

Power Interplay In The Implementation Of Legislative Functions (*case study: conflict on Padang Panjang parliament within the determination of KUA PPAS fiscal year 2017*)

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Abstract—This paper discusses the phenomena of conflict within the legislature regional level (DPRD tingkat Daerah) about the implementation of its function as a legislative body, especially the budget function. The budget for regional expenditure and income (APBD) is the resource of all potentials owned and will be used by the regional, especially for regions that have a dependence on the central government. This condition causes the actors in the region try to attempt to dominate it, which is used for group or private interests. Using all of the power and effort in dominating it often gives rise to conflict. Conflict and consensus theories are used as tools for analyzing of these phenomena, the approach of both theories is used to explain causal analysis until the consensus of the conflict on this study. A manifestation of the powerful interplay of patron-client groups to overcome the disruption from outside their groups. control over important positions through official rules of the institution is their strategy.

Keyword: *Conflict; Power Interplay; Legislature Regional Level.*

INTRODUCTION

The democratization that touches Indonesia also has a tremendous effect on the decentralization process. The embodiment of Law Number 22 The year 1999 on Regional Government, which locates the Regional Government (Pemda) and the Regional People's Legislative Assembly (DPRD) as local government administrators. At first local government is a form of representation of the national government system, but in the revision of the Regional Government Law further began to be given more autonomous functions. As a consequence, in the regions, there is also established a system of government with the same element, where its basic position refers to the central government. Local Government as executive and DPRD as legislative, where its functions, duties, authority and rights and obligations are almost the same but have certain limitations.

Law no. 22 of 1999 on Regional Government, changed into Law no. 32 of 2004, then revised into Law no. 23 of 2014, and the latest being Law no. 9 The year 2015. Based on this juridical provision, the DPRD as one of the institutions of government administration is politically responsible for the administration in the region. In this matter pursuant to Law No. 9 The year 2015 Section 41 on Regional Government, DPRD

has 3 (three) main function that is a function of legislation, the function of budget and function of supervision. Implementation of the three basic functions that exist in this DPRD will determine the execution of tasks and performance of the government itself, where the management of local government is not inseparable from the implementation of the function of the DPRD itself, because the DPRD is a representative body in the area of authority as an authorized institution in regional autonomy.

In its development, the implementation of regional autonomy experienced several problems, especially in terms of budget management, Problems that occur in budget management, one of the causes is the implementation of budget functions that are less than the maximum by the legislature. This problem arises because of various factors, such as lack of harmony between legislative and executive relations, lack of understanding of legislative members towards the implementation of budget functions, and the birth of conflicts in the implementation of the budget function.

Viewed from the role of the legislative body in the implementation of the budget function has at least three roles, namely; First, create a budget policy. Second, affect the budget. Third, approve

and approve the budget.^[1] In practice, these three roles often lead to disagreements and disagreements or conflicts of interest, whether between legislative members, between factions within the legislature, between the executive and the legislature, even between the legislature and the civil society. Conflicts of interest of the legislature in budget discussions tend to occur because they want to compete for resources. "... Political conflicts can be generated by resources and positions scarcity, the more limited the political resources the greater the occurrence of political conflicts, political conflicts can be resolved legally through law enforcement agencies because it has to do with lawlessness ..."^[2].

Implementation of budgetary functions undertaken by legislative bodies in Padang Panjang City is tainted by the violence of fellow members of the legislature that occurred in the plenary session of the DPRD. This action indicates that a power play leads to conflict within the legislature and cannot be resolved through deliberations as ideally as the legislature.

MuriceDuverger proposes three types of conflicts based on their nature. First, the conflict has absolutely no basis in principle. Second, conflict arises because there are differences about parts of a principle but not about the principle itself. Third, the conflict is completely derived from a basic principle.^[3] SyamsuddinHaris added the first type of conflict with regard to practical issues unrelated to ideological issues. Where differences of opinion arising from the conflict of interest of a person or group are included in this type. The second type of conflict concerns the

differing views on a matter that relates to the interests of the party, organization or society that the party considers to represent. While the third type of conflict arises when the disputed constitutes an ideological and constitutional issue, such as on the basis of the state.^[4]

Furthermore, Lewis Coser holds that the characteristics of conflict can be divided into two categories, namely realistic conflict and nonrealistic conflict. Real conflicts are caused by frustration because certain demands are not in line with the expectations the participants wish to achieve, whereas conflict does not manifestly arise not because of antagonistic goals, but because goals are born out of the need to relieve aggressive tension in an interaction. In this case, the opposite choice depends on the decisive factor and is not directly related to the contentious issue and not the specifically intended outcome orientation.^[5]

