Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference "Far East Con" (ISCFEC 2020)

Opportunity Costs, Leadership, and Cooperation in Strategic Alliances

Authors
I S Kukaev, C JF Candido, A M Makarov
Corresponding Author
I S Kukaev
Available Online 17 March 2020.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200312.342How to use a DOI?
Abstract
This paper presents a model of behaviour in strategic alliances, the iterated assurance game model with an exit option. From the literature review and the derived model, several hypotheses are proposed and then tested using Wilcoxon rank sum tests. Data was collected from self-administered questionnaires sent to emails of manufacturing firms in Russia. Results show there is no leadership effect on cooperation in dyadic alliances. Results also show that firms with high opportunity costs are more cooperative than firms with low opportunity costs. These results corroborate previous theoretical findings but challenge previous studies in laboratory experiments. They also suggest new avenues for further research on alliance partners’ behaviour.
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Volume Title
Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference "Far East Con" (ISCFEC 2020)
Series
Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research
Publication Date
17 March 2020
ISBN
978-94-6252-929-8
ISSN
2352-5428
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200312.342How to use a DOI?
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.

Cite this article

TY  - CONF
AU  - I S Kukaev
AU  - C JF Candido
AU  - A M Makarov
PY  - 2020
DA  - 2020/03/17
TI  - Opportunity Costs, Leadership, and Cooperation in Strategic Alliances
BT  - Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference "Far East Con" (ISCFEC 2020)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 2461
EP  - 2466
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200312.342
DO  - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200312.342
ID  - Kukaev2020
ER  -