Proceedings of the 2025 3rd International Academic Conference on Management Innovation and Economic Development (MIED 2025)

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Research on the Evolutionary Game and Dynamic Equilibrium of Service Standards of Online Ride-Hailing Platforms Driven by User Complaints

Authors
Yan Chen1, *
1School of Information Management and Mathematics, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang, Jiangxi, China
*Corresponding author. Email: 2202204790@stu.jxufe.edu.cn
Corresponding Author
Yan Chen
Available Online 17 September 2025.
DOI
10.2991/978-94-6463-835-6_77How to use a DOI?
Keywords
Ride-hailing platforms; Service standards; User complaints; Evolutionary game; Simulation analysis; Cost-benefit mechanism
Abstract

The game relationship between service standards of ride-hailing platforms and user complaints profoundly impacts the sustainable development of the industry. This paper constructs a duopoly evolutionary game model to analyze the interaction mechanism between service standards and user complaints, and explores the impact of key variables on equilibrium through numerical simulation. The findings reveal that when the industry benchmark falls below user expectations, high-standard services form a "cost savings-repurchase growth" cycle by reducing complaint rates, with their effect modulated by user rights-awareness and platform response efficiency. Under the user "voting with their feet" mechanism, high-quality sensitivity and efficient complaint handling can suppress the "bad money drives out good money" phenomenon. The dynamic parameter adjustment model can identify the inflection point of marginal returns from service investment, optimizing the equilibrium path. The study provides a basis for constructing a service quality internal control system driven by user feedback, and suggests guiding high-quality equilibrium through differentiated pricing and transparent regulation.

Copyright
© 2025 The Author(s)
Open Access
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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Volume Title
Proceedings of the 2025 3rd International Academic Conference on Management Innovation and Economic Development (MIED 2025)
Series
Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research
Publication Date
17 September 2025
ISBN
978-94-6463-835-6
ISSN
2352-5428
DOI
10.2991/978-94-6463-835-6_77How to use a DOI?
Copyright
© 2025 The Author(s)
Open Access
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

Cite this article

risenwbib
TY  - CONF
AU  - Yan Chen
PY  - 2025
DA  - 2025/09/17
TI  - Research on the Evolutionary Game and Dynamic Equilibrium of Service Standards of Online Ride-Hailing Platforms Driven by User Complaints
BT  - Proceedings of the 2025 3rd International Academic Conference on Management Innovation and Economic Development (MIED 2025)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 720
EP  - 728
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-835-6_77
DO  - 10.2991/978-94-6463-835-6_77
ID  - Chen2025
ER  -