According to MaswadiRauf, conflict can be interpreted as any contradiction or difference of opinion between at least two people or groups. Conflict includes not only physical conflict, so oral conflict in the form of debate, polemics, dissent can be categorized as a conflict because of the conflict within it even though acts of violence involving physical objects have not occurred. Associated with oral conflict is called conflict on interest and conflicting of ideas. In order to distinguish political conflicts with social conflicts, Rauf asserted one requirement for mutual conflict to be a political conflict.^[6]

Namely the involvement of political rulers in it. In discussing the political conflict, Rauf on his book "Consensus and Political Conflict", describes 4 (four) theories that can be used as a reference. that is; (i) Duverger Conflict Theory. (ii) The Geertz Conflict Theory. (iii) The Marx

^[1]SugengBahagijo, MashudiNoorsalimandDarmawanTriwibowo, *PeranParlemenDalamSistemPenganggaran di Berbagainegara, SebuahTinjauanKomparasi*. (LP3ES, Jakarta 2009). page 83.

^[2]MaswadiRauf, *KonsensusdanKonflikPolitik, SebuahPenjajaganTeoritis*; (DirektoratJenderalpendidikanTinggi, DepartemenPendidikanNasional, 2001), page 6.

^[3]Maurice Duverger, "Political Parties", N.Y. John Willwy& Sons, Inc. 1963, page 413 – 419, onAmatDarsonoSudibyo, *Proses PolitikPenentuanAnggaranPendidikan Minimal 20 Persendari APBN Tahun 2005-2009 Di Indonesia*, (tesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2013), page 43.

^[4]SyamsuddinHaris, "Pola Dan KecenderunganKonflik", *JurnalAnalisa CSIS*, Tahun XVII No 5 Mei 1988, page 271, on AmatDarsonoSudibyo, *Proses PolitikPenentuanAnggaranPendidikan Minimal 20 Persendari APBN Tahun 2005-2009 Di Indonesia*, (tesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2013), page 47.

^[5]Lewis A Coser, *The Function of Social Conflict*, (London,The Free Press, New York Collier Maemillan Limited, 1964), onAmatDarsonoSudibyo, *Proses PolitikPenentuanAnggaranPendidikan Minimal 20 Persendari APBN Tahun 2005-2009 Di Indonesia*, (tesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2013), page 49.

^[6]MaswadiRauf, *Op.cit.*.page 35.

Conflict Theory. (iv) Scott's Conflict Theory. As follows:^[7]

First, Duverger conflict approach is used to describe that political conflict is created due to the two meanings of the nature of political power and the realization of political objectives which he calls political antagonism. Duverger illustrates two possible traits in any political power which are intrinsically contradictory but carried on alternately by political rulers.

Second, Geerts cultural approach is used to highlight the problem of mixing political allegiances with primordial allegiances. The incorporation of primordial loyalty with political allegiance breeds fanatical politics, resulting in conditions that are not conducive to the development of democracy, this condition also poses a danger of the possibility of a great political conflict and difficult to resolve.

Third, the approach of class conflict proposed by Marx because of the fundamental and profound differences between the two classes. According to Marx, consciousness towards the group is the trigger for a sharp difference between the two classes. This theorem is an affirmation which he uses to show that the two classes are of no interest because of the fundamental differences in way of life and way of thinking.

Fourth. Approach patron clients^[8] of political conflict proposed by Scott, based on client group patron conflicts. However, there are different forms of bonding in groups when compared to the two previous approaches (primordial and class groups). The relationship between patron clients leads to solidarity that leads to compliance with patrons, this is what causes if there is a conflict related to the continuity or integrity of the group or the interests of patrons, the client is willing to engage in conflict with others even if it is not related to the client.

From the preliminary research process, the data obtained that the two members of this council faction occurred because of different opinions between the Chairman of the Faction of GolonganKarya and the Chairman of the Democratic Star Faction about the implementation of the Plenary of KUA-PPAS endorsement. The parties involved in this inci

dent were the Chairman of the faction in the Padang Panjang City Council, Mahdelmi the beating agent who was the Chairman of the Faction of the GolonganKarya, while HendraSaputra as the victim was the Chairman of the Democratic Star Faction. Since the opening of plenary sessions, the victim and the perpetrator have been a debate, especially about the attitude of the victim who did the interruption of the plenary and suggested to stop the plenary stipulation of KUA PPAS.^[9]

The DPRD of Padang Panjang is divided into five factions, the GolonganKarya faction is the largest faction with 5 members consisting of 4 council members from the Golkar Party and 1 from Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan Party (PDIP), the BintangDemokrasi Fraction is a combination of the Bintang Bulan Party (PBB) and the Demokrat Party, each of whom has two legislative members. Before the case of this beating occurs, there are often cross-references in the DPRD between the GolonganKarya Faction and the Democracy Star Faction, especially in the cases mentioned above, because the Golkar Party is the party supporting the head of the region in office.

