Opportunity Costs, Leadership, and Cooperation in Strategic Alliances
- https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200312.342How to use a DOI?
This paper presents a model of behaviour in strategic alliances, the iterated assurance game model with an exit option. From the literature review and the derived model, several hypotheses are proposed and then tested using Wilcoxon rank sum tests. Data was collected from self-administered questionnaires sent to emails of manufacturing firms in Russia. Results show there is no leadership effect on cooperation in dyadic alliances. Results also show that firms with high opportunity costs are more cooperative than firms with low opportunity costs. These results corroborate previous theoretical findings but challenge previous studies in laboratory experiments. They also suggest new avenues for further research on alliance partners’ behaviour.
- © 2020, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - I S Kukaev AU - C JF Candido AU - A M Makarov PY - 2020 DA - 2020/03/17 TI - Opportunity Costs, Leadership, and Cooperation in Strategic Alliances BT - Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference "Far East Con" (ISCFEC 2020) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 2461 EP - 2466 SN - 2352-5428 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200312.342 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200312.342 ID - Kukaev2020 ER -