A Study on Final Settlement Issues in EPC Projects Under the Construction Management Model
- DOI
- 10.2991/978-94-6239-602-9_17How to use a DOI?
- Keywords
- Project Management System; EPC Projects; Engineering Settlement; Game Equilibrium
- Abstract
Focusing on the issue of final settlement in EPC projects under the construction management model, settlement problems refer to abnormal situations where payments are delayed beyond the final payment deadline, from the submission of settlement documents to the confirmation of payment amounts. A tripartite evolutionary game model involving the construction entity, general contractor, and third-party cost auditor is constructed to reveal equilibrium patterns in their strategic choices. The analysis identifies “incentivized auditing—evidence reinforcement—professional anchoring” as the optimal strategy combination. Through numerical simulation, key influencing factors are analyzed to propose targeted countermeasures, driving the system toward ideal equilibrium and alleviating settlement delays.
- Copyright
- © 2026 The Author(s)
- Open Access
- Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Yue Che AU - Zhihong Qi AU - Xiaobo Xu AU - Tuojing Huang PY - 2026 DA - 2026/03/13 TI - A Study on Final Settlement Issues in EPC Projects Under the Construction Management Model BT - Proceedings of the 2025 7th International Conference on Economic Management and Model Engineering (ICEMME 2025) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 167 EP - 183 SN - 2352-5428 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6239-602-9_17 DO - 10.2991/978-94-6239-602-9_17 ID - Che2026 ER -