The small number of members of DPRD Kota Padang Panjang but there is a much more dominant fraction of other faction makes many vital positions in DPRD can easily be controlled by a party with a big fraction. The control over the vital position in the DPRD is the form of a power play by the Group Fraction, from the Chairman of the DPRD, the Chair of the Budget Board, the Chairman of the Commission, the Chairman of the Honorary Board. Thus, the implementation of the political process in the DPRD of the GolonganKarya faction has a far superior position than the other factions which

^[7]MaswadiRauf, *Op.cit.*.page42-112.

^[8]Patron client group in question is a dyadic relationship consisting of someone with a higher socioeconomic status (patron) using its influence and resources to provide protection, position and benefits to other (clients), client replaced it with assistance, compliance, support. and personal service to the patron.

^[9]this information collected from local newspaper, etc; HarianSinggalang, HarianHaluan, Postmetro Padang, Riau Mandiri, Harian Koran Padang, Padang Ekspres, Sumbar Post.

makes it easy to find coalition partners, especially in the execution of budget functions.

It is not a new thing if the legislature is viewed as a state institution that is highlighted the least trusted by the public, because of the many dynamics that occur in the channeling institutions aspirations, this also happens to the DPRD. DPRD as one form of the legislative body should be the final estuary of the legalization of all the manifestation of the interests of society, not the legalization of personal interests or certain groups, moreover, DPRD is the front guard of the legislative body that is directly opposite to voter.

DPRD is different from the DPR, especially in terms of authority and issues discussed, but this does not mean that the DPRD is an institution that can be underestimated problems that occur in it. It is unfortunate that if there is a conflict within the DPRD, especially if the conflict arises due to regional autonomy, in the case of regional autonomy is expected to be a formula to overcome the problem of national equalization, it actually brings new problems in the body of DPRD.

Autonomy gained by local government should give birth to DPRD in accordance with local characteristic and local wisdom. Where it becomes the soul of the DPRD in addressing the problems according to conditions in the area, not even make the DPRD has different problems according to the conditions of each region. But in the end, this privilege still bring the DPRD in the problems associated with the rules and authorities that have been formulated from the central government, one of which related to the issue of local budget management that has been set mechanism of the central government.

ASPIRATION AGENCY THAT COULD BE CONTAMINATED

Currently on Kota Padang Panjang political power is colored by the mastery of very strong capital forces. This condition is in contrast to the economic condition of the majority of society so that at the level of grassroots and elite transactional political pattern gives a very big influence. Furthermore, Kota Padang Panjang is a city that still has a dependence on financial assistance from the central government, so the APBD is still a very dependable resource. So no wonder, the existence of the budget as a limited

resources certainly a source of conflict contested by the parties concerned, one of which political interests.

In addition, according to Foucault and Robert Dahl, political conflicts within democracies are an arena of competition and a struggle of interests, not only seizing political resources but also a battleground for political influence to seek the legitimacy of its constituents. That should be a political conflict, but in the case of conflict in the discussion of KUA PPAS Kota Padang Panjang, there is no similar condition with what is conveyed by the political experts. Conflict instead was created not by a struggle in seeking the legitimacy of the constituent however as a form of a search for the legitimacy of the largest power holders in the region.

The conflict that occurred in the discussion of KUA PPAS Kota Padang Panjang is the problem of whether or not the budget proposed by the City Government in the DPRD, especially in the discussion of the Banggar. There is a difference of understanding that occurred in the discussion of Rusunnawadevelopment activities proposed by the city government, most members of Banggartry questioned the effects of benefits and planning of this activity. Banggar members feel it is important to know this problem because the proposed budget is not contained in the Padang Panjang City Medium Term Development Plan (RPJMD). The problems that form the basis of the different views between the budget body and the Regional Finance Manager (PPKD) are the planning of those activities that are outside the RPJMD agreement, the program of activities proposed by the municipal government is not yet mature in the concept of planning and utilization so that it has not yet fulfilled the urgency aspect to be realized, and use of APBD funds in these activities because previously there has been assistance from Kemenpera for these activities.

