

conditions of different countries, there may be certain difference in estimation results, but the core conclusion is consistent.

Additionally, the data in this paper can also be used to discuss the influence of the government's motive for tariff and the lobbying ability of the industries on the taxation. The readers who are interested in it can refer to the original text of Christian et al.

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