chat's authenticity [41]. This earlier disclosure did not directly address Hendrik's subsequent, more pointed challenge, and no independent confirmation of the number's owner was found. Hendrik's own credibility was simultaneously questioned by commenters, who noted his public association with the incumbent government, suggesting the counteraccusation may have been politically motivated. No independent verification resolving this dispute in either direction was

found. Because Polin's case anchors the cluster's highest-value and most frequently cited data point, the chat evidence is treated as contested, not confirmed, extending the same evidentiary caution applied to the disputed Widianto case above. The core claims do not depend on Polin's case alone: five further cases in the cluster — each independently disclosed by a different creator with its own supporting evidence — are sufficient to support the analysis of the offer template and pricing structure developed here.

A second, distinct commodification mechanism emerged in the same case cluster: content creator Azka Salsa Nabila reported receiving a direct message offering IDR 3 million in exchange for deleting a post critical of the House of Representatives, not for producing new content [34]. Nabila declined and instead published the offer. This variant — payment for the removal of critical political speech, not payment for producing supportive speech — extends the definition of algorithmic commodification of political voice beyond the production side theorized in the Literature Review: here, the commodity purchased is not authenticity-branded content but silence itself, priced far below what mega- and macro-tier creators received for active participation. This asymmetry likely reflects lower perceived value: deleting a single post has less reach than producing new, algorithmically distributed content.

Read together with the study's structural anchor, these findings show a clear temporal alignment (Figure 1). The offer cluster was circulated and refused within the same 25 August–2 September window when TikTok's voluntary Live suspension occurred [9,10] and during Drone Emprit's independent social network analysis documented anonymous, buzzer-indicated accounts amplifying “pembubaran DPR” narratives across X, YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok in sequence [32]. Komdigi's formal data request to TikTok — issued 16 September, refused by TikTok on 23 September, and resulting in the brief TDPSE freeze of 3–4 October — thus followed, roughly two weeks later, an episode which Indonesia's identifiable micro- and macro-influencer economy was simultaneously solicited to create an appearance of calm on Instagram. The two data threads this study brings together — platform-regulatory confrontation over TikTok Live, and commercial solicitation of Instagram creators — did not merely coincide in time; they addressed the same underlying event (the 25–30 August protests) through two structurally distinct mechanisms identified in the Literature Review: anonymous, coordinated buzzer activity (documented here via Drone Emprit's macro-level triangulation) and identifiable, authenticity-branded micro-influencer solicitation (documented here via the primary case cluster).

Read through the lens of platform imperialism [13,18], the TDPSE sequence offers an ambivalent illustration of the thesis. On one hand, the fact that Komdigi had to use regulatory leverage at all — that TikTok's initial response to a formal state data request was refusal rather than automatic compliance — is evidence of the structural asymmetry Jin describes: a transnational platform corporation operating outside the immediate reach by default of Indonesian regulatory authority, complied only after formal sanctions, the TDPSE, were imposed. On the other hand, the speed and completeness of TikTok's eventual compliance — full data submission and reinstatement within twenty-four hours of the freeze — complicates any reading of platform imperialism as a fixed or intractable power differential. Instead of a prolonged standoff, the TDPSE episode shows a Global South state successfully securing rapid compliance once it escalated from request to sanction. This suggests that platform

imperialism, at least in this case, describes a default asymmetry that targeted domestic regulatory action can correct, at least partially — a nuance that Jin's (2015) emphasis on structural dependency does not fully anticipate, and one this study's two-platform design revealed because it treated TikTok's regulatory confrontation and Instagram's commercial solicitation as two faces of the same underlying power structure not as separate phenomena.

These findings substantiate the commodified participatory democracy framework proposed in the Literature Review, across both asymmetries: platform-level asymmetry, visible in the TDPSE sequence, and labor-market asymmetry, visible in the offer cluster's pricing and reception. On commodification: the standardized offer template, tiered pricing, and simultaneous-release deadline indicate a managed commercial operation, not an improvised approach to individual creators but a managed commercial operation applying the same negotiation logic documented in Indonesia's broader buzzer industry [5,6] to a previously undocumented population: identifiable mega- to macro-tier influencers, not anonymous cyber troopers. On asymmetry: every creator explicitly acknowledged, of the reputational and moral cost of accepting — Jerome Polin's framing of the fee as a moral failure, Mella Carli's sarcasm, Nabila's decision to publicize rather than comply — suggesting that the same audience-trusted authenticity that makes identifiable micro-influencers valuable as political intermediaries [27,28] also makes accepting such offers unusually costly to disclose, which helps explain why Widiyanto's disputed case attracted disproportionate hostility relative to the refusal cases: visible compliance, unlike refusal, directly threatens the authenticity that underpins a creator's commercial value. This points to an asymmetry not fully anticipated earlier: acceptance of political commodification offers may be systematically under-documented not only because of limited data access, but because the commodity being purchased — authentic-seeming political voice — is undermined once its commercial origin becomes public. This suggests a micro-influencer economy in which successful commodification requires concealment — a pattern consistent with the earlier finding that no TikTok-native identifiable case could be located despite systematic search: if accepting carries reputational cost, commodified instances may be harder to detect than refused ones, regardless of platform.