Differences in the Banggar is not a thing that cannot be resolved so that the plenary of KUA PPAS determination. In the appointment of KUA PPAS, the Golkar Party Chairman positioned himself pro against the program proposed by the City Government, in contrast to the existing in the budget body which still doubt the program of the City Government. In the plenary of PPA KUA, there was a strong controversy between the Golkar Party Chairman and the Chairman of the Democratic Star Faction, this condition which

ultimately became the background of the conflict in the DPRD of Padang Panjang City which resulted in unlawful acts. Until now this paper is written there is still no accurate data regarding the background of the political attitude of the Golkar Party Faction Chair because the concerned is not willing to give further details and assume the problem has been completed. So if you sulk on the theory put forward there are only two compelling reasons, namely; this is influenced by a personal factor (Duverger approach) or promoted by a patron-client factor (Scott's approach).

Based on the data found in the field, these two factors could be the background of this conflict. In terms of personal factors, the Golkar Faction Chairman is known as a politician who often has different views with other members of the legislature, although he has firmness which often leaves other members of the legislature reluctant. While in terms of patron-client track record he became a member of the legislature resembles the track record of the position of Head of Region. He and the Regional Head are indeed Padang Panjang original citizens, but in the previous period they were officials from neighboring areas of Padang Panjang. He is a member of the legislative of Tanah Datar DPRD, while the Head of Region is the Vice Regent of Tanah Datar. This is not yet strong as a proof but during the political journey in Padang Panjang City there was an inconsistency in his political stance, during his campaign he stated that he would be the front guard in controlling the regional head but in fact, he became the leading supporter of the regional head program.

PRAGMATIC COALITION

In the case of focus, the DPRD as an institution actually has several laws that regulate its institutional mechanisms by default, namely; First, Law Number 17 Year 2014 on People's Consultative Assembly, House of Representatives, Regional Representatives Council, Regional House of Representatives, Second, Law Number 23 Year 2014 on Regional Government. Third, Government Regulation Number 16 The year 2010 on the Drafting of the Regional House of Representatives Regulation on the Standing Orders of the Regional People's Legislative Assembly. But in the actualization of the field, there are rules that are not written but a mutual agreement between fellow DPRD members, one of which is a partnership

mechanism (coalition) between political parties in the legislature.

This is consistent with Scoot's commentary on the institutionalization of "are comprised of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life". Scoot clearly also realizes that there are three fundamental elements in an institutional, ie rule, norm, and meaning system. Scoot further explains that these three elements are central to the birth of institutional structures and codes of conduct. Such behavior guidelines may change elastically, including behavioral relationships as well as metrical resources from aspects of social life through production and reproduction of resources. So in plain language Scoot also attends that there are regulations governing the institution, but there is another agreement which is also an unwritten rule.

The absence of a standard rule on the coalition mechanism of political parties, in the end only created a coalition system built only on the condition of like-dislike between political parties. This is evidence that the influence of political parties is very great on the legislative body and there is no control over it, different to the executive, where the community directly can also give influence even though the influence of political parties is still dominant. This condition allows political parties to build coalitions based on interest factors without being based on other crucial factors such as party ideology. Conditions were found in Padang Panjang City, within the DPRD there was a coalition that was not based on fundamental things in political parties. This relationship originally departed from the similarity of ideas as a party supporting the head of the region in 2013 and this relationship succeeded in succeeding the head of a stretcher. After the success of the previous relationship, in 2014 after the legislative elections, this relationship turned into a coalition bond in the legislature. This coalition was built by 4 parties, namely; GolonganKaryaParty (Golkar), Gerakan Indonesia Raya Party (Gerindra), KeadilanSosialParty (PKS) danBulanBintangParty (PBB). This coalition is also a fulfillment of the need to fight for the interest of the DPRD between parties, whereas in the end, this coalition becomes the majority of DPRD holders with 13 seats exceeding the minimum quota of 50% + 1 vote.

In a coalition built Golkar Faction becomes an actor with resources that are far more dominant than others. Golkar Party became the dominant resource owner in the legislature caused by many factors, among others Golkar is the winning party in the regional legislative elections, Golkar politicians who become members of the legislature is a senior politician (experienced in legislative members more than once, 3), Golkar's special proximity to the Head of Region (the head of the region is the council of the Golkar DPC), and the Golkar Faction is the largest Faction within the DPRD with 25% of the legislative seats. This led Golkar to become a superiority to its coalition partners. This condition made Golkar try to dictate the attitude and political choice of its coalition partners, in the end, it gave rise to resistance from its coalition partners.

