Proceedings of the 2026 3rd International Conference on Applied Economics, Management Science and Social Development (AEMSS 2026)

<Previous Article In Volume
Next Article In Volume>

Inefficient Equilibrium Traps and Mitigation Strategies in University-Industry Collaborative Talent Development: A Perspective of Incomplete Information Games

Authors
Yan Li1, 2, Jian Cui1, *, Shiyu Wang1, Pengxia Yin1, Na Yu2
1Bortala Vocational and Technical College, No. 14, Sailimu Lake Road, Bole, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, 833400, China
2Wuhan Institute of Shipbuilding Technology, No. 2, Tieqiao South Village, Yuehu Street, Hanyang District, Wuhan, Hubei, 430050, China
*Corresponding author. Email: 346158720@qq.com
Corresponding Author
Jian Cui
Available Online 12 May 2026.
DOI
10.2991/978-94-6239-672-2_58How to use a DOI?
Keywords
Incomplete Information Games; Low-Level Equilibrium Trap; School-Enterprise Cooperation
Abstract

Despite longstanding policy advocacy for school-enterprise collaboration as a cornerstone of vocational education, a persistent “low-level equilibrium” trap hinders effective talent cultivation in underdeveloped regions such as Xinjiang. This interaction results in a supply-demand mismatch, evidenced by local data showing that fewer than 20% of participating firms articulate clear competency standards with hiring promises, and employer satisfaction with graduates stands at only 87% despite a high major-related employment rate. The study conceptualizes this impasse as an outcome of incomplete information dynamic games, where both parties rationally choose suboptimal strategies based on asymmetric information and unverifiable commitments. By constructing a game-theoretic model, the paper aims to systematically analyze the formation conditions and evolutionary path of this inefficient equilibrium.

Copyright
© 2026 The Author(s)
Open Access
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

Download article (PDF)

<Previous Article In Volume
Next Article In Volume>
Volume Title
Proceedings of the 2026 3rd International Conference on Applied Economics, Management Science and Social Development (AEMSS 2026)
Series
Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research
Publication Date
12 May 2026
ISBN
978-94-6239-672-2
ISSN
2352-5428
DOI
10.2991/978-94-6239-672-2_58How to use a DOI?
Copyright
© 2026 The Author(s)
Open Access
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

Cite this article

risenwbib
TY  - CONF
AU  - Yan Li
AU  - Jian Cui
AU  - Shiyu Wang
AU  - Pengxia Yin
AU  - Na Yu
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/05/12
TI  - Inefficient Equilibrium Traps and Mitigation Strategies in University-Industry Collaborative Talent Development: A Perspective of Incomplete Information Games
BT  - Proceedings of the 2026 3rd International Conference on Applied Economics, Management Science and Social Development (AEMSS 2026)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 601
EP  - 608
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6239-672-2_58
DO  - 10.2991/978-94-6239-672-2_58
ID  - Li2026
ER  -