5 Conclusion

This study examined how Indonesia's micro-influencer political communication ecosystem operates within algorithmic campaign logics, and how this commodification reshapes the democratic public sphere. It used the TDPSE TikTok episode (August–October 2025) as its case anchor and a cluster of Instagram-documented influencer solicitations as its primary empirical evidence.

On the first question, the findings indicate that Indonesia's identifiable micro-influencer economy follows the same commercial logic long documented for Indonesia's anonymous buzzer industry [4,5], but applied to publicly branded creators, not anonymous accounts: standardized templates sent simultaneously to multiple recipients, tiered pricing loosely tied to follower count, and fixed deadlines coordinated to specific political moments. This is a managed commercial operation, not an ad hoc practice.

Crucially, this commodification operates through two distinct mechanisms. The first is the production of supportive content, priced at IDR 85–150 million depending on audience size. The second is the removal of critical content, priced at a small fraction of that amount (IDR 3 million). To our knowledge, this suppression mechanism has not been previously documented at the identifiable-creator level. Both mechanisms fit within, and extend, the definition of algorithmic commodification of political voice: in the first, voice is manufactured and purchased; in the second, voice is silenced and purchased, at a price suggesting intermediaries treat the two as commercially distinct products, not variations on a single service. This labor-market commodification is inseparable from platform imperialism's state-platform confrontation [13,18]: the TDPSE sequence in the Discussion shows that Indonesia's default structural dependency on TikTok's compliance can be corrected through rapid, sanction-backed regulatory action, even as the labor-market side of the same ecosystem — where identifiable creators are commercially solicited on Instagram — remains effectively unregulated.

On the second question, the findings point to an effect distinct from what disinformation-focused buzzer scholarship [15,16] would predict. Instead of shaping public opinion through covert manipulation, the documented offers to identifiable creators were uniformly refused, publicly disclosed, and used by recipients to mobilize scrutiny of the campaign attempting to solicit them. Yet this apparent resilience does not mean that identifiable-creator commodification is ineffective. The disputed Marshel Widiyanto case and the structural absence of any confirmed accepted offer suggest an alternative interpretation: visible acceptance destroys the authenticity that makes a micro-influencer valuable, so successfully commodified political voice tends to be concealed. It is therefore less likely to be publicly documented than refused offers. The democratic public sphere may be reshaped less by the visible cases documented here than by an unknown population of accepted, undisclosed offers that current methods are not well positioned to detect. This evidentiary asymmetry is a significant finding, and future research should treat it as a central methodological challenge, not a peripheral issue.

Taken together, these findings substantiate the commodified participatory democracy framework proposed in the Literature Review — encompassing both the platform-level asymmetry described by platform imperialism scholarship [13,18] and the labor-market asymmetry documented in the offer cluster — while refining it in two respects. First, commodification of political voice includes a suppression variant priced independently of the production variant. Second, the same authenticity-based asymmetry that makes identifiable micro-influencers valuable political intermediaries also structure which instances of their commodification become empirically visible to researchers, journalists, and the public.

This study has several limitations. Its retrospective design limits the dataset to digital traces retrievable as of July 2026; TikTok Live sessions, which the platform does not archive, could not be recovered. The case cluster is small (seven creators) and self-selected toward public refusal, precluding prevalence claims. Two central cases remain disputed, and broker-to-creator messaging networks were not directly observed. Some sources are online news outlets whose editorial standards were not independently verified, though core claims were corroborated across multiple outlets.

Future research should test whether the absence of TikTok-native cases reflects a genuine platform-specific difference or simply a limitation of retrospective data access. Work with access to primary broker-network data — WhatsApp groups, given the one documented channel, though Telegram and other platforms should also be considered — would be better positioned to observe accepted offers directly. Real-time netnography during a comparable political moment would similarly address this gap. Finally, the suppression-commodification mechanism — paid content deletion — deserves further dedicated investigation. It appears novel relative to the production-focused commodification mechanisms that dominate existing scholarship on Indonesia's digital political economy.

Acknowledgements. AI-assisted tools were used during the preparation of this manuscript solely to support translation and data processing tasks. The manuscript has been independently redrafted by the authors prior to submission.

Disclosure of Interest. The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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