Furthermore, from the problems described earlier, the indications of weak bonding of the coalition being built are also found from the power-sharing conditions in the DPRD. The partnerships they built in the form of faction coalitions in the DPRD only led to the division of commissioners' quota for each coalition partner. In fact, this pattern continues even after the case of conflict of discussion on APBD APBD of Fiscal Year 2017 in the ratification of KUA PPAS, but after this case happened the exchange of coalition partners. BintangDemokratFaction, a combination of the BulanBintangParty and the Demokrat Party, who were partners initially expelled from the coalition and replaced with the Persatuan Pembangunan Party (PPP) - NasionalDemokrat Party (Nasdem) Faction.

The transformation of the coalition in the DPRD of Padang Panjang is not a political shock, especially during the journey in the coalition of Golkar, Gerindra, PKS, and PBB, there are often differences of views, opinions, and choices between factions. Bulan Bintang Party as the "little" is classified as naughty and difficult to regulate in this coalition, especially in the case of the determination of KUA PPAS Padang Panjang City Year 2017, the Chairman of the Bulan Demokrat faction and Chairman of the Golkar faction even had a fight in the plenary session. Moving Golkar's heart to PPP from the PBB is a rational choice if the goal is to seek stability within the coalition, only the time it takes to exchange this coalition couple becomes less precise with the case. If the explanation is that the organizational need will be a rationally

acceptable reason, but if this is due to personal problems it becomes a justification for the weakness of the coalition's bond and the magnitude of private interests rather than the public interest.

Substitution of coalition partners does not violate the rules, whether laws or regulations in the DPRD, it is also the authority and rights of the faction. Based on the meaning system that exists or is formed in the legislature even put it as a natural thing (commonly done). Assessed in terms of norms, when examined from an individual side outside the system, it appears to be a violation of commitment, but what commitments are agreed upon when the establishment is only concerned individuals who know it. Ultimately a coalition that is essentially formed into a force based on common interests and can turn into a new conflict in the event of a shift from underlying interests.

THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL CONFLICT AND RESOURCES.

The case of conflict that occurred in the discussion of KUA PPAS in DPRD Padang Panjang is very unique, in general, the whole approach that has been stated felt to have an influence in this case. However, as stated earlier, assertion uses a more dominant approach without minimizing the meaning of the existence of other approaches to bring this paper to a more specific conclusion.

First, in the course of this group, they call themselves as political partners but the conditions of these actors have disparate social conditions. The conditions created in this connection resemble Scott's picture of patron-client relationships, where patron clients turn out to be patrons for clients at lower levels. However, the symptoms found throughout the study did not indicate the relationship as the client's patron relationship, since no intensive relationship between the actors was indicated by the fact that there were indications for the actuator who had more resources. In the case studied it was found indications that less-rated actors (clients) provided support and assistance to actors with more resources (patrons) without directions or instructions. Data collected only indicates that the client is patronizing patron through personal initiative.

Second, the existence of this client's patron relationship in the political constellation creates conflict, the factors that affect the client's patron relationship are resource gaps and importance levels. If there is a change in both factors it causes a change in the structure of the relationship level, where there is a shift in the client's level but not at the highest patron level. The effect of the existence of this relationship increases the intensity of the conflict that has arisen because of the influence of other approach factors. Personally, a client has brought the seeds of conflict in him, because literally the client as an individual also has the interests he fought for and the patron's interests cause the client as a pawn piece that moves with their own style. In this case, the client bears two interests, there are clients who assume the interests simultaneously because there are differences in direction of interests, there are clients with chronic interests because there are similarities in the direction of interest.

Third, the attraction of interest between parties in the form of visible dynamics turned into a tangible form when entering the territory of the legislature. This affects the performance of the legislature. The absolute influence of political parties on the apparatus of their party in the legislature becomes a form of undemocratic in the legislative body. The factor of the existence of client-patron relationship facilitated by the condition of a political party can influence the implementation of the function of the legislative institution. If a patron becomes an element outside the executive role the oversight of the legislature becomes more critical, whereas if the patron becomes an element in the executive the supervisory role becomes softer.

Fourth. The conclusions drawn from the provisional findings are political conflict based on the resources caused by three things, namely; first, in the process of distributing the resources, there is a group of powers that are not brought along. Second, unequal distribution of resources is agreed upon in the process of distribution. Third, awareness of the bargaining position in the process of distribution.

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