Effect of CEO Power on Executive Pay-Performance Sensitivity: A literature Review
- 10.2991/emim-15.2015.93How to use a DOI?
- CEO Power; Executive pay-performance sensitivity (EPPS); Manipulation Effect; Executive Compensation; Literature review
In order to reconcile the conflicting conclusions of research on the manipulation effect of CEO power on executive pay-performance sensitivity (EPPS) and further promote the research progress, the method of literature review is adopted by investigating and discussing the latest studies on this topic in detail. According to the review, as the result of interdisciplinary combination and theoretical integration, CEO power theory can actually explain the reality of low and asymmetric EPPS more effectively than traditional principal-agent theory, and the research of EPPS based on CEO power perspective should become the mainstream in this topic. Review results also show that manipulation effect of CEO power on EPPS does exist across the world. However, the strength and nature of such manipulation effect have not been recognized clearly. It is the newest trend to recognize that the manipulation effect of CEO power on EPPS is a kind of “contingent effect” instead of “absolute effect”. In the future, more scholars should discuss the critical contingent variables that can affect the relationship between CEO power and EPPS in depth, such as CEO tenure.
- © 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Changzheng Zhang AU - Zhuoqin Gao PY - 2015/04 DA - 2015/04 TI - Effect of CEO Power on Executive Pay-Performance Sensitivity: A literature Review BT - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Education, Management, Information and Medicine PB - Atlantis Press SP - 476 EP - 481 SN - 2352-5428 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/emim-15.2015.93 DO - 10.2991/emim-15.2015.93 ID - Zhang2015/04 ER -