Proceedings of the 2026 4th International Conference on Digital Economy and Management Science (CDEMS 2026)

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Research on Market Game Dynamics in Low-Altitude Logistics under Subsidy Strategies

Authors
Xue-gang Shi1, Huan Liu2, *
1School of Transportation Science and Engineering, Civil Aviation University of China, Tianjin, 300300, China
2Institute of Airport Economics Research, Civil Aviation University of China, Tianjin, 300300, China
*Corresponding author. Email: 878889291@qq.com
Corresponding Author
Huan Liu
Available Online 2 June 2026.
DOI
10.2991/978-94-6239-699-9_43How to use a DOI?
Keywords
Government subsidy; R&D innovation; Low-altitude logistics; Evolutionary game theory; Consumer adoption
Abstract

The logistics industry is being significantly transformed by the sustained growth of the low-altitude economy; however, how the government can effectively strengthen its regulatory role in the low-altitude logistics market remains a pressing issue. This paper investigates the interaction mechanisms among low-altitude logistics enterprises, the government, and consumers using a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze payoff variations and equilibrium conditions under different strategy combinations. The results indicate that: an optimal interval exists for subsidy intensity, and a graduated phase-out mechanism should be adopted to achieve efficient resource allocation; penalty instruments require differentiated design to balance regulatory constraints with innovation incentives; policy resources should prioritize enterprise R&D to leverage technological innovation for demand stimulation; and the government should concentrate its efforts during the critical early window of industrial development, facilitating the market’s breakthrough past the tipping point before orderly withdrawal, thereby establishing a scientifically efficient governance model.

Copyright
© 2026 The Author(s)
Open Access
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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Volume Title
Proceedings of the 2026 4th International Conference on Digital Economy and Management Science (CDEMS 2026)
Series
Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research
Publication Date
2 June 2026
ISBN
978-94-6239-699-9
ISSN
2352-5428
DOI
10.2991/978-94-6239-699-9_43How to use a DOI?
Copyright
© 2026 The Author(s)
Open Access
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

Cite this article

risenwbib
TY  - CONF
AU  - Xue-gang Shi
AU  - Huan Liu
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/06/02
TI  - Research on Market Game Dynamics in Low-Altitude Logistics under Subsidy Strategies
BT  - Proceedings of the 2026 4th International Conference on Digital Economy and Management Science (CDEMS 2026)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 401
EP  - 410
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6239-699-9_43
DO  - 10.2991/978-94-6239-699-9_43
ID  - Shi2026
ER  -