

Research on DPM Algorithm Based on Abnormal Flow in IPv6 Network

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Abstract—Distributed denial of service attack has become one of the most serious security threats in the network. This paper researched distributed denial of service under IPv6 network, improved the deterministic packet marking algorithm that existed in IPv4 network and applied it to IPv6 network. Detection of abnormal flow in the network can make the basic deterministic packet marking algorithm improved. Theoretical analysis and experiment show that the algorithm is effectively to packet marking in the IPv6 network and reduce the resource consumption of network and router.

Keywords—IPv6; distribute denial of service; abnormal flow; DPM

I. INTRODUCTION

With the rapid development of network technology, the IPv4 protocol is unable to meet the needs of people, and the IPv6 protocol come into being. Though security issues were taken into consideration in IPv6 protocol, DoS/DDoS attacks and other security threats still exist in IPv6 network. DoS is an attack mean that attacker deliberately caused the network cannot provide the required services to the user or service performance degradation through specific means. DDoS attack is still DoS attack, but it refers to more than one zombie hosts launch DoS attacks at the same time, the zombie hosts are controlled by an attacker [1].

IP address spoofing existing in the most of DDoS attacks and IP address in attack packets are often forged, so other means to track the attacker's source IP are required. P.Ferguson and D.Senie proposed DDoS defense thinking based on false IP address tracking [2]. Savage proposed PPM (Probabilistic Packet Marking) algorithm for the flood type DDoS attack in the IPv4 network, sample the part of attack packets and mark the path information, finally reconstruct the complete attack path on the victim side [3]. The basic principle of DPM (Deterministic Packet Marking) algorithm is mark each packet when it pass through the border router, reconstructed the ingress address of the source of the attack on the victim side. To apply above classical algorithms in IPv4 network to IPv6 network needs to make some modifications to the algorithm.

This paper has researched on the application of DPM algorithm in IPv6 network, proposed a DPM algorithm based on abnormal flow, move mark information to the IPv6 destination option header. Only marking abnormal flow can improve the efficiency of packet marking and reduce the burden of network resources and border router.

II. IPTRACING TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW

A. The Classification of IP Tracing Technology

IP tracking technology can be divided into two categories: proactive tracking and reactive tracking [4]. Proactive tracking record information when packets were transmitted. When under attack, reference to the previously recorded information can trace the source of the attack. Packet marking and ICMP tracking are two typical proactive tracking. Reactive tracking begin to trace after the attack. Mostly DDoS attack is initiated by the zombiehosts, reactive tracking is backtracking from the end to the source, looking for the real attacker is not easy. In addition, scholars have put forward a number of tracing algorithms recently, such as logging, link test, ICMP tracing, packet marking [5]. Where the research focus is the packet marking algorithm, because compared with other algorithms it has many advantages, such as use less bandwidth and computing resources, do not need coordination between the ISPs, allow analysis after attack. But cannot be directly applied in IPv6 network is its disadvantage.

B. DPM Algorithm Summary

The basic principle of DPM algorithm in IPv4 network is: when packets entering the network, edge ingress router will mark the packet and divide its IP address (ingress address) into two sections, then write it into 16-bit ID field. Sections mark will be written in 1-bit RF field. The main difference between DPM algorithm and PPM algorithm is: the former is only used in edge ingress router, mark ingress address and reconstruct it on the victim side; the latter is used in all routers, mark the identity of the router and reconstruct attack path on the victim side. It can found that DPM algorithm marking process is efficiency from the above difference. But DPM algorithm just reconstruct edge ingressport address, not the attack source address. When the attack source is locked, how to find the attacker is the problem need to solve.

III. DPM ALGORITHM BASED ON ABNORMAL FLOW

A. Selection of Storing Field and Mark Encoding

In the DMP algorithm based on IPv4 protocol, the mark information is stored in 16-bit ID field and 1-bit RF field. But ID field and RF field are not existed in IPv6 header, it is needed to find a new area to store mark information. As defined in RFC 2460, only 8-bit traffic class field and 20-bit

flow label field is undefined [6]. But using 28-bit space to store 128-bit IPv6 address coding requires a lot of computing resources. Therefore, mark information stored in IPv6 header is not suitable [7]. There are several extension headers defined in IPv6, only destination option header and hop-by-hop option header are not be defined how to use. This paper chooses the destination option header as the information storage area. Destination option header encoding format is shown in Fig. 1.

Figure 1. Mark encoding format.

B. Modification on Path MTU Algorithm

choose 24 bytes as the minimum value to recalculate the PMTU.

C. Detection of Abnormal Flow

Figure 2. Network flow characteristics.

D. Procedure

threshold which called mark probability. If $P_i > P_{min}$, mark the packet. Otherwise, determine that this packet is normal. Procedure of DPM algorithm based on abnormal flow is shown in Fig. 3.




Figure 3. Procedure of DPM algorithm based on abnormal flow.

IV. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS ANALYSIS

A. Simulation Environment

This paper uses NS2 simulation software to simulate DPM algorithm based on abnormal flow. NS2 provides simulation of TCP based on the wireless or wired network, routing and multicast. Some modifications to NS files need to be made to simulate the DPM algorithm based on abnormal flow: the ip.cc and ip.h files under the common folder need to be modified for add destination option header; make supplement to the recv function in classifier class; create DPM agent which inherit agent class to complete the DPM mark process; create UNDPM agent which inherit agent class to extract the ingress address and write it to trace file.

B. Experimental Topology

Experimental topology is shown as Fig. 4.




