Is Top Executive Compensation Really Sticky in China
- 10.2991/emcm-15.2016.15How to use a DOI?
- Managerial power; Pay-performance Sensitivity(PPS); Executive compensation; Compensation Stickiness; Corporate governance
The current literature documents that executives are rewarded for performance increases but are not penalized to the similar extent for performance decreases, especially it seems to be supported in China more strongly. However, in contrast with current literature, we find no significant asymmetry in pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) of executives in China. Drawing on the insights of managerial power and principal-agent theory, taking the Chinese listed manufacturing companies over the year of 2011-2013 as the research sample, the paper investigates the existence of stickiness of PPS of executives at present. By adopting the method of multiple regression linear analysis based on OLS, empirical analysis has proved that though managerial power still has a negative manipulation effect on executive PPS to some degree no matter how firm performance changes, executive PPS always keeps being equivalently positive and thus the asymmetry in executive PPS has disappeared statistically for Chinese listed manufacturing companies. It can be concluded that corporate governance quality, often heavily underestimated in China by both scholars and business circles, has realized substantial improvements, and the monitoring and decision-making role of the shareholders and the board has been growing steadily. Limitations and future research focuses are provided.
- © 2016, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Changzheng Zhang AU - Yuefan Lv AU - Xin Mu PY - 2016/02 DA - 2016/02 TI - Is Top Executive Compensation Really Sticky in China BT - Proceedings of the International Conference on Electronics, Mechanics, Culture and Medicine PB - Atlantis Press SP - 72 EP - 77 SN - 2352-538X UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/emcm-15.2016.15 DO - 10.2991/emcm-15.2016.15 ID - Zhang2016/02 ER -