International Disputes of the IMF: A Review

DOI

10.2991/aebmr.k.220307.308How to use a DOI?

Keywords

IMF; Conditionality; Geopolitical; Moral Hazard

Abstract

This article mainly analyses whether its benefits outweigh its harms or whether its harms outweigh its benefits. It reviews the literature from the two aspects of conditionality and IMF’s internal defects. It concludes that from the perspective of conditionality, the conditions put forward by the IMF to a country are too rigid and not targeted. The reduction of social expenditure required by it leads to more serious social problems. Judging from the defects of the IMF itself, the IMF may be used by the government as a tool to persuade voters to a certain extent. Thus, it may indeed lead to moral hazard. The IMF’s position as both lender and supervisor makes its policies ineffective. Furthermore a large number of documents point out that the United States and the G7 do benefit from the IMF and have great power. Finally, the paper analyzes the role of IMF in avoiding default. The summary and analysis of this paper hopes to contribute to the research in this field.

Copyright

© 2022 The Authors. Published by Atlantis Press International B.V.

Open Access

This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license.

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Yiqian Zhu
PY  - 2022
DA  - 2022/03/26
TI  - International Disputes of the IMF: A Review
BT  - Proceedings of the 2022 7th International Conference on Financial Innovation and Economic Development (ICFIED 2022)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 1871
EP  - 1876
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.220307.308
DO  - 10.2991/aebmr.k.220307.308
ID  - Zhu2022
ER  -