Analysis on Environmental Pollution and Control in China Based on Game Theory

DOI

10.2991/978-94-6463-098-5_161How to use a DOI?

Keywords

game theory; environmental pollution; pollution regulation; mixed strategy

Abstract

This paper analyzes the problem of environmental pollution control in China based on game theory. The two main participants in the game are the pollutant discharge enterprises and the government, of which government is divided into central government and local government. In this passage, three different game analysis is made. First, a game between enterprises is analyzed. Then, there is a game model made between government and pollutant discharge enterprises. Companies will decide whether to control pollution or not in their own interests, and their decisions will change due to the existence of supervision. Since local governments have the right of independent management, and control part of the administrative and financial power, tax revenue need not be handed over completely to the central government. Therefore, local governments might collude with the local enterprises to evade the supervision of the central government. As a result, a third game model of enterprises, local governments, and the central government is made. Results show that when there is no government supervision, enterprises will always choose to have no pollution control. When the local governments supervise, companies will choose to control pollution. The collusion between local governments and enterprises depends on the number of fines and the cost of collusion. When fines are greater, the two parties will not collude. When costs are higher, the two parties will choose to collude.

Copyright

© 2023 The Author(s)

Open Access

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

Download article (PDF)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Jiatian Li
PY  - 2022
DA  - 2022/12/27
TI  - Analysis on Environmental Pollution and Control in China Based on Game Theory
BT  - Proceedings of the 2022 4th International Conference on Economic Management and Cultural Industry (ICEMCI 2022)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 1417
EP  - 1427
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-098-5_161
DO  - 10.2991/978-94-6463-098-5_161
ID  - Li2022
ER  -