9th Joint International Conference on Information Sciences (JCIS-06)

Difficulty of cooperation in iterated multi-Prisoner's Dilemma situation-Experimental evidence-

Authors
Kazuhito Ogawa 0, Tetsuya Kawamura, Tatsuya Kikutani, Sobei H. Oda
Corresponding Author
Kazuhito Ogawa
0Hiroshima City University
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DOI
https://doi.org/10.2991/jcis.2006.322How to use a DOI?
Keywords
multi-contact, experimental economics, channel reduction, cooperation induction
Abstract
Using the laboratory experiment and simple multi–Prisoner’s dilemma model, this paper explores the effect of the change in the number of contacts and in the contact (payoff) structure, and then the characteristics of the strategy that leads players to reach mutual cooperation. When the number of contacts increases from one to two, players face with the more complicated situation and their behavior may be different from the single contact. The change of payoff structure will also affect their behavior. In fact, most of the subjects under multi contact who reached mutual cooperation adopted the "channel reduction and cooperation induction" strategy and dealt with the complicated situation. This strategy is similar to the GRIT strategy used for the resolution of the diplomatic problems.
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Proceedings
9th Joint International Conference on Information Sciences (JCIS-06)
Publication Date
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ISBN
978-90-78677-01-7
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2991/jcis.2006.322How to use a DOI?
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.

Cite this article

TY  - CONF
AU  - Kazuhito Ogawa
AU  - Tetsuya Kawamura
AU  - Tatsuya Kikutani
AU  - Sobei H. Oda
PY  - NaN/NaN
DA  - NaN/NaN
TI  - Difficulty of cooperation in iterated multi-Prisoner's Dilemma situation-Experimental evidence-
BT  - 9th Joint International Conference on Information Sciences (JCIS-06)
PB  - Atlantis Press
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/jcis.2006.322
DO  - https://doi.org/10.2991/jcis.2006.322
ID  - OgawaNaN/NaN
ER  -