Figure 4. Topology in NS2.

In Fig. 4, node0 is normal user, its IPv6 address is 2000:0:0:1000::2. Node0 connects with one of node2 port, its address is 2000:0:0:1000::1. Node0 connects with UDP agent udp0, udp0 connects with flow generator cbr0, cbr0 setting is: packet size 500 bytes and send interval 10ms. The link between node0 and node2 setting is: bandwidth 1Mb, delay 10ms, FIFO. Node1 is attacker, its IPv6 address is 2000:0:0:2000::2. Node1 connects with one of node2 port, its address is 2000:0:0:2000::1. Node1 connects with UDP agent udp1, udp1 connects with flow generator cbr1, cbr1 setting is: packet size 500 bytes and send interval 5ms. The link between node1 and node2 setting is: bandwidth 1Mb, delay 10ms, FIFO. Node2 is an edge router, connects with DPM agent dpm0. The port of node2 which connects to node3 IP address is 2000:0:0:3000::2, the corresponding port on node3 IP address is 2000:0:0:3000::1. The port of node3 which connects to node4 IP address is 2000:0:0:4000::2. Node4 is victim, its IP address is 2000:0:0:4000::1. Node4 connects with UNDPM agent. The link between node2 and node3 setting is: bandwidth 2Mb, delay 10ms, FIFO. The link between node3 and node4 setting is: bandwidth 2Mb, delay 10ms, FIFO. Set $I_{min}=800\text{Kb/s}$, $I_{max}=1.5\text{Mb/s}$, $P_{min}=0.5$. At 0.5s, cbr0 start. At 1s, cbr1 start. At 3s, cbr1 stop. At 3.5s, cbr0 stop. At 5s, finish simulation, close trace and nam files.

C. Analysis of Simulation Result

Simulation result is shown as Fig. 5.

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dpm.tr
- 1.21 1 2 cbr 500 ----- 0 1.0 4.0 42 113
r 1.21 3 4 cbr 500 ----- 2 0.0 4.0 67 102
+ 1.21 0 2 cbr 500 ----- 2 0.0 4.0 71 114
- 1.21 0 2 cbr 500 ----- 2 0.0 4.0 71 114
r 1.211 2 3 cbr 500 ----- 0 1.0 4.0 37 106 <2000:0:0:2000:0:0:0:1>
+ 1.211 3 4 cbr 500 ----- 0 1.0 4.0 37 106 <2000:0:0:2000:0:0:0:1>
- 1.211 3 4 cbr 500 ----- 0 1.0 4.0 37 106 <2000:0:0:2000:0:0:0:1>
r 1.213 3 4 cbr 500 ----- 0 1.0 4.0 35 103 <2000:0:0:2000:0:0:0:1>
r 1.214 1 2 cbr 500 ----- 0 1.0 4.0 40 110
+ 1.214 2 3 cbr 500 ----- 0 1.0 4.0 40 110 <2000:0:0:2000:0:0:0:1>
- 1.214 2 3 cbr 500 ----- 0 1.0 4.0 40 110 <2000:0:0:2000:0:0:0:1>
r 1.214 0 2 cbr 500 ----- 2 0.0 4.0 70 111
+ 1.214 2 3 cbr 500 ----- 2 0.0 4.0 70 111
+ 1.215 1 2 cbr 500 ----- 0 1.0 4.0 43 115
- 1.215 1 2 cbr 500 ----- 0 1.0 4.0 43 115
- 1.216 2 3 cbr 500 ----- 2 0.0 4.0 70 111
r 1.216 2 3 cbr 500 ----- 0 1.0 4.0 38 107 <2000:0:0:2000:0:0:0:1>
+ 1.216 3 4 cbr 500 ----- 0 1.0 4.0 38 107 <2000:0:0:2000:0:0:0:1>
- 1.216 3 4 cbr 500 ----- 0 1.0 4.0 38 107 <2000:0:0:2000:0:0:0:1>
r 1.218 2 3 cbr 500 ----- 2 0.0 4.0 69 108
+ 1.218 3 4 cbr 500 ----- 2 0.0 4.0 69 108
- 1.218 3 4 cbr 500 ----- 2 0.0 4.0 69 108
r 1.218 3 4 cbr 500 ----- 0 1.0 4.0 36 104 <2000:0:0:2000:0:0:0:1>
r 1.219 1 2 cbr 500 ----- 0 1.0 4.0 41 112
+ 1.219 2 3 cbr 500 ----- 0 1.0 4.0 41 112 <2000:0:0:2000:0:0:0:1>
- 1.219 2 3 cbr 500 ----- 0 1.0 4.0 41 112 <2000:0:0:2000:0:0:0:1>
+ 1.22 1 2 cbr 500 ----- 0 1.0 4.0 44 116

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Figure 5. Simulation trace file.

In Fig. 5, after 1.0s, attacker sends a large number of packets which made network flow exceed DPM mark threshold. Then start the mark algorithm. The algorithm marked packets send from node1 with ingress address. But it did not mark packets send from node0. The result shows that DPM algorithm based on abnormal flow can flexible mark packets and save network resources.

V. CONCLUSION

Research on DPM algorithm under IPv6 network and a modified DPM algorithm is proposed to trace DDoS attack in IPv6 in this paper. Then simulate the modified DPM algorithm, the result shows that the improved algorithm is effective in IPv6 network, can reducing the burden on edge route network. Network flow characteristics is needed for determine mark threshold and mark probability, it is

adisadvantage of this algorithm. The focus of future research is how to measure the mark threshold and mark probability.

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