title: |
Difficulty of cooperation in iterated multi-Prisoner's Dilemma situation-Experimental evidence- |
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publication: |
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part of series: |
Advances in Intelligent Systems Research | |
ISBN: |
978-90-78677-01-7 | |
ISSN: |
1951-6851 | |
DOI: |
doi:10.2991/jcis.2006.322 (how to use a DOI) | |
author(s): |
Kazuhito Ogawa, Tetsuya Kawamura, Tatsuya Kikutani, Sobei H. Oda |
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corresponding author: |
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publication date: |
October 2006 |
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keywords: |
multi-contact, experimental economics, channel reduction, cooperation induction |
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abstract: |
Using the laboratory experiment and simple multi–Prisoner’s dilemma model, this paper explores the effect of the change in the number of contacts and in the contact (payoff) structure, and then the characteristics of the strategy that leads players to reach mutual cooperation. When the number of contacts increases from one to two, players face with the more complicated situation and their behavior may be different from the single contact. The change of payoff structure will also affect their behavior. In fact, most of the subjects under multi contact who reached mutual cooperation adopted the "channel reduction and cooperation induction" strategy and dealt with the complicated situation. This strategy is similar to the GRIT strategy used for the resolution of the diplomatic problems. |
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copyright: |
©
Atlantis Press. This article is distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
non-commercial use, distribution and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited. |
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full text: |