Doing Nothing? Carbon Abatement Decisions of Pure Monopoly Airlines under a Dynamic Aviation Carbon Tax
- DOI
- 10.2991/978-94-6239-699-9_16How to use a DOI?
- Keywords
- Carbon Abatement Technology Investment; Aviation Carbon Tax; Carbon Allowances; Monopoly Airline
- Abstract
The aviation carbon tax is a critical policy instrument for emission reductions, yet its impact on airline operations remains under explored. This study investigates the optimal capacity and abatement investment decisions of a monopolistic airline under a dynamic aviation carbon tax. By constructing and solving three models—no tax, tax without abatement, and tax with abatement—we derive equilibrium solutions revealing key insights. When initial carbon allowances are sufficient, the tax policy becomes ineffective. When allowances are scarce, the airline’s abatement level and cost become critical determinants of its optimal strategy. Interestingly, a larger market size or lower abatement cost may paradoxically reduce the airline’s tolerance for the carbon tax. Moreover, under sufficiently high tax rates, even environmentally conscious green airlines may find it optimal to abandon abatement investments altogether. This research provides theoretical contributions and practical insights for airlines in countries with low carbon regulations as they navigate increasingly stringent aviation carbon tax policies.
- Copyright
- © 2026 The Author(s)
- Open Access
- Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Lei Xu AU - Longfei Dong AU - Junwei Zhang PY - 2026 DA - 2026/06/02 TI - Doing Nothing? Carbon Abatement Decisions of Pure Monopoly Airlines under a Dynamic Aviation Carbon Tax BT - Proceedings of the 2026 4th International Conference on Digital Economy and Management Science (CDEMS 2026) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 135 EP - 144 SN - 2352-5428 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6239-699-9_16 DO - 10.2991/978-94-6239-699-9_16 ID - Xu2026 ER -